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Abstract 
This study investigated the political role of the City Press‟ black journalists in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Taking into consideration its ownership by a white media company, the study 
investigated the role played by African cultural values in the execution of their tasks with a 
particular focus on the period 1994 to 2004. 
The interest in the role played by African cultural values in the execution of the City Press‟ 
black journalists‟ tasks, and in the issue of the newspaper‟s white ownership, was driven by 
an observation that historically, the trajectory of black newspapers was to a great extent 
influenced by the interests and values of the owners. The issue of ownership was of interest 
also because the black political elite frequently accused black journalists in South Africa of 
undermining the ANC government so as to please the white owners of the newspapers they 
worked for.  
Also, taking into consideration that the City Press played a conscious role in the struggle 
against apartheid, the study sought to investigate the role the City Press defined for its 
journalists in post-apartheid South Africa, specifically in the first decade after 1994. 
Three theoretical frameworks were deemed applicable in this study, namely Liberal-
Pluralism, Political Economy, and Afrocentric theories on the media‟s political role in 
society. The first was chosen on the basis of its theorisation on the political role of the media. 
The second was chosen on the basis of its analysis of the link between the performance of the 
media and ownership, although that is not the only issue Political Economy deals with. The 
third was chosen on the basis of its focus on African historical and cultural issues. The study 
has employed qualitative research methods, namely content analysis and interviews. It has a 
quantitative aspect in that it involved the counting of the City Press‟ editorials, columns and 
opinion pieces, as an indication of how many journalistic pieces were analysed.  
The period of this study ends in 2004 in the year that the City Press was re-launched as a 
“Distinctly African” newspaper. The “Distinctly African” concept had both cultural and 
political implications for the City Press‟ journalists. This study covers some of these aspects 
in a limited way since the research period ends in the year 2004. 
The research found that in post-apartheid South Africa, the City Press‟ black journalists‟ 
political role was to make sure that the objectives of the anti-apartheid struggle were 
achieved. It also established that the City Press‟ black journalists executed their tasks 
independently without interference from their newspaper‟s white owners. The study also 
established that some of the newspaper‟s black journalists experienced tensions between what 
they perceived as expectations of journalism and what they perceived as the prescriptions of 
African culture. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie studie het die volgende ondersoek: die politieke rol van die City Press se swart 
joernaliste in post-apartheid Suid-Afrika, die rol van Afrika-kulturele waardes in die 
uitvoering van hul taak met ‟n spesifieke fokus op die periode 1994 tot 2004, en die konteks 
van die koerant as eiendom van ‟n tradisionele wit media maatskappy.  
Die belangstelling in die rol van Afrika-kulturele waardes in die uitvoering van die taak van 
die City Press se swart joernaliste en die kwessie van die koerant se wit eienaarskap is gedryf 
deur die waarneming dat, histories, swart koerante grotendeels beïnvloed is deur die belange 
en waardes van die eienaars. Die kwessie van eienaarskap was ook van belang omdat die 
politieke elite gereeld swart joernaliste beskuldig het dat hulle die ANC-regering ondermyn 
om sodoende die wit eienaars van die publikasies vir wie hulle werk, tevrede te stel.  
In ag geneem die feit dat die City Press ‟n bewustelike rol in die struggle teen apartheid 
gespeel het, het die studie ook die rol ondersoek wat die City Press vir sy joernaliste in post-
apartheid Suid-Afrika gedefinieer het, spesifiek in die eerste dekade ná 1994. 
Drie teoretiese raamwerke is beskou as van belang vir hierdie studie, naamlik die Liberale-
Pluralisme, die Politieke Ekonomie en Afrosentriese teorieë oor die media se politieke rol in 
die samelewing. Die studie het twee kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologieë gebruik, by name 
inhoudsanalise en onderhoude. Daar was ‟n kwantitatiewe aspek deurdat die City Press se 
hoofartikels, rubrieke en meningstukke getel is as ‟n aanduiding van hoeveel stukke 
geanaliseer is. 
Die navorsing het bevind dat die City Press se swart joernaliste hul politieke rol in post-
apartheid Suid-Afrika gesien het as om onder meer seker te maak dat die doelwitte van die 
vryheidstryd bereik word. Die studie het ook vasgestel dat die City Press se swart joernaliste 
hul taak onafhanklik en sonder inmenging van die koerant se wit eienaars kon doen. Ook is 
bevind dat sommige van die koerant se swart joernaliste spanning ervaar tussen eise van die 
joernalistiek en wat hulle beskou as voorskriftelikheid van Afrika-kulturele waardes. 
Die tydperk van die studie eindig in 2004, die jaar waarin die City Press geloods is as ‟n 
“Distinctly African”-koerant. Die “Distinctly African”-konsep het beide kulturele en politieke 
implikasies vir die City Press se joernaliste. Hierdie studie dek sommige van hierdie aspekte 
in ‟n beperkte mate aangesien die navorsingstydperk in 2004 eindig. Dit word voorgestel dat 
meer navorsing gedoen word met spesifieke verwysing na die tydperk tussen 2004 en 2009, 
die volgende vyf jaar van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika. In die politieke diskoers verwys die 
swart politieke elite gereeld na Afrika-kultuur. Dit is nog ‟n aspek wat toekomstige studies 
kan ondersoek, naamlik die verhouding tussen joernalistieke waardes en praktyke aan die een 
kant, en Afrika-kultuur aan die ander. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
The period 1994 to 2004 is a significant period in the history of South Africa. That is because 
it marks the first decade of democracy since the first non-racial democratic elections were 
held on April 27, 1994. The media played a role in ushering in the democratic dispensation 
(Harber, 2004:86; Raubenheimer, 1991:102; Mazwai, 1990:203). In the struggle against 
apartheid, black journalists, in particular, believed that it was incumbent upon themselves, as 
part of the black community, to fight for the destruction of apartheid (Raubenheimer, 
1991:102). Historically, the concept “black journalism” had a generic connotation in South 
Africa. It was associated with what was referred to as the “black press” or the “black-oriented 
press” (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1989:39; 41), which was defined in terms of what Africans, 
Coloureds, and Asians read (Hachten & Giffard, 1984:133; Switzer & Switzer, 1979:1).  
While the concept of the “black press” refers to both magazines and newspapers, the focus of 
this research is specifically on the political role of black journalists who worked for a black-
oriented newspaper, the City Press, in the period 1994 to 2004. 
 
While, initially, the concept of “black journalism” in South Africa had a generic connotation, 
later, conceptually, a more political connotation developed which was influenced by the Black 
Consciousness philosophy. Black journalists, under the influence of Black Consciousness, 
asserted that they were “blacks first and journalists second” (Raubenheimer, 1991:102). This 
means that they saw themselves primarily as articulators of the black struggle.  They rejected 
the traditional concept of liberal objectivity of white English language newspapers and saw 
nothing wrong in being revolutionary propagandists (Raubenheimer, 1991:102; Hachten & 
Giffard, 1984:133). But, rejecting “objectivity” did not mean, for these journalists, twisting 
facts and distorting reality (Raubenheimer, 1991:118). Rather, because they were black, they 
felt they were bound to have a different political interpretation and social analysis from that of 
their white counterparts. The white liberal press was viewed with suspicion by black 
journalists, in that it was seen as being “pretentious” in the struggle against apartheid 
(Manganyi, 2004:111). On this point Tomaselli and Tomaselli (1989:61) argue that during the 
apartheid era, since the English press was owned by white capital, which had vested interests 
in maintaining the conditions conducive to the continued accumulation of capital based on an 
exploitative division of labour, its opposition to apartheid was structurally limited.  
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 
 
But when signs emerged that South Africa was on the path to democracy, black journalists 
saw a need to re-examine their role (Mazwai, 1990:203). Since black journalists supported the 
liberation movements during the struggle against apartheid, the question that confronted them 
was: would they be expected to continue a role of supporting the liberation movement which 
would form a government later? While the study focuses specifically on the City Press, the 
remark by the Sowetan‟s former editor, Aggrey Klaaste, contributed in stimulating interest in 
researching the role of black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa (Manganyi, 2004:112). 
Noting that the Sowetan had played “the role of flying the anti-apartheid flag…[w]ith 
liberation in 1994, the paper had to find its feet. We frankly did not know what to do next.” 
One can similarly ask: In what state did the City Press find itself considering that the Sowetan 
was confused about its role in post-apartheid South Africa? The City Press was chosen as a 
focus of study because it is a historically white-owned newspaper operated by black 
journalists, and in the light of former South African president, Nelson Mandela‟s claim that 
black journalists were used by their publications‟ owners to undermine a black government, 
as will be discussed later. 
 
Whilst the term “black” in South Africa still refers to Africans, Coloureds and Indians, this 
research‟s focus is particularly on indigenous black African journalists, the interest being in 
the role that African culture played, if at all, in the execution of the City Press‟ black 
journalists‟ political role during the research period. The concept of “blackness” in reference 
to the City Press‟ journalists in this study does not imply or assume that the subjects of this 
study subscribe to the Black Consciousness philosophy. Their ideological orientation did not 
constitute part of the interest and focus of this study. While it is acknowledged that the Black 
Consciousness philosophy had an impact on and contribution to black journalism, 
conceptually, in the context of this study, black journalism is understood in the generic sense 
– journalism practised by black African journalists irrespective of their partisan or ideological 
orientations. 
 
1.2 Preliminary Study 
Research into the history of the black press in South Africa, in the larger African continent 
and the United States, where black people were subjected to racial oppression, indicates that 
Africans (including African-Americans) were galvanised towards independence and freedom 
by the media (Ziegler & Asante, 1992:11 – 12). Ziegler and Asante further note that African-
Americans and Africans influenced one another in their use of the media. There are parallels 
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in the history of the black press between African countries (including South Africa), and the 
USA that lend credence to this. 
 
Similar to the South African situation, black journalists in countries such as Sierra Leone, 
Ghana and Nigeria, among others, used the press as a platform for the struggle against 
European colonialism (Banda, 2007:65). After independence, Hydén and Okigbo (2002:39) 
observe that while the media  
 
“had played a role of promoting democratisation in the years before 
independence, it did not take long thereafter for the same media to become 
strangled by the very masters they had helped to power”.  
 
Similarly, in South Africa, after 1994, tensions developed between the government and some 
black journalists because the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party in South 
Africa since 1994 to date, had a perception that “certain black journalists and commentators 
who criticise the ANC get promoted quicker, because the media is desperate to have these 
names on their pages, regardless of the quality of their analysis” (Calland, 2006:200).  
 
In the case of the USA, black journalists there played the same role as that of black journalists 
in South Africa in that the black press was regarded as a “fighting press” inspired by the belief 
that it was useless complaining about the way white newspapers distorted black life by over-
emphasising crime (Stevens, 1980:109). The reason that led to the establishment of 
newspapers such as Imvo Zabantsundu in South Africa, and the Freedom Journal in the USA, 
was that black people needed to speak for themselves instead of being spoken for (Wilson II 
& Gutierrez, 1995:181; Ziegler & Asante, 1992:12; Barrow Jr., 1977 – 78:118). Through the 
Freedom Journal, black journalists sought not only to plead their own cause but to establish 
their own identity in the white world (La Brie III, 1977 – 78:111). In South Africa, more than 
just reporting on events in black communities, black journalists in the apartheid era brought 
new (black) perspectives to the newsrooms (Sparks, 2003:69), challenging tendencies in the 
white-owned and white-managed media which predominantly represented the white 
population‟s Western history, culture, economic and political interests, where, to a great 
extent, the citizens were uninformed about the condition of the majority of the black 
population who lived under the apartheid rule (Fourie, 2002:20). 
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
Similar to the South African situation where at white-oriented newspapers, a moderate story 
by black standards was considered radical by white editors (Hachten & Giffard, 1984:142), in 
the USA black journalists have had to contend with the meaning of terms such as “radical” 
and “extremist” when used in reference to black revolutionaries on issues that white power 
holders mostly strongly opposed (O‟ Kelly, 1977 – 78:115).  
 
Following the abolishing of racist legislations in the USA that discriminated against black 
people, it has been observed that black journalists in the USA had lost their sweeping 
influence, with some observers noting that this was because black newspapers had ceased 
being “tough-minded” and “plugged” into their communities as they used to be in the past 
(Strader, 1995:359; 361). This means that black-oriented newspapers had ceased being both 
the moulders and mirrors of black opinion and building a sense of Black Consciousness and 
community identity among blacks in the United States (Domke, 1994:136; Wilson II & 
Gutierrez, 1995:181; Krieling, 1977 – 78:132). Similarly, in South Africa, it has been 
observed that since the emergence of the democratic dispensation the “presence of more black 
faces… in news rooms” has not resulted in more or better coverage of black reality 
(Nyamnjoh, 2005a:64). It has been observed that the black press is “less influential” in the 
democratic South Africa‟s political scene (Jacobs & Calland, 2002:12). 
 
1.3 Rationale 
The City Press newspaper was launched in 1982 under the name Golden City Press 
(Whitehead, 2007:6). The newspaper consciously played a role in the struggle against 
apartheid (Tsedu, 2007:4). Taking this fact into consideration, this researcher is interested in 
establishing the role the City Press defined for its black journalists in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and the role played by African cultural values in the execution of their task with 
particular focus on the period 1994 to 2004.  
 
While more attention will be given to the definition “culture” and “African culture” and 
consequent problems arising out of the definitions of these concepts in Chapter 4 (Theoretical 
Frameworks), for now “culture” is understood as a “product of a people‟s history”, 
embodying “a whole set of values by which a people view themselves and their place in time 
and space” (Wa Thiong‟o, 1993:42). 
 
While not suggesting that indigenous black Africans throughout the continent are 
homogeneous, Asante (2003:4) and Davidson (1994:18) allude to a “unity of culture” 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
manifested in diversities. One of the distinguishing features of African culture is its insistence 
on the prioritisation of the community over the individual (Kasoma, 1994a:27). A model of 
journalism infused with African culture would be, according to Kareithi (2005:13), that of 
“the press that…emphasizes community values over individualism”. Another distinguishing 
feature of African culture, which Moemeka and Kasoma (1994:41) refer to as “another key 
quality in African life” is “respect”. 
 
Rooney (2007:213) observes that this “respect and deference does [sic] not encourage a 
questioning attitude” on the part of the young to the community‟s elders. This is one quality 
that has been contentious in as far as journalism practice is concerned.  Wilcox (in Banda, 
2007:73) observes that although constructive criticism is located in the traditional African 
value of respect for authority, it can be argued that this value has been used as a pretext for 
disregarding the freedom of the media.  
 
It is against this background that the research is interested in the relationship between African 
culture and black journalism. Did the City Press‟ black journalists have to deal with the 
challenge to reconcile “belong[ing] to their society first” and being “journalists second” 
during the research period (Moemeka & Kasoma, 1994:40)? Therefore, in terms of this study, 
the aspect of African cultural values that will inform this study‟s research into the City Press‟ 
black journalists‟ political role, is the notion of “respect” in African culture in the context of 
journalism practice. 
 
The City Press‟ black journalists‟ political role in the period 1994 to 2004 is of research 
interest for the following reasons:  
 
 The period 1994 to 2004 marked the first decade of South Africa‟s democratic 
dispensation. 
 This decade was characterised by tensions between the media and the ANC-led 
government, whose then deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, accused the media of having 
a “European mindset” (Jacobs & Calland, 2002:12).  
 In 2001 the ANC accused the white-owned media of pushing an anti-government 
agenda (Fourie, 2002:29). In the light of this claim, the City Press is of research 
interest because it is owned by Naspers, a company that supported the National Party, 
the political party behind the apartheid government (Muller, 1989:134).  
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 The City Press is further of research interest because it is perceived as one of the 
“most influential newspapers” in political journalism in South Africa (Calland, 
2006:194 – 195). 
 
1.4 Problem Statement and Focus 
This research seeks to establish the political role that the City Press defined for its black 
journalists in post-apartheid South Africa, and the role played by African cultural values in 
the execution of their task with particular focus on the period 1994 to 2004. Taking into 
consideration the historical role played by white ownership of black-oriented newspapers, this 
research also seeks to investigate how white ownership of the City Press impacted on the 
newspapers‟ black journalists‟ execution of their tasks. The tasks refer to the newspaper‟s 
editorials, the City Press‟ individual black journalists‟ columns and the City Press‟ black 
journalists‟ opinion pieces. 
 
1.5 Research Question 
The central research question of this study is:  
 
What was the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists 
in post-1994 democratic South Africa in the period 1994 to 2004 within the 
context of African culture and white ownership?  
 
The central research question will help answer and give clarity to the sub-questions, which are 
the same questions that constitute the interview questions attached as Addendum A. 
 
Interviews and content analysis are employed in this study as a method of investigation. This 
will be discussed in section 1.7 and extensively in Chapter 5. 
 
Bennett (1982b:294) observes that to speak of the political role of the media is not an abstract 
undertaking. He argues that this can be done only through a study of the role played by the 
media in concrete, historically determined political conjunctures. To study these, it is 
necessary to deal not only with the media but the political issues at stake in those 
conjunctures.  In post-apartheid South Africa, political analysts (Calland, 2006:190 – 191; 
Sparks, 2003:85; Jacobs & Calland, 2002:2 – 4) have identified crime, the Zimbabwean crisis 
and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and how the former South African president Thabo Mbeki 
handled the latter two issues, as major political issues during the period 1994 to 2004. 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
 
Against this background, this researcher has selected and studied the City Press‟ editorials, 
the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces specifically dealing with crime, 
the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS. Editorials refer to statements and views expressed on 
behalf of a publication. Columns refer to journalists‟ or other experts‟ opinion pieces that 
appear on a regular basis (daily, weekly, bi-weekly or monthly). Opinion pieces refer to 
individual or shared journalists‟ or other writers‟ writings that do not appear on a regular 
basis. 
 
The choice of editorials is informed by the observation that they serve as guidelines to 
publications‟ norms (Breed, 1997:109; Bennett, 1982b:303). This assertion is not the same as 
suggesting that publications‟ editorials represent the views of all journalists working at a 
particular publication. Rather, one can state that regardless of the existent heterogeneity, the 
editorial represents an official view which is not necessarily a collective view of a 
publication‟s staff. The choice of columns and opinion pieces by the City Press‟ black 
journalists is informed by the same observation made by Breed (1997:109) and Bennett 
(1982b:303) about editorials, the difference with the columns and opinion pieces being that in 
the latter cases they serve as guidelines to individual black journalists‟ perspectives on issues. 
 
This study seeks to investigate the political role of the City Press‟ black journalists by, asking 
them whether they had consciously defined such for themselves. For this the interview 
method was employed. Some questions specifically sought to find out from the City Press‟ 
black journalists how they dealt with specific political issues identified during the research 
period. Combining the interviews and content analysis (studying the editorials, columns and 
opionion pieces that dealt with the identified political issues of the day during the research 
period) was informed by a view that it would be inadequate simply to rely on the 
interviewees‟ responses without actually examining what they wrote. Therefore, this study, in 
investigating the political role of the City Press‟ black journalists, sought to investigate the 
political role they defined for themselves (through interviews), and whether or not they 
succeeded in accomplishing such (through content analysis). The combined use of these two 
research methods, together with the relevant literature review helped in enabling the 
researcher to assess whether or not there was consistency in what was written by the City 
Press‟ black journalists and what they said during the interview sessions. 
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In the Research Methodogy Chapter (Chapter 5), this researcher points out that crime, the 
Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS have been identified as three of the major political 
challenges in post-apartheid South Africa. It would be expected, therefore, that if in the 
interview questions the research inquired about the City Press‟ stance on the Zimbabwean 
crisis and HIV and AIDS, the issue of crime should arise as well in the interviews. This is not 
the case, because, firstly, the last two questions about Zimbabwe and HIV and AIDS were not 
initially, part of the interview questions. They were added after the researcher, analysing the 
City Press‟ editorials, realised that the stance of the City Press on Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS 
appeared to be inconsistent and self-contradictory. With this realisation the researcher decided 
to add the last two questions to the interview questions to establish why there was 
inconsistency. On the issue of crime, the City Press‟ editorials were consistent and clear. That 
explains why there is no question in the interview questions asking about the City Press‟ 
position on the issue of crime. 
 
1.6 Theoretical Points of Departure 
The subject of this research – the political role of black journalists in South Africa from 1994 
to 2004: the case of the City Press – will be analysed according to the Liberal-Pluralist, 
Political Economy and Afrocentric theories on the media‟s role in society. These will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
1.7 Research Design and Methodology 
In seeking to investigate the political role of the City Press‟ black journalists, this study did 
not to seek to prove any hypothesis. A hypothesis is a statement about how concepts relate 
and are “likely to arise during line-by-line analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:68). According 
to Strauss and Corbin, a hypothesis is a statement that asserts that “[u]nder such a condition, 
such and such will happen or this and that outcome will occur”. A hypothesis is a “conjectural 
statement or assertion about the relation between two or more properties” (Gobo, 2007:418). 
It is, according to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996:62), a “tentative answer to a 
research problem”. Similarly, Punch (1998:39) defines a hypothesis as a “predicted answer to 
a research question”.  
 
This study did not depart from a premise of a tentative or predicted answer. Rather, this study 
has sought to establish what its subjects have defined for themselves what their political role 
was during the research period. Hypotheses are generally associated with the quantitative 
research methodology because such studies are interested in “predicting and controlling 
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numbers” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006:11). In qualitative research participants are the 
“origin” of the data, and are the ones who “to a large extent influence where the emphasis will 
be placed during data collection” (Hesse-Biber, 2006:7). This is not the same as saying that 
there are no hypotheses in qualitative research. Rather, as Silverman (2005:99) notes “[i]n 
many qualitative research studies, there is no specific hypothesis at the outset. Instead, 
hypotheses are produced (or induced) during the early stages of research.”  
 
To achieve the objective of researching the political role that the City Press defined for its 
black journalists in the period 1994 to 2004, the research design chosen is a case study. The 
methodology chosen is, to a large extent, the qualitative research methodology, and to a little 
extent, involved counting. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
The spelling style according to which this thesis is written, is South African English. Where a 
source is quoted directly, and the spelling style is different, the source‟s style is adhered to. 
The same applies to, for example, titles that will be in italics, except where a source did not 
write them in italics. The acronyms HIV and AIDS are written in capital letters, except where 
a source writes them differently. 
 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
This thesis will be presented according to the following outline:  
 
Chapter 2 – Context: Developments in the History of Black Journalism in South Africa 
– this chapter discusses the major events in the history of black journalism that had political 
significance in the history of South Africa before and after the emergence of the democratic 
dispensation in 1994 to provide the necessary context or foundation for this study. 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review – this chapter reviews literature focusing on the political role 
of the media in general, and black journalism in particular. 
Chapter 4 – Theoretical Frameworks – this chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks 
chosen for this study and the reasons for their choice.  
Chapter 5 – Research Design and Methodology – this chapter discusses the research design 
and methods believed to be best suitable to achieve the objectives of this research. 
Chapter 6 – Research Findings – this chapter tables findings based on the City Press‟ 
editorials and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces. 
Chapter 7 – Data Analysis 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion and Recommendations. 
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1.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the research topic, discussed the rationale for the study, explained the 
problem statement and focus and formulated a central research question and sub-questions. 
The applicable theories and methodologies were introduced and, finally, a chapter outline was 
provided. 
 
The next chapter discusses developments in the history of black journalism in South Africa.  
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Chapter 2 
Context: Developments in the History of Black Journalism in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is not a comprehensive history of black journalism in South Africa, but captures 
certain developments in the history of black journalism in South Africa. While some black 
newspapers that will be mentioned below are now defunct, there are two newspapers which 
operated during apartheid which survived to present – the City Press and the Sowetan.  
Special attention will be given to these newspapers, firstly, because of their survival; 
secondly, much has been written about them; thirdly, they played a significant role in the 
history of journalism opposing apartheid; and fourthly, the City Press in particular is the focus 
of this research. The New Nation, a newspaper run by blacks, which was established in 1986 
and folded in 1997 (Tomaselli, 2000:378; 381) does not receive the same treatment accorded 
to the City Press and the Sowetan. That is because though the New Nation was staffed by 
black journalists, it targeted “a multiracial, mainly urban-based, trade union readership”. The 
focus of this research is on newspapers whose product was by black journalists and targeted 
specifically to a black readership. 
Attention is given to the formation of journalists‟ organisations formed after 1994 in which 
black journalists participated as members and the role these organisations played during the 
research period. The organisations are the South African National Editors‟ Forum (SANEF) 
and the Forum of Black Journalists (FBJ). The formation of the FBJ in 1997, an organisation 
whose membership is exclusively black, three years after the democratic elections, is 
significant for this study. It reveals that even after a non-racial order was ushered in in 1994, 
black journalists still believed that there were issues that affected them as blacks and needed 
to be confronted as such. As will be shown in this narrative, the evolution of SANEF revealed 
that black journalists within a non-racial organisation operated as a black block at a particular 
juncture. These developments within both the FBJ and SANEF are significant for this study.    
Attention is also given to important events such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) and the South African Human Rights Commission‟s (SAHRC) hearings into claims 
about racism in the media. An examination of the TRC hearings gives insight into the 
experiences of black journalists in the apartheid era and exposes the constraints they 
experienced during that period. The SAHRC hearings revealed that even in post-apartheid 
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South Africa black journalists felt that white journalists carried out their duties in a way that 
suggested that their judgment was clouded by racial attitudes. 
The history of black journalism in South Africa has gone through five phases (Wigston, 
2007:36; Diederichs & de Beer, 1998:90; Johnson, 1991:16; Switzer & Switzer, 1979:4). The 
phases are: The missionary-owned black newspapers‟ phase, the black-owned newspapers‟ 
phase, the white capital phase, the multi-racial phase and the black empowerment phase. 
These phases are discussed because they reveal the role that ownership patterns played in the 
trajectory of black journalism in South Africa before and after the demise of apartheid. 
2.2 First Phase – Missionary Beginnings: 1830s – 1880s 
The first newspaper published by the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary was Umshumayeli 
Wendaba, which was published in isiXhosa between July 1837 and April 1841, in 
Grahamstown and later in Peddie – both towns being in the Eastern Cape (Switzer & Switzer, 
1979:1). In 1862, another publication, Indaba, was published in isiXhosa and English by the 
Glasgow Missionary Society, a Presbyterian mission at Lovedale, between August 1862 and 
February 1865. In January 1876, the Presbyterians, through the Lovedale Mission Press, 
published yet another newspaper, Isigidimi SamaXosa. This was the first African newspaper 
edited by Africans in Southern Africa (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:3).  
 
Under the editorship – from 1881 to 1884 – of John Tengo Jabavu, and William Wellington 
Gqoba from 1884 to 1888, the newspaper‟s content reflected an emphasis on news of general 
interest to an African audience, including political news and opinion (Switzer & Switzer, 
1979:3). Isigidimi SamaXosa, during both the tenures of Jabavu and Gqoba, was used to 
“express…views on what [was] considered to be the black man‟s1 point of view” (Johnson, 
1991:16). 
 
While these publications served the interests of the Africans, Johnson (1991:16) observes that 
the “influence of the missions on black journalism cannot be overemphasised”. The 
implication here is that not only were the missionaries the suppliers of the skills and technical 
tools of journalism, but under their influence progress for Africans was defined in terms of the 
assimilation of Western civilisation, and as such, the black newspapers reflected this 
                                                 
1 During this time and much later, including the period of the Black Consciousness Movement 
activities, the term “man” was used in a gender-insensitive way as if women were not part of 
and participating in the struggle. 
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conception. What this means is that the missionary-owned newspapers promoted a 
Eurocentric interpretation of Christianity which denounced African traditional spirituality.  
 
This had the effect of undermining African cultural traditions which resulted in the 
denudation of cultural confidence among black Africans (Rukuni, 2007:146; Biko, 2005:76; 
Mbennah, Hooyberg & Mersham, 1998:20; Prah, 1995:54). The emphasis on, and the 
elevation of Christian values at the expense of African indigenous values by the missionary-
owned publications, conflicted with African traditionalists who upheld their African values. 
This paved the way for Africans breaking away from missionary control, leading to the 
second phase of black journalism. 
 
2.3 Second Phase – Black-Owned Press: 1880s – 1920s 
Prominent in this phase was John Tengo Jabavu who made a significant break from mission 
control when he established in November 1884 Imvo Zabantsundu, the first black-owned and 
controlled newspaper in South Africa (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:4). While Imvo Zabantsundu 
was black-owned and controlled, its financial support came from Jabavu‟s white liberal 
friends, Messrs James Weir and RW Rose-Innes (Ndletyana, 2008:35). Imvo Zabantsundu‟s 
objective was “to inform the African population about public issues, and promote their 
participation in the electoral process” (Ndletyana, 2008:35). 
 
The newspaper quickly became the most influential organ of African opinion in the Cape 
colony. Imvo Zabantsundu‟s growing influence gave birth to “competition” that was 
“resented” by Isigidimi SamaXosa, which Jabavu previously edited (Johnson, 1991:17). 
Under the editorship of Jabavu, Imvo Zabantsundu advocated the principles of non-violence 
and the necessity of working together with liberal whites in order to try to reform white 
domination in South Africa (Johnson, 1991:17 – 18). 
 
Within thirteen years of its establishment, Jabavu‟s newspaper‟s claim of being representative 
of the “African Opinion” was challenged. In 1897, a new newspaper, Izwi Labantu, was 
established by Walter Benson Rubusana in the Eastern Cape (Ngqongqo, 2008:48).  The 
newspaper was aimed at giving a clear and independent African  voice as opposed to Jabavu‟s 
Imvo Zabantsundu that was perceived to be guided by Jabavu‟s white liberal friends 
(Ngqongqo, 2008:50; 54). Rubusana‟s journalistic involvement began when he started writing 
for Isigidimi SamaXosa and the Christian Express (Ngqongqo, 2008:48). At the time he was 
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simultaneously acting as an agent for Jabavu‟s newspaper, Imvo Zabantsundu, by 
corresponding for and selling the newspaper.  
 
Political differences between Jabavu, on the one hand, and, on the other, Rubusana and a host 
of other African leaders emerged when Jabavu supported liberal politicians known as 
“Friends of the Natives” who supported legislation that introduced restrictions designed to 
limit the number of eligible African voters (Ngqongqo, 2008:48). Rubusana and his peers felt 
betrayed by Jabavu‟s support for the “Friends of the Natives”.  According to Ngqongqo they 
attributed his support for the “Friends of the Natives” to his indebtedness to white liberals for 
having financed his newspaper. 
 
While the founders of Izwi Labantu, including Rubusana, supported and participated in the 
initiatives that led to the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC – 
later renamed the African National Congress [ANC]) in 1912, Imvo Zabantsundu‟s Jabavu 
refused to associate himself with the SANNC, his objection being that the SANNC was 
racially exclusive (Ndletyana, 2008:39). Instead, Jabavu formed his own non-racial 
organisation, the South African Races Congress. 
 
The issue about the restrictions designed to limit the number of eligible African voters 
(Ngqongqo, 2008:48) was not the only point about which Imvo Zabantsundu found itself in 
conflict with the African elite and fellow African journalists. The newspaper‟s support for the 
Grobler-Sauer Bill, which eventually became the Land Act of 1913, generated an acrimonious 
exchange between Jabavu and Solomon (Sol) Plaatjie, a journalist and founding member of 
the ANC (Ndletyana, 2008:39). Jabavu reported that a meeting of Africans in King William‟s 
Town was in favour of the Grobler-Sauer Bill, a claim that was vigorously contested by 
Plaatjie.  
 
Consequently, Plaatjie challenged Imvo Zabantsundu‟s Jabavu to call a series of three public 
meetings, anywhere in the district of King William‟s Town, to put Jabavu‟s claim to the test 
(Ndletyana, 2008:40). Jabavu responded in the negative to Plaatjie‟s challenge, provoking the 
latter to declare that Jabavu was “fabricating the mess out of imaginary native votes of 
confidence for his masters‟ delectation…because his paper is native only in language”. In 
today‟s language, one can state that Plaatjie was calling Jabavu a “coconut” – black outside 
and white inside. 
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Besides Imvo Zabantsundu and Izwi Labantu, there were other black newspapers that were 
established. Koranta ya Becoana, a Tswana/English weekly, was founded by Silas Molema 
and Solomon Plaatjie (mentioned above) in 1901 but folded “within a few years of its 
establishment” due to lack of finance and low readership (Johnson, 1991:18). In 1903, John 
Langalibalele Dube founded Ilanga laseNatal, a Zulu/English weekly which became 
politically involved, but cautiously so, projecting an image of “responsibility” and 
“moderation” (Johnson, 1991:18). 
 
Another significant event in this period under discussion was the move by the ANC to 
establish its own mouthpiece, Abantu-Batho, in 1913 (Johnson, 1991:19). While black 
newspapers took political positions that sometimes conflicted, as pointed out above, Abantu-
Batho clearly articulated the concerns of the ANC. After seven years of its existence, Abantu-
Batho faced a serious threat from another newspaper, Umteteli Wa Bantu, that was established 
by the Chamber of Mines in 1920 (Johnson, 1991:20).  
 
Due to its economic muscle, Umteteli Wa Bantu drew talented journalists away from Abantu-
Batho. Umteteli Wa Bantu sought to “defuse native passions” aroused by the “miners‟ 
passions” reflected in such newspapers as Abantu-Batho. Its wide and free distribution, 
combined with its capturing of talented black journalists, posed a threat to black-owned 
newspapers (Johnson, 1991:20). This new development set the stage for the next stage of 
black journalism: black newspapers‟ ownership by white business. 
 
2.4 Third Phase: Black Newspapers, White Capital: 1931 – 1977 
The establishment of the Bantu Press (Pty) Ltd in 1932 by Bertram F.G. Paver, an ex-farmer 
and itinerant salesman, marked the third entry of the third phase in black journalism (Switzer 
& Switzer, 1979:7). Through the Bantu Press, Paver founded the Bantu World in April 1932 
with the objective to “provide the Native people with a platform for fair comment and the 
presentation of their needs and aspirations”. In this venture Paver attracted black investors 
amongst whom was Richard V. Selope Thema, a veteran black journalist.  
 
Due to a lack of sufficient capital, 14 months after its establishment, the Bantu Press was 
taken over by the Argus Printing and Publishing Company (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:7). 
Paver‟s efforts of attracting black investors which numbered half of 38 shareholders before 
the takeover by the Argus company were reversed within three years of the takeover. Thema, 
the last African on the board, was ousted as a director in 1936 (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:7). 
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Not only did changes reflect in the make-up of personnel. This phase saw a change in the 
style of black journalism. Black journalists were gradually weaned away from the colourful, 
rhetorical style of the older, protest press, and made “to conform to the more prosaic, non-
partisan „objective‟ prose style of modern conventional journalism” (Switzer & Switzer, 
1979:8). News and opinion were separated, and focus was on event-oriented rather than issue-
oriented news. In 1954 the Bantu World became a bi-weekly and was renamed the World 
(Switzer & Switzer, 1979:10). During this period one-third interest in the Bantu Press 
(Switzer & Switzer, 1979:9) belonged to the Anglo-American Corporation which had bought 
its share in 1952. But in 1962 the Argus Company once more regained formal control over the 
Bantu Press. 
 
Coinciding with the third phase of black journalism was the rise of political consciousness in 
South Africa in the late 1960s in the form of the Black Consciousness philosophy which was 
spearheaded by Bantu Steve Biko. In 1972 black journalists formed the Union of Black 
Journalists (UBJ) whose bulk membership worked at the World newspaper (Raubenheimer, 
1991:95; Hachten & Giffard, 1984:139). The thinking and approach of the UBJ was 
influenced by Biko‟s Black Consciousness creed. 
 
Biko (2005:53) defined Black Consciousness as  
 
“the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his 
brothers2 around the cause of their operation – the blackness of their skin – and 
to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them 
to perpetual servitude”.  
 
Biko further pointed out that Black Consciousness sought to demonstrate the lie that “black” 
is an aberration from the “normal” – which is white. The Black Consciousness creed went 
beyond pigmentation in its consideration of blackness. In the case of the Black Consciousness 
Movement, “being black is a reflection of a mental attitude” (Biko, 2005:52). Biko 
emphasised that the term black was not “all-inclusive”, the point made being that the “the fact 
[that] we are all not white does not necessarily mean that we are all black”. In Biko‟s book, 
                                                 
2 This is the point made earlier about the gender-insensitive use of language in liberation 
politics. Here, Biko speaks about “brothers” to the exclusion of “sisters”, yet there were 
women, like Mamphele Ramphele, in the forefront of the Black Consciousness Movement. 
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being “black” was not synonymous with being “non-whites”. Non-whites, according to Biko 
(2005:52) were those whose aspirations were whiteness but whose pigmentation made such 
attainment impossible.  
 
Biko (2005:52) further observed that by  
 
“[m]erely describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards 
emancipation, you have committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek 
to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you as being subservient”. 
 
 The Black Consciousness creed, therefore, was a call to black people to be active agents 
against their oppression. The activism of the UBJ needs to be understood against this 
background. 
 
While the birth of the UBJ was greeted with enthusiasm by young black journalists, some of 
the older journalists – among them Leslie Sethume and M Maswai, both working at the World 
– were not happy with this new development (Raubenheimer, 1991:95). They objected to its 
racial exclusiveness – only black journalists were allowed to join the UBJ.  
 
The UBJ went on to develop political and organisational links with Black Consciousness-
oriented movements like the South African Students‟ Organisation (SASO) and the Black 
People‟s Convention (BPC). This direction was not acceptable to some black journalists who 
argued that black journalists should focus purely on professional matters (Raubenheimer, 
1991:98). The view that prevailed was that black journalists “had a role to play in making 
newspapers more relevant to black people”. At one UBJ congress a motion that the term 
“black” be dropped from the UBJ‟s constitution was “heavily defeated”. This position was 
informed by a strong belief by UBJ members that they were “blacks first and journalists 
second” (Raubenheimer, 1991:102). What this meant was that these journalists saw their duty 
as giving loyalty to their community first, and then their profession. 
 
With the rise of black militancy within the black communities, led by the Black 
Consciousness Movement, in the seventies, although not actively supporting black political 
aims, the World broke “out of the straitjacket of non-political, pseudo-news sensationalism 
placed on it by the Argus Company” (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:18). It embarked on reporting 
concerns and problems of urban blacks, especially those living in Soweto (Hachten & Giffard, 
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1984:149). With the appointment of Percy Qoboza as editor of both the World and Weekend 
World in 1976, the World took a step further than just reporting blacks‟ concerns – it went on 
to “identify with the urban African and reflected his or her fears, hopes, and frustrations” 
(Hachten & Giffard, 1984:136). This stance did not go unnoticed by the government of the 
day.  
 
The then Justice Minister Jimmy Kruger warned Qoboza several times to tone down the 
newspaper‟s coverage, but Qoboza ignored the warnings (Hachten & Giffard, 1984:135). 
When on October 19, 1977, the government banned 17 Black Consciousness organisations, 
the World and Weekend World were also banned, and Qoboza, together with his news editor, 
Aggrey Klaaste, were detained for “contributing to a subversive situation” (Hachten & 
Giffard, 1984:135). After the banning of the World in 1977, Thloloe (2006:15) observes that 
the World 
 
“rose from the ashes as Post Transvaal – same journalists still led by the same 
Percy and pushing the same agenda. And when the government shut down Post 
Transvaal in 1981, it resurfaced as Sowetan”.  
 
The Sowetan, which will be discussed next, carried the anti-apartheid tradition of its 
predecessors. 
 
2.4.1 The launch of the Sowetan 
The Sowetan was launched on February 2, 1981, with Joe Letakgomo as its first editor 
(Molefe, 2001:16). From its inception, the newspaper “plunged head-long into the pertinent 
issues affecting the black community it sought to serve” (Molefe, 2001:16). Within a few 
years of its launch, the country was thrown into a political turmoil that was characterised by 
state violence on black communities and violence within the black communities themselves. 
As a newspaper reporting on these issues, the Sowetan found itself on the receiving end. The 
government, under the presidency of Pieter Willem Botha, imposed a state of emergency in 
1985 and renewed it in 1986. Under the emergency rules, newspapers were not allowed at the 
scenes of unrest and to report on these (Molefe, 2001:16). 
 
In protest against these measures, the Sowetan left blank spaces where pictures of unrest were 
supposed to be placed and some sentences hanging, and wrote explanations to its readership 
that the material was censored as to comply with emergency regulations (Molefe, 2001:16). 
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The government was not happy with the Sowetan‟s stance and sent senior police officers to 
the newspaper‟s offices to express the government‟s displeasure at what was perceived as a 
“mockery of the law” (Molefe, 2001:16). Copies of the newspaper were seized by the 
government twice shortly after the declaration of the state of emergency in June 1986 
(Tomaselli, 2000:386). 
 
Not only did the Sowetan suffer from state repression, but it also came under pressure from 
black political organisations (Mazwai, 1990:207). As the struggle against apartheid 
intensified, the Sowetan journalists were called upon to “ignore news concerning certain 
organisations while highlighting those of others” (Mazwai, 1990:207). Secondly, they were 
expected to publish the atrocities of the one and ignore those of the other when black political 
organisations were killing one another‟s members. This resulted in the Sowetan‟s journalists 
refraining from quoting names of organisations when one member of one organisation was 
killed by a member of another (Mazwai, 1990:209). Lastly, the Sowetan‟s criticism of what 
was called “necklacing” (the method of killing those suspected of being informers/sell-outs by 
putting tyres around their necks and setting them alight) by ANC supporters, did not go down 
well with those who came under criticism (Mazwai, 1990:207).   
 
In reaction, the Sowetan was accused of being anti-ANC, a charge denied by the Sowetan‟s 
former Business Section editor, Thami Mazwai (Mazwai, 1990:207). According to Mazwai 
(1990:207), the Sowetan had “never been anti-ANC”. Instead, Mazwai further points out, the 
Sowetan had supporters of the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM) on its staff. Tomaselli (2000:387) observes that though the 
Sowetan covered the activities of both the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Black 
Consciousness-aligned organisations, “its editorials clearly revealed a BC position”.  
 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) called for the boycott of the 
Sowetan and placard-wielding affiliates marched to the newspaper‟s headquarters (Molefe, 
2001:16). Trucks carrying copies of the Sowetan “were barred from entering one or two 
townships” (Mazwai, 1990:207). At one funeral in Soweto, a group of youngsters “all armed 
to the teeth and carrying the „trusted tyre‟, came looking for any reporter from the Sowetan” 
(Mazwai, 1990:208). However, pressures on the Sowetan did not come from only pro-ANC 
organisations, but also from the PAC and the BCM supporters as well (Mazwai, 1990:209). 
These setbacks did not, however, deter the Sowetan from its determination to be involved in 
solving black people‟s problems. 
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When Aggrey Klaaste succeeded Letakgomo and assumed editorship in 1988, he launched the 
newspaper‟s new campaign known as “Nation Building”. In the words of Tissong (2001:15), 
who was a Sowetan journalist at the time, the Nation Building concept defined Sowetan as 
“more than a newspaper carrying news”, and more of a newspaper dedicated to uplifting the 
South African society from the devastating legacy of apartheid. The Nation Building project 
entailed writing stories about people who were doing things to help the community (Tsedu, 
2004a:4).  
 
Black professionals such as psychologists and career guidance experts were called upon to be 
part of the project by holding symposiums around the country helping people to deal with 
issues from alcoholism and drugs to teenage problems and search for jobs (Tsedu, 2004a:4). 
Through the Nation Building project, Klaaste “wanted to disprove the notion that townships 
were all about gore and blood”.  
 
While the idea was welcomed by some, other journalists felt that Klaaste‟s approach was “too 
tame”, and preferred an approach that would inspire them “to toyi-toyi and fight” (Tissong, 
2001:15). The dissenters felt that “the demands of the revolution were not to rebuild but to 
destroy the structures of the regime of the time” (Tsedu, 2004a:4). Outside the Sowetan staff, 
some black community organisations responded with a dismissive attitude to the Nation 
Building concept. While the Azanian People‟s Organisation (Azapo) “denounced it as 
unrevolutionary and part of the liberal agenda” the United Democratic Front (UDF) treated it 
with disdain (Mazwai, 2004:17). For its part, the security police viewed the project with deep 
suspicion (Mazwai, 2004:17). Just over a year after the Sowetan was launched, another black-
oriented newspaper, the City Press, which played an anti-apartheid role, was launched.  
 
2.4.2 The launch of the City Press 
The City Press was established as a Friday weekly on March 28, 1982, originally under the 
name Golden City Press (Whitehead, 2007:6). It was initially owned jointly by the South 
African Associated Newspapers (SAAN) and Jim Bailey, the publisher of Drum magazine 
(Hachten & Giffard, 1984:132; Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1989:49). In December 1982 the two 
joint owners split up, and Bailey continued as the sole proprietor, with the name City Press. 
The newspaper‟s first editor was a white man, Phillip Selwyn-Smith (Whitehead, 2007:6). A 
year later, in 1983, Selwyn-Smith was succeeded by Percy Qoboza, a position he held until 
his death in 1988. 
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From its inception, the City Press was greeted with expectations by the black people it sought 
to serve. Anti-apartheid campaigner Archbishop Desmond Tutu “expressed the hope that City 
Press would interpret reality as blacks know it and express their aspirations” (Mbhele, 
2003:8). In response to such calls, the newspaper identified itself with the struggle of the 
oppressed by positioning itself as “the voice of the voteless masses” in South Africa (Sibiya, 
1992:1).  
 
It “fought for the poor and the underdog” and “fearlessly” took up cudgels against 
governments, the military and the police when it warranted it, as well as “exposing those who 
made themselves wealthy at the expense of the poor and gullible” (Blow, 1992:6). The City 
Press‟ participation in the anti-apartheid struggle was not just about striving “to promote the 
aims of blacks in order to create a just society, but our front page could easily be transformed 
into a protest poster” (Mngadi, 1992:7).  
 
For taking this stance the newspaper was “harassed, threatened with censorship and on 
numerous occasions…faced closure by the authorities” (Sibiya, 1992:1). But the support for 
the struggle did not mean, for the City Press, alignment to any black liberation movement. 
The newspaper “chose the only winning strategy for any newspaper that means business – and 
that is political independence, non-alignment, objectivity and a studious refusal to be turned 
into a party-political rag” (Dhlomo, 1992:7). A year after Qoboza assumed the reigns as 
editor, the newspaper changed hands in ownership. The then Nasionale Pers (now Naspers) 
bought the newspaper from Bailey in 1984 (Kudlak, 2007:153).  
 
The takeover was received with “apprehension by most of the surprised staffers” (Kalane, 
1992:4). Naspers, a historically “pro-government Afrikaans press group” (Kudlak, 2007:153) 
and “a militant black newspaper and Percy Qoboza as its associate editor, nogal…made 
strange bedfellows” (Kalane, 1992:4). Many “eyebrows were raised” and observers were 
“startled” by this “unlikely association of black and Afrikaner” (Vosloo, 2003:2; Vosloo, 
1997:3). Some staffers “muttered that Afrikaner ownership of a newspaper for black people 
would put the final nail in the coffin” (Selwyn-Smith, 1997:6). As a result of the apprehension 
felt by the staff, a meeting between Naspers and the staff was held “to seek clarification on 
matters that deeply affect[ed] us and our readership” (Qoboza, 1992:2).  
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The meeting resolved that black journalists working at the City Press “will maintain our 
highest journalistic integrity and interpret our people‟s aspirations the way they expect us to” 
(Qoboza, 1992:2). This stance reflected the City Press‟ black journalists‟ determination “to 
reflect the aspirations of black people at all costs” (Sibiya, 1997a:1). It was also agreed that 
the City Press‟ journalists would enjoy “the same degree of freedom of expression they have 
enjoyed over the years” (Qoboza, 1992:2). To this effect a charter guaranteeing these 
agreements was signed by Naspers (Qoboza, 1992:2). According to Vosloo (1997:3), despite 
the upheavals that greeted the partnership between black journalists and Naspers, the 
professional partnership endured and grew stronger. The newspaper‟s editorial integrity and 
independence were upheld (Vosloo, 1997:3).  
 
While this may have been the case, it appears that Naspers did make an attempt to interfere 
with the City Press‟ black journalists‟ execution of their task (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 
1989:57). According to Tomaselli and Tomaselli, in 1985 a “managerial directive from 
Nasionale Pers to the editorial staff of City Press a few weeks before the declaration of the 
state of emergency…instructed that unrest reporting had to be reduced by 50 per cent”. 
However, Tomaselli and Tomaselli further observe that a “content analysis of the paper at the 
time suggests…that this instruction was largely ignored by the editor and staffers”. 
 
An examination of political developments in South Africa, particularly in Afrikaner politics, 
offers an insight into Naspers‟ approach to the City Press and its black journalists. In 1982, 
the then ruling party, the National Party (NP), experienced a split when the then leader of the 
then Transvaal NP, Dr A Treurnicht, led 21 Members of Parliament to give a vote of no-
confidence to the then state president, Pieter Willem Botha (Muller, 1989:134). Treurnicht, 
who represented the conservative elements within the NP, went on to form the Conservative 
Party (CP), and was opposed to Botha‟s move to take the party on the path towards reforming 
apartheid in South Africa. At that time the NP had the support of both Afrikaner media 
companies, Perskorporasie van Suid Afrika (Perskor) and Nasionale Pers (Naspers).  
 
The divisions within the NP were characterised by the then Transvaal conservative element 
and the liberal Cape element. To a large degree – which saw vacillation on its part, Perskor 
was sympathetic to the conservative element in the NP, while Naspers was pro the liberal 
element (Muller, 1989:131 – 132). So, when Naspers acquired the City Press, it was 
decidedly in favour of the NP programme to gradually do away with apartheid, and in that 
sense a newspaper whose journalists were opposed to apartheid was not inimical to the 
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objectives of Naspers. More discussion on the City Press will follow later in this chapter 
(2.7). For now, attention will be given to the fourth phase of black journalism. 
 
2.5 The Fourth Phase: The Multi-Racial Focus: 1980 – 1996 
This phase of black journalism refers to a trend where in the mid-1960s the white press found 
itself increasingly dependent for economic survival on the cultivation of its own black 
readers, even though it already owned and controlled the black press (Wigston, 2007:40; 
Switzer & Switzer, 1979:14). This new trajectory was an outcome of a survey conducted in 
South Africa that “revealed the growing dependency of the English-language White press on 
its black audience” (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:14 – 15). Consequently, the white media owners 
sought to acquire a multi-racial image (Switzer & Switzer, 1979:15). Switzer and Switzer 
(1979:16) identify a number of factors that contributed to this phase. They observe that the 
success of regular “township” editions, which entailed a few pages in traditionally white 
newspapers dedicated to “black news” had led to this phase. The few pages increasingly 
resulted in fully-fledged supplements.  
 
Though these supplements were maligned for entrenching a “ghetto” press mentality, Switzer 
and Switzer (1979:16) observe that these supplements were “remarkably successful 
nevertheless in drawing black readers to white newspapers”. As a result of this success, 
Switzer and Switzer further observe that black journalists originally hired for “township” 
editions became permanent employees on many English and Afrikaans-language newspapers. 
More specifically, Switzer and Switzer (1979:16) identify the Rand Daily Mail and Daily 
Dispatch as newspapers that took a lead in integrating their news and opinion, sports, 
women‟s, society and financial pages. Sparks (2003:67) observes that the Evening Post, a 
small (now defunct) daily in Port Elizabeth, and the Cape Town-based Cape Times, both then 
edited by white editors, John Sutherland and Anthony Heard respectively, reported vigorously 
on black issues during the period mentioned by Switzer and Switzer. 
 
After the 1994 elections, the non-racial dispensation strove to deracialise its institutions, both 
public and private. These endeavours affected the media as well. This deracialisation of the 
media is referred to as the fifth phase of black journalism and will be discussed next. 
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2.6 The Fifth Phase: Black Economic Empowerment: 1994 onwards 
This phase refers to the selling of shares in the media by historically white companies to black 
business and community organisations (Diederichs & de Beer, 1998:100; Mabote, 
1996a:320). Newspapers that fall in the discussion of this chapter which were affected by this 
change were the Sowetan and the City Press. In 1993 the Argus company sold 52% of its 
stake in the Sowetan to Ntatho Motlana‟s New Africa Investment Limited (NAIL) (Mabote, 
1996a:320). On its part, Naspers announced plans to sell 51% of its shares to a black business 
consortium, Ukhozi Investments (Diederichs & de Beer, 1998:101).  According to Naspers‟ 
chairperson Ton Vosloo (Vosloo, 2010), Naspers sold 20% shares to Ukhozi Investments, but 
since Ukhozi Investments could not raise the necessary funds, Naspers got its shares back and 
owned the City Press 100%. This means then that the fifth phase of black journalism in South 
Africa had no implications for the City Press. For the Sowetan, this phase had implications 
which will be discussed next.   
 
2.6.1 Black ownership implications for the Sowetan 
Mabote (1996a:323) observes that these acquisitions were not without controversies. The first 
issue that confronted the new owners was editorial independence. Not long after the 
acquisition, the Sowetan journalists complained that Motlana was interfering in editorial 
matters, taking orders from the then country‟s president, Nelson Mandela. Though Motlana 
denied that Mandela suggested or implied that he should do anything about editorial matters, 
he is on record admitting that Mandela called him to complain about a story that featured the 
ANC‟s rival –  the PAC –  on the front page, while the ANC was on the fourth page (Mabote, 
1996a:323).  
 
Mandela was reportedly not happy that the story about the PAC rally, which attracted 5 000 
people, should feature more prominently than his organisation‟s rally, which had attracted 
more people on the same day. It was also suggested that the ANC had recommended to the 
NAIL the removal of Joe Thloloe as managing editor of the Sowetan because of his PAC 
links. Shortly after the rumour started, Thloloe, one of the founder journalists at the Sowetan, 
left and joined the SABC as editor-in-chief of television news (Mabote, 1996a:323). 
 
When Aggrey Klaaste died in 2004 after being in a coma in hospital, some in the journalism 
fraternity pointed to the NAIL as partly responsible for his death (Tissong, 2004:26). In a 
tribute to Klaaste published in the Sowetan, the Sowetan‟s then managing editor, Mike 
Tissong, pointed out that Klaaste “died as much from heartache as from the illness that took 
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his life”. Tissong traced Klaaste‟s “heartache” to the year 2002 when he was told by the new 
bosses that he would have to leave the Sowetan and relocate to the NAIL‟s offices in 
Bryanston. Confiding in Tissong three days after being told of the new developments, Tissong 
wrote that Klaaste “was so shocked” that he said nothing. His concern was not only for 
himself but for his Nation Building programme which he felt had to be run from the Sowetan 
and not from a distant Bryanston. Klaaste believed that the Nation Building programme was 
about people and that it needed a voice and a life through the Sowetan.  
 
What emerges from this narrative about the black ownership of the Sowetan is that instead of 
ameliorating the conditions of black journalists, black ownership disrupted the trajectory of 
black journalism. In stating that Klaaste died of “heartache”, one can deduce that Tissong is 
partly blaming the NAIL as being responsible for Klaaste‟s death. 
 
After Klaaste moved to the NAIL‟s office, he continued being in touch with his readers 
through his column, On the Line. Tissong observes that Klaaste “was broken when his column 
was moved off the page opposite the editor‟s opinion”. When his photograph was removed 
from his column, his “heart hurt again, because he saw that other writers‟ photos were still 
being used with their columns”. Klaaste‟s final blow came when he was told months later that 
he should not write every week, but when requested to do so. Tissong observes that the effect 
of this move was as if “his umbilical cord to his beloved readers” was “painfully hacked off”. 
According to the NAIL‟s chief executive officer, Saki Macozoma, there was no malice 
intended in relocating Klaaste (Masungwini, 2004). Macozoma said that it was because of a 
R10 million budget the NAIL had for social projects which they felt only Klaaste “could 
properly execute” that informed their decision to relocate him.  
 
2.6.2 Black Journalism Phases: Summary 
This section discussed the five phases that black journalism has gone through. These were 
identified as: the missionary-owned black newspapers‟ phase; the black-owned newspapers‟ 
phase; the white capital phase; the multi-racial phase and the black empowerment phase. It 
was pointed out that in the first phase (missionary-owned newpapers‟ phase), owners sought 
to impose a Eurocentric version of Christianity that undermined African traditional culture. 
This led to black journalists seeking to have their own newspapers (black-owned newspapers‟ 
phase) and articulating Africans‟ concerns. The third phase (white capital phase) sought to 
wean black journalists away from radical positions, orientating them into being neutral 
journalists who take no political positions.  
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Black journalists, in this period, influenced by Black Consciousness, rebelled and identified 
their journalism with the struggle against apartheid. In the fourth phase (multi-racial phase), 
black journalists became employed at traditionally white newspapers and issues of interest to 
black people were given more space and attention. In the fifth phase (black empowerment 
phase), black businesspeople bought a stake in the media and had control. According to some 
observers the fifth phase had serious political implications for the Sowetan in that the ANC, 
through its connections to the NAIL‟s Motlana, sought to influence the newspaper to be pro-
ANC. Though the fifth phase had no implications for the City Press, the newspaper had its 
own political challenges in post-apartheid South Africa. Those challenges are discussed next. 
 
2.7 Post-apartheid political challenges for the City Press’ Black Journalists 
Soon after taking over as the City Press‟ editor, reflecting on the role of this newspaper, Mona 
(2001a:8) noted that the City Press was a “quality, serious black newspaper which tries to 
reflect on issues of substance”. In line with that position, Mona (2001a:8) pointed out that the 
menu on the City Press was “more than just sex, scandal and gossip”. Identifying the City 
Press with the country and the society it served, Mona (2001a:8) committed the newspaper to 
the task of running stories “largely to inspire courage and determination” and to “inspire 
readers to do good and to improving the quality of life for all”.  
 
While committing the City Press to providing a platform for diverse opinions, and to resisting 
“pushing a particular political line”, Mona (2001a:8) simultaneously pledged editorials and 
columns that would “stimulate rededication to our country and the welfare of its people”. 
Mona (2002:18) believed that “Black people – who are our predominant audience – deserve 
better than a diet of comics, agony columns and such like fluff”. He observed that while there 
was a widely held belief that  
 
“the public is bored by anything important and is only interested in a news 
formula of love, lust and lucre…history tells it is usually the serious though 
still entertaining, thoughtful and penetrating newspaper that shows the best 
gains in circulation, advertising and influence”. 
 
Against this background, Mona (2002:18) observed, the City Press wanted to be a newspaper 
that would be serious, yet entertaining.  
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On September 7, 2003, the City Press ran a front-page lead story about an allegation that the 
head of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Bulelani Ngcuka, had been 
investigated by the then exiled ANC in the 1980s as an apartheid spy (Maluleke & City Press 
Correspondent, 2003:1).  
 
2.7.1 The City Press and the Ngcuka saga 
The City Press (Maluleke & City Press Correspondent, 2003:1) reported that documents 
leaked to the newspaper, which formed the basis of the story which was said to have been 
sourced from the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) database, identified Ngcuka as 
“possibly, but not conclusively, an apartheid police spy nicknamed „Agent RS452‟”. The 
story was accompanied by a front-page comment explaining why the City Press took a 
“not…easy editorial decision” (City Press Comment, 2003a:1).  
 
The City Press further said that the decision to publish a story speculating that the head of the 
National Prosecuting Authority was accused of being a spy was an “issue of public concern 
and national interest”. That was because, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2003a:1) 
pointed out, the public had a right to know whether the spy claims against Ngcuka were “part 
of an intricate power play within the ANC” or whether “Ngcuka‟s investigation of [Jacob] 
Zuma [was] itself about power political games”.  
 
The claims emerged at a time when Ngcuka had announced to the public that the NPA had 
prima facie evidence that the then deputy president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, was 
involved in corrupt activities. The City Press‟ report (Maluleke & City Press Correspondent, 
2003:1) also revealed that the person who was handling the investigations into Ngcuka‟s spy 
allegations in the 1980s was the same Zuma that Ngcuka was investigating for corruption. At 
the time the ANC was allegedly investigating Ngcuka, Zuma was the ANC‟s head of 
intelligence structures, and Ngcuka‟s case was “directly supervised by…Zuma”. 
 
In reaction to the story, Ngcuka, through his spokesperson, Sipho Ngwema, rejected the 
report as “lies and fabrications” and threatened to serve summons to the City Press (Petros, 
2003:3). Reacting to the story, former Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
researcher, John Daniel (2003:31), pointed out that the report was “not serious investigative 
reporting but a smear, in which innuendo and suspicion are used as the basis for character 
assassination”. Daniel further argued that the “City Press of all papers should know that…the 
mere suggestion that someone collaborated in apartheid is problematic”. This was not the only 
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negative reaction that the report received. More was to come from within the media fraternity 
itself. 
 
In its editorial, the Business Day (Business Day Comment, 2003:10) said that the City Press 
story was “so patently devious, ethically corrupt and politically self-serving that it is a wonder 
it was paid the slightest heed”. The Business Day editorial further pointed out that the  
 
“story was clearly promoted either directly or by associates of Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma and former transport minister Mac Maharaj – both of 
whom are being or have been investigated by Ngcuka‟s Scorpions – and is 
designed to discredit the man personally in order to divert attention from the 
work his people are doing on serious corruption issues in the country”.  
 
Columnist and Wits University journalism professor, Anton Harber (2003:22), described the 
report as an “astounding story” with “little evidence to justify the allegation, except the word 
of some of Ngcuka‟s bitter political enemies”.  
 
Harber further argued that the story was “self-evidently a crude attempt to discredit Ngcuka in 
his battle with Deputy President Jacob Zuma and former minister Mac Maharaj”. The 
comment that was run along with the story by the City Press, Harber added, “seemed to do 
little more than show that they knew that they were sticking their necks out – legally and 
ethically – in doing what other newspapers had declined to do”. Harber noted that there were 
other newspapers that had had the story for weeks but had felt that it was safe to only report 
that there were attempts afoot to discredit Ngcuka through leaks and innuendos. Harber‟s 
assertion was confirmed later by the Sunday Times‟ editor, Mathatha Tsedu (2003:1), in a 
front-page editorial comment outlining the reasons for his newspaper not running the story.  
 
Tsedu pointed out that since July 2003, the Sunday Times‟ journalist, Ranjeni Munusamy, had 
been investigating the claims about Ngcuka. The ANC Intelligence unit‟s investigation which 
involved Mo Shaik, Mac Maharaj and Jacob Zuma had found that agent RS452 “could be 
BN” – Ngcuka‟s initials. It emerged in the Sunday Times‟ newsroom discussions that the 
investigation file on Ngcuka had been given to Zuma more than ten years prior to the 
revelation regarding Ngcuka. According to Tsedu, as a result of this background, a question 
arose: Why was this information emerging only now, at a time when Ngcuka was 
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investigating Zuma, Maharaj and Shaik‟s brother, Schabir? Munusamy was urged to carry out 
more investigations.  
 
According to Tsedu (2003:1), although Munusamy did not bring sufficient information, she 
was adamant that her story should be run, whereupon Tsedu set three conditions before the 
story could be run: 
 
 That the initial ANC investigators should give the Sunday Times all the information 
that was at their disposal at the time so that the newspaper could see what made them 
reach their conclusion; 
 Having looked at the information, the Sunday Times‟ journalists be satisfied that they 
would come to the same conclusion; and 
 The intelligence unit that had shown her the database give the Sunday Times 200 
names so that they all, or as many of them be subjected to an investigation. 
 
According to Tsedu (2003:1), Munusamy said that she would not be able to meet the 
conditions. A few weeks later “she gave her information to another paper, which ran the 
story”. Subsequent investigations, Tsedu pointed out, suggested that RS452 was a white 
woman. Tsedu further noted that he remained convinced that the publication of the story, with 
the information at the disposal of the Sunday Times, would have “served interests other than 
those of the public”. Stories published by the Sunday Times had to pass a number of tests, 
including accuracy, public interest, balance and fairness (Tsedu, 2003:1). 
 
Criticisms that followed the City Press‟ revelations did not discourage the City Press from 
pursuing the Ngcuka story. The following week the newspaper ran another front-page lead 
story that reported that Ngcuka “was granted a passport by the former apartheid government 
in 1981, despite being in detention on suspicion of high treason at the time” (Maluleke & City 
Press Correspondents, 2003:1). This piece of information, like the previous report, was 
attributed to the ANC‟s Intelligence unit‟s investigation of Ngcuka. In the same issue that 
carried the follow-up story, the City Press used its entire editorial comment to respond to the 
criticisms that followed its initial story on the spy allegations (City Press Comment, 
2003b:18).  
 
In this editorial, the City Press charged that in “their absurd attack on City Press, our 
detractors have among other things, alleged we are being used to assassinate Ngcuka‟s 
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character”. The newspaper wanted to “put it on record that these allegations are all drivel” 
which “come mainly from people who themselves have lost the sense of impartiality as shown 
by their lame analysis which provided good context to the Ngcuka/Jacob Zuma debacle”. The 
editorial (City Press Comment, 2003b:18) further argued that its decision was  
 
“guided by a universally accepted ethical conduct which requires of journalists 
to identify sources and question their motives as the public is entitled to as 
much information as possible about sources‟ identity”.  
 
Despite the City Press‟ protestations, the newspaper was not let off the hook. Financial 
Mail‟s columnist, Peter Honey (2003:26) pointed out that the “City Press‟s [sic] portrayal of 
the chief prosecutor as an apartheid mole plotting to split the ANC was no more than a 
malignant press release” which “does to journalism what crime does to the country”. 
  
Almost three weeks after the Ngcuka story was exposed by the City Press, Mona, found 
himself an object of journalistic investigation (Altenroxel, 2003:1). The Star newspaper 
reported that Mona was “linked to a company that is being paid millions to rectify 
Mpumalanga‟s scandal-ridden image” (Altenroxel, 2003:1). The report stated that Mona was 
a director in one of three companies trading as Rainbow Communications and Rainbow 
Kwanda Communications, which had placed “a controversial advertisement in his own 
newspaper earlier this month”. The advertisement had “accused the media of lying, bribery, 
intimidation and theft of three damning reports that outlined corruption in the province‟s 
Health Department”. 
 
Responding to these allegations, Mona suggested that the claims had been brought up because 
of his editorial stance on spy claims directed at Ngcuka (Mabena & Sapa, 2003:4). 
Consequently, Mona stepped down voluntarily to allow his employers to carry out an 
investigation into a possibility of conflict of interest. According to This Day newspaper, Mona 
resigned as the editor of the City Press early in November 2003 after his employers 
determined that his involvement with Rainbow Communication constituted a conflict of 
interest (Jepson & Burger, 2003:2). Mona‟s image and journalistic integrity suffered another 
blow when he appeared before the Hefer Commission on November 27, 2003 (Waldner, 
2003:5). 
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2.7.2 The Hefer Commission 
The Hefer Commission was set up by the then country‟s president, Thabo Mbeki, to 
investigate allegations that Ngcuka was an apartheid spy (Tabane, 2003:4). Evidence leader, 
Kessie Naidu, at the Hefer Commission hearings held in Bloemfontein, told Mona that he had 
committed his newspaper, “a widely read and respected newspaper, to smut” (Waldner, 
2003:5). Naidu‟s “disgusted tone” followed a vigorous cross-examination during which Mona 
“conceded that his handling” of the Ngcuka report, “as well as follow-ups, had been an 
exercise in recklessness”. Legal council for Ngcuka, Marumo Moerane, called Mona “a 
disgrace to journalism”.  
 
Mona‟s decision to testify “despite strong objections from his industry peers and his former 
colleagues at City Press” at the Hefer Commission about an off-the-record meeting he had 
attended together with a number of black editors, provoked a public criticism by the South 
African National Editors‟ Forum (SANEF) (Msomi, 2003:4). In fact, according to Msomi 
(2003:4), Mona did not resign from the City Press because he was found guilty by the 
commission that investigated his conflict of interest. According to Msomi, Mona was forced 
to resign from the City Press when members of his staff submitted a memorandum to the 
newspaper‟s management accusing him of tarnishing the newspaper‟s image by “taking sides 
in the political battle between Ngcuka and Deputy President Jacob Zuma”. The memorandum 
noted that Mona‟s violation of the principle of respecting the off-the-record briefings meant 
that he could no longer be trusted by the reading public. Therefore, the City Press‟ journalists 
felt that in future, news sources would not be comfortable holding off-the-record meetings 
with the City Press‟ journalists.   
 
The off-the-record session referred to above took place in a hotel in Sandton on July 24, 2003 
(Gleason, 2003:10). Invited by Ngcuka at this briefing were the then editors of the City Press, 
Vusi Mona, together with his then political editor, Jimmy Seepe, the Sunday Times‟ Mathatha 
Tsedu, the Mail&Guardian‟s Mondli Makhanya, the Sunday Independent‟s Jovial Rantao and 
the Sunday Sun‟s Phalane Motale. The purpose of the meeting was to provide background on 
the investigation on Zuma by Ngcuka with special reference to an anonymous e-mail doing 
the rounds in the media containing accusations against Ngcuka. Ngcuka wanted to give his 
perspective on the accusations.  
 
According to Gleason‟s source at the meeting, Ngcuka said that Zuma “surrounded himself 
with Indians” and that this was the reason he was “now in such hot water”. The source also 
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said that Zuma could not meet his monthly expenses and was being “bankrolled” by Schabir 
Shaik and Vivian Reddy, a Newcastle casino owner. The other problem was that in this 
relationship, according to the report (Gleason, 2003:10) Zuma took orders from Shaik. At this 
meeting Ngcuka “asked the editors to help him” at which point the editors present began to 
feel “uncomfortable” because they felt that “their editorial integrity might be at stake” 
(Gleason, 2003:10). 
 
2.7.3 Displeasure about the black-journalists-only-off-the-record-briefing  
That Ngcuka had invited black journalists only to his off-the-record session did not go down 
well with some white journalists. Business Day‟s editor, Peter Bruce (2003:6), noted that 
having “already divided the ruling African National Congress” the Zuma-Ngcuka “saga…it 
seems…is going to work its toxic way among the journalistic fraternity, setting editors against 
each other and dividing the nation‟s newsrooms”. Bruce also noted that Zuma, too, had been 
wooing black journalists like this for years:  
 
“Now why would these high officials brief only black journalists? In the 
laughable belief that there might be some racial solidarity between them, that‟s 
why.”  
 
Bruce‟s remark was not taken lying down by some black editors who had attended the 
briefing. In its editorial comment, the Sowetan (Sowetan Comment, 2003:20) noted that the 
meeting had now “become an issue, with mostly white editors questioning why only black 
counterparts were invited”. The editorial argued that there was “nothing sinister in this” 
because it was “Ngcuka‟s right to invite whoever he wished”. It also noted that “history is 
littered with examples of briefings where black editors were routinely excluded even by 
prominent black decision makers”.  
 
In a defiant note, the editorial further pointed out that in future the Sowetan would continue to 
send its journalists to confidential briefings. That was because, according to the editorial, such 
briefings “tend to be useful in providing us, as practitioners, with a context of breaking news 
and unfolding events”. The Sowetan also further stated that such a stance was informed by a 
commitment to the public interest. On the same day that the Sowetan issued this response, 
Rantao, one of the attendees of the off-the-record session, penned a response in The Star 
newspaper.  
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Having noted that “[o]ur reporters will continue to accept invitations to off-the-record 
meetings”, Rantao (2003:14), like the Sowetan editorial, defiantly declared that he “will not 
apologise for that”. Similar to the Sowetan‟s editorial argument, Rantao noted that “[i]n fact, 
one of the complaining editors and his reporters have, separately, held confidential briefings 
with senior people in government”. 
 
2.7.4 The Ngcuka saga and its implications for South African journalism 
Reflecting on the implications that the Ngcuka saga had for journalism, Msomi (2003:4) 
noted that just as in  
 
“the same way that neither Ngcuka nor his chief accusers, Mac Maharaj and 
Mo Shaik, will come out of the battle without major scars, South African 
journalism will not escape unscathed”.  
 
Msomi further observed that the  
 
“activist role played by Mona and a few other journalists in the Ngcuka spy 
saga, make it difficult for media organisations to claim impartiality in a fight 
that looks set to rage beyond next year‟s general elections”. 
 
The significance of this analysis by Msomi (2003:4) is that the City Press at this juncture 
found itself playing a political role, not independently, as expected of journalism, but in a way 
that suggested that the newspaper‟s editor and some of its journalists were manipulated by 
members of the ruling party, namely the ANC. 
 
Yet the media, Msomi argued further, could have stayed out of the conflict by just sticking to 
the basics of journalism. Whatever the outcome of the Hefer Commission, Msomi concluded, 
“the events of the past few months call for serious soul-searching by journalists”. Prior to 
Msomi‟s observation, the City Press had realised as much. In an earlier editorial (City Press 
Comment, 2003c:18) the newspaper had observed: 
 
“As much as we journalists expect African political leaders to subject 
  themselves to Nepad‟s peer review mechanism, we think it is  
  probably about time we ourselves in this profession be subjected to 
  a similar peer review mechanism.” 
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If the Sunday Times‟ (Msomi, 2003:4) report is accurate that Mona was forced out of his job 
by a memorandum presented to the City Press management by his peers, then the 
recommendation above, written by the City Press, came true for Mona and cost him his job. 
Ironically, he was succeeded by Mathatha Tsedu, the man who refused to publish the story 
that alleged that Ngcuka was a spy, while Mona accepted it from Tsedu‟s staff member. When 
Tsedu took over from Mona he redefined the mission and the image of the City Press.  
 
2.7.5 The City Press becomes “Distinctly African” 
From October 2004 the newspaper‟s motto changed from “The People‟s Paper” to “Distinctly 
African” (Tsedu, 2004b:1). In launching the “Distinctly African” City Press, Tsedu (2004b:1) 
noted that amongst the challenges facing South Africa in its first decade of democracy was the 
country‟s relationship with the rest of the continent. Tsedu noted that South Africans, in 
having been “indoctrinated with the belief” that they were different from the rest of the 
Africans of the continent, internalised this belief and saw themselves “not as Africans, but as 
South Africans”.  
 
The challenge, therefore, for South Africans, was how to integrate themselves with the rest of 
the continent‟s African family. In order to address these challenges, according to Tsedu, a 
“Distinctly African” approach would mean that in South Africa the issues that enhanced and 
threatened the African identity would drive the City Press‟ coverage. “Distinctly African” 
also meant that the City Press would commit itself to covering the African continent 
thoroughly and in a distinct way. 
 
While the newspaper was designed to appeal to the tastes of a discerning middle-to-upper-
income market, Tsedu noted that the City Press would not neglect issues of the poor. Tsedu 
further noted that the reason for the existence of the City Press was to be the voice of the 
voiceless, of the poor and the powerless, “a responsibility we have carried out with typical 
African distinctiveness and which we commit ourselves here to continue doing” (Tsedu, 
2004b:1).  
 
2.7.6 Summary: The City Press’ post-apartheid challenges 
This section discussed the political challenges faced by the City Press in a post-apartheid 
dispensation. Particular attention was given to the City Press‟ story that involved allegations 
that Ngcuka was an apartheid spy. The story was condemned as journalistically unethical and 
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contributed to Mona vacating his editorship at the City Press. This episode also saw black and 
white journalists pitted against one another over the off-the-record briefing by Ngcuka 
exclusively for black journalists.  
 
So far, this chapter has highlighted the roles played by black-oriented newspapers and black 
journalists up to the year 2004. What has not been given attention to are journalists‟ 
organisations that were formed in post-apartheid South Africa which sought to influence the 
role played by South African journalists – including the subjects of this study, black 
journalists – during the research period. The next section pays attention to these organisations. 
 
2.8 Journalists’ organisations in post-apartheid South Africa 
In post-apartheid South Africa, journalists saw a need to form organisations that would unite 
them around a common purpose. After 1994 – during the research period – two journalists‟ 
organisations were formed. The first was the South African National Editors‟ Forum 
(SANEF) and the Forum of Black Journalists (FBJ). Next these organisations‟ genesis and 
their role will be traced.  
 
2.8.1 The South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF) 
SANEF was formed on October 20, 1996 at the Breakwater Lodge in Cape Town (Tissong, 
1996:5; SANEF, 1996:6). Its formation marked an act of unity between the Black Editors 
Forum (BEF) – a black editors‟ body – and the Conference of Editors (COE) – a forum of 
predominantly white editors. Also present at the launch of SANEF were journalism trainers 
from South African universities and technikons. In its Declaration of Intent, SANEF (1996:6) 
committed itself to the following goals: 
 
 To nurture and deepen media freedom as a democratic value in all our communities 
and at all levels of our society; 
 To foster solidarity among journalists and to promote co-operation in all matters of 
common concern; 
 To address and redress inappropriate racial and gender imbalances prevalent in 
journalism and news organisations and encourage corrective action and a 
transformation of culture within industry; 
 To promote media diversity in the interests of fostering maximum expression of 
opinion; 
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 To promote the process of media education and to help aspirant and practicing 
journalists to acquire or develop skills; 
 To promote professional freedom and independence in broadcast media and all media 
funded by public authorities; 
 To encourage government to ensure transparency and openness in administration and 
to pass laws ensuring maximum freedom of information;  
 To use all available institutions to defend media freedom. 
 
What emerges from this Declaration is a clear intention on the part of SANEF to play a 
political role in the public affairs of South Africa. This is reflected in the organisation‟s quest 
to “deepen media freedom as a democratic value”. This is also reflected in SANEF‟s 
consciousness of the racist legacy of South Africa and the organisation‟s commitment to 
address these. It sought to deal with the legacy of racism by “address[ing] and redress[ing] 
inappropriate racial and gender imbalances prevalent in journalism and news organisations 
and encourage corrective action and a transformation of culture within industry”.   
 
In a somewhat anticipatory note, Tissong (1996:6) having noted that editors “are typically 
individualistic people with strong opinions”, warned that “uniform responses to the 
commitments can be excluded”. He also observed that such individualism and strong opinions 
“will probably be the source of a lot of infighting in the future”. Almost a year since SANEF 
was established, its chairperson, Thami Mazwai, resigned (Seepe, 1997a) “following a string 
of disagreements with his colleagues” within the organisation. Mazwai said that the reason for 
his resignation was due to attempts made to prevent him from making public statements on a 
wide range of issues in the forum‟s meetings. He noted that white editors still did not see the 
media as an integral part of South Africa, and therefore as part of the country‟s national 
objectives. His experiences with his white colleagues within SANEF had left him with the 
conclusion that “no black journalist can survive in these non-racial organisations unless he 
becomes a „coconut‟” (Seepe, 1997a).  
 
Mazwai‟s resignation came barely two months before SANEF‟s second conference where 
both the BEF and the COE were to cease to exist and completely merge as one organisation. 
But following his resignation, Mazwai warned that it would be “premature” for the BEF to 
consider terminating its operations “when the white editors have not lived up to the spirit of 
Cape Town when Sanef was formed”. Commenting on Mazwai‟s resignation, the then City 
Press editor, Khulu Sibiya (City Press Comment, 1997:16) said that the reasons for Mazwai‟s 
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move sounded “familiar”. Sibiya noted that when he “resigned as chairman of the mainly 
white Conference of Editors, it was precisely for the same reasons”. 
 
Sibiya (1995a:14) resigned as chairperson of the COE in 1995. In resigning, Sibiya cited the 
predominantly white editors‟ organisation‟s “lack of urgency to transform itself to meet the 
needs of the entire population today”. When Sibiya, with the assistance of Moegsien Williams 
and Aggrey Klaaste, tried to bring the BEF and COE together, “there were editors – with 
influential voices within the Conference of Editors – who were sceptical about this move”. 
These editors, in Sibiya‟s view, were people who did “not want to upset their comfort zones”. 
By that Sibiya meant that for the white editors who resisted the integration of black and white 
editors‟ bodies, it was “all very well to have a handful of blacks in their midst – but not to be 
swallowed up by them”.  
 
When it emerged that there was an “initiative by the chairman of the Black Editors Forum and 
Cape Times Editor Moegsien Williams…to form a new editors‟ association that [would] bring 
together black and white editors”, Sibiya was “glad”. He hoped that SANEF would fulfil the 
task of uniting black and white editors, but Mazwai‟s resignation, according to Sibiya, 
deferred the dream: 
 
“Mazwai had good intentions when he accepted the position at SANEF. He 
wanted black and white editors to work together towards a unified new 
democratic South Africa. He has been sadly let down. I recall asking him after 
he was elected chairman of SANEF what faith he had in the white editors. He 
replied „all the faith‟. I hate to say I told you so…For SANEF to survive, the 
replacement of Mazwai by another black face is no solution. Attitudes in the 
body have to change” (City Press Comment, 1997:16). 
 
While the BEF pledged to remain a separate identity, black editors within SANEF decided to 
remain within the organisation conscious of the insinuation from Mazwai that doing so would 
imply that they were “coconuts” – black outside and white inside (Haffajee, 1997:10). 
Mazwai‟s position was filled by the then Cape Argus editor, Moegsien Williams. In January 
1998, SANEF was officially launched with the then Sowetan editor, Mike Siluma, elected as 
its chairperson (Berger, 1998a:11). After Siluma, SANEF was headed by more black editors 
within the research period, namely former Evening Post editor, Lakela Kaunda, and former 
City Press editor, Mathatha Tsedu, among others (Barratt, 2006:28). 
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After Mazwai‟s departure, racial tension reared its head again. When the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) issued subpoenas to some editors to appear before the 
organisation‟s hearings into racism (to be discussed in detail later) in the media, SANEF 
deputy chairperson, Ryland Fisher, said that he was “convinced that some editors would 
attend if there is an unconditional withdrawal of the subpoenas” (Bhengu & Khangale, 
2000:3). Subsequent to Fisher‟s statement, “five black editors in an open letter said they 
would attend the hearings whether subpoenas were withdrawn or not” (Barratt, 2006:28).  
 
The editors were then SANEF chairperson, Lakela Kaunda, the Daily News‟ Kaizer 
Nyatsumba, the Sowetan‟s Mike Siluma, the Independent On Saturday‟s Cyril Madlala and 
the Sowetan Sunday World‟s Charles Mogale. According to Barratt, the five black editors 
“said they were expressing themselves as black editors as it seemed black editors had no 
problem with taking part in the hearings: they were more concerned about the media‟s 
reputation than the subpoenas” (Barratt, 2006:28). 
 
Barratt (2006:29) notes that although Kaunda did not make the statement in her capacity as 
SANEF chairperson, but in her personal capacity, in the media it was reported as if she had 
spoken as SANEF chairperson. This created such problems for SANEF – since the 
organisation‟s members held a variety of opinions – to an extent that the “divisions threatened 
to split Sanef permanently” (Barratt, 2006:29). The tensions in SANEF were an indication 
that the effects of apartheid continued to haunt the media industry into the new dispensation. 
These effects manifested themselves in 1997 when black journalists decided to form a black 
journalists‟ body that came to be known as the Forum of Black Journalists (FBJ). The 
organisation excluded white membership. 
 
2.8.2 The Forum of Black Journalists (FBJ) 
The FBJ was launched in January 1997 with Abbey Makoe as its first chairperson (Dube, 
1997:13). The founding goal of the FBJ was to seek  
 
“to make black journalists become the authorities of their own experience; 
acquit themselves with utmost professionalism that adheres to governing codes 
and ethics of journalism and yet tackle issues confronting our country and the 
world head on, and to take a public position as may be dictated upon by 
circumstances without fear or favour” (FBJ, 1999).  
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On the “intellectual front” the FBJ sought to “navigate a presence and voice of black 
journalists on the country‟s policy landscape, especially as it pertains to the media”.  
 
The navigation of “this path [was] based on the belief that black people are as much a source 
of knowledge, whose worldview, the South African public deserves to contend with” (FBJ, 
1999). Remarking on the FBJ‟s assertion on the need for a prominent presence and voice of 
black journalists, Seepe (1997b:11) noted that the claim that “black journalists have not been 
in the forefront in defining the agenda for the transformation of this country is unfortunately 
true”.  Seepe further pointed out that these “concerns have surfaced time and again during 
meetings of black intellectuals and journalists alike”. One of the reasons for the formation of 
the FBJ was informed by “[r]epeated remarks by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, President 
Nelson Mandela and other leading figures that black journalists were ill-informed” (Dube, 
1997:13). 
 
In fact, in November 1996, Mandela had singled out – without naming them – certain senior 
black journalists and accused them of having a secret agenda of undermining his government 
(Sapa, 1996:2). Mandela pointed out that the unnamed black journalists regretted the 
destruction of white supremacy in South Africa and were “taking out their venom on the one 
organisation that has brought about radical changes in this country”. Mandela further stated 
that the unnamed black senior journalists had “no conception of the problems facing the 
country”, falsely thinking and assuming that whites were “defeated…on the battlefield and 
that the whites are now lying on the floor helpless and begging for mercy”. Mandela further 
stated that he was not prepared to be dictated to by people with secret agendas. 
 
A few days after making this statement, Mandela reiterated his attacks on the unnamed black 
journalists at an ANC-hosted business meeting (Jenvey, 1996:1). This time around Mandela 
said that the “white-controlled conservative media” had co-opted senior black journalists to 
do “their dirty work”. He further pointed out that in order to protect their jobs and ensure 
promotion, the unnamed senior black journalists were forced to report negatively on successes 
achieved by the ANC government. As a result of these confrontations, the then SANEF 
chairperson, Thami Mazwai, requested a meeting between Mandela and senior South African 
black journalists in an attempt to defuse tensions (Dlamini, 1996:2). 
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On the same day (November 18, 1996) that Mandela was going to meet black journalists, the 
Sowetan (Sowetan Comment, 1996:10) issued an editorial in which it expressed “surprise” at 
Mandela‟s  
 
“tirade of unsubstantiated accusations at unnamed senior black journalists 
whom he claimed had been co-opted by the „conservative‟ newspaper 
establishments to discredit the African National Congress-led Government”. 
 
The Sowetan editorial made it clear that the Sowetan did not believe that 
 
 there are black journalists who can stoop so low as to allow themselves to be abused in 
the way Mandela suggests; 
 there are black journalists who are pursuing secret agendas for personal 
aggrandisement; 
 there are black journalists who want to see the return of white supremacy (Sowetan 
Comment, 1996:10). 
 
The Sowetan further pointed out that to black journalists, many of whom made personal 
sacrifices during years of repression, and who unselfishly worked for the creation of the new 
order, Mandela‟s suggestion that they could be “bought for a few pieces of silver to 
undermine the cause they fought for”, was an insult. The Sowetan further pointed out that its 
defence of black journalists was not synonymous with the assertion that black journalists were 
entirely without blemish. The editorial acknowledged that at times black journalists‟ 
criticisms of the ANC-led government were unfair and not entirely constructive (Sowetan 
Comment, 1996:10). 
 
After Mandela and 22 black journalists – comprising of senior journalists and editors – met, it 
was reported that the differences between the two parties had been resolved (O‟Grady, 
1996:2). While according to the report Mandela undertook not to repeat allegations that black 
journalists were being used by their bosses to undermine the ANC-led government, the 
undertaking was made with the provision that journalists would not “overstretch the limit”. 
What the “limit” was, the report did not state. It was also reported that in that meeting 
Mandela explained that he saw writings by some senior black journalists as questioning his 
integrity and that of the ANC. The report also stated that the “journalists in question 
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responded that their writings were the result of „how they saw the situation at the time‟”. The 
report did not name the journalists but simply referred to them as the “journalists in question”.  
 
But a Sunday Times‟ report (Dlamini, 1996:2), published a day before the meeting, gave a 
clue about the identity of the “journalists in question”. The Sunday Times revealed that 
Mandela had insisted on the attendance of three prominent black journalists without whom 
there would be no point in meeting. The journalists were: Jon Qwelane (then a columnist for 
Independent Newspapers), Kaizer Nyatsumba (The Star‟s then political editor), and Khulu 
Sibiya (the City Press‟ then managing editor). Though Mandela‟s spokesperson, Parks 
Mankahlana, pleaded ignorance about this, Qwelane confirmed that he had been informed that 
Mandela had insisted that the three senior black journalists should attend (Dlamini, 1996:2). 
Further credence to reports that Mandela had summoned Qwelane, Nyatsumba and Sibiya, 
was given by Sibiya (1996a:14) in his column, My Way, when he pointed out that “three days 
after the bruising no-holds-barred fight, three of the culprits he (Mandela) singled out for his 
scathing attack were invited to the presidential guest house to welcome the president of 
Gabon” (researcher‟s italics). 
 
Apparently, this was not the first time Sibiya was summoned by Mandela. According to 
Nyatsumba (1996:10) Sibiya was summoned to Shell House (the ANC headquarters, now 
known as Luthuli House) where a “very upset” Mandela told Sibiya that as a black journalist 
he should be more understanding of the political situation in which the ANC found itself. 
Sibiya apparently disclosed this encounter with Mandela prior to Mandela‟s attack on 
unnamed senior black journalists. But Joel Netshitenzhe, the then head of communications in 
the President‟s Office, recalled the meeting differently. Netshitenzhe (1996:8) asserted that 
Mandela invited “the City Press editor to brief him on a matter that the president felt had been 
overlooked in his editorial”. Mandela, according to Netshitenzhe,  
 
“did so precisely because he respects the editor, and did not want him to labour 
under a wrong impression, and they both agreed the discussion was useful. 
There were definitely no „summons‟ and „remonstrations‟.” 
 
Remarking on this episode, Qwelane (1996:26), who was one of the journalists reportedly 
summoned by Mandela, felt that the cause of the tension between Mandela and black 
journalists was that of “identity”. He pointed out that the ruling party could not come to terms 
with the fact that gone were the days when liberation movements and black journalists 
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occupied the same trenches in the struggle against apartheid. The reality, according to 
Qwelane, was that the ANC government was faced with the challenge of playing the role for 
which they were chosen – to govern – and the media to “continue, in exactly the same way 
they did in the past – to keep a vigilant watch on the government”.  
 
The formation of the FBJ must be understood against this background. Furthermore, its 
formation was an acknowledgement “that they [black journalists] indeed have a problem, and 
feel that only they can reverse the situation themselves” (Dube, 1997:13). While black 
journalists acknowledged that they indeed had a problem, there were, according to Seepe 
(1997b:11), 
 
“concerns often expressed among black journalists that government 
bureaucrats and ministers are generally more obsessed with what appears in 
white run [sic] newspapers than they are with what is printed in black 
publications”. 
 
The “overriding mentality in the black majority government”, Seepe further noted, “seems to 
be that the only opinions that matter are those printed in white newspapers”.  
 
Seepe further observed that there was a common feeling among black journalists that since 
the democratic elections, journalists working for black-oriented newspapers found “it more 
difficult to gain access to government ministers than do their black and white colleagues 
working on white publications”. Whilst ministers preferred to leak information to “white 
publications whenever important policy matters have to be tabled…black newspapers are the 
first to be invited by government when it is confronted with a major crisis” (Seepe, 
1997b:11). Seepe‟s sentiment was echoed by Sibiya (1997b:16) who pointed out that more 
often than not the ruling party (the ANC) had a tendency of reminding black journalists of 
their “blackness and the role expected from us…but when it comes to scoops and leakages of 
information, we are expected to take a back seat to the white media”.  
 
This tendency on the part of the ANC government, according to Sibiya, was objectionable. 
Black journalists, Sibiya argued, should “not be called upon when chips are down, or to clean 
up the mess”. Black journalists believed, “and rightly so”, Sibiya further pointed out, that “the 
ANC‟s constituency and our readers are one and the same – and if they want to address them, 
it should be done through the black press”. The ANC, Sibiya asserted, should not “expect 
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black publications to write follow-ups of stories that first appeared in the white media”. In 
clearer terms, Sibiya pointed out that for black publications “to remain credible and believable 
in the eyes of our community, they cannot now play second fiddle to the white media”. In 
demanding this recognition, Sibiya (1997b:16) felt that black journalists had earned it because 
black journalists “were locked up and tortured for taking a stand against an evil system 
[apartheid]”, while on the other hand “the white media…was sympathetic to the past 
government”. 
 
Against this background, the FBJ‟s membership was open to black journalists only, a move 
that was seen by critics as “racist” (Dube, 1997:13). The FBJ committed itself to the 
“upliftment of black journalists in general and the African in particular…with emphasis on 
African leadership” (FBJ, 1999). Those opposed to the exclusive nature of the FBJ argued it 
had “no place in a new South Africa where reconciliation should be the order of the day” 
(Golding-Duffy, 1997:B4). Challenging this argument, Makoe (in Golding-Duffy, 1997:B4) 
countered that “reconciliation can only take place when black journalists are on an equal 
footing with their white colleagues”. Backing his argument, Makoe pointed out that while 
black journalists were  
 
“respected in the township…once in the newsroom we are merely told what to 
do by our white editors and are often influenced by them. That all has to 
change and change it will…” 
 
Makoe acknowledged, though, that white journalists, more often than not, deserved their 
positions in the newsrooms because of their qualifications. On the other hand, Makoe further 
pointed out, among black journalists a lot needed to be improved starting with their use of the 
English language which for some was not up to standard as a result of the low quality of 
education given to black people.  
 
Criticism towards the FBJ was not confined to allegations of racism. The organisation was 
criticised for its off-the-record sessions with South African politicians (Mabote, 1996b:B8). In 
its effort to get insider information into the goings-on of South African politics, the FBJ 
invited certain black politicians – among them, the ANC‟s Thabo Mbeki and the expelled 
ANC member, Bantu Holomisa – and requested them to give their perspectives off the record. 
In Mabote‟s view, the FBJ had, by creating this opportunity for itself and the politicians, 
allowed itself to be “an unofficial platform for the powers that be to cleanse their tarnished 
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images”. Mabote further pointed out that the “forum allowed itself to be used by discredited 
politicians and personalities bogged by controversies”.  
 
In an indirect response to this criticism, the FBJ‟s then Secretary General, Oupa Ngwenya 
(Ngwenya, 1999:15) observed that while the FBJ was  
 
“unmistakably a black platform, it is nevertheless mindful of the hazards of 
power…Consistent with this, the FBJ is not sworn to being the hush puppy of 
black mischief and failure, nor to being sycophantic lapdogs that pander to 
powerful forces, be they private or public.”  
 
In fact, Ngwenya (1999:15) further argued, “black journalists must be the most ruthless in 
dealing with wrongdoing and should not turn a blind eye or deaf ear to any evil, from 
whatever quarter it emanates”. Further, Ngwenya argued that black journalists should be 
“weary of blacks who forget that they are black in prosperity but only remember their 
blackness when caught up in adversity”.  
 
2.8.3 Summary: Journalists’ organisations in post-apartheid South Africa 
In this section the discussion was about the genesis, the objectives and trajectory of two 
journalists‟ organisations that sought to consciously determine their political role in 
advancing the democratic project of post-apartheid South Africa. The first organisation 
discussed was the non-racial SANEF and the Black Consciousness-inspired FBJ. It was 
pointed out that even as it committed itself to a non-racial character, SANEF was haunted and 
assailed by racial tensions which threatened to disintegrate the organisation. The formation of 
a blacks-only FBJ gave a clear indication that some black journalists believed that the 
remnants of apartheid in post-apartheid South Africa were still felt and that black journalists 
needed to fight this legacy as a separate and independent entity. Eight months after the FBJ 
was formed, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) conducted hearings into racism 
in the media as part of its hearings into human rights violations in apartheid South Africa 
between 1960 and 1994. Next, attention is given to the TRC‟s hearings into racism to further 
provide context for this study.  
 
2.9 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) hearings on the media 
The TRC was conceived as part of a bridge-building process in South Africa to help lead 
South Africans away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of 
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human rights and democracy (TRC Report, 1998a:48). It was established within the 
framework of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No 34 of 1995. One of 
its main tasks was to uncover as much as possible of the truth about past violations of human 
rights committed in the period 1960 to 1994 (TRC Report, 1998a:24; 48). The TRC hearings 
on the media took place from September 17 to 19, 1997 at the offices of the SABC in 
Johannesburg (TRC Report, 1998b:166). The hearings covered both the print and the 
broadcasting sectors (Krabill, 2001:568; Skjerdal, 1997). Since, as it was pointed out in 
Chapter One, that the focus of this research is on the print sector, this section on the TRC 
discusses the hearings on print journalism.  
 
Late in 1996, the chairperson of the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI), Raymond Louw, 
approached the TRC to suggest that the media under apartheid should be investigated 
(Skjerdal, 1997). This suggestion was informed by the view that a thorough investigation of 
South Africa‟s past would be incomplete without an inquiry into the role of the media in 
maintaining apartheid. The suggestion was that an independent body, free from the 
government and the TRC, should conduct a preliminary research. The body suggested was the 
FXI. The suggestion that the FXI do the preliminary research for the TRC was rejected by 
some black journalists (TRC Report, 1998b:165). 
 
Mazwai argued that Louw was an executive at SAAN (South African Associated 
Newspapers), a company that “hardly raised a sweat in opposition to the then government‟s 
stranglehold on the media” (Mazwai, 1997:9). Instead, Mazwai argued further, the SAAN was 
among the media companies that “implemented apartheid with vigour – separate toilets, 
eating facilities, differing salaries, inferior working conditions for blacks, and so on”. Mazwai 
further pointed out that Louw was the editor of the Rand Daily Mail when “black journalists 
revolted against being served tea in enamel mugs while their white colleagues were given 
cups”. While Mazwai conceded that Louw was not responsible for policies that discriminated 
against black journalists, he argued that Louw was “part of the system that applied them”. 
 
It was for these reasons that Mazwai objected to Louw being involved in preliminary 
investigations. However, Mazwai went further than just objecting to Louw‟s involvement, but 
objected to the involvement in a preliminary investigation of all “people who were in the 
media during the apartheid days, or their organisations, whether it be the Black Editors‟ [sic] 
Forum or the FXI”.  Echoing Mazwai in rejecting a preliminary investigation by the FXI, 
Thloloe argued that such a process would usher a sanitised version or distorted evidence 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
(Zaina, 1997:8). While these black journalists objected only to the FXI‟s role, the very idea of 
conducting a hearing into the media by the TRC received mixed reactions. 
 
Former Rand Daily Mail editor, Allister Sparks, believed that an investigation by the TRC 
would be valuable, “not only for establishing the degree of media collaboration with the 
government…but for probing a whole range of issues” (Zaina, 1997:8). Among these, 
according to Sparks, was the extent to which newspapers and broadcasters were used as bases 
for the security force espionage through the planting of false stories for propaganda purposes.  
While another former Rand Daily Mail editor, Rex Gibson, had no problem participating in an 
investigation into the media by the commission, he feared that there was “a risk that an 
investigation of this nature could turn into a witch-hunt” and that it was “more likely to 
become a platform for dealing with newsroom grievances”. The Star‟s former editor, Harvey 
Tyson, believed that far from being helpful, the proposed investigation would “trivialise the 
process of truth and reconciliation” (Zaina, 1997:8). In Tyson‟s view, the “mistakes, both of 
commission and omission, on the part of the media – Afrikaans, English and all political bents 
– are apparent on their pages”.  
 
At the TRC hearings black journalists spoke about the discrimination they experienced at the 
hands of white media owners (O‟Grady, 1997a:4). Representing the FBJ at the TRC hearings 
were Thami Mazwai, Jon Qwelane, Don Mattera, Mike Tissong and Mondli Makhanya 
(Zwane, 1997a:2). Mattera told the TRC that the white media facilitated “a holocaust of the 
truth”. Qwelane noted that black journalists were denied training and promotion and that as 
late as 1976, canteen and toilet facilities at the SAAN were segregated (O‟Grady, 1997a:4). 
Qwelane also accused the white-owned media of being “guilty of gross human rights abuse” 
by excluding finance and business reports from the black editions of their newspapers 
(Zwane, 1997a:2). Makhanya corroborated Qwelane‟s statement by pointing out that the 
white-owned media failed to inform the population about the “evil” that was going on around 
them and victimised those in their employ who were actively opposing apartheid.  
 
Tissong stated that black journalists were denied promotions and that “the long term effect of 
starting careers at newspapers like The Star was that our careers were held back” (Zwane, 
1997a:2). The TRC also heard that some journalists worked as police informers and 
manipulated news reporting to suit the interests of the apartheid government (Zwane, 
1997b:2). This was revealed by a former Rand Daily Mail journalist, John Horak, who was 
also a ranking police officer. Horak claimed that a number of editors, whom he did not 
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mention by name, knew that he was working for the police, and that they used him when they 
ran into difficulties with the law.  This was confirmed at the TRC hearing by Vic McPherson 
who commanded the apartheid state‟s covert Strategic Communications (Stratcom), who also 
revealed that there were about 40 journalists he regarded as his contacts in the media 
(O‟Grady, 1997b:1).  
 
Mattera told the TRC that Horak had “hounded and vilified” him through “whispering 
campaigns and dirty tricks” (Brand, 1997:6). As a result of the information supplied by 
Horak, Mattera told the TRC hearing that his house was raided several times by the police. 
Another black journalist who was on the receiving end of police spies who also practised as 
journalists was Tissong (Zwane, 1997a:2). Tissong spoke about the pain he felt when he was 
removed from the story that was originally his that involved policemen booby-trapping hand 
grenades which were passed on to freedom fighters in Duduza, Nigel. The grenades exploded 
when the pin was released, resulting in the death of the freedom fighters. Tissong was 
removed from the story and it was given to a police spy, Craig Kotze, and Chris Steyn, who 
gave a watered-down version of the story. For the sanitised version, Tissong blamed the then 
news editor of The Star, Andrew Walker (Zwane, 1997a:2). That Kotze was a police spy 
doubling as a journalist was confirmed by himself at the TCR hearings (Zwane, 1997b:2). 
 
Black journalists also made written submissions to the TRC prior to the hearings, which noted 
the following (TRC Report, 1998b:175 – 176): 
 
 That newspapers used terms such as “terrorists” instead of “guerillas” to describe 
those who were waging an armed struggle against apartheid. 
 That stories featuring whites were given preference to those that involved blacks, even 
if the latter were more newsworthy. 
 That two days leave or pay was deducted when black journalists went on a march 
while white journalists were never penalised for protesting. 
 That there was a lack of training for black journalists, and a denial of promotion 
because of lack of training. 
 
While conceding that black journalists in general suffered in the newsroom, Mathiane 
(1997:31) argued that the condition of female black journalists was worse than their male 
black counterparts. While male black journalists and female black journalists entered the 
world of journalism with the same qualifications, Mathiane pointed out that for years, editors 
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and news editors relegated female black journalists to fill up women‟s pages. She further 
noted that while Sam Nzima, the photographer who took the pictures of the Soweto 1976 
uprisings, was given an award for his pictures, the female journalist Sophie Tema, who was 
with him on that day, was not mentioned by her newspaper. Mathiane also stated that while 
all male black journalists – “even stringers” – working at the Rand Daily Mail had 
typewriters, female black journalists did not have them and were compelled to wait until their 
male counterparts had finished their tasks. 
 
Reflecting on the proceedings of the TRC hearings on the media, the Sunday Times‟ editorial 
comment (Sunday Times Editorial, 1997:24) noted that while there was truth in the claim of 
black journalists that the English-language press in the apartheid years lacked courage, such 
was “only part of a larger truth”. The other part of the larger truth, according to the Sunday 
Times, was that there were “many honourable journalists and editors who succeeded against 
great odds, in setting before the public the dark side of the apartheid state”. The Sunday Times 
also lamented the failure on the part of black journalists to credit the print media‟s 
contribution in persuading the majority of white South Africans to accept democracy – “a 
process that led in the end to a relatively peaceful transition”.  
 
2.10 Summary: TRC  
This section dealt with black journalists‟ submissions to the TRC where they narrated the 
discrimination they experienced at the hands of white media owners. They also revealed that 
the newsrooms were infiltrated by police agents who sought to manipulate news in such a 
way that they represented the apartheid state in a positive light. The infiltration by the police 
also led to a containment and distortion of stories that exposed apartheid brutalities. The TRC 
hearing into racism in the media was not the only hearing that was conducted on this issue. 
The TRC‟s was followed by another hearing conducted by the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC), which is discussed next. 
 
2.11 The South African Human Rights Commission Hearings (SAHRC) into claims of 
racism in the media in post-apartheid South Africa 
In 1998, the SAHRC, an independent state institution established by law, as provided in the 
South African Constitution for the protection and promotion of human rights, received a 
complaint from the Black Lawyers Association (BLA) and the Association of Black 
Accountants of South Africa (ABASA), to investigate allegations of racism against two 
Johannesburg-based newspapers, the Mail&Guardian and the Sunday Times (Glaser, 
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2000:374; Pityana, 2000:525 – 526). When the SAHRC received the two organisations‟ 
complaints, it decided not to “accede to the request as put…because it was concerned about 
the arbitrary nature of the selection of the newspapers” (Pityana, 2000:526). Rather than 
focusing only on the two newspapers, the Commission decided to conduct an investigation 
into racism in the media in general. 
 
The purpose of the Commission‟s hearings was to “monitor the representation and treatment 
of racism, sensitivity to equality as pertains race, ethnic or social origin, colour, culture, 
language or birth” (Pityana, 2000:526). By conducting the investigation, the Commission 
hoped that the inquiry would generate debate and dialogue among South Africans about the 
nature, meaning and incidence of racism in South Africa, in the belief that South Africans 
needed to be informed about racism if they were to be able to address it (Pityana, 2000:527). 
Having considered the dossier of the allegation against the Mail&Guardian and the Sunday 
Times, the Commission forwarded them to the newspapers concerned for their response 
(Pityana, 2000:525). According to Pityana, the newspapers‟ responses were a refutation of the 
allegations together with a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Commission and the locus 
standi of the authors of the communication. 
 
In response to the refutations, the Commission cited the Preamble to the Act which states that 
the Commission shall be “competent and obliged” to investigate any allegations of human 
rights (Pityana, 2000:526). The Commission also rejected the suggestion that the authors of 
the dossier had no locus standi, arguing that the BLA and ABASA were professional bodies 
representing the interests of black people and that the two organisations had a legitimate 
interest in the issue of racism in the media. In November 1998, the SAHRC announced to the 
public that it was going to embark on an exercise of investigating racism in the media. 
Reactions to the announcement were mixed (Banda, 1998:2).  
 
The Sunday Times, one of the two newspapers singled out by the BLA and ABASA, said that 
the move by the SAHRC was an “anti-thesis to democracy” and “akin to a regime of 
censorship” (Banda, 1998:2). In the Business Day‟s (Business Day Comment, 1998:15) view, 
a considered and balanced research into the state of the media, including an analysis to the 
extent to which racial prejudice remained relevant, was “not a bad idea”. Simultaneously, the 
Business Day recognised that a call to the media to look more closely into the mirror might 
not be comfortable for many, and that “the findings would certainly not please everyone”.  
But the Business Day doubted that the Human Rights Commission under the leadership of 
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Barney Pityana was the right body to conduct the investigation. That was because, the 
Business Day argued, Pityana carried “far too much ideological baggage” to be the person to 
lead the kind of project he was proposing. 
 
The Business Day‟s observation was based on its observation that the BLA and ABASA,  
 
“two racially exclusive associations, are part of a small but vocal and hardline 
Black Consciousness community of which – surprise, surprise – Pityana has 
been a leader for about 30 years”.  
 
On the basis of this observation, in the Business Day‟s view, there was “a not-so-hidden 
agenda at work”. The Business Day‟s disqualification of Pityana on the basis of his link to the 
Black Consciousness creed was echoed by The Citizen newspaper (The Citizen Comment, 
1998:6) a day after the Business Day‟s editorial comment.  
 
Before dealing with Pityana, The Citizen pointed out that racism was not a one-way traffic, 
adding that any person, “black, white, or technicolour”, could be a racist. Racist prejudices, 
The Citizen argued, could be vented by formations of “racially exclusive” organisations such 
as the BLA, ABASA and the FBJ. The coming together of the BLA and ABASA to tackle 
racism in the media was, in The Citizen‟s view, “a case of the pot casting dubious aspersions 
on the kettle”. The Citizen further noted that for the two organisations‟ campaign to be “taken 
up by a bitter Black Consciousness (BC) exponent, we enter the realms of the absurd”. 
Observing that Pityana “is an excitable former activist, and…not a judge”, The Citizen further 
argued that Pityana was not “temperamentally or professionally equipped to assess how the 
scales are tipped”. On the same day that The Citizen‟s editorial supported the Business Day‟s 
observation, The Star newspaper (The Star Comment, 1998:12) countered the Business Day‟s 
argument. 
 
Though The Star did not directly refer to the Business Day‟s editorial comment, it criticised 
the latter‟s stance. The Star noted the “media‟s general response – accusing the two 
complainants of being racist, by their very existence – has been of the knee-jerk variety, and 
quite unfortunate”. Unequivocally, The Star asserted that there was “nothing racist about the 
objectives of the two organisations”. The Star argued that the probe was not about freedom of 
expression but racism. In defence of the SAHRC‟s  move, The Star further argued that the  
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“enemy [was] not the HRC, but racism which keeps reconciliation beyond 
reach. If we are to move forward as a nation, the media should take seriously 
the perception that it violates the rights of a section of the population”.  
 
The Sowetan (Sowetan Comment, 1998:8) agreed with The Star‟s observations. The 
newspaper‟s editorial, like The Star‟s, argued that it was “simplistic” to argue, like the Sunday 
Times did, that “by embarking on this investigation, the HRC has placed the freedom of the 
media at risk”. Like The Star, the Sowetan further argued that what could not be denied in the 
new democracy was that “despite the political change that has occurred in the country, racism 
continues to be a factor in our lives” and that it “permeates every aspect of our society – 
including the media”. However, the Sowetan cautioned the SAHRC by pointing out that in its 
investigation of alleged racism in the media, it would also have to take into account the 
commercial and professional realities faced by the media, such as issues of focus, 
specialisation and that the media audiences were still in many ways separated according to 
race.  
 
The Sowetan‟s point about taking into cognisance the constraints imposed by specialisation 
and focus driven by race was echoed by Berger (1998b:13). Berger noted that in conducting 
its investigation, the SAHRC would have to recognise that most black and white reporters had 
different experiences which found their way into their journalism. Likewise, Berger further 
noted, readers, viewers and listeners were often interested in different things along racial 
lines. The question that the SAHRC would have to answer, Berger pointed out, was: When do 
these racial differences become racism? Against this background, Berger asserted that any 
probe into racism in the media, would have to be informed by a clear definition of racism. 
 
In the Mail&Guardian‟s view (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 1998:24), “the lack of 
confidence in Pityana‟s ability to conduct the investigation in a non-partisan manner, was 
admirably articulated by The Citizen”. While the Mail&Guardian admired The Citizen‟s 
position, it tore into The Star‟s editorial comment and dismissed it as “pusillanimous”. The 
Mail&Guardian also noted that The Star‟s position was “a reminder of how attuned to current 
orthodoxy the country‟s largest newspaper group has become, presumably with a view to 
Tony O‟Reilly‟s profit margins”. In other words, what the Mail&Guardian implied was that 
The Star‟s position was unprincipled but convenient. 
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The Mail&Guardian stated that it had no objection to an investigation into racism in the 
media as such since its “record fighting racism is well known”. But it made clear its 
displeasure about the SAHRC investigation because, in the newspaper‟s view, “the racism 
complaint is no less than a feebly disguised assault on freedom of expression”. In the 
Mail&Guardian‟s perspective the investigation was an “encroachment of censorship” which 
the newspaper was “determined to fight”. 
 
The Mail&Guardian‟s argument was not convincing according to Tsedu (1998:10). Its 
invocation of “its so-called struggle credentials in an effort to convince us that because it was 
once banned by the apartheid regime it is incapable of being racist” was insufficient for 
Tsedu. To Tsedu, the Mail&Guardian‟s argument was “like arguing that because Winnie 
Madikizela-Mandela is a social worker who has fought for people, she could not have treated 
Stompie Seipei in the way she did”. Tsedu also dismissed as a “flawed rationale” the 
argument disqualifying Pityana‟s fitness to chair the inquiry on the basis of his “ideological 
baggage” – a term used by the Business Day. That was because, according to Tsedu, Pityana 
had cut ties with the Black Consciousness Movement in the 1980s when he left it to join the 
ANC. 
 
Taking into consideration the dissatisfaction by some sections of the media with the intentions 
of the SAHRC, the latter “held continuous consultations with editors and journalists”, the 
purpose being “to explain the inquiry and the process undertaken by the Commission” 
(Pityana, 2000:528). Pityana further notes that during this period of consultations, members of 
the Commission received countless calls from journalists encouraging the inquiry, adding that 
what was “significant about this was that almost all of them were black” and “wished to 
remain anonymous although they disclosed their names and identities to the Commission”. 
Many of the journalists who supported the inquiry, according to Pityana “were employed by 
the very newspapers that objected so vociferously to the inquiry”. 
 
To carry out its mandate, the SAHRC employed Claudia Braude to undertake its research into 
racism in the media (Pityana, 2000:528). The SAHRC also engaged the Media Monitoring 
Project, an independent media research and monitoring unit. The SAHRC rationale in this 
approach was that Braude would analyse news reports over a set period of time using 
acknowledged race analysis methodologies, and that the MMP would track stories in the 
media and show how race had been treated by different media. Following this process, the 
SAHRC published its Interim Report on 22 November 1999 (Pityana, 2000:529). The reports 
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were given to the parties mentioned in the report. But according to Pityana, it soon became 
apparent that a number of editors and journalists were determined to obstruct the process of 
the inquiry. Against this background a decision was taken to issue subpoenas to all the parties 
perceived by the SAHRC as having information that could assist the Commission in 
conducting the inquiry. 
 
The subpoenas were withdrawn by the SAHRC after the Commission held talks with SANEF 
in which it agreed to withdraw the subpoenas while the editors agreed to participate 
voluntarily (Brand, 2000:5; Naidu, 2000:3). But before this agreement was reached between 
SANEF and the SAHRC, five black editors (the Sowetan‟s Mike Siluma, the Evening Post‟s 
Lakela Kaunda, the Daily News‟ Kaizer Nyatsumba, The Independent on Saturday‟s Cyril 
Madlala and the Sowetan Sunday World‟s Charles Mogale) had broken ranks, and pledged to 
cooperate with the SAHRC after SANEF had stated that it would participate only if there 
were an unconditional withdrawal of subpoenas to editors and journalists (Bhengu & 
Khangale, 2000:13).  
 
It must be noted that although the five black editors pledged to cooperate with the SAHRC, 
they noted that  
 
“the approach taken by the HRC, of issuing subpoenas to editors and others 
involved in media work, is ill-advised because serving subpoenas assumes that 
those served with them would otherwise have refused to take part in the 
inquiry” (Bhengu & Khangale, 2000:13).  
 
With the subpoenas withdrawn, the editors and journalists who were implicated in the interim 
report on racism asked the SAHRC for time to prepare written submissions for the hearings 
that were scheduled for March 6, 2000 (Bhengu, 2000a:4). 
 
When the hearings commenced, the then Sowetan editor, Siluma, representing himself and 
four other black editors, Mogale, Nyatsumba, Phillip Molefe and Madlala, told the SAHRC 
that the white-controlled media continued giving priority to white people‟s voices at the 
expense of the black majority (Mathiane & ka Manzi, 2000:3). Siluma further stated that 
although some white editors genuinely believed that there was no racism in the media, in his 
view racism still prevailed in the democratic South Africa. He said that white racism 
manifested itself in a subliminal way, citing the attitude of white journalists who behaved in a 
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way that suggested that they believed that “black people were incompetent until they proved 
themselves otherwise”.  
 
Siluma‟s sentiments were echoed by the then Evening Post editor and the then SANEF 
chairperson, Lakela Kaunda (Sapa, 2000a:5). Kaunda noted that the situation where the media 
continued to be controlled by the white minority, enabling the minority to set the agenda for 
debate in the country, could not be allowed to continue. She asserted that the lack of black 
ownership of the media explained the kind of “white liberal slant” prevalent “in the media as 
well as the racism that manifests itself”. 
 
Kaunda also protested against what she referred to as a trend to portray blacks in the media as 
perpetrators of crime and whites as victims of crime (ka Manzi, 2000:4). On top of that, 
Kaunda asserted that black people were often featured as victims of disasters dying in large 
numbers and not deserving sympathy. While she emphasised her subscription to the watchdog 
role of the media of exposing maladministration where it reared its ugly head in the 
government, Kaunda argued that such should “not mean government must not be given credit 
when due”. The then City Press editor, Khulu Sibiya, endorsed Siluma‟s presentation on 
racism and ownership of the media (Bhengu & Molefe, 2000:7). He noted that among white 
publications themselves, there continued to be a different approach to news, and further noted 
that black newspapers also approached issues differently from white newspapers. 
 
White editors also had the opportunity to state their case. The then Business Day editor, Jim 
Jones, whose publication was accused by the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) of 
depersonalising the death of black people, said that an attempt to perpetuate racism would be 
a commercial suicide because it would contribute to a loss of readership (Bhengu, 2000b:3; 
Sapa, 2000b:5). Jones dismissed as flawed the MMP‟s example of citing a headline in the 
Business Day that reported about 60 Nigerians that had died in clashes, saying that it would 
have been impossible to name all the people who died in the clashes reported on. Driving his 
point home about how flawed the methodology of the MMP report was, Jones noted that 
while the Business Day ran hundreds of articles weekly, the MMP had only highlighted three 
perceived wrongs (Sapa, 2000b:5). The then Financial Mail editor, Peter Bruce, observed that 
considering that racism was law for more than 50 years, it could not simply be legislated away 
(Sapa, 2000c:5). Bruce suggested that one of the ways to ensure fair racial representation 
would be through the increase of the number of black sub-editors, since it was this section of 
the newsroom that finally shaped what went into print. 
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The then Die Burger editor, Ebbe Dommisse, took offence at “the Media Monitoring Project 
for accusing my newspaper of suffering from xenophobia on the basis of a „half-baked‟ 
report” (Bhengu & Molefe, 2000:7). Dommisse further noted that Die Burger had changed, 
and that, in fact, “our predecessors will turn in their graves to see that we cover areas of 
people who are not white”. The then Beeld editor, Arrie Rossouw, told the Commission that 
while his newspaper did “not support any form of racism” that did “not mean that at times 
racial undertones” were not present in reports and leader articles or that such did not slip 
through unintentionally (Bhengu & Molefe, 2000:7). Rossouw also revealed at the hearing 
that he was sympathetic to black editors, noting that their position made him recall the British 
colonial period when the Afrikaners were disempowered and discriminated against (ka Manzi, 
2000:4).  
 
While Rossouw expressed sympathy for black editors, the Rapport editor, Johann de Wet, 
was critical of black editors who had presented to the Commission complaining about 
marginalisation in the newsrooms (ka Manzi, 2000:4). De Wet felt that the right place to take 
such complaints to were the employing companies, not the Commission. On the issue of 
racism, De Wet noted that racism was everywhere, adding that his newspaper condemned 
racism wherever it occurred. De Wet could not understand why black editors made “such a 
fuss about white control of the press” while the “Sowetan is the biggest circulating daily 
newspaper in the country and it is black-owned” (Bhengu & Molefe, 2000:7). He was 
“offended” that there was a claim of “conspiracy to keep the media in white hands” and that 
he was part of that conspiracy. 
 
Presenting his newspaper‟s case before the Commission, the Mail&Guardian editor, Phillip 
van Niekerk, observed that allegations of racism against his newspaper presented a dilemma 
as to whether or not the Mail&Guardian should continue telling “the unsweetened truth” of 
the South African story (Bhengu & Molefe, 2000:7). He told the Commission that the critical 
question that had always faced the newspaper since 1994 was how to relate to those who were 
now in power since there was no longer a white minority government. He observed that the 
Mail&Guardian stood accused of racism for “being upfront, in-your-face, hard-hitting and 
fiercely independent”. 
 
The hearings resumed on April 3 and lasted until April 5, 2000. Making his presentation 
before the Commission, the then Sunday Independent editor, John Battersby, said that South 
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Africans were in denial of their racist attitudes, and that the South African society was 
dishonest about conversations they held in private (Mathiane, 2000a:4). Noting that the 
SAHRC hearings had changed his outlook on racism, Battersby observed that though he was 
not consciously racist, he realised that he was “in an internalised way” because he still found 
himself doing things that could be viewed as racist. He also expressed empathy for black 
journalists who saw press freedom as a secondary issue to the SAHRC inquiry, while white 
editors tended to view the inquiry as an infringement on press freedom. 
 
In Battersby‟s view the “reality” was that press freedom and the issue of racism in the media 
were “two sides of the same coin”. Battersby‟s observation was echoed by The Star editor, 
Peter Sullivan, who noted that freedom of expression existed side-by-side with the right to 
human dignity and equality (Warby & Sapa, 2000:3).  But Battersby disapproved of the move 
by black editors to make a submission to the SAHRC at the exclusion of white editors.  
 
Representing the ANC, the then Minister of Public Enterprise, Jeff Radebe, accused the media 
of stereotyping black people, particularly Africans (Mathiane, 2000b:4). In his offensive 
against the media, Radebe frequently singled out the Mail&Guardian and the Sunday Times, 
as having editorials which pitted Mandela against his successor, Mbeki, the former being 
exalted as a “saint” and the latter as “inspiring great nervousness” among whites. Referring to 
the Mail&Guardian in particular, Radebe alleged that its then white editor, Phillip van 
Niekerk, had written an article which criticised Mbeki but had it appear with the by-line of a 
black woman journalist, Lizeka Mda. 
 
According to Radebe these stereotypes affirmed the mainstream media‟s beliefs that Africans, 
with the exception of Mandela, were corrupt and anti-democratic. In response to these 
allegations, the Mail&Guardian issued a statement, dismissing Radebe‟s claim and charging 
that his allegations carried the implications that Mda, as a black woman journalist, was not 
capable of expressing her own opinions and was prepared to be crudely manipulated by her 
editor. Responding to the accusations, Mda (2000:1) reiterated the Mail&Guardian‟s 
response, adding that she could not “imagine a worse insult” to her professional integrity. 
Considerlng that the ANC “sidelined every member who has dared not to toe the line”, Mda 
pointed out that “the idea of a black woman who can think for herself may be a novel one”. 
 
According to Mda, this was not the first time she had been attacked for writing the article. The 
then spokesperson of Nelson Mandela, Parks Mankahlana, had reacted by saying that Mda 
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had projected herself in a manner “worse than the most conservative liberal”. An African-
American writer, Robert Suresh Roberts, had remarked that Mda was contributing “to a 
rainbow-nation brand of Afro-pessimism”. All this was a result of Mda alleging that there 
were “alarming signs that Mbeki‟s backroom maneouvres” were making a mockery of the 
country‟s democratic institutions (Mda, 2000:1). 
 
Not only was it the Mail&Guardian that came to Mda‟s defence, but also the City Press. 
Noting that “Mda is lividly mad and justifiably so”, the City Press (City Press Comment, 
2000a:10) added that considering that Radebe was a senior member of the ANC, it would 
have been hoped that he would have “checked his facts before making such a damning 
submission”. Mona (2000c:10) noted that Radebe‟s accusation against Mda was the “[most] 
depressing feature of this week‟s Human Rights Commission hearings on racism” and a 
“below-the-belt blow” dealt on Mda. 
 
2.12 Summary: Chapter 2  
This chapter named and discussed the history of the five phases that black journalism went 
through in South Africa and the implications thereof. It also paid attention to journalists‟ 
organisations formed in post-apartheid South Africa and the reasons for their formation. The 
chapter also covered the hearings into racism in the media conducted by the TRC and HRC. 
 
The next chapter discusses theoretical frameworks with regard to the role of the media 
selected for this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
A review of literature is defined as a process of “reading whatever has been published that 
appears relevant to the research topic” (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000:19). Having read what 
has been published about the research topic, the researcher contextualises in such body of 
scientific knowledge her/his own research (Babbie, Mouton, Vorster & Prozesky, 2007:565). 
Literature review also assists a researcher in ensuring that one does not duplicate a study 
already made (Mouton, 2006:6). Mouton further notes that a literature review enables a 
researcher to discover what the most recent and authoritative theorising about the subject is, 
and to find out what the most widely accepted empirical findings in the field of study are.   
 
A search done on the political role of black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa in books 
and peer-reviewed academic journals and research engines such as Libraries in Africa 
(Africat), South African National Bibliography (SANB) and Libraries in Southern Africa (SA 
Cat) did not yield anything specifically on the subject matter of this study. Much of what is 
available is on the political role of black journalists during the apartheid era which was 
covered in Chapter 2 of this study.  
 
The period 1994 to 2004 marked the first decade of democracy in South Africa. Taking that 
into cognisance means that in this study, literature review will refer to the examination of 
literature covering the “political role of the media” in a “democracy”, since this study deals 
with a democratic epoch. It will also review literature that examines “African culture” in 
relation to the media. And lastly, it will review literature that deals with the impact of media 
ownership on the media. The issue of ownership of the media and its implications for 
journalism practice will be given more attention in Chapter 4 – Theoretical Frameworks – 
since one of the theoretical frameworks chosen for this study, Political Economy, deals with 
that. In this chapter, focus will be given more specifically to literature dealing with this issue 
on the African continent. 
 
A number of studies have been undertaken on the role of the media in a democracy 
(Wasserman & de Beer, 2006:68 – 70; Fourie, 2002:34; Berger, 2002:81; Berger, 2000:21; 
Megwa, 2002:12; Scammell & Semetko, 2000:xi; Blankenberg, 1999:42; McQuail, 1995:11; 
Ungar, 1995:371; Rønning, 1994:1; Ansah, 1988:13; Blumler, 1981:121). It has been 
observed that in many studies examining the role of the media in a democracy, in the main, 
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most of the literature is focused on Western societies (Berger, 2000:21; Scammell & 
Semetko, 2000:xi). While there is a large body of literature on the role of the media focusing 
on Western societies, Kareithi (2005:3) observes that “[l]iterature on the African press is scant 
compared to that focusing on the media in other parts of the world”. 
 
While recognising Kareithi‟s observation on the limitedness of literature on the political role 
of the media in Africa, one can state that there is a reasonable body of literature that can be 
referred to on this topic (Nyamnjoh, 2005b:40; Kareithi, 2005:14; Mphahlele, 2004:331; 
Kasoma, 1996:102; Moemeka & Kasoma, 1994:40; Ansah, 1990:34). This literature, 
conscious of the preponderance of the Western focus on media discourse, calls for the 
cognisance of “African consciousness” on the political role of the media. What this entails 
will constitute part of the literature review in this chapter. A review of literature that discusses 
“African consciousness” will, at the same time, be addressing one of the central themes of this 
study, namely the role played by African cultural values in the execution of black journalists‟ 
political role in a democratic South Africa. The literature examining issues of “African 
consciousness” is mainly written from an Afrocentric perspective. Afrocentricity will be 
defined and discussed in Chapter 4, the chapter that deals with Theoretical Frameworks. 
 
Rønning (1994:1) observes that the early nineties may be characterised as a period when the 
“interest in the debate over the freedom of the press and the role of the media in the 
democratic process suddenly burst into the open in Africa”. In the case of South Africa, 
Blankenberg (1999:42) observes that this was a period during which “the role of the media 
became subject to soul-searching, as did the question of national identity”. When apartheid 
was dismantled in South Africa, the new government headed by the ANC expected the media 
to play a role in “national development”, “nation-building” and “national interest” 
(Wasserman & de Beer, 2006:68 – 70; Fourie, 2002:34). These concepts mean different 
things to different people. Their relationship with the media and how the media were expected 
to play a role in advancing them will be examined as part of the literature review in this 
chapter.  
 
For purposes of clarity the first task will be that of giving working definitions for the terms 
“politics” and “democracy”. 
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3.2 Defining politics and democracy 
There is no single definition for the term “politics” or what constitutes the “political”. This is 
so because, according to Leftwich (2004:2), politics is “a highly contested subject”. The term 
“politics”, Held (1991:3) notes, “denotes an activity about which many people feel a 
combination of cynicism, scepticism and mistrust”. The negative attitude towards politics, 
Held further notes, is informed by a perception that politics is “associated frequently with 
self-seeking behaviour, hypocrisy and the manipulation of attitudes”.  
 
Louw (2005:14) defines politics as “the processes of legitimating and or enforcing decisions” 
which involves “a struggle over gaining access to the decision-making positions”. Along 
similar lines, Chilton (in - ήigo-Mora, 2009:1) defines politics as “a struggle 
for power between those who seek to maintain their power and those who seek to resist it”.  It 
is the “process through which classes with antagonistic interests struggle to obtain, retain or 
influence state power” (Callinicos, 2004:60). It refers, according to Peters (2004:25)  
 
“fundamentally to the relations of power and influence between states and their 
societies…and in particular to that complex set of processes whereby 
governments come to choose between a variety of collective goals for society 
and seek to implement them”. 
 
Schumaker (2010:1) observes that “[p]olitics concerns how we live in community with others, 
how we cooperate to achieve benefits, how we engage in conflict for greater shares of the 
things value, and how people are governed”. Ordeshook (1992:7) asserts that “politics 
concerns the actions of people whose fates are interdependent, where the nature of that 
interdependency is determined in significant part by institutions we choose to call political”. 
Similarly, Chilton (in - ήigo-Mora, 2009:1) defines politics as “cooperation, 
as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money 
influence, liberty and the like”. Gyekye (1997:193) defines the word “political” as that which 
refers to “public affairs: the official goods, affairs, fortunes, agencies, resources, and 
institutions of the state”.  
 
The common theme in all the definitions given above is that politics is a constestation for 
power among state institutions. The approach that limits politics or associates politics only 
with the institutions of government creates, according to Squires (2004:119) “a very particular 
boundary between the public, as the apparatus of government, and the private, as civil 
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society”. Arguing from a feminist perspective, Squires (2004:120) points out that “the narrow 
association of politics with the institutions of state and government excludes the „private‟ 
sphere of domesticity and sexuality from political sight”. Squires argues for a broader 
conception of politics which sees politics “as those processes concerned with the struggle over 
the control and distribution of power across a whole range of sites” which “opens up space for 
considering issues of gender as central to the study of politics” Squires‟ (2004:119) central 
argument is that there is no single “site of politics”. Rather, as she points out, “[p]olitics is 
everywhere”.  While this study is cognisant of Squires‟ intervention, for the purpose of this 
study, politics refers to “public affairs” and “public institutions”. Having defined “politics”, 
the next term to define is “democracy”. 
 
As is the case with the definition of politics, defining democracy is not an easy task (Dahl, 
1998:40). Among the factors that make this task difficult is that, as Dahl (1989:2) observes, 
“[t]he very notion of democracy has always provided a field day for its critics”.  Dahl 
identifies three categories of critics that pose a “number of problems for which no definitive 
solution seems to exist”. The critics comprise those 
  
 who are opposed to democracy because they believe that while it may be possible it is 
inherently undesirable; 
 who argue that while it might be desirable if it were possible, in actuality it is 
inherently impossible; and those 
 who are sympathetic to the idea and wishing to maintain it but critical of it in some 
important regard. 
 
Before an attempt is made to define democracy, it is worth noting Carter and Stokes‟ (2002:1) 
observations about democracy. They note that since the end of the Cold War, “few have 
queried the ideal of liberal democracy”. They (Carter & Stokes, 2002:1) note that its values 
and institutions are “accepted throughout the world as providing the only framework for 
achieving or maintaining genuine democracy”. This study is conscious of Carter and Stokes‟ 
observations and is not confined by a limiting and limited understanding of democracy 
pointed as out by Carter and Stokes. Instead, there is awareness, as pointed out by Megwa 
(2002:12), that democracy is a “complex, contested and problematic concept”. That is 
because, Megwa further notes, the concept is open to different interpretations because of the 
gap between what it means in theory and how it is being practised. One of the contributing 
factors to the contestation of this concept is that, as Kareithi (2005:6) observes, “discourses on 
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democracy are…framed in Western perceptions and concepts, emphasising competition for 
public office, efficiency in the public sector and respect for human rights”. 
 
The features identified by Kareithi above, are that of liberal democracy, as attested to by 
Carter and Stokes (2002:1) who list them as, among others, “popular choice and 
governmental accountability to citizens through regular and fair elections that are contested 
by a number of parties”. Carter and Stokes further observe that “liberal democracy requires 
strong parliaments that can exercise control over governments and a framework of the rule of 
law”. Kareithi further argues that even definitions of concepts such as “human rights” are 
discussed in the “narrow sense of an individual right to free expression, association, 
movement, a fair trial and freedom from torture and arbitrary detention”. In protest against 
this “narrow” reduction of the definition of the concept of democracy, Kareithi (2005:6) notes 
that 
 
“[o]ther than the underlying philosophy of private property, economic and 
social rights are clearly not on this agenda. These would include the right to 
decent food and shelter, the right to healthcare and education opportunities, 
and the right to work.” 
 
Similarly to Kareithi, in criticising the Western model of democracy, with particular reference 
to the United States of America (USA), Blum (2002:169) notes that  
 
“numerous pronouncements emanating from Washington officialdom over the 
years make plain that „democracy‟, at best, or at most, is equated solely with 
elections and civil liberties. Not even jobs, food and shelter are part of that 
equation.” 
 
Similarly, Carter and Stokes (2002:2) note that despite the general agreement on the political 
benefits of liberal democracy, “there is a widespread sense that its present institutions are not 
operating satisfactorily”, this being based on the argument that liberal democracy‟s 
institutions “are unable to deliver reliably what citizens expect from any government, namely, 
a reasonable degree of social stability and economic security”. 
 
One major strand of liberalism is its regarding of “governing as the prerogative of an elite, 
with citizens playing a primarily passive role as voters” (Carter & Stokes, 2002: 1 – 2). This 
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strand is regarded by other theorists of democracy as inadequate. This came with the 
realisation that democratic political equality or extension of the franchise in Europe did not 
address “drastic inequalities” (Plant, 2002:250). There are a number of different types of 
democracy that will be briefly discussed next. 
 
An alternative theory, the social democracy theory, which emerged in the latter part of the 
19th century, advanced the view that  
 
“it is possible to extend democratic values into the social and economic 
domain to ensure that the economy and society actually serve democratic 
purposes such as greater social and economic equality, social justice and 
individual security” (Plant, 2002:249).   
 
Another key idea informing social democracy is that “it is possible to use the power of 
government to achieve these goals” (Plant, 2002:249). 
 
Another theory that argues that political representation is insuffiecient as a guarantee of 
democracy is “deliberative democracy”. Deliberative democracy is informed by a view that 
while voting results in a decision, voting by itself provides no link between the decision and 
what each individual wants, either for oneself or for the collective (Warren, 2002:173). 
Theories of deliberative democracy emphasise that participation, not just by the elites, but all 
stakeholders, is as crucial as voting is. 
 
Warren (2002:174) argues, for instance, that “democracy requires not only equality of votes, 
but also equal and effective opportunity to participate in processes of collective judgement”. 
What this means, as Warren further points out, is that  
 
“deliberation about matters of common concern should not be restricted to 
political representatives, judges, media pundits, technocrats, and other elites, 
but should infuse a society so structured that it underwrites ongoing processes 
of public opinion-formation and judgement”. 
 
Also arguing for measures beyond the central institutions of liberal democracy is the theory of 
associative democracy (Carter, 2002:228). According to Carter, associative democracy seeks 
to promote individual freedom, social justice and political participation, which according to 
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the theory of associative democracy is undermined by excessive reliance either on the state or 
on the market. Associative democracy advances the notion of decentralisation of state power, 
a transfer of state functions to citizen bodies and an extension of democracy to non-political 
spheres, in particular the workplace (Carter, 2002:228).  
 
While arguing that organised groups can build associative democracy through providing 
policy-makers with necessary information on the interests of their members, and that 
voluntary bodies can be instruments of alternative governance by playing a role in developing 
and implementing policies and creating processes of communication and collaboration, 
associative democracy theorists recognise that “organised interest groups have often been 
seen as a threat both to democratic norms and the public welfare” (Carter, 2002: 232 – 233). 
 
The discussion above about different types of democracy attests to Megwa‟s assertion that 
democracy is a contested term that is complex to define. The discussion also shows that this 
concept can be defined in ways that serve sectional interests, particularly those of the 
powerful elites. What emerges from the discussion about different types of democracy is a 
quest that seeks more than just “representation” by the elite, but “accountability” on the part 
of political representatives. Democratic accountability, as Dunn (1999:335) observes, is “best 
seen as a relation between the past acts of those who exercise power and their future 
liabilities”. Its “core site”, Dunn further observes, “is the degree to which our rulers, in a 
democracy, are effectively compelled to describe what they are doing while ruling us, and 
why they take this to be appropriate”. As will be discussed later, one of the roles of the media 
is to help to keep the ruling elites accountable to the electorate.  
 
Adding his voice against a “reductionist” approach to democracy, and with particular 
reference to the Western world, Pilger (2002:2) notes that the  
 
“undermining of the Bill of Rights in the United States and the further 
dismantling of trial by jury in Britain and a plethora of related civil liberties are 
part of the reduction of democracy to electoral ritual: that is, competition 
between indistinguishable parties for the management of a single-ideology 
state”. 
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With regards to the discussion about democracy in isolation from the economic realm, 
Rønning (Berger, 2002:82) notes that the concept of democracy should, of necessity, include 
an economic component, and that discussion about this concept should have wider reference 
than solely a focus on the suffrage. 
 
Adding his voice against the confinement and reduction of democracy to the Western model, 
Berger (2000:21) observes that  
 
“many writers (but not enough) have sounded warnings about lifting concepts 
like media and democracy from western conditions and applying them 
unthinkingly to Africa”.  
 
He further observes that the caveat against this reduction is informed by a “quest…for 
universally applicable concepts, which are relevant and explanatory for media and democracy 
in Africa”. 
 
Having noted that the concept of democracy is one which has a wide diversity of 
interpretations, Ansah (1988:13) points out that however democracy is defined, it implies 
accountability which is established through periodic elections. Meyer and Hinchman (2002:3) 
define democracy as “a system of institutions, a set of procedures for discussion and decision-
making, and, in some cases, a path to certain outcomes”. Roemer (1999:57) defines 
democracy as “a set of institutions and practices whose intention is to implement a certain 
kind of equal participation of citizens in the political process”. Van Parijs (1999:193) defines 
democracy “not as government by the people (collectively) but as contestibility by the people 
(distributively) and therefore as intrinsically freedom-friendly if freedom is defined as the 
absence of arbitrary power”. Dahl (1989:5) defines democracy as “a distinctive set of political 
institutions and practices, a particular body of rights, a social and economic order, a system 
that ensures certain desirable results, or a unique process of making collective and binding 
decisions”. Recognising, as Dahl does, that democracy is a “process”, not an event, Kasoma 
(1994b:11) notes that “genuine democracy is never „achieved‟, it is a constant struggle.” 
 
For the purposes of this study, the term “politics” will be understood as, though not limited to, 
a contestation for power between individuals or parties so as to exercise influence in societies. 
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Democracy will be understood as processes that involve discussion, decision-making and 
accountability in public life. 
 
Having defined the terms “politics” and “democracy”, the next step is to review literature 
examining the political role of the media in general.   
 
3.3 The political role of the media  
Having noted that the “political” aspect of journalism is “probably the most critical”, Berger 
(2002:81 – 82) defines journalism as “communication done on behalf of the public interest, 
by people who are relatively independent of special interests”. This definition, according to 
Berger (2002:82) assumes, therefore, that “at root, journalism has a democratic thrust”. The 
term “role” in this context is understood as referring to “a composite of occupational tasks and 
purposes that is widely recognizable and has a stable and enduring form” (Christians, Glasser, 
McQuail, Nordenstreng & White, 2009:119). The relationship between the media and politics 
is as old as when the print media came into being in the West and in Africa as well (McNair, 
2000:19; Berkman & Kitch, 1986:1; Ainslie, 1966:21).  
 
Some media scholars (Larsson, 2002:21; Tettey, 2001:5; 8; Berger, 2002:81; McNair, 
2000:47; Traber, 1989:89; Ansah, 1988:12; Blumler, 1981:121) are of the view that politics 
and the media are two sides of the same coin. Larsson (2002:21) observes that one of the 
“central components of a functioning democracy is the reporting of politics and institutions by 
the news media”. Tettey (2001:5; 8) regards the media and democracy as “symbiotically 
related” in that while in a democratic environment the press provides for citizens 
opportunities to influence the political process, democratic media also enable political leaders 
to be aware of the mood of society so that they can respond immediately.  
 
McNair (2000:47) notes that the media are “important political actors themselves” and 
observes that the “media make statements about politics in their own right, in the form of 
commentaries, editorials and interview questions”. Recognising as McNair does, that the 
media are political actors themselves, this role is welcomed by some and resented by others. 
Lilleker (2006:4) notes that the media‟s “role in society has been both attacked and defended 
by academics, politicians and journalists alike,” these positions being informed by the view 
that the media are “too powerful” and promote agendas that can be contrary to pluralist 
democracy. Those who attack the media, Lilleker further points out, argue that “the media can 
fall under political control, and so weaken pluralism through offering a biased perspective”.  
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Traber (1989:89) observes that news is – both nationally and internationally – “part of the 
political process”. Ansah (1988:12) captures this point by noting that “it is pointless to isolate 
the issue of the media and discuss it outside the general political framework”. The role of the 
media in democracy consists of “making appropriate political information and evaluation 
possible for all citizens” by depicting the political process “in all its diverse dimensions and 
facets” (Meyer & Hinchman, 2002:9). This means, therefore, that the media are expected to 
be catalysts in the democratic process (Traber, 1987:68). This role entails, according to Ungar 
(1995:371), providing “an effective forum for public debate, a mechanism for precious two-
way communication between the people and their leaders”. Ungar further points out that the 
press can, in fact, be “more effective than an opposition party in achieving change in an 
oppressive system”.  
 
At this point a question needs to be asked: Do mass media inherently serve democracy? 
Addressing himself to this question, Bogart (1995:1) observes that the fast and conventional 
answer to this question is in the affirmative. However, Bogart (1995:10) argues that the media 
do not inherently serve democracy but can play that role “only when those who manage them 
feel a passionate responsibility to create and maintain it”. 
 
He (Bogart, 1995:1 – 2) points out that a sober scrutinisation reveals that the media are 
vulnerable to manipulation by political authorities motivated by ideological zeal or crude self-
interest, or by economic forces that limit the media‟s resources, variety and integrity. The 
media‟s quest to serve democracy can get compromised when politicians and media owners 
use their power to suppress the media in order to fulfil their personal gains (Bogart, 1995:5). 
This point – media ownership – will be returned to later in this chapter. 
 
In as much as there is no single definition of the term “democracy”, there is also no single 
type of democracy. Christians et al (2009:95 – 104) mention four models of democracy and 
the role the media are expected to play in such democracies. Next, these models will be 
mentioned, defined and the expectations of the roles of the media in such democracies stated. 
 
 The Pluralist Model of Democracy – Pluralist democracy holds the view that 
individuals can most effectively assert their interests and preferences by coming 
together in the form of groups, small and large, that compete against one another in an 
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effort to find or forge mutually satisfying policies and programmes (Christians et al, 
2009:96). In this set-up 
 
“journalism…promotes negotiation and facilitates the process of bargaining by 
amplifying agendas and by providing platforms for specialized analyses and 
commentaries” (Christians et al, 2009:98). 
 
 The Administrative Model of Democracy – This model holds the view that ordinary 
citizens lack the interest and expertise to effectively govern themselves and, therefore, 
need an elite corps of popularly elected leaders whose dedication to public service 
ensures that matters of legislation and administration receive the serious and sustained 
attention they deserve (Christians et al, 2009:99). In this model of democracy, 
Christians et al (2009:100) observe that 
  
“rather than inform citizens about issues over which they have no direct and 
immediate control, journalism serves an administrative democracy by alerting 
the community to crises, especially ones involving corrupt or incompetent 
leaders”. 
 
Further, journalists, in an administrative democracy, are also expected to provide 
detailed accounts of campaign promises and platforms, especially during the months 
preceding a contested election.  
 
 The Civic Model of Democracy – This model holds the view that citizens convey 
consent in a civic democracy through a distinctively “public judgment” that may or 
may not coincide with the sum of the private choices individuals make in a pluralist or 
administrative democracy (Christians et al, 2009:101). Known also as “public 
reasoning”, “public judgment” denotes a political process through which citizens 
“defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others 
have reason to accept”. In this model the role of journalism is to “find better ways of 
engaging readers…as citizens with a stake in the issues of the day” (Christians et al, 
2009:102). The role of journalism is further seen as that of “promoting and indeed 
improving the quality of public life – and not merely reporting on and complaining 
about it”. 
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 The Direct Model of Democracy – This model “takes self-government literally by 
accentuating unmediated involvement in public affairs” (Christians et al, 2009:103). 
In a direct democracy the role of journalism is to  
 
“serve the interests of the community, not the interests of journalists and their 
managers. The community, rather than market forces or even the newsroom 
itself, needs to be the final arbiter of journalism‟s quality and value.” 
 
The mentioning of the above four types of democracy does not mean that this study is bound 
by and confined to them. They are mentioned because they exist, and also because the role of 
journalism is described in written form. This study is conscious of Wiredu‟s (in Nyamnjoh, 
2005a:35) call for the need to take into consideration traditional African democracy in 
political discourse. This type of democracy is referred to as “consensual democracy” 
(Nyamnjoh, 2005a:35). Adding his support for the examination of indigenous Africans‟ 
notion of democracy, Nyamnjoh (2005a: 27 – 28) notes that liberal democracy is inadequate 
in that, in its insistence on individualism, and African culture‟s emphasis on communalism, 
those Africans who subscribe to the communal aspect of African culture  
 
“are bound to be torn between serving their communities and serving the 
„imagined‟ rights-bearing, autonomous individual „citizen‟ of the liberal 
democratic model”. 
 
Nyamnjoh (2005a:26) asserts that the “future direction of democracy” may well be in a 
“marriage” of coexistence between individual aspirations and community interests. That is so, 
Nyamnjoh further argues, because “Africans continue to emphasise relationships and 
solidarities over the illusion of autonomy”, and that, therefore,  
 
“[f]or democracy to succeed in this context, it must recognise the fact that most 
Africans are primarily patriotic to their home village, to which state and 
country in the modern sense are only secondary”. 
 
One can conclude that what Nyamnjoh is calling for, is a recognition of Africans‟ world-
views. 
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3.4 Summary: Contextualising the political role of the media in a democracy 
This section was concerned with reviewing the political role of the media in a democracy. It 
was pointed out that the term “politics” and “democracy” needed to be defined for contextual 
purposes. Democracy is a complex and contested term, and its definition has been to a great 
extent sensitive to the interests of the Western world. What democracy means and should 
mean to Africans was discussed. Next, attention is given to literature that examines the role of 
the media in a democracy informed by Afrocentric perspectives. 
 
3.5 The role of African journalism in developing “African Consciousness” 
There are a number of academics who, in reflecting on the role of the media in Africa, have 
called for taking into consideration African cultural values (Kareithi, 2005:14; Nyamnjoh, 
2005b:40; Mphahlele, 2004:331; Moemeka & Kasoma, 1994:40; Kasoma, 1994b:9). This 
researcher (Sesanti, 2010:343; Sesanti, 2009a:221; Sesanti, 2009b:132) has also argued for 
this in a few articles. 
 
Writing on the status of the media in South Africa ten years after the first democratic 
elections, Nyamnjoh (2005b:40) noted that although it was relatively too early to use the same 
yardsticks employed for the bulk of Africa in judging South Africa, whose freedom was only 
a decade old, it was worth noting that there was “concern about the slow pace of reform in 
media relations with the black majority in the „so-called new South Africa‟”. One of the 
“concerns” raised by Nyamnjoh was that increased black ownership and partnership in the 
media industry had not necessarily made newspapers “more representative of the concerns, 
interests and aspirations of Africans as cultural communities”. In particular, Nyamnjoh 
(2005b:40) observed that the  
 
“ideas of ubuntu and Africanisation have yet to capture the creative 
imagination of the media and cultural industries beyond the tokenism with 
which we are all too familiar”.  
 
Arguing that greater presence of blacks in the media had not moved beyond “tokenism”, 
Nyamnjoh pointed out that black faces in boardrooms and news had not resulted “in more or 
better coverage of black realities informed by their experiences, predicaments and 
philosophies of life”. In other words, Nyamnjoh was arguing that in the first decade of 
democracy in South Africa, a distinctly Black or African Consciousness was missing in the 
content of the media. The quest for “Africanness” found expression beyond the confines of 
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journalism into the world of African writing. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was an “impulse 
to resist the cultural incorporation of African writing” and “has continued in projects aimed at 
the „decolonization‟ of African culture” (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 2002:126). This quest 
rejected a “Eurocentric” thrust perceived as seeking to make African writers as “apprentice 
European[s] with no canons other than western ones to emulate” (Ashcroft et al, 2002:127).  
In calling for African consciousness in African literature, African writers “stressed the need to 
see African literature in relationship to the society which produced it, and to understand the 
unique characteristics and function of art in Africa” (Ashcroft et al, 2002:125). 
 
In reflecting on the role of black journalists in a democratic South Africa, Mphahlele 
(2004:331) shares Nyamnjoh‟s concerns. According to Mphahlele, the role of black 
journalists should be to “[c]reate a cultural vision” and “help to develop an African 
consciousness”. The creation of a “cultural vision” for Mphahlele means inculcating into the 
minds of black people that  
 
“although we have adopted Western systems of education, of technology, even 
the religion brought by our colonizers – in spite of this, we owe it to our sanity 
of mind to develop African ways of perceiving”. 
 
The development of “African consciousness”, according to Mphahlele (2004:331) means that 
black journalists have a responsibility of “educating the reader about historical actions and 
discourse”: 
 
“We should remind ourselves that several African countries were single vast 
tracts of land before the colonial masters carved up the continent, that in 
establishing boundaries they succeeded in cutting across unilingual 
populations.” 
 
What Mphahlele is advocating for is that black journalists in a democratic society have a 
responsibility of promoting African solidarity and a spirit of pan-Africanism.  In echoing the 
importance of “African consciousness” on the part of African journalists, Moemeka and 
Kasoma (1994:40) argue that  
 
“African journalists…should strive to attain the virtuous life of a good man 
and woman according to African society before they try that of a good 
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journalist. After all, they belong to their society first and are journalists 
second.” 
 
What this means, according to Moemeka and Kasoma, is that African journalists‟ actions 
should be informed by their “customs, traditions, cultural norms and practices”. It is worth 
noting that Moemeka and Kasoma‟s (1994:40) assertion that African journalists “belong to 
their society first and are journalists second” echoes a declaration by black journalists who, in 
the 1970s, inspired by the Black Consciousness philosophy, declared that they were “blacks 
first and journalists second” (Raubenheimer, 1991:102). 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the “African first, and journalist second” discourse was 
revisited by Mbeki (2003a) in his address at a SANEF conference in 2003. Proceeding “from 
the assumption that you were African before you became journalists and that despite your 
profession, you were still Africans”, Mbeki echoes Mphahlele about what “African 
consciousness” on the part of journalists should mean, and how this consciousness should 
influence the role of journalists in post-apartheid South Africa. Mbeki asserts that African 
consciousness on the part of journalists means that journalism should promote 
interconnectedness among Africans, that is, journalists should get Africans to know one 
another so as to promote “African unity”. 
 
This assertion comes against Mbeki‟s observation that when South African exiles returned in 
1990 after the unbanning of liberation movements, 
 
“we realised how little many of our people knew about the rest of our 
continent. Over many years we had absorbed an image of the African continent 
projected by a media that was relentlessly contemptuous of many things 
African.” 
 
As a result of this “contemptuous” media, Mbeki (2003a) observes that “a feeling of 
superiority towards other Africans even among the oppressed in our country” was 
“encouraged”.  
 
For Kareithi (2005:14), African consciousness means “a departure from the kind of news 
values common in the Western tradition which routinely privilege economic, political and 
intellectual elites”. Instead, Kareithi further argues,  
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“the African press should train future journalists to emphasise stories of 
interest to their community of audiences rather than those that promote the 
financial interest of the institutions for which the journalists work”.  
 
There are two points made by Kareithi that need further interrogation. The first is his call for a 
“departure from the kind of news values common in the Western tradition”. The second is his 
call for journalists to serve “community”. These questions arise as a result of his assertion: 
What is the alternative to “news values common in the Western tradition”, and what is meant 
by “community” in the African traditional sense? 
 
3.5.1 An alternative to Western news values 
Before exploring Kareithi‟s alternative model, it is appropriate to first re-visit the Western 
news values that Kareithi opposes. According to the Western tradition newsworthiness is, 
among other things, determined by the following: timeliness, proximity – both geographical 
and psychological – prominence, peculiarity, conflict and human interest. Determining 
newsworthiness in the Western traditional approach can be inappropriate for Africa (Ansah, 
1990:35). In particular, Ansah (1990:33) identifies three news values that he regards as 
inappropriate for African development. These are: timeliness, prominence and negativity.  
 
 Timeliness – the emphasis on timeliness reveals an approach to news as a perishable 
merchandise with a monetary value (Ansah, 1990:34). According to Ansah (1990:35) 
the problem with this approach is that news become an event-driven exercise, as 
opposed to a process-driven one. For developing countries like those of Africa, over-
emphasis on events deprives consumers of an opportunity to make sense of complex 
political issues. 
 
 Prominence – the emphasis on prominence means the privileging of the political, 
social and economic elites of societies in the media (Ansah, 1990:33).  Martin and 
Chaudhary (1983:3) note that “News of the elite (i.e., of important people) is generally 
given preference by all editors”.  In the Western context, such selection is based on the 
assumption that the elite are known to larger segments of the audience, and therefore 
news about them is of more general interest (Martin & Chaudhary, 1983:3 – 4).  
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On the African continent, where many people are poor, this means the negligence of 
their stories by the media. Such negligence, Traber (1987:69) argues, gives focus on 
prominence an anti-democratic edge, in that the poor are marginalised while the elite 
of society are given attention. It is against this background that Kareithi (2005:14) 
argues for an approach which “calls for a departure from the kind of news values 
common in the Western tradition which routinely privilege economic, political and 
intellectual elites”. Kareithi‟s assertion is echoed by Nyamnjoh (2005b:47) who 
argues that the “duty” of African journalists is “not to lecture fellow Africans from the 
insensitive pulpits of power and prejudice”. Rather, Nyamnjoh points out, the role of 
African journalists should be to be the eyes and noses of the people, “carefully 
observing and documenting the lives of ordinary people in ways that are really of 
service to them and their priorities in life”. This might call, Nyamnjoh further 
observes, from time to time, for “breaks with traditions and received wisdom on how 
journalism should or should not be practised”. 
 
Nyamnjoh‟s call for breaks with “traditions and received wisdom” is a rejection of a 
Western-inspired approach to journalism and a call to African journalists to infuse 
their journalism with African cultural values. 
 
 Negativity – The emphasis on negative news in “the West… is thought to be of 
greater interest than positive news”, the rationale being that “the West expects 
progress; hence failure is newsworthy because it is an aberration, an unusual situation” 
(Martin & Chaudhary, 1983:5). Martin and Chaudhary (1983:6) further point out that 
the press‟ interest in negative news is motivated by the belief that publication of 
negative news by the press “promotes dissatisfaction and therefore interest in more 
news (i.e., reports of change) in the hope that there will be a change for the better”.  
 
For those who advocate a developmental role for the media in Africa, “negative news” 
means “information that may tend to undermine national integration and solidarity or 
retard economic and social progress” (Ansah, 1990:34). Boateng (1999:388 – 9) 
protests against a “dominating culture of news processing in the Western media, in 
which good news has very little value”. Boateng further observes that while such 
negative news may not be inaccurate, the lack of positive news “has resulted in the 
indelibly negative projection of a depraved continent and masses of various national 
citizens with a very low self-esteem”. 
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Having made the above observations, the next point to consider is Kareithi‟s proposed 
alternative. Kareithi (2005:12) asserts that “[w]hat Africa needs is an „articulation model‟ of 
the press”. Such a model, he further points out, “would combine the ethical journalistic 
considerations of accuracy and fairness and the right of the public to know”. Its difference 
from other models is that it would be “linked to the institutions of civil society – not outside 
of them, but an intrinsic part of their functioning”. Kareithi‟s (2005:12) articulation model 
“emphasises group and societal values rather than focusing on the individualisms promoted 
by a fetishistic market-led press”. His proposed model of the press “de-emphasises the 
packaging of public information as a commodity for sale” and “calls for an approach to 
journalism that emphasises community values over individualism”. The latter assertion leads 
to the second issue: the meaning of the concept of “community” from an African traditional 
perspective and its implications for journalism. 
 
3.5.2 The meaning of “community” in the African traditional sense and its implications 
for journalism 
The concept “community values” according to Kareithi (2005:13) refers to Africans‟ 
traditional beliefs in the importance of “social units like family, clan and ethnic groups from 
which many Africans still draw their identities”. The belief in the unity of these units means, 
for Kareithi (2005:13), a rejection of “individualism”. In order to be able to understand 
Kareithi‟s strong opposition, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the concept of 
“community” according to African traditional beliefs. In African culture, the concept of 
community consists of the living, the dead, and those yet unborn (Kasoma, 1996:102; 
Richards, 1996:212; Kamalu, 1990:157). Those who have passed on are regarded as an 
integral part of the community in the belief that “the spirits of the dead have bodies too but 
that these bodies are spiritual and not physical” (Kasoma, 1996:103). 
 
Reflecting on the meaning of the “community” in the context of African culture, Kasoma 
(1994a:26 – 27) observes that “a good action is one that is performed for the benefit or service 
of other persons”. That is because 
 
“[f]or the African, it is the survival of the family, clan and community that 
matters more than that of the individual. The individual is important only in so 
far as he or she is part of the family, clan or community. A good person is one 
who gears all his or her actions to the preservation and well-being of the 
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family, clan and community…A bad person is one whose actions are 
motivated by personal gain to the exclusion of or, worse still, elimination of 
the family or ethnic group.” 
 
Kasoma (1994a:27) is conscious that the above assertion could be misconstrued or 
misunderstood as a suggestion that “Africans do not hold individual rights dear”. On the 
“contrary”, he argues that “there are many practices in African society which attest to the very 
high regard Africans have for the individual”. Among these is the “almost godly reverence for 
the dead” that Africans have. The “elaborate funeral rites” that Africans conduct “are intended 
to show that the living hold the departed person as a valued member of their community, one 
whose worth does not end with their [sic] death” (Kasoma, 1997:27). 
 
Conceptualising this African approach as the “philosophy of collectivism”, Kamalu (1990:26) 
notes that  
 
“[t]his form of collectivism recognises individuality. The individual in African 
society, being aware of the African notion of collective moral responsibility 
takes his individual moral responsibility all the more seriously; for his actions 
will have consequences not only for himself but for his community.” 
 
What this means, therefore, is that while African culture recognises and embraces 
individuality (uniqueness of the individual), it rejects individualism – the notion that an 
individual is responsible for him/herself and does what s/he wishes irrespective of the 
concerns of his/her community. Against this background, Kasoma (1994b:9) argues that  
 
“African journalists must look to their moral philosophy for those principles 
and values which will raise African journalism to a more acceptable ethical or 
moral level than has been the case during much of the post-colonial era.”  
 
3.6 Summary: African Cultural Consciousness 
This section has reviewed literature discussing the role of African culture in journalism, and 
the role of journalism in African culture. Scholars argued that African values such as 
communalism, as opposed to Western individualism, should inform the approach of African 
journalists to their profession. What this means is that the scholars argued that African 
journalism should be driven by African consciousness. Among other things “African 
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consciousness” means that African journalists should consider themselves Africans first, and 
journalists second. It was observed that this call was reminiscent of the 1970s in South Africa 
when black journalists imbued with Black Consciousness asserted that they were blacks first, 
and journalists second (Raubenheimer, 1991:102). Calls for the infusion of African cultural 
values have posed challenges of their own for journalism practice. These challenges are 
discussed next. 
 
3.7 African culture and journalism – negative implications 
While some African scholars have called for African consciousness in journalism practice, 
other media scholars‟ writings (Rooney, 2007:213; Tomaselli, 2009:6; Tomaselli, 2003:432; 
Musalika, 1994:155; Okigbo, 1994:77; Wilcox, 1977:35 – 36) on journalism practice in 
Africa have noted that calls for infusing journalism with African culture have had negative 
implications for journalism on the continent. 
 
The scholars argue that the concept of “respect” in African culture promotes an obeisant and 
acquiescent behaviour among its practitioners, in general, and an uncritical attitude in 
journalists, in particular (Rooney, 2007:213; Tomaselli, 2003:432; Wilcox, 1977:35 – 36). In 
line with this assumption, Musalika (1994:155) asserts that “[p]robably one of the worst 
practices of African culture is the excessive respect without questioning bestowed on elders 
and those holding power”. Noting that “[t]raditionally, it would be grossly indecent and 
unpardonably rude to show disrespect to an elder statesman in the name of „journalistic 
objectivity‟”, Okigbo (1994:77) contends that  
 
“[s]uch a cultural practice can lead to serious ethical problems as young 
reporters battle with their consciences on how to present negative news reports 
about community elders”. 
 
Rooney (2007:213) observes that in a society like Swaziland, where informal education 
“centres on the home and community where children are taught to respect and recognise their 
elders”, this African emphasis on “respect and deference does not encourage a questioning 
attitude in people”. Consequently, critical thinking – a necessary tool for all journalists –  
 
“is a difficult task as Swazi journalism does not engage with power or confront 
established thinkers and yet it is journalists who challenge the people who 
produce and reproduce conventional wisdom” (Rooney, 2007:218).  
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In his interaction with Swazi journalism students, Tomaselli (2003:432) encountered the same 
experience where students argued that to question authorities is alien to African culture.  
 
The claim that African culture frowns upon dissent towards authority is disputed by Ansah 
(1988: 4 – 5). Ansah contends that “[e]ven the king or chief was subject to laws, and failure to 
abide by them could entail his de-stoolment or removal from office”. According to Ansah 
(1988:5), if Africa‟s record in terms of respect for human rights is a  
 
“dismal one, this cannot be properly attributed to the assumption that Africans 
have a completely different conception of human rights from that of the 
Western societies”. 
 
Ansah further points out that reasons for poor performance on human rights in Africa have to 
be sought “elsewhere, but certainly not in African cultural and political traditions”. Ansah 
further points out that in traditional African society, freedom of expression is recognised as a 
“fundamental right where consensus was given a high premium, and this was based on the 
free expression of opinion”. Similar to Ansah‟s assertion, Williams (1987:168) notes that 
being a “king” or “chief” in African societies meant being “the mouthpiece of the people and 
the instrument for carrying out their will”.  
  
William‟s assertion is confirmed by Davidson (1994:36) who observes that among the people 
known as the Zanj, on the East African coast, the Africans gave the title “Waqlimi” which 
means “supreme lord” to their king “because he has been chosen to govern them with equity”. 
Significantly, Davidson further observes that  
 
“once he [the king] becomes tyrannical and departs from the rules of justice, 
they cause him to die and exclude his posterity from succession to the throne, 
for they claim that in behaving thus he ceases to be the son of the Master, that 
is to say, of the king of heaven and earth.”  
 
These accounts by Willliams and Davidson are an indication that Africans were intolerant to 
injustice. Not even a king was spared from the sword if he deviated from principles of justice. 
That is because, as Davidson (1994:21 – 22) notes, in the inner African tradition, kings  
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“could not be divine no matter how much ordinary mortals might humble 
themselves in the dust when approaching the royal presence. What was divine 
in African belief was their spiritual authority. They would die but that could 
not.”  
 
Reflecting on the Akan experience in Ghana, Busia (in Ansah, 1988:5) observes that the  
 
“members of a traditional council allowed discussion, and free and frank 
discussion of opinions, and if there was disagreement, they spent hours, even 
days if necessary, to argue and exchange ideas till they reached unanimity.”  
 
Busia‟s observation is not uniquely Akan but a traditional African practice. As Kasoma 
(1994a:28) for instance notes, “the reason why Africans often hold what appear to be endless 
discussions until they reach agreement” is that the long discussions are meant to give each 
member of the community a say, even if it means merely repeating what others have already 
said. If there is disagreement, Kasoma further notes, Africans are known to spend hours and 
even days in reaching consensus. Sachs (1996:155), has accurately observed that “consensus 
seeking…is very powerful in African culture”. 
 
One can thus state that African consensus did not and does not mean absence of criticism or 
disagreement. Rather, as Sachs (1996:154) correctly observes,  
 
“the African style would be to acknowledge the right of the person you are 
going to criticize to express their point of view, to acknowledge the good 
points of what they have to say, and only then to continue with the critique”.  
 
Those entrusted with alerting the nation to the rulers‟ deviation were iimbongi (in isiXhosa) 
or izimbongi (in isiZulu). These Nguni terms have been loosely and misleadingly translated 
into English as “praise-singers”. Imibongo, which Kunene (1984:xxix – xxx) notes “have 
been wrongly described as praise poems,” have in traditional African societies done “more 
than praise” and are more complex…  
    
“Rather, they project an ethical system beyond the individual. Thus,  
individuals are heroes so long as they fulfil the roles defined for them by 
society. If they become arrogant and disrespectful of elders (guardians of 
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social order) they are mercilessly lampooned and demoted…The greatest 
exponents of this social doctrine are the poets whose freedom of speech is 
jealously guarded by society.” 
 
As Chinweizu (1999:364) notes, in traditional African societies, poets “informed, advised, 
admonished” prince and populace alike, inviting them to righteous living. In traditional 
African societies, as Dandala (1996:76) observes, iimbongi, were “accountable not to the 
incumbent chief, but to the ancestors”. The ancestors‟ wisdom stressed the importance of 
justice, as pointed out above. Significantly, Dandala (1996:77) notes that iimbongi‟s role “is 
to be the official reader of the context of the governance of the chief, similar to today‟s 
journalists”. Taking a cue from Dandala, the interpretation of this observation can be that 
journalists, from an African cultural perspective, are expected to be critical of power. 
 
Williams (1987:165) notes that the African philosophy that accorded deference to elders was 
based upon the assumption that “all other things being equal, those who were living in the 
world and experiencing life before others were born should know more than these others”.  
Echoing this point, Kasoma (1996:104) notes that in African communities counselling is 
usually done by elders, who, because of their wide experience in life, are looked up to as 
being wiser than the younger members of the community. However, this attitude and 
approach was not absolute. As Mthembu (1996:224) correctly observes, “[a]dults and children 
respect each other”. As Kasoma (1996:104) further observes,  
 
“[w]hen it is elders who are going wrong and there are no age mates to advise 
them, there is also room for young people to advise elders provided proper 
etiquette is followed”.  
 
What this means, therefore, is that if adults deviated from communal norms, young ones 
could sensitise them to this.  
 
African traditions demanded respect for the young ones of the society in the belief that since 
they are “physically weak and vulnerable”, they needed “special attention, care, and indeed 
respect” (Traber, 1987:67). Therefore, historically, in African culture, respect was not 
exclusively reserved for the powerful elders – it was also accorded to the physically weak and 
vulnerable. 
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Hence, “children are taught from young age that they must refer to anyone who is the same 
age as their father/mother as father/mother, and never to call such people by their names as 
this would be considered disrespectful” (Kamwangamalu, 1999:28). What this means, as 
Sachs (1996:148) observes, is that traditional African society placed a great emphasis on 
“community interaction, on mutual solidarity and support, and on trying to achieve consensus 
wherever possible”. If a person refused to conform to the prescribed standards, s/he would be 
referred to as “akamntu wamntu”, a Nguni expression meaning “not part of the 
community/not human” (Mthembu, 1996:220).  
 
Cognisant of this background, this researcher (Sesanti, 2010:344) argues that the concept of 
respect in the context of African culture has been misconstrued by the African elite, and 
consequently misunderstood by both academics and students who have commented on it. 
Elsewhere,  this researcher (Sesanti, 2009:14) also points out that years of colonial rule in 
South Africa ensured that to a great extent black Africans were alienated from their culture, 
and as a result became ignorant of its tenets. This condition rendered open an environment 
where many could make claims in the name of African culture without facing a challenge. 
 
3.8 Summary – negative implications for African culture in the context of journalism 
practice 
In this section it was pointed out that some scholars have argued that the concept of respect in 
African culture is inimical to journalism practice. That is because, the scholars argued, 
African culture promotes acquiescence in the face of power. However, it was also argued by 
this researcher that years of colonial rule ensured that African culture was distorted by the 
African elite for their own selfish ends.  
 
The next session considers recommendations made that African journalism should play a role 
in promoting a consciousness of African history through the media. 
 
3.9 The need for the media to promote a consciousness of African history 
There are at least two roles that the media have played in Africa – aiding colonialism and 
resisting colonialism (Ainslie, 1966:19; Banda, 2007:73; Musa, 2009:35 – 37). In the first 
instance, the “media were seen as direct accomplices” of the European colonialists in the 
same way as “other dominant contemporary societal institutions, such as the colonial police, 
judiciary and civil service” were perceived by oppressed Africans (Musa, 2009:37). In the 
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second instance, the media were used by African nationalists in their struggle against 
colonialism (Musa, 2009:38). 
 
Against this background, Netshitenzhe (1999:382) asserts that it is critical in the democratic 
South Africa for the media “to ensure that the ideas and values which inspired the forces that 
brought about the liberation become the dominant ideas in each of our countries and on the 
continent”. This sentiment is shared by Ngwenya (1999:15) who notes that black journalists‟ 
agenda in the democratic South Africa “is very much influenced by the liberation project, 
along with its deviations, setbacks and breakthroughs”.  Ngwenya‟s continuation of “the 
liberation project” means “a transition from armed conflict to an arena of policy warfare”. In 
this arena, Ngwenya observes, “many black people appeared disinterested or ill-equipped, if 
not too politically fatigued to fight on”. What Ngwenya envisages in this regard is that the 
role of black journalists should be to help black people understand the critical need to engage 
with policy formulation exercises.  
 
Black journalists, according to Ngwenya (1999:15), need to make black people aware of the 
“avenues and platforms where the country‟s national agenda is being contested and settled, 
and become factors rather than eternally aggrieved absentees”. For Netshitenzhe, the 
liberation project entails that “African journalists, whatever their political affiliation, should 
become passionate advocates of Africa‟s renewal”. Here, Netshitenzhe is referring to the 
African Renaissance project which had defined the trajectory of the democratic government 
led by Nelson Mandela‟s successor, Thabo Mbeki. There was a feeling in government circles 
that the media was apathetic towards “being part of the African Renaissance” (Ngwenya, 
2001:8).  
 
Nyamnjoh (2005b:32) argues that in dealing with post-colonial issues, African journalists 
must “put things in historical context, even when speaking as journalists whose focus is 
usually the current situation and events”. Nyamnjoh (2005b:33) advances this argument 
against the observation that “former colonial masters” tend  
 
“to wipe clean the colonial blackboard of excesses and high-handedness, not 
through reparations but by sheer rhetoric and exaggeration of the degree to 
which African states are really independent actors, nationally and in global 
affairs”.  
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The point that Nyamnjoh is making is that African journalists, while not defending dictatorial 
tendencies pushed by post-colonial governments must not embrace former colonial masters‟ 
self-exoneration. That is because, Nyamnjoh further argues, post-colonial African leaders 
inherited oppressive laws and systems from their colonialists. In arguing that “Africans 
cannot afford to ignore their histories of collective devaluation and deprivation”, Nyamnjoh 
points out that this is a “call for journalists and scholars to put things into historical context” 
and “indeed for critical attention to the convergences and divergences between the past and 
present in media-state relations”. Historical context is important to Nyamnjoh (2005b:33 
because “[j]ust as it is dangerous to blame everything on the past, it is equally dangerous to 
deny the power of the past in shaping the present”. In this regard, Mphahlele (2004:331) notes 
that the duty of black journalists is to “remind one another that independence was not a gift 
from heaven. It was the result of purposeful struggle...” What this means is that black 
journalists should inculcate in the minds of black people that they should be assertive in their 
newly-found state of freedom and not behave as if they are grateful to anyone for their 
freedom.  
 
3.10 Summary: Media’s role in promoting consciousness of African history 
This section reviewed media scholars‟, intellectuals‟ and journalists‟ writings on the role of 
the media in promoting consciousness of African history. In dealing with the successes and 
failures of the African continent, journalists must situate their analysis in a historical context. 
A point was made also that since journalists are not apart from but part of society, they must 
play their role in advancing the aspirations of the African continent. 
 
The next point to be discussed is media ownership in Africa.  
 
3.11 Media ownership and its enabling and constraining factor on the media’s role in 
democracy  
In Chapter 4 – on Theoretical Frameworks – this study will discuss the assertions of Political 
Economy of the media, which argues that the contents and meanings carried by the media 
reflect the interests of those who finance the production of the media contents – not just media 
owners, but advertisers as well (Boyd-Barrett, 2006:186; McChesney, 2004:3; 1998:3; 
Curran, 2000:73; MacGregor, 1997:48; Altschull, 1997:259; Curran, Gurevitch, & 
Woollacott, 1982:19). The Political Economy theories of the media oppose the Liberal-
Pluralists‟ assertions observing that the “marketplace model is a truly democratic approach to 
accountability” in the assumption that “the people, speaking clearly through the market, 
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determine to a great degree the content of the media” (Merrill, 1989:15). The issue addressed 
in this section – media ownership – will also be given attention to as part of theoretical 
frameworks in Chapter 4. 
 
This study does not just discuss theoretical issues in relation to media ownership and media 
content in Chapter 4, but in Chapter 2 it also discusses concrete examples such as the 
implications media ownership have had in the operations of the South African media. This 
was done with particular reference to the Sowetan and the City Press (Vosloo, 2010; 
Diederichs & de Beer, 1998:101; Mabote, 1996a:323). 
 
This section reviews literature examining media ownership implications for the political role 
of the media in democracy in Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2004:129; Hydén & Okigbo, 2002:49; 
Tomaselli, 2002:129; Rønning & Kupe, 2000:157; Kasoma, 1996:101; Rønning, 1994:3). The 
dominant perspective that emerges from this review is that neither government nor capital 
ownership of the media is a guarantor of a democratic role for the media. Nyamnjoh 
(2004:128), for instance, in arguing that neither the African states nor the market ownership 
of the media has afforded Africans democracy, points out that “the media in Africa are 
effectively controlled by government and capital, who are both keen to feed the public with 
nothing subversive to their interests and power”. 
 
Rønning (1994:3) observes that the problem with the debate over the role of the media in the 
democratic process in Africa is that too much emphasis has been put on the role of the state. 
This is a result of many years of strict government control of the media, “often in the form of 
direct ownership”. As a result of this over-emphasis on government control of the media, 
Rønning notes that the “problematic role of the market in relation to the media has been 
underplayed”. The consequence of the underplaying of the role of the market, Rønning 
asserts, is that “too little attention has been paid to a discussion of the media in relation to 
citizens‟ rights”. Citizens‟ rights, in the context discussed by Rønning, become, as Nyamnjoh 
(2004:129) also observes, “peripheral”. While to a great extent the media in the greater part of 
the African continent are owned and controlled by governments, in South Africa the most 
“significant aspect of the media sector is the dominance of corporate capital” (Tomaselli, 
2002:129). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, after (not necessarily because) blacks had bought some stake in the 
media, Tomaselli (2002:148) observes that “all English-language papers, some now with 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
 
black editors, began to reinvigorate themselves”. This was in terms of broader “political, 
economic, and identity issues”. Tomaselli notes that news was indeed becoming “national”, 
that is, addressing all the country‟s citizens, in a way that was “non-racial” and  
“multi-cultural”. Specifically, Tomaselli (2002:148) notes that  
 
  “[f]or the first time black people and stories about blacks began to appear with  
  regularity and with much greater representativity than had previously occurred 
  in mainly white-read news media”. 
 
Nyamnjoh (2004:125), however, does not share Tomaselli‟s optimism. He notes that in South 
Africa, where freedom was achieved in 1994, “the press is yet to break free of its past record 
of black debasement”. He further notes that although  
 
“the end of apartheid has led to some degree of black ownership and 
partnership in the press, this has not made the newspapers more representative 
of South African society”. 
 
Nyamnjoh (2004:125) further observes that newspapers “are yet to develop a more 
comprehensive news formula that articulates mainstream black interests and aspirations”. 
 
While in South Africa media ownership is characterised by private ownership, in other 
African countries media ownership is both private and public, that is, state-owned (Rønning 
& Kupe, 2000:157). The consequences of post-colonial government takeover of the media, 
with particular reference to Zimbabwe, according to Rønning and Kupe (2000:158), was that  
 
“the news media developed into praise-singers for the party and their leader in 
the name of national unity, and their agenda consisted of an emphasis on 
development journalism in its most uncritical form”.  
 
Hydén and Okigbo (2002:49) note that the ownership of the media by individual tycoons 
directly involved in political life contributed to the media‟s failure in promoting democracy. 
This ownership pattern, Hydén and Okigbo further note, resulted in the media becoming the 
“mouthpieces of the agenda of these particular individuals rather than serving the interests of 
a wider public”. In Kasoma‟s (1996:101) observation, such acts by journalists are misuse of 
press freedom and abuse of democracy.  Onadipe and Lord (in Tettey, 2006:240) echoes 
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Hydén and Okigbo‟s observation by noting that some African journalists are on record as 
having stated that “if your paper is owned by a politician then you are expected to toe the 
line”. This is alluded to by Rønning (2009:164) as well in noting that the media‟s efforts in 
entrenching democracy and fighting corruption can be impeded when the media are controlled 
by “strong and often fraudulent business interests”. 
 
3.12 Summary: Media Ownership 
This section reviewed literature examining the implications of media ownership for 
journalism practice. It was pointed out that in the South African case the print media is 
privately owned and that ownership implications in the South African case were discussed in 
Chapter 2. While this is the case, implications of black ownership of the media in South 
Africa were discussed. Bearing in mind that Chapter 4 discusses ownership of the media 
widely, this chapter discussed ownership of the media with specific reference to Africa. It was 
pointed out that both state-owned and privately-owned media were compelled to live up to the 
expectations of their owners. 
 
In the next section attention is given to the roles expected of the media in post-apartheid 
South Africa and the rest of the African continent. 
 
3.13 The role of the media in “nation building”, “national development” and the 
“national interest” 
As pointed out above, when apartheid was dismantled in South Africa, the new government, 
headed by the ANC, expected the media to play a role in “nation-building”,  “national 
development”, and “national interest” (Wasserman & de Beer, 2006:68 – 70; Fourie, 
2002:34). These concepts have different meanings for different people. Their relationship 
with the media and how the media were expected to play a role in advancing them will be 
examined as part of the literature review in this section.  
 
3.13.1 Nation Building 
The concept “nation-building” means different things to different people and can, therefore, 
be defined in different ways. Brinkel (2006:18) defines nation-building as a “project of 
establishing ties among the citizens of a state oriented towards the relations between state and 
citizens”. These citizens, Brinkel further observes, “may belong to one or sometimes more 
cultural communites…but they all share citizenship of one state”. Nation-building can also be 
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defined as a process that is “undertaken either to bring peace or to reconstruct a society badly 
damaged by internal conflict” (Jenkins & Plowden, 2006:1).  
 
The need for media support for African governments has been identified in cases where newly 
independent African countries inherited bitter feelings and hatred as a result of wars during 
the struggle for freedom (Ziegler & Asante, 1992:36). In such cases the media were called 
upon to play the role of supporting what has been referred to in some African countries as 
“nation-building” and “national reconciliation”. When South Africa attained democracy in 
1994, one of the government‟s first prioritised objectives was to reconcile blacks and whites 
and fuse the two into one South African non-racial nation. In the new South Africa, the 
government expected black journalists to play a role in nation-building (Media on the menu, 
1996:8).  
 
It appears, though, that the South African government, or at least, the Head of State, Nelson 
Mandela, did not expect criticism in this regard. When criticism emerged from amongst senior 
black journalists, Mandela singled out some for, in his words, “making it difficult for us in 
promoting reconciliation without which we would not have had peaceful transformation” 
(Media on the menu, 1996:47). The appeal to the media in Africa to play a role in nation-
building is not uniquely South African. Such calls have been made in other African countries 
as well. On this point, Ziegler and Asante (1992:35) point out that such calls were made 
against the legacy of colonialism. Citing Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, 
Ziegler and Asante note that at independence in these countries there was “no concept of 
nation”.  
 
The wars of independence in these countries “left bitter feelings of hatred in the hearts of 
some people” (Musarurwa in Ziegler & Asante, 1992:35). In other African countries ethnic 
consciousness dominated national consciousness. According to Ziegler and Asante (1992:36) 
in this regard African journalists were required to be “sensitive and responsive” to “national 
problems”. Without nation-building, African politicians saw little hope of national 
development. There was an expectation that the media should play a role in national 
development which is discussed next. 
 
3.13.2 National Development 
The concept “development” is, according to Prah (2006:178) “generally understood to 
embrace the idea of advancement in all areas of social life, but particularly in an economic 
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sense”. It also means, “in the minds of the general citizenry, that choice and desired consumer 
items are not only available, but within the purchasing power of the larger classes” (Prah, 
2006: 177 – 178). According to Rodney (1982:3) at the level of the individual, development 
“implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, 
responsibility, and material well-being”. At the level of social groups, Rodney further points 
out, it “implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships”. 
   
The 1960s, a period that saw the gaining of independence from colonial powers, was for many 
a period of “great hope and expectation in Africa” (Odhiambo, 1991:20). During that period, 
the path of Africa‟s “bright future seemed clear and well-defined”, the objective being to 
“regain lost glory and enter a new age of restoration and cultural Renaissance” (Odhiambo, 
1991:21). 
 
At this point in history, Odhiambo notes that the continent‟s intellectual and political 
leadership was in agreement that Africa‟s emancipation was predicated on rapid socio-
economic development. Thus, Odhiambo further observes, “development became the 
historical organic ideology, or the organising principle, for social policy and programmes”. 
Against this background, development “was historically necessary given the prevailing 
structures of post-colonial backwardness and poverty”. The media was expected to play a role 
in the development project. 
 
Considering that some former colonialists left some African countries “woefully illiterate”, 
Ziegler and Asante (1992:35 – 36) argue that the political role of the press in post-colonial 
Africa should be to assist new African governments in meeting challenges that arose 
following the attainment of independence. They note, for instance, that when the Belgians left 
Zaire, they left a nation in which no more than twenty individuals had a college education. In 
the case of Mozambique, the Portuguese “dismantled infra-structure of Mozambique as 
rapidly as they could, taking with them even the design of the sewerage of Maputo”. 
However, Ziegler and Asante (1992:39) point out that support for the “government does not 
mean absolute agreement with all policies of the government” but that such support does 
“include criticism of the state”.  
 
Development journalism designates the journalistic activity of gathering news with a view to 
satisfying the needs of a country‟s population with specific reference to development and is 
“invariably positive in its disclosure” (Ngugi, 1995:8). In defining “development news”, 
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Ansah (1990:34) observes that such entails information on how to achieve specific 
development objectives and actual achievements. These reports may entail the building of 
new schools, hospitals, bridges and roads as well as political education and agricultural 
development (Ziegler & Asante, 1992:37).  Qualifying news as “developmental” is an 
indication that developmental journalism sets it apart from other forms of journalism. 
 
The birth of developmental journalism was the recognition of a nation‟s need for economic 
development and as such “required reporters and editors capable of understanding and 
transmitting increasingly complex economic, scientific, and related information” (Sussman, 
1978:76). While Sussman (1978:77) concedes that developmental journalism “began as an 
inspiration of professional journalists, not government information directors”, he contends 
that for developmental journalism to succeed, “governments must control the mass media in 
the name of economic development”. That is because, Sussman argues, “[o]nly the 
government is responsible for, and can assure [sic], the proper use of communication for this 
purpose”.  
 
Sussman‟s contention indicates that there was no uniformity of approach in developmental 
journalism‟s school of thought. His approach, as he himself notes, was “distinct from the 
earlier development journalism, which was essentially non-governmental in origin and 
practice”. 
 
Against this background, some believe that given the developmental role of information 
dissemination, and in the light of Africa‟s political and social problems, positive news should 
be stressed and negative news played down or not reported at all (Ansah, 1990:34). While 
Ansah does not reject the aspect of “positiveness” as a characteristic of developmental 
journalism or news, he warns that the stressing of positive news should not be confused with 
or mean the playing down or complete concealment of negative news. Ansah (1990:34) 
observes that development is not the same as turning a blind eye on African governments‟ 
failures in the achievement of national objectives. He contends that failure to expose 
governments‟ shortcomings will “breed cynicism in the audience…and undermine the 
credibility of the media”. While recognising the need for exposing governments‟ wrongs, 
Ansah (1990:34) issues a caveat: 
    
“Failures and setbacks should surely not be played up in the way it is 
  done by the foreign media which thrive on coups, earthquakes and 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
  crises in Third World countries as their regular stock-in-trade, but they 
  should not be glossed over either.” 
 
Other than playing a role in national development, the media in Africa have been expected to 
play a role in promoting the national interest, an issue that is discussed next. 
 
3.13.4 The National Interest 
The concept “national interest” is according to Adar (2002:102) used in at least two different 
senses. It refers, in the first usage, to “the goals or objectives of a state‟s foreign policy”. In 
the second usage, “national interest can be used as a justification for any state policy” (Adar, 
2002:103). Similarly, Burchill (2005:26) notes that the concept “national interest” is 
employed in two related ways, the first being “to describe, justify or oppose foreign policy, 
and secondly, as an analytical tool for assessing and explaining the external behaviour of 
nation-states”. The debate regarding whether or not the media in South Africa should serve 
the national interest surfaced between the years 2000 and 2003 (Mak‟Ochieng, 2006:1; 
Fourie, 2002:18).  Fourie (2002:28) notes that in the year 2000 government officials and 
cabinet ministers increasingly claimed that the media did not support development plans and 
ideals, and thus were not serving the national interest.  
 
While the government saw the need for the media to serve the national interest, there was no 
consensus in the media fraternity, firstly about what the concept meant, and secondly, on 
whether or not the media should serve the national interest (Mak‟Ochieng, 2006:14). Those 
who opposed the notion of the media serving the national interest cited the following reasons 
(Mak‟Ochieng, 2006:5 – 6): 
 
 In apartheid South Africa the government invoked the national interest in pursuit of its 
apartheid policies. 
 Governments do not necessarily serve the national interest but sectional interests. 
 The interests of the state can be presented as being in the national interest but not in 
the public interest. 
 
Those in favour of the media serving the national interest – but in a critical manner – argued 
that the national interest entailed: 
 
 Fighting poverty and the instability that poverty entailed. 
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 Building people‟s capacity to know their rights and to exercise them as the country‟s 
citizens (Mak‟Ochieng, 2006:5 – 6). 
 
Recognising the need for the media to serve the public interest in a democratic society, 
Netshitenzhe (2002a) argues that the media have a role in defining and promoting the national 
interest, further pointing out that a genuine national interest in a democracy cannot of 
necessity be contradictory to the public interest. Recognising that national and public interest 
are distinguishable, Netshitenzhe (2002a) further points out that the two “can and do coincide; 
they can and should be in fact be complementary, specifically under conditions of abiding 
democracy and a culture of human rights”. The reason that Netshitenzhe (2002a) puts forward 
for the convergence of national and public interest is that democratic governments do not 
exist for themselves but to serve society which gave them the mandate to rule.  
 
While legitimate [democratic] states have been given the mandate to define the national 
interest, Netshitenzhe (2002b) argues that the governed have a right to contribute on how they 
should be governed – and that is where the media come in – to serve as platforms in engaging 
the government.  
 
In response to those who argue that it could be in the public interest to expose corruption in 
the government, but not in the national interest, Netshitenzhe (2002a) argues that “there is no 
reason why it should not be in the national interest or even a truly democratic government‟s 
interest to expose corruption”. For the record, Netshitenzhe (2002b) understands that “public 
interest” means to “represent the interests of the aggregate collective of citizens – independent 
of state institutions”. On the other hand, Netshitenzhe (2002b) defines the national interest as 
a “sixth sense” of the state which “cannot be decreed in statutes” but whose starting point, in 
the South African context, is the constitution. 
 
Tsedu (in Mak‟Ochieng, 2006:7) echoes Netshitenzhe when he notes that the serving of the 
public interest by the media does not always mean serving everyone‟s interest, but those of 
well-organised and vociferous groups of people. In a similar vein to Tsedu‟s point, Tettey 
(2006:233) notes that the notion of the media serving the public interest implies “the 
responsibility of protecting and upholding the values on which the society is built”. Tettey 
elucidates this assertion by noting that this “assignment of responsibility comes with 
expectations that the media will go about performing their functions in a manner that is 
consistent with the ideals and values of societies in which they operate”. Even the serving of 
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what is understood as the public is not without being problematic. Tettey (2006:233) asks, for 
instance, what happens when the “ideals and values of society in which (the media) operate” 
are not consistent with democratic ideals? 
 
In cases such as when publics served by the media have anti-democratic inclinations, Haas 
and Steiner‟s (2003:39) observation give a sense of direction. They note that journalists 
should be “required to expose…specific articulations of racism, homophobia, sexism, and 
religious intolerance as such, even if these apparently represent dominant community values” 
(researcher‟s italics). This means that the notion of serving the public interest should neither 
be confused with nor reduced to the media playing a conformist role but a critical one. 
 
Discussing the question of “who decides whether news is, or is not, in the national interest”, 
Moemeka and Kasoma (1994:48) point out that such “power should belong to journalists and 
not politicians”, adding that when “journalists surrender this right, the press is not free”. 
Kasoma (1994a:30) further observes that the issue of the national interest had been used in 
other parts of the African continent by politicians whose agenda had been to protect their own 
interest. A “good example of imposed journalistic duty” is when politicians often call on 
African journalists, directly or indirectly, to have a sense of responsibility for national unity 
by not reporting on “sensitive” issues which might divide the people”, and these “sensitive” 
issues being decided by politicians ( Kasoma, 1994a:30).  
 
In having noted that politicians in Africa have used the “national interest” for selfish ends, 
Kasoma (1994b:20) views  
 
“the national interest as the highest level of community representation. This 
national interest, however, should be representative of the common good rather 
than merely the interests of those in power.”  
 
3.14 Summary: The media’s role in “nation building”, “national development” and 
“national interest” 
This section reviewed literature examining the media‟s role in “nation building”, “national 
development” and “national interest”. It was pointed out that governments in Africa, 
including South Africa, expected the media to assist the governments to achieve the goals of 
nation building, national development and national interest. In the name of these objectives 
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the government expected the media to be uncritical towards the government. This was not 
welcomed by journalists and media scholars in Africa. 
 
3.15 Summary: Chapter 3 
This chapter reviewed literature dealing with the political role of the media in a democracy, 
starting with a generic discussion and thereafter dealing specifically with Africa. The terms 
“politics” and “democracy” were defined for contextual purposes. As part of literature review, 
the concept of “respect”, according to African culture, and in the context of journalism 
practice, was interrogated. Concepts such as “African consciousness” within the context of 
journalism practice in Africa were also examined. Literature examining the implications of 
media ownership for journalism practice was reviewed. Lastly, this chapter also examined 
literature discussing the media‟s role in “nation building”, “national development” and 
“national interest”.  
 
The next chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks chosen for this study. 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Frameworks 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In investigating the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists in post-
apartheid South Africa in the period 1994 to 2004, this researcher chose three theoretical 
frameworks: The Liberal-Pluralist, the Political Economy and Afrocentric theories on the 
political role of the media.  
 
The Liberal-Pluralist theory is chosen on the basis of it being a normative theory dealing with 
the “political” role of the media. The Political Economy theory is appropriate since it 
examines, among other issues, how media ownership influences the manner in which the 
media execute their task of serving the public. The City Press‟ white ownership is of research 
interest in the light of the ANC‟s claim that the white-owned media pushed an anti-
government agenda against the ANC government during the research period (Fourie, 
2002:29). Afrocentricity is chosen on the basis of the researcher‟s interest in the role, if any, 
played by African cultural values in the City Press‟ black journalists‟ execution of their 
political role with particular focus in the period 1994 to 2004.  
 
In this chapter the author will define these theories and explain their particular positions in 
relation to the political role of the media. Next the theories will be explained in the order 
outlined above. 
 
4.2 Liberal-Pluralist theories on the role of the media  
In understanding the Liberal-Pluralist theory on the role of the media, it has to be clarified that 
the term “liberalism” instead of “libertarianism” is employed in this study. That is because 
“libertarianism” is one “species” of liberalism among others, while liberalism is the broader 
term (Berry, Braman, Christians, Guback, Helle, Liebovich, Nerone & Rotzoll, 1995:42). The 
principles of liberalism gradually evolved from the theoretical explorations of a large number 
of individual thinkers such as John Milton, Alexis de Tocqueville, James Madison, John 
Stuart Mill and many others who were directly influenced in their speculations by the social, 
political, and economic events of their times  (Berry et al, 1995:37; Siebert, 1963:40).  
 
Criticisms notwithstanding, Siebert‟s 1963 work is cited here because, as Curran and Park 
(2003:3 – 4) note, his work on the four theories of the press has been “viewed as a landmark 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
study for the next forty years [since its first appearance in the 1950s]”.  Siebert also observes 
that although libertarian philosophers differ widely in some respects, they share a number of 
common bonds which identify them as belonging to a general school or system of philosophy. 
 
Known also as the “market model”, the Liberal-Pluralist theory is based on the original free 
press (libertarian) theory, which identifies press freedom with the freedom to own and operate 
the means of publication without permission or interference from the state (McQuail, 
2007:185). In order for the media to carry out their watchdog role and report in an “objective” 
way, the Liberal-Pluralist theory contends that the state should not be in control of the media 
but should operate in a capitalistic environment, that is, they should be privately owned and 
compete in an open market (Siebert, 1963:51 – 52). It is against this background that the 
Liberal-Pluralist theory of the media is known as the market model. 
 
4.2.1 The Market Model 
Libertarians opposed government support for the media in the belief that it would lead to 
domination by the government (Siebert, 1963:52). In the view of the Liberal-Pluralists, the 
media that operate in a free market provide the greatest chance to reach the truth and the best 
way to get a full range of ideas, information and opinions (Merrill, 1989:12). That is because, 
according to this theory, the audience of the media control the media and keep them 
accountable for their actions (Merrill, 1989:13). This accountability, it is assumed in the 
market model, is ensured by the audience‟s reward or punishment of the media through 
increased or decreased circulation.  
 
Due to the public‟s power to reward or punish, Liberal-Pluralist theorists believe that the 
public could be trusted to define what is and what is not in the public interest (McQuail, 
2007:185; Siebert, 1963:52). Against this background, Merrill (1989:15) argues that the 
“marketplace model is a truly democratic approach to accountability” because “the people, 
speaking clearly through the market, determine to a great degree the content of the media”. 
Liberal-pluralists regard the media as the “Fourth Estate”, a concept which will next be 
discussed. 
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4.2.2 The Fourth Estate 
According to Liberal-Pluralists, the media, functioning as the “Fourth Estate” (the other  three 
estates being the legislature, the judiciary and the executive) should play an important part in 
the democratic process in constituting a source of information that is independent of the 
government (Schultz, 1998:13; Bennett, 1982a:31). Being the “Fourth Estate” entails not just 
being a source of information, but “watching, questioning, analysing” as well (Schultz, 
1998:6). It is against this background that the media, as the “Fourth Estate” are referred to as 
the “watchdogs”, their role being to expose wrong done and monitoring the full range of state 
activity (Curran, 2000:121).  
 
Being the Fourth Estate entails providing a plurality of clashing and diverse viewpoints 
through which governing elites could be pressurised and reminded of their dependency on 
majority opinion (Schultz, 1998: 23; Bennett, 1982a:40; Siebert, 1963:52). It is in the 
presentation of all manner of evidence – or diversification of information, viewpoints and 
opinions to the best of their ability – that according to the Liberal-Pluralist theory, the media 
can play a “pluralistic” role (Merrill, 1989:13). This role also entails involvement in initiating 
discussion on government policies and criticising their application (Boyce, 1978:28). In 
playing the Fourth Estate role, the media, according to Liberal-Pluralists, are expected to be 
“objective”. What this entails will be discussed next. 
 
4.2.3 “Objective” journalism 
The media are expected, from a Liberal-Pluralist perspective, to carry out their duty of 
reporting in an objective way (Siebert, 1963:62). The theory of “objective reporting” entails 
elimination as far as possible of any bias in the news. Objective journalism is a concept of 
which the origins are traced to the West, particularly English-speaking countries, but most 
popular to and invoked by American journalists (Lichtenberg, 2000:238; Martin & 
Chaudhary, 1983:8).  
 
The concept of objectivity in the West came about as a result of the disgruntlement of 
newspaper readers who observed that newspapers were not factual but partisan in their 
delivery of news and reflecting the perspectives of their owners (McChesney, 2004:6). It was 
against this background that the concept of “professional journalism” emerged, emphasising 
the need for journalism to be produced by trained professionals who would not allow their 
own values to cloud their professional trained judgment. Instead, they would be non-partisan 
and objective. Objectivity in journalism meant that journalism practice would distinguish 
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between fact and opinion (McNair, 2000:50; Martin & Chaudhary, 1983:8). This means that 
in carrying out reporting assignments, journalists are expected not to adorn their reports with 
value-laden adjectives and adverbs.  
 
Criticism of objectivity in journalism has taken many forms, with some saying that journalism 
is not objective; others that it cannot be objective; and still others that it should not be 
objective (Lichtenberg, 2000:238; Smith, 1978:153). Some journalists have, themselves, 
rejected the concept as an “illusion” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001:74). These charges come 
from individuals and groups, who, as Lichtenberg notes, believe that journalists have 
misrepresented, been unfair or biased against them. Linked to these claims are the charges 
that journalists cannot be objective because no one “can totally escape his or her biases” 
which can be based on beliefs or cultures (Lichtenberg, 2000:239). Such charges against 
objective journalism, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001:41) argue, completely miss the point.  
 
Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001:72) argue that this is because when the concept was originally 
evolved, it was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. On the contrary, the 
concept emerged in the 20th century “out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of 
bias, often unconsciously”. The call for objectivity, therefore, was a method conceptualised 
for journalists to develop a consistent way of testing information “precisely so that personal 
and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work”. The point of objective 
journalism “originally…was not the journalist who was imagined to be objective. It was his 
method (researcher‟s italics)” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001:42). 
 
Fourie (2007a:188) summarises Liberal-Pluralist theories‟ expectations of the media‟s 
political functions thus: To inform about political developments; to guide public opinion 
about political decisions; to express different views about political developments and 
decisions; and to criticise political developments and decisions. 
 
It is against these functions as finally outlined and summarised by Fourie that the political 
role of the City Press‟ black journalists will be assessed from a Liberal-Pluralist theoretical 
framework.  
 
4.2.4 Summary: Liberal-Pluralist theories on the role of the media 
This section has focused on the political role of the media from a Liberal-Pluralist 
perspective. According to this theory the role of the media entails not just being a source of 
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information, but watching, questioning and analysing the activities of the state as well. The 
media are expected to expose the wrong done and monitoring the full range of state activity. 
The media are also expected to provide a plurality of clashing and diverse viewpoints through 
which governing elites could be pressurised and reminded of their dependency on majority 
opinion. It is in the presentation of all manner of evidence – or diversification of information, 
viewpoints and opinions to the best of their ability – that according to the Liberal-Pluralist 
theory, the media can play a “pluralistic” role. In doing so, it will be borne in mind that 
journalists do not operate in a vacuum, but in environments that can be either enabling or 
constraining. Political Economy perspectives on the role of the media help in analysing the 
enabling and constraining factors, and will therefore be discussed next. 
 
4.3 Political Economy theories on the role of the media 
The Political Economy theory on the media is a perspective which searches for the answers to 
the question of the power of the media in the analysis of ownership and control (Boyd-Barrett, 
2006:186; McChesney, 1998:3; MacGregor, 1997:48; Herman & Chomsky, 1994:xii; Curran 
et al, 1982:19). Golding and Murdock (2000:72-73) observe that critical Political Economy 
differs from mainstream economics in four main respects: firstly, critical Political Economy is 
holistic; secondly, it is historical; thirdly, it is centrally concerned with the balance between 
capitalist enterprise and public intervention, and, fourthly, it goes beyond technical issues of 
efficiency to engage with basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public good.  
 
Elucidating their point, Golding and Murdock further point out that whereas mainstream 
economics see economy as a separate and specialised domain, critical Political Economy is 
interested in the interplay between economic organisation and political, social and cultural 
life. According to the Political Economy theory of the media, the contents and meanings 
carried by the media reflect the interests of those who finance the production of the media‟s 
contents – not just media owners, but advertisers, as well (Altschull, 1997:259). This 
argument holds the view that the financiers will not allow their media to publish material that 
frustrates their vital interests. Altschull (1997:262) further points out that even though the 
media may enjoy certain levels of political autonomy, “[n]o newspaper, magazine or 
broadcasting outlet exceeds the boundaries of autonomy acceptable to the paymasters”.  
 
The Political Economy theory serves as a critique of Liberal-Pluralists‟ assumptions about the 
role of the media. This theory enables a researcher to examine the claim that trained 
professional editors and reporters provide neutral, trustworthy journalism uninfluenced by 
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media owners, advertisers, or the biases of journalists themselves (McChesney, 1998:6). It 
seeks to examine how much and what type of autonomy is afforded journalism from owners 
and advertisers.  
 
4.3.1 Critique of the market-anchored media 
Cognisant of the fact that “[i]n political terms” the media “may serve to enhance democracy 
or deny it” the question of who owns the media is a critical issue for the Political Economy 
theory on the role of the media (McChesney, 2004:3). That is because, as Hale (2003:140) 
observes, media ownership has major consequences for political debate and, therefore, for 
democracy since the media are the major sources of information about state and local 
governments.  
  
In critiquing and criticising Liberal-Pluralists‟ advocacy for privately-owned media, political 
economists argue that “private ownership and control does not necessarily guarantee media of 
public service” (Nyamnjoh, 2004:122). Private ownership of the media can contribute to the 
undermining of democracy when owners have a direct interest in political processes. In some 
African countries, as Hydén and Okigbo (2002:49) observe, where the media are owned by 
individual tycoons, “some of whom are directly involved in political life”, the “media…often 
become the mouthpieces of the agenda of these particular individuals rather than serving the 
interests of the wider public”. Instead of serving democracy, Hydén and Okigbo further point 
out, the media tend to become undisguised apologists for individual politicians with an axe to 
grind. 
 
Political Economists further point out that the Liberal-Pluralists‟ stringent opposition to state-
owned media ignore the reality that, unlike in the 18th century when Liberal-Pluralists 
developed their theories, the relationships between governments and profit-oriented media 
organisations have not remained the same (Curran, 2000:123). Research reveals that in cases 
where media organisations found it convenient, they developed tactical alliances with 
governments in order to secure their selfish interests. Curran (2000:124) identifies three cases 
where corrupt relationships between repressive governments and private owners of the media 
undermined democracy: 
 
 A privately-owned newspaper, El Mercurio, backed a military coup in Chile and 
“loyally supported the Pinochet dictatorship and largely overlooked its violation of 
human rights”; 
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 In Argentina, privately-owned media failed to investigate “state-sponsored” 
disappearances during the period of military rule; 
 In Taiwan, privately owned media not only accepted authoritarian rule but also helped 
to “rationalise” it. 
 
In all these cases, Curran points out that the collaboration between the media and the 
repressive governments occurred because “media owners were part of the national system of 
power”. Political Economists point out that not only do media owners tend to ignore 
governments‟ violations of democracy, but do so as well where corporate corruption takes 
place. The tendency to ignore corporate corruption is motivated by media owners‟ 
dependence on the corporate world for revenue accruing from advertising. Against this 
background, Boyce (1978:27) argues that the  
 
“paradox of the Fourth Estate, with its head in politics and its feet in 
commerce, can, however, only be understood if it is appreciated that the whole 
idea of the Fourth Estate was a myth”.  
 
This assertion is based on observations that the history of the media has revealed that as 
concentration of media ownership became the order of the day, editors lost their independence 
and followed the dictates of managers whose preoccupation was profit maximisation (Boyce, 
1978:37). This preoccupation with profit reduced the media from an “estate” to an “industry” 
that resorted to trivialisation and sensationalisation of news so as to attract mass readership 
(Boyce, 1978:37 – 38).  
 
Herman and McChesney (1997:6) observe that preoccupation with profit results in preference 
for entertainment at the expense of “serious political debate, and discussions of documentaries 
that dig deeply, inform, and challenge conventional opinion”. Consequently, the 
preoccupation with trivialisation and sensationalism weakens journalism and undermines the 
very commitment to the watchdog role highly prized by Liberal-Pluralists. Political Economy 
theorists argue that the watchdog role of the media is inadequate when it fails to take into 
account the ways in which the market is a source of corruption (Curran, 2000:123). 
 
Opposed to the Liberal-Pluralists‟ contention that the media anchored in capitalism is a 
guarantee of democracy, Political Economy theory asserts that the working of capitalism, with 
its invariable push toward strong class inequality and possessive individualism, has a 
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distinctly anti-democratic edge (McChesney, 1998:8). This “anti-democratic edge” manifests 
itself, according to Herman and McChesney (1997:6), in the tendency of media owners to 
represent narrow class interests – specifically those of the rich.  
 
Emphasising Herman and McChesney‟s argument, Curran (2000:128) points out that 
anchoring the media in the free market – as Liberal-Pluralist theorists insist – hinders people‟s 
access to information because, he notes, free market generates information-rich media for 
elites and information-poor media for the general public. The advertisers‟ bias towards 
courting the affluent privileges the rich at the expense of the poor in terms of information in 
that, as McChesney (1998:18) points out, quality journalism is afforded the affluent and 
directed to their needs and interests, while the masses get poor journalism. The result, Curran 
(2000:128) further notes, is a polarisation between prestige and mass newspapers.  
 
Political Economy theorists, as pointed out above, believe that journalists‟ professional 
ideologies can be compromised and constrained by the interests of owners. The basis of these 
claims will be discussed next. 
 
4.3.2 Professional ideologies and the work practices of the media 
According to Political Economy theorists, the links between the economic determinants of the 
media and the contents of the media must be sought in the professional ideologies and the 
work practices of media, “since these are the only channels through which organisational 
controls can be brought to bear on the output of the media” (Curran et al, 1982:18-19). 
Studying news organisations and journalists‟ professional ideologies means paying attention 
to organisational culture. Bantz (1997:126) defines organisational culture as patterns of 
meanings that define appropriate action. Understanding of organisational culture enables a 
researcher to understand the world of its members, which would include knowing how news 
workers define words and actions, what they value and devalue, what constitutes a good 
reason and a bad reason for acting (Bantz, 1997:124).  
 
The assumption here is that “news professionalism is an efficient and effective means for both 
controlling and rewarding journalists” (Soloski, 1997:146). Professionalism is understood in 
this case to be referring to journalists‟ expertise, how they rationalise their approach to their 
work, and the values and norms that govern them in the news organisations they work for 
(Gallagher, 1982:162). Media organisations apply “control” on journalists in two related 
ways: (i) setting standards and norms of behaviour, and (ii) determining the professional 
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reward system (Soloski, 1997:142). Norms and behaviour of journalists in media 
organisations are implemented through policies.  Breed (1997:108) defines policy as the more 
or less consistent orientation shown by a newspaper, not only in its editorial, but in its news 
columns and headings as well, concerning selected issues and events.  
 
Media owners, having the prerogative to determine their newspapers‟ policies, exercise this 
right in determining the orientation of their newspapers and seeing to it that their staff 
activities are coordinated in such a way that their newspapers‟ policies are enforced (Breed, 
1997:107). Editors apply these policies in editorial meetings, through story assignments or 
reprimanding journalists when they do not conform to the companies‟ policies (Soloski, 
1997:148). Guided by the editorial policies, the “editor ensures that the more important 
stories, which are more likely to have policy implications, are covered by the more 
trustworthy reporters” (Soloski, 1997:149). This is the “reward system” referred to earlier by 
Soloski (1997:142). 
 
4.3.3 Summary: Political Economy theories on the role of the media 
This section has explored the Political Economy theory on the political role of the media. It 
was pointed out that the Political Economy theory on the media is a perspective which 
searches for the answers to the question of the power of the media in the analysis of 
ownership and control. According to the Political Economy theory of the media, the contents 
and meanings carried by the media reflect the interests of those who finance the production of 
the media‟s contents – not just media owners, but advertisers as well. This argument holds the 
view that the financiers will not allow their media to publish material that frustrates their vital 
interests.  
 
The Political Economy perspective on the media will be applied in this research on the 
political role of the City Press‟ black journalists, with particular reference to the white 
ownership of a newspaper produced by black journalists. Next is the discussion on 
Afrocentricity. 
 
4.4 Afrocentric theories on the role of the media 
Some commentators and media academics (Kareithi, 2005:14; Mphahlele, 2004:331; Kasoma, 
1994c:xvii) have argued that African journalists, in carrying out their duties, must be 
cognisant of indigenous African cultural values. Such perspectives are termed Afrocentric. 
Before offering a definition of “Afrocentricity” it is crucial to make two observations for the 
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sake of clarity. Firstly, a distinction must be drawn between “Afrocentricity” and 
“Afrocentrism”. As Asante (2007:17) cautions, “Afrocentricity should not be confused with 
the variant of Afrocentrism” because the term “Afrocentrism” was first used by the 
“opponents of Afrocentricity who in their zeal saw it as an obverse of Eurocentrism”.  
 
Secondly, there needs to be a clarification on the relationship between Afrocentricity and 
Eurocentrism. This is important because there is a tendency to regard the concepts as two 
sides of the same coin. Shepperson and Tomaselli (1993:169) commit this error in observing 
that “[i]n the Afrocentric approach, nothing radically new is taking place conceptually, since 
the process involves little more than an inversion of categories within the same logical 
framework”, and that framework being that “the dominant boot should be on the Other foot, 
and all problems are thereafter solved”. Similarly, Mbembe (2001:8; 12), who refers to 
Afrocentricity as “Afrocentrism” notes that Eurocentrism and Afrocentricity “look like the 
two sterile sides of the same coin”.  Asante (2007:17) cautions against making the assumption 
that “Afrocentricity is the opposite of Eurocentricity”.  
 
Afrocentricity is a mode of analysis that insists that when African issues are discussed, this 
should be done within the context of African history and culture (Asante, 2007:16; Karenga, 
2003:77; Okafor, 1993:200-201; Hoskins, 1992:251). Afrocentricity seeks to uncover and use 
codes, paradigms, symbols, motifs, myths and circles of discussion that reinforce the 
centrality of African ideas and values as a valid frame of reference for acquiring and 
examining data (Winters, 1994:170). It is a paradigm dedicated to validating, regenerating, 
creating, and perpetuating African life and living – informed by African perspective or world 
outlook (Bekerie, 1994:131). Afrocentricity seeks to unshackle African studies from 
Eurocentric hegemony on scholarship, and thus assert a worldview through which Africa can 
be studied independently (Obeyade, 1990:234).  
 
The unshackling of African studies should be understood as what Ashcroft (2001:1) refers to 
as transformation, which he defines as that which “describes the ways in which colonized 
societies have taken dominant discourses, transformed them and used them in the service of 
their own self-empowerment”. The central strategy in transformation of colonial culture, 
Ashcroft (2001:2) further points out, is the “seizing of self-representation”. Aschroft (2001:2) 
defines representation as the process of giving concrete form to ideological concepts. Self-
representation is an act of resisting what Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:235) refer to as the 
“colonization of…consciousness”, spurred by “consciousness of colonization”. 
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Eurocentrism is understood here as a phenomenon that “claims that imitation of the Western 
model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time” (Amin, 1989:vii). It is 
the idea that “Europe is the standard and nothing exists in the same category anywhere” 
(Asante, 2007:111). It is a European tradition which, as Mbembe (2001:2) observes, when 
“dealing with Africa or with other non-European worlds…denied the existence of any „self‟ 
but its own”. It is a tradition that treats anything different from itself as “being nothing” 
(Mbembe, 2001:4). Imbued with Eurocentrism, the European colonising powers regarded and 
treated Africans as the child race and themselves as the adult race (Ashcroft, 2001:39; 42). In 
this scheme, as Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:5) observe, “the Western eye frequently 
overlooks important similarities in the ways in which societies everywhere are made and 
remade”. In this scheme of things, the Africans are “presented…as the human obverse of the 
European, the „link‟ between man and animal” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992:218). Africans 
were presented as creatures with “dim minds” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992:4; 218) whose 
way of life was superstitious and primitive, while on the other side the European‟s is 
associated with modernism. While human civilisation is seen as Western from this 
perspective, Africans are seen as “not quite human” (Mudimbe, 1988:68).  
 
While Eurocentrism projects itself as “universalist” (Amin, 1989:vii), Afrocentricity on the 
other hand “does not seek African hegemony; it seeks [cultural] pluralism without hierarchy” 
(Asante, 2007:111). To this end, Karenga (2003:73), arguing from an Afrocentric perspective, 
notes that not only must human diversity be tolerated but that it must be embraced and built 
upon. 
 
In the discipline of communication studies, the Afrocentric paradigm encourages awareness 
of the particular ways that African communication differs from the Western modes of 
communication and how issues of the representation of Africans in the mass media are 
emphasised (Fourie, 2007b:177). This approach, Kareithi (2005:14) argues, calls for a 
departure from the kind of news in the Western tradition which routinely privilege economic, 
political and intellectual elites.  
 
One of the distinguishing features of African culture is its insistence on the prioritisation of 
the community over the individual (Kasoma, 1994a:27). A model of journalism infused with 
African culture would be, according to Kareithi (2005:13), that of “the press 
that…emphasizes community values over individualism”. Another distinguishing feature of 
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African culture, which Moemeka and Kasoma (1994:41) refer to as “another key quality in 
African life” is “respect”. Rooney (2007:213) observes that this “respect and deference does 
[sic] not encourage a questioning attitude” on the part of the young to the community‟s elders. 
This is one quality that has been contentious in as far as journalism practice is concerned.   
 
While journalism is a universal profession with many common principles and values which 
are shared worldwide, in line with Afrocentricity, Kasoma (1994b:9) argues that African 
journalists must look to their moral philosophy for those principles and values that will 
elevate African journalism. That is because, as Kasoma (1994c:xvii) argues, every society is 
characterised by social values and that it is these values that predispose journalists to act in a 
certain manner under certain conditions. 
 
Mogekwu (2005:15) observes that a cursory look at the different curricula of various media 
programmes on the African continent gives the impression that many African institutions are 
striving to produce clones of American or Western journalists in many parts of Africa. It is 
significant to note, as Kasoma (1994a:29) points out, that the journalism values that 
Europeans and Americans brought to Africa were embedded in the West‟s cultural history and 
traditions. One such value is individualism. Kasoma (1994b:19) observes that to a great extent 
the post-colonial period in Africa has been marked by a syndrome of do-what-the-authorities-
tell-you-and-behave-like-Western journalists. As an alternative to this approach, Kasoma 
(1994c:xvii) recommends that African culture should set the boundaries of what the media 
can do and with what effects. For Mphahlele (2004:331) this means that the role of black 
journalists is to help develop an African consciousness and African ways of perceiving which 
expand to the outer reaches of the world from a position of self-knowledge. 
  
A view exists that whenever criticism is raised with regards to African culture, Afrocentrists 
tend to be defensive (Sesanti, 2010:345). There is an element of truth in this. But equally true 
is that this is often a reaction to what is perceived by Afrocentrists as an unfair attack on 
African culture (Sesanti, 2010:345). Yet this must not be misconstrued as a rejection of 
criticism on African culture when this is warranted. Not only do Afrocentrists welcome 
critical engagement with African culture – they encourage it and, in fact, exercise it (Asante, 
2007:41). As Asante notes, “[t]here are no closed systems; that is, there are no ideas that are 
absolutely seen as off limits for discussion”. Thus, Asante (2007:41) further points out, that 
“when Afrocentricity is employed in analysis or criticism, it opens the way for examination of 
all issues related to the African world”. If, as Kasoma and Mphahlele argue, that African 
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culture should set the boundaries of what the media can do and with what effects, it is 
important to understand what is meant by “culture” in general, and “African culture” in 
particular. 
 
4.4.1 African culture defined 
The term “culture” is defined in various ways.  Maathai (2009:161) defines culture as “the 
means by which a people express itself through language, traditional wisdom, politics, 
religion, architecture, music, tools, greetings, symbols, festivals, ethics, values and collective 
identity”. Wa Thiong‟o (1993:42) defines culture as a “product of people‟s history” 
embodying “a whole set of values by which people view themselves and their place in time 
and space”. Asante (2003:134) defines it as “the totalization of the historical, artistic, 
economic, and spiritual aspects of a people‟s lifestyle”. Cabral (1979:141) defines culture as  
 
“the fruit of a people‟s history and a determinant of history, by the positive or 
negative influence it exerts on the evolution of relations between man and his 
environment and among men or human groups within a society, as well as 
between different societies”.  
 
From the four definitions above, two characteristics of culture are significant – traditional 
wisdom and history. That is because in order to understand a people‟s present, reference must 
be made to their history and what they believed in – traditional wisdom (Nhlapho, 2000:141; 
Kunene, 1982:xii). This is so whether or not people cling on to traditional ways or adopt new 
ways.  
 
 The term “African” also has many meanings attached to it, but for the purposes of this study, 
“African” will refer to the indigenous people of the African continent. This is not intended to 
exclude anyone but simply to achieve lucidity in terms of reference. African culture, in the 
context of this study, should be understood as the “sum total of African philosophy, ideas, and 
artifacts” (Asante, 1996:4). In discussing culture in general, and African culture in particular, 
this researcher is not oblivious to the fact that culture is dynamic and not static or frozen in 
time. This point is alluded to in Biko‟s (2005:106) definition of culture about which he 
observes that it is “essentially the society‟s composite answer to the varied problems of life”. 
This definition makes the point that culture is the way in which people deal with their 
everyday challenges, meaning that as time moves, and new challenges arise, people must have 
new ideas and approaches to such challenges.  
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It is against this background that Wiredu (1980:10) notes that the  
 
“culture of a people is their total way of life, and this is seen as well in their 
work and recreation as in their worship and courtship; it is seen also in their 
ways of investigating nature and utilizing its possibilities and in their way of 
viewing themselves and interpreting their place in nature”.  
 
This study appreciates Mudimbe‟s (1994:206) observation that African culture is not based on 
“fixed traditions, even in the precolonial period” but that traditions “are, indeed, continuities, 
but also discontinuities”. While recognising the dynamism of culture, this study is premised 
on the view that changes in culture do not preclude continuity (Karenga, 2004:24). Also, this 
researcher is conscious of the caveat, as pointed out by Tomaselli (2003:428) that in 
discussing African culture, caution must be exercised against the reductive assumption that all 
practices on the continent can be reduced to homogeneous sets of continent-wide social and 
African cultural values.  
 
In discussing African culture in this study, there is sensitivity to and familiarity with problems 
that arise when one “generalizes the traditions of one or two communities in Africa as 
„African culture‟” (Boateng, 1996:111). In appreciation of Tomaselli‟s caveat, Gakwandi 
(1996:182 – 183) observes that “[a]lthough Africa‟s cultures and languages overlap and enjoy 
certain commonalities, especially at sub-regional level, the differences cannot be wished away 
or ignored”. Similarly, Williams (1987:162) cautions that “[t]his distinction is important here, 
for too often things are characterized as „African‟ which apply only to certain societies”.  
 
However, while not denying the ethnic and cultural diversities in Africa, this researcher 
subscribes to Asante and Asante‟s (1996:x) and Soyinka‟s (1996:30) observations that 
cultural commonalities throughout the African continent constitute “African culture”. This 
point is echoed by Gyekye (cited in Kamwangamalu, 1999:26) who observes that despite 
Africa‟s cultural diversity, threads of underlying affinity do run through the beliefs, customs, 
value systems, and sociopolitical institutions and practices of the various African societies. 
However, this assertion is not the same as denying ethnic cultural differences among Africans. 
Such differences are acknowledged here. But the point is, as Dove (2003:167) points out, that 
this “diversity does not preclude sameness”.  
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Since in his definition of African culture, Asante (1996:4) says it is the “sum total of African 
philosophy, ideas, and artifacts”, there is a need for a brief discussion about “African 
philosophy”, since, as in the case of African culture, there are conflicting positions.  
 
As in the case of African culture, there are those who argue, on the one hand, like Hountondji 
(1996:53) that “African philosophy, like any other philosophy, cannot possibly be a collective 
world-view” but “can exist as a philosophy only in the form of a confrontation between 
individual thoughts, a discussion, a debate”. Emphasising his assertion, Hountondji (1996:76) 
observes that there  
 
“is no philosophy that would be a system of implicit propositions or beliefs to 
which all individuals of a given society, past, present and future, would adhere. 
Such a philosophy does not exist, has never existed.”   
 
Hountondji (1996:62) defines African philosophy as “a literature produced by Africans and 
dealing with philosophical problems”. Remarking on Hountondji‟s stance on philosophy, 
Mudimbe (1988:160) observes that “Hountondji‟s critique displays the superiority of a critical 
conception of philosophy”. Mudimbe (1994:203) defines philosophy as “an explicit, critical, 
autocritical, systematic discourse bearing on the language and experience” of “the level of 
discourses and interpretations of the founding events of a culture” and “the level of experts‟ 
discourses which actualize disciplinary practices or, put simply, what one might consider 
scientific discourses”. 
 
There are those, on the other hand, who argue, contrary to Hountondji‟s assertion, that 
philosophy, and African philosophy in particular, can both be an individual and a collective 
enterprise (Wiredu, 1980:16). In this regard, Wiredu observes that a “fact about philosophy in 
a traditional society, particularly worthy of emphasis, is that it is alive in day-to-day 
existence”. Wiredu‟s assertion finds expression in Obenga‟s (2004:220) observation about the 
ancient Egyptian society in relation to that society‟s guiding philosophy known as Maat. Maat 
is defined as “justice, a way of intelligent, conscious living, a concept at once ethical and 
speculative, a logos”. In line with Wiredu‟s argument, Obenga (2004:220) points out that 
“ancient Egyptians, whether they were kings or ordinary persons, lived under the imprint of 
Maat, Justice-Truth, the one way to true happiness, peace, beauty and the intelligible life”. It 
could be, as Hountondji asserts, that there may have been and continue to be dissidents in 
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African societies, who deviate from the norm, but that does not discount the existence of such 
a norm.  
 
While Hountondji (1996:75 – 76) emphatically argues that “there cannot be a collective 
philosophy” and that to speak of African philosophy in the collective sense is a “huge 
misconception”, Wiredu (1980:37), though recognising the collectiveness of African 
philosophy, simultaneously recognises  
 
“a class of individuals in traditional African societies who, though unaffected 
by modern intellectual influences, are capable of critical and original 
philosophical reflections as distinct from repetitions of the folk ideas of their 
peoples”.  
 
What this implies is an appreciation of individual Africans‟ embrace of their heritage while 
simultaneously being critical of unacceptable or obsolete aspects of the very same culture. 
Wiredu (1980:21) clarifies this point by noting that  
 
“[t]hose who seem to think that the criticism of African traditional philosophy 
by an African is something akin to betrayal are actually more conservative than 
those among our elders who are real thinkers as distinct from mere repositories 
of traditional ideas. If you talk to some of them you soon discover that they are 
not afraid to criticise, reject, modify or add to traditional philosophical ideas.”  
 
4.4.4 Summary: Afrocentric theories on the role of the media 
This section has examined the Afrocentric theory in relation to the political role of the media. 
It was pointed out that Afrocentricity posits that the media in Africa must take into cognisance 
African culture when dealing with African issues, and that in fact journalism must be 
informed by African values. This assertion necessitated that a definition of African culture be 
given. It was stated that while there is recognition that Africa has many heterogeneous ethnic 
groups, there are also unifying beliefs and practices that are universal in Africa: the concept of 
the community, the concept of respect and the rules of political engagement in African 
traditional settings. Against these concepts, the City Press‟ black journalists‟ political role 
will be examined, to determine whether or not in executing their political tasks, the City 
Press‟ black journalists were conscious of, and influenced by African cultural beliefs. 
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4.5 Summary: Chapter 4 
This chapter defined and discussed three theoretical frameworks chosen for this study, 
namely: the Liberal-Pluralist, the Political Economy and Afrocentric theories on the political 
role of the media. It was observed that the Liberal-Pluralist theory was chosen on the basis of 
it being a normative theory dealing with the political role of the media. The Political 
Economy theory was chosen on the basis of its examination of, among other things, how 
media ownership influences the manner in which the media execute their task of serving the 
public. Afrocentricity was chosen on the basis of its examination of how African cultural 
values are taken into cognisance when African issues are engaged by the media.  
 
The next chapter deals with the Research Design and Methodology chosen for this study. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The central research question of this study is:  
 
What was the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists 
in a post-1994 democratic South Africa in the period 1994 to 2004 within the 
context of African culture and white ownership?  
 
This question will help answer and give clarity to the following questions which also serve as 
interview questions: 
 
 How did the concept of “black journalism” evolve from a colonial and apartheid South 
Africa into post-apartheid democratic dispensation? 
 What was the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists in the 
period 1994 to 2004? 
 Did the ownership of the City Press by a white company impact on the political role of 
the City Press‟ black journalists in the period 1994 to 2004? 
 What role did African cultural values play in the City Press‟ political black journalists‟ 
approach to their work in the period 1994 to 2004? 
 How have African and Western cultural differences impacted upon the mandate of the 
City Press‟ political black journalists? 
 How do African cultural values link to the City Press‟ concept of “Distinctly 
African”? 
 On the issue of the Zimbabwean crisis, the media, nationally and internationally, have 
condemned what they have termed Mbeki‟s “quiet diplomacy”. What has been the 
City Press‟s position on this issue? 
 Nationally and internationally, the media have generally criticised President Thabo 
Mbeki‟s handling of HIV and AIDS and have labelled him an AIDS Denialist. What 
has been the City Press‟ position on this issue? 
 
5.2 Research Methodology 
Generally, there are two major research methodologies used in scientific research, these being 
the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. Before stating which research 
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methodology this study employs, both methodologies will be defined and their differences 
briefly explained in order to be clear about why one was chosen as opposed to the other.  
 
The qualitative research methodology is a scientific inquiry that is interpretive and naturalistic 
to its subject matter (Babbie et al, 2007:270; Denzin & Ryan, 2000:578). Research is 
naturalistic when it is carried out in natural settings, with the objective of attempting to make 
sense of, and interpret issues in terms of the meanings subjects bring to them. Research is 
interpretive when methods make use of the thoughts, feelings, and reactions of the researcher 
rather than trying to eliminate them entirely (Priest, 1996:4). The qualitative research 
methodology‟s focus on subtle aspects of human life and its reliance on the interpretation of 
what people do and say, distinguishes it from the quantitative research methodology (Iorio, 
2004:6). 
  
Quantitative research refers to scientific inquiry that uses numerical measures to investigate 
social phenomena (Priest, 1996:4). In quantitative research, reality is “objective”, meaning 
that reality exists apart from the researcher and is capable of being seen by all (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 1991:139).  Wimmer and Dominick further observe that in quantitative research 
there is an assumption that reality can be divided into component parts with the observer 
gaining knowledge of the whole by looking at these parts.  
 
The assumption in quantitative research is that all human beings are basically similar and that 
the researcher‟s role is to look for general categories to summarise human behaviours or 
feelings. The objective of this research is to investigate the political role that the City Press 
defined for its black journalists in a democratic South Africa in the period 1994 to 2004. It is 
aimed at finding out what the City Press‟ black journalists‟ defined role was during the period 
in question. In other words, the researcher is interested in the meaning of black journalism to 
City Press‟ black journalists in the period 1994 to 2004.  
 
The concept of “meaning” in this context refers to the researcher‟s attempt to see social reality 
“through the eyes of the subject studied” (Corbetta, 2003:40). This enables the researcher to 
learn about subjects from their own perspectives (Denscombe, 2003:267; Esterberg, 2002:2; 
Silverman, 1997:12). Against this background, the qualitative research methodology is 
deemed as the appropriate approach for this exercise. That is because, as Jensen (2002:236) 
observes, the qualitative research methodology is distinguishable by at least three distinctive 
features that are useful for this research. These are: meaning, naturalistic context and the 
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interpretive subject. These features have already been explained above.  The first two sub-
questions are specifically addressing the issue of “meaning”. In asking how the concept of 
black journalism “evolved” from a colonial and apartheid South Africa, the first sub-question 
sought to establish the meaning of “black journalism” in the democratic dispensation in 
comparison to its meaning during the apartheid era. In asking how the City Press defined its 
political role for its black journalists during the period 1994 to 2004, the second sub-question 
sought to investigate what the City Press meant its political role to be during the research 
period. 
 
The study has, to a great extent, employed qualitative research methods, namely content 
analysis and interviews. Counting was done so as to show the number of editorials, columns 
and opinion pieces analysed on crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS. 
 
Two research techniques, interviews and content analysis, to be discussed next, were 
employed. 
 
5.2.1 Interviews 
There are a number of interview techniques, namely: basic individual interviewing, in-depth 
individual interviews and focus group interviews (Babbie et al, 2007:289 – 292). For this 
study the researcher has chosen the basic individual interviewing. This type of interview 
allows the subject of study to speak for him/herself rather than to provide a respondent with a 
battery of predetermined hypotheses-based questions (Babbie et al, 2007:289). It allows a 
researcher to be “flexible, iterative, and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and 
locked in stone” (Hebert & Rubin, in Babbie et al, 2007:289). This researcher has employed 
semi-structured interview questions (see Addendum A) because they allow interviewees 
greater freedom to express their opinions and ideas in their own words (Esterberg, 2002:87). 
 
Bernard (2000:191) notes that in situations where a researcher will not get more than one 
chance to interview his/her subject, semi-structured interview questions are the “best”. That is 
because though semi-structured interview questions have, like unstructured interviews, a 
freewheeling quality, they have an “interview guide”. An interview guide is a written list of 
questions and topics that need to be covered in a particular order. Even though an interviewer 
may make use of discretion to follow leads, the interview guide is a set of clear instructions 
(Bernard, 2000:191). 
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The interviews took place over a period of a year and two months – the first being in August 
2008 and the last being in October 2009. Arrangements were made telephonically and through 
e-mails. All the interviews with the City Press‟ black journalists who were working for the 
newspaper during the research period, and who were identified as key role players, were 
carried out face-to-face. The eight questions were uniform and were posed in a question and 
answer form. The researcher took notes during the interview and did not use a recorder. 
Therefore, for the purposes of accuracy the questions with answers were e-mailed to the 
respondents so that they could give feedback. This was done due to ethical considerations – to 
ensure that the research reflected an accurate recording of the interviewees‟ responses. All the 
interviewees confirmed, through e-mails, that the answers were a true reflection. In some 
cases some interviewees made some factual corrections. These were very few. 
 
For ethical purposes, the interviewees were informed in advance that if, during the interview, 
they were uncomfortable, they were free to recuse themselves. It was made clear to them that 
the interview contents were going to be published and, therefore, they were entitled not to 
respond to questions they felt uncomfortable with. The interview questions were sent to them 
in advance, prior to physical contact between the researcher and the interviewees. The 
correspondence between the researcher and the interviewees to this effect is available. 
 
The options given to the interviewees are in accordance with the requirements of the 
Stellenbosch University‟s Ethics Committee which gave permission for this study to proceed, 
provided that the researcher remained within the procedures and protocols indicated in the 
research proposal. The Ethics Committee also recommended that the researcher obtain 
consent from the City Press to carry out the study. This was done. 
  
The verbal responses obtained through interviews are to be analysed together with the City 
Press‟ editorials and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces. The 
analysis of the City Press‟ editorials and the newspaper‟s black journalists‟ columns and 
opinion pieces is what is referred to as “content analysis”. Content analysis will be defined in 
the next section that focuses specifically on the research method. The use of two or more 
forms of evidence (in the case of this study, content analysis and interviews) is known as 
“triangulation” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002:240). In other words, triangulation is a research 
approach that asks “different questions, seeking different sources, and using different 
methods” (Babbie et al, 2007:277). Among the advantages of using the triangulation method 
are the following: 
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 It enables a researcher to address varied questions that cannot be addressed by a single 
research approach or strategy (Brannen, 2007: 283). 
 
 It enhances the validity of findings in that it enables a researcher to check the results 
of a qualitative investigation against those of a quantitative study if the researcher 
combines qualitative and quantitative research (Babbie et al, 2007:275; Punch, 
1998:247).  
 
 It raises the quality of data, interpretations and results (Flick, 2000:91). 
 
 Use of a combination of methods in one study can partially overcome the deficiencies 
that flow from employing one method (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1996:206). 
 
While triangulation has the advantages cited above, Gaskell and Bauer (2000:344) observe 
that “[a]pproaching a problem from two perspectives or with two methods will inevitably lead 
to inconsistencies and contradictions”. This was not experienced in this study. Rather, 
studying the content of the City Press‟ editorials, columns and opinion pieces, and 
interviewing the City Press‟ black journalists during the research period enabled this 
researcher to compare what was said verbally and what was expressed in writing in the City 
Press‟ editorials, columns and opinion pieces. The findings are discussed in the findings 
chapter.  
 
It can be said though, that findings revealed that there was no homogeneity of thought and 
outlook among not only the City Press‟ black journalists, but also among the editors at their 
different periods of service. The theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 4 were also 
employed to analyse the research findings. Next, content analysis is defined. 
  
5.2.2 Content Analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine 
& Newbold, 1998:94). It is also defined as “a method of studying and analysing 
communication in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner for the purpose of 
measuring variables” (Wimmer & Dominick, 1991:157). It can also be defined as a 
“methodology by which the researcher seeks to determine the manifest content of the written, 
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spoken, or published communications by systematic, objective, and quantitative analysis” 
(Berger, 1998:23). In all these three definitions, there is a common assertion among them, 
namely that content analysis is systematic, objective and quantitative. Elaborating on all these 
concepts, Wimmer and Dominick (1991:137 – 138) make the following observations: 
 
Systematic – this means that the content to be analysed is selected according to explicit and 
consistently applied rules. Each item must have an equal chance of being included in the 
analysis. 
 
Objectivity – this means that the personal idiosyncrasies and biases of the investigator should 
not enter into the findings; if replicated by another researcher, the analysis should yield the 
same results. 
 
Quantitative – this means that the objective of content analysis is “the accurate 
representation of a body of messages”. The aim is “precision”. 
 
The assertions above are made in the conviction, as Hansen et al (1998:95) observe, that 
“[c]ontent analysis is by definition a quantitative method”. This assertion is informed by 
researchers who are grounded in quantitative research methodology. It fails to acknowledge 
that content analysis is applicable in both quantitative and qualitative research (Babbie et al, 
2007:491; Wigston, 1997:152). In noting the differences between quantitative content 
analysis and qualitative content analysis, Wigston (1997:152) notes that the quantitative 
content analysis approach “involves some form of counting, and applies the scientific method 
rigorously”, while the qualitative content analysis approach involves “no physical counting of 
data” but tends to be “more critical in nature and can be used when we need to penetrate the 
deeper layers of a message”.  
 
Content analysis methods are used to analyse mass media contents and transcripts (Du Plooy, 
2002:191). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008:295) observe that content analysis 
provides social scientists with a “systematic methodology for analyzing the data obtained 
from archival records, documents, and the mass media”. Content analysis is, also, as Berger 
(1991:25) notes “a means of trying to learn something about people by examining what they 
write”. A basic assumption implicit in content analysis is that, as Berger (1991:27) further 
notes, “an investigation of messages and communication gives insights into the people who 
create the messeages and communication”.  
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In choosing content analysis as a technique, this researcher is aware of its strengths and 
weaknesses as noted by Bauer (2000:147). The strengths of content analysis are that this 
method 
  
 mainly uses naturally occurring raw data; 
 it can deal with large amounts of data; and 
 it lends itself to historical data. 
 
Among some of its weakenesses, Bauer (2000:148) identifies the following: 
 
 citations out of context can easily be misunderstood; 
 content analysis tends to focus on frequencies, and so neglects the rare and the absent. 
 
In order to avoid the first cited weakness above, this study made a conscious effort to analyse 
not only what was said but also when and why it was said. The second weakness was not 
applicable because this study‟s focus was not on frequency but on the meaning of the 
message. 
 
By choosing to study the City Press‟ editorials, as well as the newspaper‟s black journalists‟ 
columns and opinion pieces, the research sought to get the “insights [of] the people who 
create the messages and communication” (Berger, 1991:27)  – in this case the City Press‟ 
black journalists‟ insights.  
 
The word “content” refers to words, concepts, meanings, pictures, symbols, themes or any 
message that can be communicated (Mouton, 2006:165; Burns, 2000:432). These elements 
can be counted numerically, but they can also be examined for meaning (Burns, 2000:432). 
Babbie et al (2007:384) note that content analysis is particularly well suited to the study of 
communication science and to answering the classic question of communication research 
regarding who says what to whom, why, how and with what effect. 
 
As pointed out above, this study makes use of qualitative content analysis. The City Press‟ 
political black journalists‟ understandings and the stances articulated in the  editorials, 
columns and opinion pieces on the identified issues will give an indication of the meanings 
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attached to these issues by the City Press‟ political black journalists. The meanings refer to 
their understanding/s of the issues. 
 
In the period 1994 to 2004, prominent political commentators in South Africa (Calland, 
2006:190-191; Sparks, 2003:85; Jacobs & Calland, 2002:2-4) identified crime, the 
Zimbabwean crisis, and how Mbeki handled it through what was termed „quiet diplomacy‟, 
and HIV/AIDS as  the major political issues. Against this background this researcher has 
chosen to study the City Press‟ editorials, columns and opinion pieces written by City Press‟ 
political black journalists from 1994 to 2004, dealing with these issues.  
 
Editorials of the City Press were selected because Breed (1997:109) and Bennett (1982b:303) 
assert that generally editorials give an idea about the norms or orientation of the publication. 
The columns and opinion pieces written by the City Press‟ political black journalists were 
studied in order to establish what their takes were on the issues identified above. This search 
for meanings by making use of content analysis is “coding”.  
 
Coding is defined as the classification of material into themes, issues, topics, concepts and 
propositions so as to investigate manifest and latent content (Babbie, 2002:317; Burns, 
2000:432). Codes are tags, names or labels, and this being the case, “coding is therefore the 
process of putting tags, names or labels against pieces of the data” (Punch, 1998:204). The 
point of assigning labels, as Punch (1998:204 – 205) further observes, is to attach meaning to 
the pieces of data so that the researcher may be able to index and summarise the data by 
pulling together themes and identifying patterns. In this study‟s case the issues and themes 
that the researcher sought out and categorised were “crime”, “Zimbabwe” and “HIV/AIDS”. 
With reference to crime, the researcher sought out sub-themes such as “corruption” and the 
“death penalty”. These were specifically selected because they were recurring sub-themes 
under the theme “crime”. With reference to the Zimbabwean crisis, the researcher sought out 
discussions relating to the theme “quiet diplomacy” which was perceived as Mbeki‟s 
approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. With reference to “HIV/AIDS”, the researcher sought out 
discussions around “denialism” and “dissidence” associated with Mbeki‟s approach to 
HIV/AIDS issues. 
 
The material analysed is selected from 35 copies of the City Press published from May 10, 
1994 to December 31, 2004. That is because since the democratic elections were held on 
April 27, 1994 and the government sworn in on May 10, 1994, it was only then that a 
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democratically elected government commenced its mandate. Thereafter, from 1995 to 2004, 
the City Press‟ selected editorials and City Press black journalists‟ selected columns and 
opinion pieces were taken from 52 copies of the City Press per year. The researcher selected 
editorials, columns and opinion pieces that specifically dealt wih crime, the Zimbabwean 
crisis and HIV/AIDS in the period 1994 to 2004. This means that a total of 555 copies of the 
City Press newspaper were consulted and relevant material selected from the copies. 
  
In the crime category editorials analysed amounted to 28. Out of these, 22 editorials focused 
on common crime and 6 on corruption.  
 
Editorials on common crime were as follows:  
City Press Comments, 2004a:18; 2004c:18; 2000b:10; 2000c:14; 1999a:6; 1999b:6; 
1998a:16; 1998b:14; 1998c:14; 1998d:16; 1996a:16; 1996b:16; 1996c:14; 1996d:14; 
1995a:14; 1995b:16; 1995c:16; 1995d:16; 1995e:16; 1995f:16; 1995g:16; 1994:16.  
 
Editorials on corruption were as follows: City Press Comments, 2004c:18; 2003d:22; 
2000d:12; 2001a:8; 1996e:16; 1996f:16.  
 
There were 5 columns on common crime, and were as follows: Kalane, 1998a:16; Sibiya, 
1996b:16; Sibiya, 1996c:14; Mogale, 1995:16; Sello, 1995b:16).  
 
There were 3 opinion pieces on common crime, and were as follows: Makele, 1996:17; Sello, 
1995a:16; Sello, 1994:16.  
 
There were 2 columns on corruption, and were as follows: Mona, 2000b:10; Sibiya, 
1995b:14).  
 
There were 4 opinion pieces on corruption, and were as follows: Mamaila, 2004a:18; 
Memela, 1996:17; Sello, 1995c:17; Sello, 1995d:15. 
 
On the Zimbabwean crisis there were 11 editorials, and were as follows: City Press 
Comments, 2004d:18; 2003e:18; 2003f:18; 2000g:8; 2003g:18; 2003i:18; 2002a:8; 2002b:8; 
2001h:8; 2000e:14; 2000f:12.  
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There were 3 columns on the Zimbabwean crisis, and were as follows: Mamaila, 2004:18; 
Maseko, 2001:9; Mona, 2000a:12.  
 
There were no opinion pieces on the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 
On HIV/AIDS there were 16 editorials, and were as follows: City Press Comments, 2004e:18; 
2004f:18; 2003h:18; 2002c:8; 2002d:8; 2002e:18; 2001b:8; 2001c:8; 2001d:8; 2001e:8; 
2001f:8; 2001g:8; 2000i:8; 2000h:6; 1996g:16; 1996h:16; 1995h:16.  
 
There were 6 columns on HIV/AIDS, and were as follows: Mamaila, 2004c:18; Maseko, 
2002:9; Maseko, 2000a:8; Maseko, 2000b:8; Memela, 2001:9; Mona, 2001b:8.  
 
There were 2 opinion pieces on HIV/AIDS, and were as follows: Tsedu, 2004c:18; Mahlangu, 
2000:14.  
 
Having outlined the research methodologies employed in this study and the reasons thereof, 
the researcher now proceeds to state the research design chosen. 
 
5.3 Research Design 
A research design is defined by Kumar (2005:84) as a procedural plan that is adopted by the 
researcher to answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically.  Kumar 
further notes that the function of a research design is to enable a researcher to “conceptualise 
an operational plan to undertake the various procedures and tasks required to complete [a] 
study”. In order to achieve this research‟s objective, the researcher chose a case study as an 
appropriate research design.  
 
A “case study” is defined as an intensive investigation of a single unit, which could be an 
individual person, family, community, society, a team or any other unit of social life (Babbie 
et al 2007:280). A case study can also be defined as an empirical inquiry that uses multiple 
sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
(Wimmer & Dominick, 1991:150; Kumar, 2005:112). A case study enables a researcher to 
understand the influences of multilevel social systems on subjects‟ perspectives and 
behaviours (Babbie et al, 2007:281). A case study aims “to understand the case in depth, and 
in its natural setting, recognising its complexity and its context” (Punch, 1998:150). There are 
different types of case study which will be briefly discussed below (Punch, 1998:152): 
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 The intrinsic case study – in this case the study is undertaken in order for the 
researcher to gain a better understanding of a particular case; 
 The instrumental case study – in this case a particular case is examined to give insight 
into an issue, or to refine a theory; 
 The collective case study – in this case the instrumental case study is extended to 
cover several cases, to learn more about the phenomenon, population or general 
condition. 
 
In the case of this research both the intrinsic and instrumental types of case study fit. 
However, while this study seeks to give insight on the case studied, as is the case with the 
instrumental case study, it is not the purpose of this research to “refine theory”. 
 
There are a number of criticisms leveled against the case study research design. Among these 
criticisms are the assertions that where a case study is based on only one case, its 
generalisability becomes questionable; a case study may be well suited for pilot studies, but 
not for fully-fledged research schemes; a case study is subjective (Flyvbjerg, 2007: 390; 
Punch, 1998:153). Addressing the issue of generalisability, Punch (1998:154) observes that 
“whether a case study should even seek to generalize, and claim to be representative, depends 
on the context and purposes of the particular project”. Punch further points out that 
“[g]eneralization should not necessarily be the objective of all research projects, whether case 
studies or not”. Punch further argues that a “case may be so important, interesting, or 
misunderstood that it deserves study in its own right”.  Advancing these arguments, however, 
is not the same as saying that case studies cannot or should not produce studies that are 
generalisable. 
 
Punch (1998:154) points out that there are two ways in which a case study can be 
generalisable. The first is by conceptualising and the second is by developing propositions. 
Conceptualisation in this regard means that  
 
  “on the basis of the disciplined study of a case, and using methods for  
  analysis which focus on conceptualizing rather than on describing…the  
  researcher develops one or more new concepts to explain some aspect of  
  what has been studied”. 
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Developing propositions, Punch further points out, “means that, based on the case studied, the 
researcher puts forward one or more propositions…which link concepts or factors within the 
case”. These can be assessed for their applicability and transferability to other situations 
(Punch, 1998:154). 
 
Flyvbjerg (2007:391) observes that criticisms against a case study can be summarised in five 
misunderstandings or oversimplifications: 
 
 The first is that theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than 
concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge; 
 The second is that one cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case, and that, 
therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development; 
 The third is that the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, that is, in the 
first stage, while other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory 
building; 
 The fourth is that the case study contains a bias towards verification, that is, a 
tendency to confirm the researcher‟s preconceived notions; 
 The fifth is that it is often difficult to summarise and develop propositions and theories 
on the basis of specific case studies. 
 
This study is aware of criticisms against a case study. However, this researcher is persuaded 
by Flyvbjerg‟s (2007:392) argument that “[c]oncrete experiences can be achieved via 
continued proximity to the studied reality and via feedback from those under study”. 
Flyvbjerg further argues that  
 
  “[g]reat distance to the object of study and lack of feedback easily lead to  
  a stultified learning process, which in research can lead to ritual academic  
  blind alleys, where the effect and usefulness of research becomes unclear  
  and untested”. 
 
This study has chosen the case study, convinced by Eysenck‟s (in Flyvbjerg, 2007:391) 
argument that “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at 
individual cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning 
something”. This study did not set out to prove anything, but to learn something, namely to 
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understand how the City Press‟ black journalists defined their political role in the period 1994 
to 2004.  
  
Considering Wimmer and Dominick‟s (1991:150 – 152) observation that the case study 
method is most valuable when a researcher wants  a wealth of information in that it enables 
the researcher to make use of documents such as memos, agendas and historical records, a 
case study research design is appropriate for this study. In using this research design, the 
researcher needs to identify the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis refers to the “what” of 
the study, that is, the object, the phenomenon, process or event that the researcher is interested 
in investigating (Mouton et al, 2007:84; Mouton, 2006:51). Since this study is interested in 
the political role of the City Press‟ political black journalists, and this is established through 
interviews and content analysis of the City Press‟ black journalists, the unit of analysis in this 
study refers to the interviews and the writings of the City Press‟ political black journalists. 
Speaking of a unit of analysis leads to the issue of sampling. 
 
5.3.1 Sampling 
Gobo (2007:405) observes that sampling in qualitative research has experienced difficulties 
because on the one hand qualitative researchers dismiss it as a “mere positivistic worry”. On 
the other hand, Gobo further notes it has been undervalued by survey researchers because of 
the use of non-probability methods. Arguments such as these lead to the idea, Gobo further 
argues, that thinking about issues of sampling, representativeness and generalisability is a 
waste of time. To the contrary, Gobo argues, “defining sampling units clearly before choosing 
cases is essential in order to avoid messy and empirical shallow research”. 
 
Kumar (2005:164) defines sampling as  
 
“the process of selecting a few (a sample) from a bigger group (the sampling 
population) to become the basis for estimating or predicting the prevalence of 
an unknown piece of information, situation or outcome regarding the bigger 
group”.  
 
The concept of “population” is understood here as the “entire set of relevant units of analysis, 
or data” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:179). It is “the total target group who 
would, in the ideal world, be the subject of the research” (Punch, 1998:105). The “sample” 
refers to the “subset” or the “subgroup of the population the researcher is interested in 
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(Kumar, 2005:164; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:179). In other words, as 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008:63) note, a “sample” is the “data serving as the 
basis for generalizations…collected from a subset of the population”.  It is the “actual group” 
which is included in the study, and from whom the data are collected (Punch, 1998:105). The 
“overriding consideration” in sampling is the “representativeness of that sample or how much 
it resembles that population in terms of specified characteristics” (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998:214). Strauss and Corbin further observe that while an effort is made to achieve 
representativeness, there is a recognition and an acknowledgment that in “reality [a researcher 
can] never be certain that a sample is completely representative”. There are three categories of 
sampling, namely, the random/probability sampling designs, the non-random/non-probability 
designs, and the “mixed sampling” designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:183; 
Kumar, 2005:169).  
 
The distinguishing characteristic of probability sampling is that for each sampling unit of the 
population a researcher can specify the probability that the unit will be included in the sample 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:183; Kumar, 2008:177). The distinguishing 
character of non-probability sampling, on the other hand, is that the probability of each unit‟s 
inclusion in the sample cannot be specified, meaning that there is no assurance that every unit 
has some chance of being included (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1996:183; Kumar, 2008:177). This 
study employs non-probability sampling. 
 
Non-probability sampling is categorised into four designs namely the convenience samples, 
the quota samples, the snowball samples and the purposive samples and all of which will be 
briefly explained next (Gobo, 2007:419; Punch, 1998:105, 193; Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996: 184 – 185): 
 
 Convenience samples – in this case a researcher obtains a convenience sample by 
selecting whatever sampling units are conveniently available. A researcher takes 
advantage of an accessible situation which may fit the research context and purposes. 
 
 Quota samples – in this case a researcher selects a sample that is as similar as possible 
to the sampling population. If for instance a researcher is aware that the population 
researched has equal numbers of males and females, the researcher selects an equal 
number of males and females in the sample. 
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 Snowball samples – in this case a researcher selects some subjects who feature the 
necessary characteristics, and through their recommendations, finds other subjects 
with the same characteristics. 
 
 Purposive samples – in this case a researcher selects sampling units subjectively in an 
attempt to obtain a sample that appears to be representative of the population. What 
this means is that a chance that a particular sampling unit will be selected for the 
sample depends on the subjective judgment of the researcher. This type of sampling is 
done in a deliberate way, with some purpose or focus in mind. 
 
In this case the researcher employed purposive samples. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher selected 12 City Press‟ black journalists 
associated with the political beat in the period 1994 to 2004. All the interviewees were 
selected on the basis of their involvement with the political beat of the City Press. In that 
sense they individually stood a chance of being selected for the study. Their names are listed 
below, and the reasons for their selection stated:  
 
 Len Kalane – former editor from 1995 to 2001. He was also a columnist. 
 Khathu Mamaila – he first started working for the City Press from February 1992 to 
February 1994. He returned to the City Press as its deputy editor in 2004. He was also 
a columnist. 
 Shalo Mbatha – she joined the City Press as a Consumer Editor from 1996 to 1997 
and left the newspaper in 1997. She returned to the City Press in 2003 as Features‟ 
Editor until her departure in 2005. 
 Sandile Memela – he joined the City Press as a general reporter in 1984 until 1986. 
After leaving the newspaper in 1986 he re-joined it in 1987 and was appointed as a 
Labour and Politics Reporter. He left the City Press before the end of 1987 and 
returned in 1989, becoming a senior political correspondent. From 1992 to 1997 he 
became the newspaper‟s Arts Editor. He left in 1997 and returned in 2001 and became 
the Insight and Features‟ Editor until his departure in 2003. 
 Mpumelelo Mkhabela – he joined the City Press as a general reporter in 1999 and 
worked for the newspaper until 2007. In 2001 he became the newspaper‟s Specialist 
Writer. 
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 Charles Mogale – he joined the City Press in 1988 as a reporter. In 1991 he became 
the news editor. In 1997 he became the assistant editor. 
 Vusi Mona – former editor from 2000 to 2003. He was also a columnist.  
 Andile Noganta – he joined the City Press as a junior reporter in 1995. From 1997 to 
1998 he was a Bureau Chief in East London. From 1998 to 1999 he became the City 
Press‟ Senior Features‟ Writer. He left the newspaper in 2001. 
 Zoli Nqayi – he joined the City Press in 1997 and worked as a political correspondent 
from then until 2001. 
 Mapula Sibanda – she joined the City Press in 1997 but left in the same year. She re-
joined the newspaper in 1998 until 2008. In 2005 she became Features‟ Editor. 
 Khulu Sibiya – former editor from 1988 to 1995. He was also a columnist. 
 Mathatha Tsedu – he joined the City Press as the editor in 2004. 
 
All these journalists were connected to the newspaper‟s political beat during the research 
period, taking into consideration that the main interest of this research is the political role of 
the City Press‟ black journalists‟ political role.  
 
5.4 Summary: Chapter 5 
The focus of this chapter was on the Research Design and Methodology for this study. Both 
the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies were defined and the choice was 
explained.  It was pointed out that the research methodology chosen for this study is the 
qualitative research methodology. It was also pointed out that the qualitative content analysis 
technique was used for this study. While this is the case, both the qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis techniques were defined and it was explained why one was chosen instead of 
the other. Together with content analysis, it was pointed out that this study employed the 
interview technique, particularly the basic individual interview, and it was explained why. 
The research design used is that which is referred to as a case study. This was defined, and it 
was explained why it is the appropriate research design for this studies. This chapter also 
provided a list of interviewees and motivated why they were chosen. Interview research 
questions were also provided. 
 
The next chapter discusses the research findings of this study. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Findings 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section consists of data from the City Press 
published after May 10, 1994 until December 31 2004. These are the City Press‟ editorials, 
the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ individual 
opinion pieces.  
 
In order to appreciate the issues at hand and how the City Press newspaper dealt with them, 
this researcher holds the view that a brief background about how the identified issues posed a 
challenge to the post-apartheid administration is important. Therefore, as a point of departure, 
the researcher starts off with giving a background of these issues, and thereafter the findings 
on the City Press‟ editorials and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ perspectives articulated in 
columns and opinion pieces.  
 
It will be noted that the Mail&Guardian newspaper has been significantly used to give 
background information on HIV/AIDS. There are two reasons for this approach. Firstly, the 
Mail&Guardian gave extensive coverage and held strong views on HIV/AIDS. Secondly, the 
Mail&Guardian is a newspaper of record in South Africa. 
 
6.2 Background 
In this section, the author presents background information about the issues that posed 
political challenges for post-apartheid South Africa‟s Governments led by the ANC‟s Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. The issues have been identified as crime, the Zimbabwean crisis 
and   HIV/AIDS. These will be dealt with in the order outlined above. 
 
6.2.1 Crime 
In this study there are two types of crime that have received attention due to coverage given 
and focused upon by the City Press: common crime and political corruption. Crime can be 
defined as “an act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings having one of the types 
of outcome (punishment, and so on) known to follow these proceedings” (Molan, Bloy & 
Lanser, 2003:16).  Political corruption refers to the “unsanctioned or unscheduled use of 
public resources for private ends” (Lodge, 2002:129). Attention will first be paid to common 
crime, followed by political corruption. 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
128 
 
 
6.2.1.1 Common crime 
It has been observed that (Sparks, 2003:226; Terreblanche, 2002:114;121) the crime wave 
that engulfed the new South Africa almost from its inception had its roots in the old apartheid 
order. Sparks attributes the failure on the part of the apartheid government to take note to its 
massive preoccupation with trying to repress the black uprisings of the 1980s. 
 
According to Sparks, there were two things that were happening that the apartheid 
government failed to notice. The first was that in the 1980s there was a swift increase in the 
use of narcotics in South Africa, which meant that profits from the drug trade were increasing 
dramatically. The second was that at the same time that the use of narcotics was increasing, 
there was a sharp rise in the number of fortune hunters from various parts of Europe as well as 
Lebanon, Israel and India who were moving into resource-rich countries such as Zaire (now 
called the Democratic Republic of Congo), Angola and Zambia, where they were able to take 
advantage of corrupt governments and poor policing to establish lucrative smuggling 
operations in commodities such as gold, diamonds, emeralds, cobalt, ivory, rhino horn and 
drugs in particular. South Africa, according to Sparks, did not escape, as huge quantities of 
drugs, particularly Mandrax, were smuggled into the country. 
 
The rise in the drug trade gave birth to serious problems in terms of crime. Sparks (2003:227) 
notes that as crime gangs ran into cash-flow problems in their dealings with their suppliers, 
they resorted to barter transactions. Motor vehicles, especially luxury cars, became key items 
in this barter trade. This is what gave birth to an explosion of vehicle hijackings, where 
motorists were held at gunpoint, sometimes in broad daylight. 
 
Throughout that critical time in the 1980s, while the criminals were running havoc on 
citizens‟ lives, Sparks (2003:228) observes that the apartheid government channelled more 
funds to the Special Branch, the political police who spearheaded counter-revolutionary 
operations. On the other hand, regular detectives, who were tasked with fighting crime were 
largely ignored and neglected. Instead of being encouraged to do their duty, some of the 
regular detectives were seconded to border duty where war was raging in the border 
separating Angola and South West Africa (now known as Namibia). It was not until 1990, 
Sparks observes, that the South African authorities woke up to what was happening inside 
South Africa. Alluding to Sparks‟ assertions, Terreblanche (2002:43) notes that  
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“[d]uring the heyday of apartheid only one in ten members of the police was 
engaged in crime detection and investigation; the other nine were engaged in 
efforts to protect the apartheid regime”. 
 
In 1994 the ANC gained political power and headed the Government of National Unity 
(GNU). The police who were once called upon to fight against the ANC and black people in 
general, were expected to serve a country governed by the same party they fought against, and 
the very people who were said to be enemies. Sparks (2003:229) describes this change for the 
police as a “bewildering experience”. He further observes that it was  
 
“[s]mall wonder they felt disillusioned, demotivated and demoralized, and that 
in their disillusionment many simply crossed the line to become criminals 
themselves. While some left the police service to join the criminal syndicates 
or form new ones of their own, others remained in the service but provided 
crucial services to the criminal syndicates in the form of documents for forging 
and changing the serial numbers of stolen vehicles, and even the destruction of 
police investigation dockets to abort prosecutions.” (Sparks, 2003:229). 
  
This assertion by Sparks is also alluded to by the City Press, as will be seen later in this 
chapter. Next, the focus turns to political corruption. 
 
6.2.1.2 Political Corruption 
Lodge (2002:133) points out that a large proportion of the corruption reports which have 
appeared in newspapers since 1994 reflect behavioural patterns inherited from the old 
apartheid regime. One example relates to the apartheid government‟s Department of Defence. 
Lodge (2002:133) notes that during the 1980s the Department of Defence spent around R4 
billion per annum on secret projects. Lodge observes that although much of this money would 
have been expended on arms procurement, this in itself supplied plenty of opportunity for 
private profit, with officials setting up ostensibly private companies in foreign countries and 
awarding themselves comfortable salaries. Lodge further observes that in Namibia, the 
Military Intellligence set up a company, Inter Frama, purportedly to generate income for 
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for Total Independence (UNITA). The 
company became a conduit for ivory and mandrax smuggling, the profits landing into the 
pockets of UNITA and the South African Defence Force (SADF) commanders (Lodge, 
2002:133). 
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One of the major scandals – if not the major – that shook the new South Africa involved arms 
dealings (Gevisser, 2007:676; Feinstein, 2007:218 – 219). In June 2005, the then South 
African president, Thabo Mbeki, fired his deputy, Jacob Zuma, after Judge Hilary Squires 
found Schabir Shaik guilty of facilitating an annual bribe of R500 000 for Zuma from 
Thomson-CSF, a French arms company that sought Zuma‟s support in securing a slice in a 
₤5.2 billion arms deal (Gevisser, 2007:676; Feinstein, 2007:218 – 219). Tracing the genesis of 
the arms deal controversy in South Africa, Feinstein (2007:155) points out that in the early 
years of the democratic government, the South African parliament had conducted a Defence 
Review proposing a modernisation of the country‟s defence force. 
 
During this period – in 1998 to be specific – Feinstein further points out that as competition 
for the lucrative arms contracts intensified, British Aerospace, now known as BAE Systems, 
made a generous donation of R5 million to Umkhonto WeSizwe Military Veterans 
Association (MKMVA), whose Life President was Joe Modise, and also South Africa‟s 
Minister of Defence. Modise reportedly also received between R10 million and R35 million 
in cash from a variety of the bidders (Feinstein, 2007:155). 
 
Following revelations by Patricia de Lille, the then Pan Africanist Congress‟ (PAC) Member 
of Parliament, in the year 2000, that the ruling party (the ANC) had fraudulently benefitted 
from an arms deal involving foreign companies, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA) launched an inquiry (Gevisser, 2007:679). An Auditor-General‟s report which 
SCOPA also made use of, found out that there had been a litany of irregularities in the 
procurement of the armaments and weapons (Feinstein, 2007:158). The Auditor-General‟s 
report, Feinstein further asserts, revealed that by far the most expensive of the contracts, the 
decision was taken to exclude cost as a criterion. This assertion emerged on the basis of an 
observation that a contract was awarded to BAE/SAAB, whose tender was almost twice as 
expensive as that by an Italian company, Aeromachi. It is worth noting at this point that BAE 
was the same company that reportedly gave money to MKMVA, an association associated 
with Joe Modise.  
 
Another irregularity related to a conflict of interest which involved Chippy Shaik, the Director 
of Procurement in the Defence Force, who allegedly favoured his brother, Schabir, in the 
awarding of a contract. Schabir Shaik was a director of the African Defence Systems (ADS), a 
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company that was involved in the bidding for sub-contracts (Feinstein, 2007:164). Fifty per 
cent of ADS was owned by Thomson-CSF. 
 
It also emerged that the former ANC chief whip, Tony Yengeni, had been a recipient of a 
Mercedes 4X4 from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) which 
had been ordered by EADS from the manufacturers as a “staff car” (Lodge, 2002:147). 
Yengeni resigned as chief whip in October 2001 after being charged with corruption and 
perjury over his acceptance of the car from EADS. 
 
6.2.1.3 Summary: Background to the crime problem in post-apartheid South Africa 
This section gave a background to the challenge of crime that confronted the democratic 
South Africa since its inception in 1994. It was indicated that both common crime and 
political corruption had their genesis in the apartheid administration and spilled over into the 
democratic dispensation. 
 
Discussed next is the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 
6.2.2 The Zimbabwean Crisis 
Close to two years after ascending to the office of the presidency, and being involved in 
efforts to bring about political stability in Zimbabwe, the Mail&Guardian newspaper 
(Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2001:26) asserted that the then President Thabo 
Mbeki‟s “quiet diplomacy” had been a singular failure. Its editorial argued that instead of 
confronting Robert Mugabe‟s “crude, brutal and idiotic” rule, Mbeki had shown a timid 
approach. The newspaper expected him to pursue a more “robust policy towards Mugabe”. 
The Mail&Guardian (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2000a:20) held the view that 
since South Africa supplied “most of Zimbabwe‟s electricity and fuel”, Mbeki‟s government 
could close Zimbabwe down in a month. At this point it would be helpful to retrace the events 
that gave birth to the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 
In March 2000, ex-combatants forcibly entered and took over about 70 white-owned 
commercial farms (Makunike, 2000:11). Iden Wetherell (2000:12), the Zimbabwe 
Independent editor whose writings regularly appeared in the Mail&Guardian, observed that 
this development was Mugabe‟s “move to unleash ex-combatants of the liberation war on to 
productive farms to punish their white owners for helping to reject his constitutional 
proposals”. The constitutional proposals referred to by Wetherell were contained in a draft 
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constitution prepared by a commission appointed by Zimbabwe‟s government aimed at being 
adopted before elections scheduled for April 2000 (Hartnack, 1999:8). Among the proposals 
entailed in the draft constitution was the Zimbabwean government‟s intention to redistribute 
“millions of hectares of white-owned land” (Sapa-AFP, 1999:4).  
 
The draft constitution “adopted a clause, likely to spark an outcry, allowing the government to 
seize land for resettlement without paying compensation”, the compensation to be paid being 
only for buildings and other structural improvements (Mandizvidza, 1999:4). Before the draft 
constitution was presented to the public, critics argued that the process was flawed and open 
to manipulation by the ruling party whose final product would misrepresent the opinions 
voiced by Zimbabweans from all walks of life (Sayagues, 1999:5). When objections were 
raised to the draft constitution, the government promised to offer Zimbabweans a chance to 
reject the draft in a referendum to be held early in the year 2000 (Sapa-AFP, 1999:4).  
 
True to its promise, the government held a referendum in February 2000. The government‟s 
draft constitution was rejected – 55% voted against, while 45% voted for it (Sayagues, 
2000:6). The “No vote”, according to Sayagues, was an indication of “the end of Zanu-PF‟s 
yoke over the country” and that “people are no longer open to populist promises, deceit and 
manipulation”. The results of the referendum were “hailed by many as the beginning of the 
end of Mugabe” (Pretorius, 2000:11). Makunike (2000:11) observes that on the day of the 
referendum white Zimbabweans, who had “always stayed aloof of political involvement since 
independence in 1980 – thronged the polling stations to protect their interests and property”. 
That was because, according to Makunike, for white Zimbabweans a “No” vote was the only 
way they could protect their privileges. 
 
Not only did Mugabe unleash the ex-combatants against his opponents, but also, according to 
his critics, the armed forces as well (Sayagues, 2001:13). When the privately-owned 
newspaper, the Daily News, was bombed, Sayagues (2001:13) wrote that “State terrorism has 
escalated in Zimbabwe with Sunday‟s bomb attack on the independent newspaper, the Daily 
News”. The bombing, according to Sayagues, showed “a qualitative jump in army 
involvement, coupled with arrogant disregard for self-incrimination – a signature bombing”.  
 
The Zimbabwean referendum was followed by the presidential elections which were also 
contested by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai. The elections were won by Mugabe. The Mail&Guardian newspaper was livid, as 
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reflected in its editorial (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2002a:22). It noted that 
Mbeki‟s response to the outcome of the elections had to “confront the reality that Robert 
Mugabe is back in power and should not be there”.  
 
The Mail&Guardian (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2002a:22) expected Mbeki to 
“appreciate that it is vital that Mugabe absent himself, or be removed, from government in 
Zimbabwe as quickly as possible”. But Mbeki did not subscribe to this view. Instead, after a 
week of silence, his acceptance of Mugabe‟s victory was announced by his cabinet‟s 
statement which stated that “President Mbeki has noted and accepted the report of the South 
African parliamentary observer mission” (Forrest & Pressly, 2002:07). 
 
In May 2003, Mbeki along with Obasanjo and Malawian president Bakili Muluzi went to 
meet Mugabe and Tsvangirai, in a bid to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis (Kindra & Masunda, 
2003:2). The Mail&Guardian (Kindra & Masunda, 2003:2) reported that while the country 
was “agog” that the visit would result in an announcement of a transitional government run by 
Zanu-PF and the MDC, the “three leaders issued a lukewarm statement after the talks, stating 
that Mugabe and MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai were ready to meet” without stating a 
firm date or venue. Remarking on Mbeki‟s continued efforts on Zimbabwe, Wetherell 
(2003:15) noted that the visit “failed to shift Mugabe from entrenched positions, thus 
exposing the much-vaunted New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (Nepad) as a toothless 
totem”.  
 
In response to charges that his mission to Zimbabwe was a failure, Mbeki (2003b:31) charged 
that his “detractors” were “firm in their conviction that we have some divine right to dictate to 
the people of Zimbabwe”. He also pointed out that his “detractors” believed that if South 
Africa issued some “instructions” to the political leaders of Zimbabwe, this leadership would 
obey what the “baas” (Afrikaans word for “boss”) across the Limpopo would have told them. 
In unequivocal terms, Mbeki rejected such a position, stating that South Africa “will never 
treat Zimbabwe as the 10th province of South Africa”.  
 
When the Zimbabwean government refused to grant the Daily News a licence to publish 
following the newspaper‟s refusal to register with the state and to have its journalists 
accredited, according to the government‟s new law known as the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), Mbeki‟s “quiet diplomacy” was condemned by the 
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Mail&Guardian (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2003:32), and dismissed as “a 
national disgrace” by the Sunday Times (Sunday Times Editorial, 2003:20). 
 
The condemnatory tone of the Sunday Times was echoed by Bill Saidi, The Daily News on 
Sunday‟s editor in an opinion piece published in the Mail&Guardian entitled “The curse of 
quiet diplomacy” (Saidi, 2003:14). Saidi pointed out that “most of what was happening to 
ANZ (Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe – the publishers of the Daily News) was a result 
of the „quiet diplomacy‟ launched by Mbeki to help the people of Zimbabwe to find real 
meaning in their hard-fought independence”. 
 
6.2.3 Summary: Background to the Zimbabwean crisis 
This section dealt with the background to the crisis of Zimbabwe and Mbeki‟s efforts in 
playing a mediating role. This section showed that Mbeki‟s mediation role was condemned as 
a failure by newspapers such as the Mail&Guardian and Sunday Times which expected him to 
take strong measures against Mugabe. The Mail&Guardian, in particular, expected South 
Africa to impose economic strangulation against Zimbabwe so that the latter could stop the 
forceful takeover of white-owned land. Mbeki disagreed with that approach and insisted on 
dialogue with Mugabe. 
 
HIV/AIDS and the challenges they posed in the democratic dispensation are discussed next. 
 
6.2.4 HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
Twenty two months after former president Thabo Mbeki took over the reigns from Nelson 
Mandela in June 1999, the Mail&Guardian (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2001:26) 
declared Mbeki‟s period in power a “disastrous reign”. According to the newspaper, Mbeki‟s 
disasters were glaring in his handling of HIV/AIDS, his “timidity over Zimbabwe” and his 
“attempts to re-racialise” South African politics. The Mail&Guardian‟s comment came about 
as a result of Mbeki‟s statement, televised on e.tv in June 2001 that it was irrelevant for him 
to take an AIDS test because such would set an example “within the context of a particular 
paradigm”. In the Mail&Guardian‟s view, Mbeki‟s “statement on e.tv sounded like someone 
who does not believe the link between HIV and Aids”. Against this background, in the 
Mail&Guardian‟s view, Mbeki sounded like “a dissident without the courage of his 
convictions”.  
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The term “AIDS dissident” was used in reference to those, who, in the early days of AIDS 
science differed from mainstream scientists who claimed that one virus could cause many 
diseases (Nattrass, 2007:24). While dissent and critique are central to science, Nattrass 
(2007:24 – 25) argues that  
 
“once it was shown that HIV worked by undermining the immune system, 
thereby rendering the body vulnerable to a host of opportunistic infections, 
their [dissidents] concerns should have been put to rest”.  
 
Nattrass further points out that those who resisted even after “all evidence” was given to 
address their concerns, were “aptly referred to as AIDS denialists”. 
 
While some “denialists” reject the existence of HIV and others do not, Nattrass (2007:22 – 
23) points out that what  “unites them all is their unshakable belief that the existing canon on 
AIDS science is wrong and that AIDS deaths are caused by malnutrition, narcotics and ARV 
drugs themselves”. Adding his voice to the “dissidence/denialism” discourse on Mbeki, 
former University of Cape Town‟s (UCT) Vice Chancellor, Njabulo Ndebele (2004:76) notes 
that upon searching “for the definite statement by Mbeki in which he denies the link between 
HIV and AIDS …I have not found it” (Ndebele, 2004:76). In a direct response to Ndebele‟s 
observation, Nattrass (2007:35) notes that  
“AIDS denialists, however, rarely make categorical statements to the effect 
that HIV does not cause AIDS, but rather claim that there is genuine scientific 
„debate‟ on the matter while insinuating that the body of science is corrupt and 
incorrect”.  
 
Nattrass further points out that “Mbeki‟s AIDS denialism can be gleaned from the fact that he 
questioned rather than affirmed the link between HIV and AIDS”. 
 
Before getting deeper into the AIDS controversy in South Africa that surrounded Mbeki, it is 
necessary to examine how HIV/AIDS was dealt with before Mbeki became South Africa‟s 
president in 1999. 
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6.2.4.1 HIV/AIDS in Mandela’s era as South Africa’s president 
Nattrass (2007:40) observes that AIDS did not appear to be a priority in the early years of the 
post-apartheid democratic state. It took Mandela almost three years to make his first major 
statement against AIDS – at an international audience in Davos.  Gevisser (2007:732) 
observes that Mandela, “who was awkward” talking about sex matters, passed responsibility 
for AIDS to his deputy – Mbeki. Mbeki was given an inter-ministerial committee on AIDS to 
chair. During Mandela‟s period as president, the government was involved in two exercises 
that received negative response. The first was the government‟s support for an AIDS 
awareness play, Sarafina II, and a home-grown anti-retroviral known as Virodene (Nattrass, 
2007:41; Gevisser, 2007:732). Since the Sarafina II project is dealt with later in this chapter, 
attention will now be given to the Virodene saga. 
 
6.2.4.1.1 The Virodene Saga 
The Virodene saga is traced back to 1997 when the University of Pretoria scientists, Ziggy 
Visser and Olga Visser, approached the then Minister of Health, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
about an unofficial trial they were conducting on AIDS patients (Nattrass, 2007:42). The 
Vissers informed Dlamini-Zuma that an antifreeze solution, which they called Virodene, was 
an effective antiviral medication. Subsequently, Dlamini-Zuma invited the Vissers to present 
their results to the Cabinet. They did so, bringing along several of the people they were 
treating. When those living with AIDS testified how Virodene was helping them recover, the 
“cabinet gave the Vissers a standing ovation” and committed to supporting the Virodene 
research up to the completion of the Medicine Control Council (MCC) process (Natrass, 
2007:42). 
 
The MCC, a body that operates through a network of committees drawing on independent 
scientists, usually based at universities, whose task is to manage the registration of medicines 
and ongoing assurance of the quality of medicines on the market, refused permission to the 
Vissers to continue with the Virodene after finding a range of scientific problems with the 
medication (Nattrass, 2007:42-43).  When the MCC rejected the Virodene, Mbeki and 
Dlamini-Zuma were reportedly unhappy with the MCC, with Mbeki accusing the MCC of 
sacrificing the lives of those who lived with HIV/AIDS (Nattrass, 2007:43; Sparks, 
2003:285).  
 
Dlamini-Zuma further accused the MCC of being in league with big drug companies 
(Gumede, 2005:154). Subsequent to this, an independent review panel led by the South 
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African Medical Research Council found that Virodene “was in fact highly toxic” and caused 
severe liver damage. Not only did Dlamini-Zuma experience conflict between herself and the 
MCC, but she soon found herself on a collision course with the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC). 
 
The TAC was formed as an independent organisation in 1999 after having been part of the 
government-sponsored National Association of People Living With HIV/AIDS (NAPWA) 
after its formation in December 1998 (Nattrass, 2007:45). The dissatisfaction was due to the 
TAC‟s perception of the inability of NAPWA to effectively pressurise the government to use 
a medication called AZT for mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP). This was 
after trials on a short course of AZT reduced maternal transmission from 18.9% to 9.4%. In 
October 1998 Dlamini-Zuma suspended MTCTP sites that had been set up by the Ministry of 
Health citing unaffordability as a reason (Nattrass, 2007:45). As will be shown later in this 
chapter, the TAC took it upon itself to wage public and court battles with the government to 
provide AZT to those who needed it.  
 
6.2.4.2 HIV/AIDS in Mbeki’s era as South Africa’s president 
In 1999 Mandela handed over the reigns of government to Mbeki. While Dlamini-Zuma cited 
unaffordability as the reason for the government not providing AZT, Mbeki (1999) announced 
that his government was concerned about two issues relating to AZT: the first was that there 
were legal cases pending in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States against 
AZT on the basis that AZT was harmful to health; the second was that there existed a large 
volume of scientific literature alleging that, among other things, the toxicity of AZT. 
 
The statement by Mbeki (1999) in his address to the National Council of Provinces on 
October 28, 1999, on the toxicity of AZT, was not received kindly. A Stellenbosch University 
zoology lecturer, Michael Cherry (2000:9), observed that Mbeki‟s assertion was based on 
“uncertain and perhaps misguided grounds of safety”. Cherry pointed out that Mbeki‟s claims 
of legal cases against AZT in SA, the USA and UK were denied by Peter Moore, the medical 
director for Sub-Saharan Africa for Glaxo Wellcome, the drug‟s manufacturer. While 
conceding that AZT had some potentially negative side effects, Cherry argued that the 
benefits of the drug were considered to outweigh substantially its risks in the management and 
prevention of HIV infection, particularly in the early stages of the disease.  
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Refuting Mbeki‟s claim about the existence of a large volume of scientific literature alleging 
the toxicity of AZT, Cherry further pointed out that the Medical Research Council president, 
Malegapuru Makgoba, had pointed out that he had “read nothing in the scientific or medical 
literature that indicates that AZT should not be provided”. Mbeki, in return, did not take 
kindly to Cherry‟s criticism. In an interview with the Sunday Times (Robertson, Hartley & 
Paton, 2000:5), reacting to Cherry‟s piece which had appeared in the Business Day, Mbeki 
pointed out that Cherry‟s point about Makgoba not having read anything in literature 
discouraging the use of AZT, exposed “university people, professors and scientists” who 
comment on issues they have not read about.  
 
Mbeki‟s statement on the toxicity of AZT, it has been suggested, was influenced by an AIDS 
dissident, Anthony Brink, who had given Mbeki and senior health officials copies of his book 
“which argued that the so-called life-giving drug was highly toxic” (Gumede, 2005:158). 
Sparks (2003:286) asserts that Mbeki “confirmed” to him (Sparks) that Brink was responsible 
for Mbeki‟s awareness of an “alternative viewpoint” about HIV and AIDS. This new 
information, according to Gumede (2005:158), caused Mbeki to surf into the internet for more 
information, accessing more dissidents‟ views which led Mbeki “to question whether HIV 
caused AIDS and whether the virus was sexually transmitted”.  
 
It was in the context of these incidents that Mbeki was labelled an AIDS dissident and 
denialist. This was especially the case when Mbeki, in his effort to understand the conflicting 
standpoints on HIV/AIDS and the treatment thereof, set up a Presidential AIDS Advisory 
Panel “with equal representation of AIDS denialists and scientists” (Nattrass, 2007:54). 
Reflecting on this move by Mbeki, Gevisser (2007:748) observes that “[t]here was certainly 
enough evidence, in his appointment of his panel, that Mbeki questioned the link between 
HIV and AIDS”. But Ndebele (2004:77) disagrees with Gevisser‟s reasoning. 
 
In Ndebele‟s (2004:77) view, Mbeki‟s act of establishing an AIDS Advisory panel was 
“painfully scientific” in that if a person seeks to understand an issue as fully as possible, the 
inquirer must bring together people with contrasting views. Aware that by bringing together 
“those declared dissidents with discredited views, he was declared a dissident or a person who 
gives credence to dissidents”, Ndebele (2004:77 – 78) insists that he “did not see Mbeki as 
expressing a preference for the dissident view” but exhibited “only a desire to better 
understand its possible implications for a broader strategy”. 
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
 
These developments led to the Mail&Guardian (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 
2001:26) moving from saying that Mbeki “sounded like someone who does not believe the 
link between HIV and Aids”. The newspaper later categorically labelled his stance as a 
“denialist position on HIV/Aids” from which it was “difficult to draw any comfort from the 
cruel and arrogant stupidity” (Mail&Guardian Comment&Analysis, 2002b:24). The 
Mail&Guardian (2000b:26) had a clear position on the causal link between HIV and AIDS, 
and “need[ed] the president simply to say: Yes, HIV causes Aids”. The Mail&Guardian‟s call 
to Mbeki to endorse its view was provoked by Mbeki‟s response to the Time magazine 
regarding HIV/AIDS. Asked whether he would acknowledge the link between HIV and 
AIDS, Mbeki responded thus: “No, I am saying that you cannot attribute immune deficiency 
solely and exclusively to a virus” (Beresford, Kindra & Deane, 2000:4; Redman & 
Hawthorne, 2000). 
 
6.2.4.3 Summary: HIV/AIDS’ challenges during Mandela and Mbeki’s presidency  
This section traced challenges post-apartheid South Africa faced with regards to HIV and 
AIDS during the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki. During Mandela‟s presidency, the 
government came in for criticism for its support for an AIDS awareness play, Sarafina II, and 
a home-grown anti-retroviral known as Virodene. During Mbeki‟s presidency, Mbeki was 
singled out as an AIDS denialist and dissident when he raised concerns about the toxicity of 
AZT, and his establishment of an AIDS Advisory panel which included AIDS “dissidents”. 
 
6.2.5 Summary: Background 
This section began by pointing out that crime, the Zimbabwean crisis, and HIV/AIDS and 
Mbeki‟s approach to the latter two issues have been identified as major political challenges in 
the first ten years of democracy in South Africa – the period which is the focus of this 
research. It has been observed that both common crime and political corruption, which 
emerged as challenges of the post-apartheid government, have their genesis in the apartheid 
era.  
 
Mbeki‟s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis was met with condemnation and criticism.  On 
the issue of HIV/AIDS, the background section showed that the manner in which Mbeki 
handled HIV/AIDS both during Mandela‟s and Mbeki‟s own presidency invited public 
condemnation from the media and the scientific community.  
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Next, the researcher is presenting the responses recorded in the City Press newspaper, 
represented in the newspaper‟s editorials, and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and 
opinion pieces. The same order – crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS – is followed. 
 
6.3 Section One 
Research Findings drawn from the City Press’ editorials, the City Press’ black 
journalists’ columns and opinion pieces 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In this section editorials, which do not carry by-lines, will be referenced as “City Press 
Comment”, whereas individual City Press black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces will 
be referenced according to the authors‟ names. In some cases, for the purpose of clarity, other 
reports which appeared in the City Press and other newspapers are used as a context. The first 
issue to be dealt with next is crime, divided into common crime and political corruption. 
 
6.3.1.1 Common Crime 
Within three months after the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, the City 
Press (City Press Comment, 1994:16) sensitised the government about crime, pointing out 
that crime was “[o]ne of the gravest problems facing the new government”. In this editorial 
comment the newspaper pointed out that the effects were felt across communities.  
 
The editorial pointed out that the “psychology which runs rampant in the streets and in the 
hearts and minds of the criminals, is a merciless beast” which “must be fought with all we 
have at our disposal. Philosophising, glib explanations and community forums might work to 
an extent.” Unequivocally, the editorial pointed out that what the newspaper was “saying, or 
rather advocating, is that the crime problems that confront our society and police everyday in 
the streets and our homes, demand hard answers”. 
 
A week later, the newspaper‟s journalist, Sekola Sello (1994:16) reiterated the sentiments 
expressed in the previous week‟s editorial. Sello noted that  
 
“[i]f there are divisions between blacks and whites about what the 
government‟s priorities should be or how to approach these problems, there is 
common ground on one issue – crime”. 
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Failure to deal with crime decisively, the newspaper (City Press Comment, 1995a:14) warned, 
could have “serious social, political and economic implications”. These implications could be 
the further soaring of crime, resulting in foreign investors fleeing, something the country 
could ill afford, the newspaper argued.  
 
The editorial went further than just identifying the problem. It diagnosed some contributing 
factors and prescribed some cures. It pointed out that something drastic needed to be done 
about young black people without a sense of purpose, and their education. Their lack of 
purpose and direction, the editorial pointed out, resulted in them wasting their lives and 
treating criminal acts like car hijackings, drug dealing, gangsterism and a host of other 
destructive forms of behaviour as the norm (City Press Comment, 1995a:14). 
 
Close to the first anniversary of South Africa‟s first democratic elections, the newspaper felt 
vindicated in its predictions that crime would hurt the country‟s economy. The City Press 
(City Press Comment, 1995b:16) pointed out that in April 1995, Gauteng‟s Primrose Gold 
Mine had closed down due to violence. More frightening, the editorial further pointed out, 
“was the SA Chamber of Business‟ statement that our country‟s frightening crime rate and 
lawless image is deterring foreign investment and forcing some local companies to close 
down”. 
 
In May 1995 the City Press (City Press Comment, 1995c:16) boldly asserted that the problem 
facing the country was not just lawlessness but lunacy as well, and warned that unless this 
was confronted, “our country will soon be reduced to a state of lunacy”. In protest, its 
editorial argued that  
 
“[u]nlike the bad old days of apartheid, where many crime-related incidents 
were politically motivated, what we experience these days is nothing but 
lawlessness and lunacy”. 
 
The editorial further argued that freedom “should not only lie on the political front but in our 
daily movements as well”. What this meant was that it was not enough to vote for a 
democratic government. What was needed was that the democratic government should 
exercise its duty of protecting its citizens. 
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Not content with just protesting, the editorial challenged the then Minister of Safety and 
Security, Sydney Mufumadi, by pointing out that the City Press‟ (City Press Comment, 
1995c:16) 
“understanding is that many carjackings are instrumented by a syndicate of 
druglords – some of them well-known even to the police – who sell the cars in 
African countries for drugs”. 
 
 
The editorial further warned that unless Mufamadi did something, “[h]istory will judge 
Mufamadi harshly.” 
 
The editorial further expressed a belief that if there were some form of severe deterrent – like 
a death penalty, or many years in prison – “these youngsters would not be causing the havoc 
they are presently doing”. 
 
6.3.1.2 The City Press for the death penalty 
On the issue of the death penalty, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1995d:16) was out of 
step with the government. In June 1995, the Constitutional Court did away with capital 
punishment (City Press Comment, 1995d:16). Reacting to this development, the City Press 
(City Press Comment, 1995d:16) expressed discomfort with the decision, observing that  
 
“[f]rankly speaking, we do not believe that there is any concrete evidence in 
support of either position. But claims that judicial killings are barbaric and 
have no place in a modern society are less than convincing.” 
 
The editorial further argued that there “are certain crimes which are so revolting and brutal 
that society must ask whether the lives of perpetrators of such evil deserve to be spared”. In 
an opinion piece written the same day, while emphasising that his opinion was “a personal 
opinion and doesn‟t necessarily reflect the position of City Press on this issue”, Sello 
(1995a:16) unequivocally declared that he was “in favour of capital punishment for certain 
crimes” and further declared that he believed that “abolishing the death penalty was the first 
blunder by this government”. Taking such a stance, Sello further noted, was not easy for him, 
considering that he had had acquaintances and friends executed by the apartheid regime. But 
similar to the City Press‟ editorial published on the same day as his opinion piece, Sello was 
convinced that there were “certain crimes which are so repulsive that the only fitting 
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punishment is to pass the death penalty”. He argued that the repeal of the death penalty would 
make criminals more bold in the future, “knowing that they will not pay with their lives”. 
 
While on the one hand South Africans had to deal with the reality of the repeal of the death 
penalty, violence in the form of “[t]axi killings in our township” went on “unabated” (City 
Press Comment, 1995e:16). The City Press‟ editorial (City Press Comment, 1995e:16) further 
protested that “this government and the one before it have done little to deter those who 
commit these dastardly acts”. In an open letter to Mufamadi, the City Press‟ journalist Charles 
Mogale (1995:16) pointed out that Mufamadi‟s “threats to clamp down, and President 
Mandela‟s alleged declaration of war against crime, have all come down to naught”. Mogale 
demanded to know: 
 
“What happened to all the pre-election talk that ex-president FW de Klerk did 
not have the „political will‟ to stop the violence? One assumes that you and the 
president have the political will to do what FW would or could not do. What‟s 
up?” 
 
The City Press was not just challenging the government alone, but citizens as well. 
Remarking on reported rampant cases of child abuses, involving “raping [of] children as 
young as three and even younger,” in an editorial, the City Press (City Press Comment, 
1995f:16) remarked that it was “not just strangers or neighbours who are guilty of these 
brutalities; in some cases parents are said to be responsible for abusing their own children”. 
Such acts flew “against the grain of ubuntu/botho”. The editorial warned that “[u]ntil parents 
and various organs of civil society show collective anger and say enough is enough, the abuse 
of our children will continue”. This sentiment was echoed later by Sello (1995b:16) who 
observed that “it was about time the communities stood up to say enough is enough”. 
 
When some citizens rose to the City Press‟ call to take responsibility in combating crime, 
Sello (1995b:16) openly acknowledged the initiative. This happened when some young 
people in Sebokeng township called a rally where they outlined their plans in fighting against 
crime. However, in the same piece, Sello noted that the low turnout to the youth‟s call was a 
clear indication in his view that “our communities are not taking this scourge of child abuse 
seriously”. He also lamented the politicians‟ lack of interest, noting that “one has since 
realised that most of them are too busy trying to get onto the gravy train”. 
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While the City Press gave the politicians a tongue lashing for what the newspaper perceived 
as failure to deal with crime decisively, it gave praise when it recognised some effort in 
combating crime. After a meeting with Mufamadi, the then City Press editor, Khulu Sibiya, 
left the meeting convinced that Mufamadi was committed to getting the job of fighting crime 
done (Sibiya, 1996b:16). A month after commending Mufamadi for his efforts in fighting 
crime, the City Press‟ editorial welcomed the national crime prevention strategy unveiled by 
the government towards the end of May in 1996 (City Press Comment, 1996a:16). While the 
editorial said that the government‟s intentions should be lauded, it also cautioned against “any 
illusion that fighting criminals in whatever guise…is going to be easy”.  
 
In the week following the welcoming of the government‟s strategy to combat crime, noting 
that the team was “excited” when the strategy was unveiled, the City Press (City Press 
Comment, 1996b:16) now observed that “the ink had hardly dried on the white paper when 
criminals struck again and in fact stepped up their activities”. The editorial was in reaction to 
the slaying of Piet and Pietman van Rensburg, father and brother of the Transvaal rugby 
flyhalf, Louis van Rensburg. In the attack Louis van Rensburg sustained a gunshot wound in 
the neck that landed him in hospital. Outraged, the City Press editorial called on the 
government to “bring back the death penalty” (City Press Comment, 1996b:16). It strongly 
argued that because of the government‟s concern for human rights, some criminals were now 
getting first class-treatment in jail where they received good food and watched their favourite 
sports on colour TV. The editorial called for an end to these amenities to “make them realise 
that crime does not pay”. 
 
Failure on the part of the government to bring back the death penalty, Sibiya (1996c:14) 
noted, was an act of ignoring a “strong enough message to the government about the feelings 
of ordinary people who want to go about with their lives in a peaceful manner”. This 
negligence, Sibiya further pointed out, could very soon see some people calling for the 
resignation of the government. In other words, Sibiya was saying that some citizens were 
losing faith in the government and would soon declare their vote of no confidence. For the 
City Press it was not enough just to call on the government to reinstate the death penalty or to 
claim that this was a popular view. In its first edition in September 1996, the newspaper 
“devoted most of our editorial space to highlight the unprecedented levels of crime” (City 
Press Comment, 1996c:14).  
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6.3.1.3 The City Press calls for a referendum on the death penalty 
The newspaper pledged to do the same with subsequent editions so as to give a platform to its 
“readers to be involved in telling us, and the government, what must be done”. This move was 
an indication that the City Press was no longer content with asking the government to call a 
referendum on the death penalty, but was taking the initiative to do so. In carrying out the 
survey, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996c:14) believed that “[w]hat the readers say 
should be an indication enough for the government to know how its citizens feel about the 
death penalty”. Boldly, the editorial comment (City Press Comment, 1996c:14) pointed out 
that “[w]e cannot just accept the views of President Nelson Mandela and Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, neither can we simply accept what the ANC Youth League or Nafcoc have to 
say about the matter”.  
 
 
What the editorial comment was saying was that prominent leaders‟ opinions on the death 
penalty were neither final nor sacrosanct. More significant for the City Press was a  
 
“growing concern in our communities that those passive about crime are so 
because they have bodyguards night and day and are protected in their safe 
houses and in the streets by taxpayers‟ money” (City Press Comment, 
1996c:14).  
 
While the City Press‟ official position advocated the return of the death penalty, this was not a 
sentiment shared by all its journalists. 
 
6.3.1.4 A City Press’ journalist opposes the newspaper’s call for the death penalty 
In particular, one staff member, Benison Makele (1996:17) strongly opposed capital 
punishment. In his argument, Makele noted that it was not insignificant that many of the 
gruesome crimes committed were carried out by teenagers. He argued that it needed to be 
remembered that those who stood accused of crime were the very people who, at the height of 
the anti-apartheid struggle, were involved in using violent ways in pursuit of the objectives of 
the struggle. The struggle, Makele further argued  
 
“had been the cauldron in which the youth were hardened by experience, the 
circumcision school which had initiated them into manhood – but the 
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superficial end of that struggle left them in a void, with their lives stripped of 
all meaning”.  
 
Left unemployed and without any education, Makele further pointed out, these youths had 
now turned to using their war skills they had learnt during the anti-apartheid struggle to give 
their lives meaning and purpose – to the detriment of the very same communities they had 
striven to liberate.  
 
Instead of the gallows, Makele noted that what was needed by the country were massive 
youth development projects to fill the void in the youths‟ lives. In a clear opposition to his 
newspaper‟s stance, Makele asserted that  
 
“the government does not have to budge…and pander to the whims of the pro-
death penalty lobby by allowing such a referendum – because, should such a 
plebiscite be held, chances are that people, inspired by emotion and revulsion 
and not rational considerations, will vote overwhelmingly in favour of the 
hangman”.  
 
He expressed a belief that hanging criminals “won‟t help and would tend to promote the view 
that one becomes a criminal out of conscious choice – which is not true”. In the week in 
which Makele expressed a view that the government should not hold a referendum on the 
death penalty, Mandela “rejected calls for a review of the death penalty and said public 
concern over the matter was due to lack of information” (City Press Comment, 1996d:14). 
Mandela reportedly went on to say that he would not ask the ANC‟s National Executive 
Committee to discuss the matter. 
 
6.3.1.5 The City Press challenges Mandela on the death penalty 
The City Press was incensed by these remarks. In its editorial comment (City Press Comment, 
1996d:14) the newspaper unequivocally declared that Mandela was “wrong” to say that those 
calling for the return of the death penalty were clamouring for this due to lack of information 
about the strategies the government was applying to eradicate crime. If the populace was 
ignorant, the City Press further charged, the fault lay with the government in not making the 
citizens aware of such measures. What the people certainly experienced, the City Press further 
asserted, was the lawlessness that prevailed in the country, police failure to apprehend the 
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criminals, how easy it was for suspects to get bail “even in serious cases”, and how lenient the 
courts were towards criminals. 
 
This editorial observed that South Africans should “accept that as long as President Nelson 
Mandela is still head of state, there is no likelihood of the government changing its position 
on the question of the death penalty” and that statements by other leading ANC members 
“also indicated that as long as the party was still in power, the return of the death penalty was 
out of question”. What this meant was that for as long as the ANC government was in power, 
the people‟s wish – the return of the death penalty – would not be respected. The City Press 
(City Press Comment, 1996d:14) believed strongly that the “cries of these people (expressing 
their support for the death penalty) need to be heeded if our government claims that it 
represented the feelings of the masses” (City Press Comment, 1996d:14). The implication 
here was that the ANC government‟s claim to representing the will of the people was false. 
 
Not only was the City Press (City Press Comment, 1998a:16) contented with charging that 
the government was not heeding the people‟s voices, but the newspaper went further to ask 
why it was that “under a democratic dispensation criminals could get away with murder when 
they could not under a totalitarian regime”. In a direct reference to the then president, Nelson 
Mandela, and his government, the editorial comment argued further that  
 
“[t]hese are the questions President Nelson Mandela and his government 
should be seriously considering, because come 1999 the electorate will remind 
them”.  
 
The statement could be read as a veiled threat that failure on the part of the government to 
address the death penalty question in an expected manner would result in the rejection of the 
government by the people because people vote for a government that protects them and their 
families. Inversely, a government that does not protect people and their families – which in 
this case the City Press believed the government did not – would not be voted for by the 
people. 
 
The following week the City Press (City Press Comment, 1998b:14) revisited the issue of the 
perception about the democratic government‟s inability to protect the citizens from crime. Its 
editorial comment recalled that in apartheid days the police were an efficient lot who, when it 
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suited the apartheid government, could surround whole townships, where “each house and 
person [were] searched thoroughly”. The editorial proceeded: 
 
“Today we have a democracy that we should all be proud of. Where are those 
policemen now? For now is the time to police the nation – the democracy – 
with zeal and dedication.” 
 
Two weeks after the City Press raised the question about the whereabouts of the police when 
they were needed, the newspaper‟s then editor, Len Kalane (1998a:16), offered an answer. 
Kalane argued that the South African military and police forces consisted of people who 
could not reconcile themselves with the reality of a post-apartheid and non-racial government. 
They were the ones, argued Kalane, who were behind the masterminding of heists and “whose 
agenda, shall we say, seems to be driven purely by political motives”. Kalane pointed out that 
their “aim is to give a feeling of intense criminal activity” and to portray the ANC 
government as dismally failing to contain crime. Three months later, the City Press (City 
Press Comment, 1998c:14) echoed this sentiment in an editorial, emphasising that  
 
“there are people out there in the military bases who still yearn for the return of 
apartheid. These are people who would do anything to undermine President 
Nelson Mandela‟s democratic government.”  
 
While Kalane‟s claim was based on conjecture, the editorial comment‟s claim was based on 
information that the police had apprehended three soldiers connected to the theft of weapons 
from a Bloemfontein military base (City Press Comment, 1998c:14). Commenting on the 
arrest later, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1998d:16) pointed out that “[u]nless proved 
otherwise, we strongly believe those stolen arms were not for personal use by the thieves but 
were meant to be used to destabilise the country”. This stance on the part of the City Press 
revealed that while the newspaper had harsh words for perceived failure on the part of the 
government to deal decisively with crime, it recognised that the task faced by the government 
was not an easy one, but one fraught with complexities. 
 
In indicating its appreciation for these complexities, in an editorial comment (City Press 
Comment, 1999a:6) following a revelation by the then National Police Commissioner, George 
Fivaz, that almost one in four South African policemen were functionally illiterate, the 
newspaper said that “[t]this shocking revelation by Fivaz, especially in the light of the high 
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crime rate in South Africa, has given us clear insight about the workings of the police force.” 
It went on to say: 
   
“Now we know why many cases have gone unsolved, even though ordinary 
citizens knew who the culprits were. We now have a better understanding as to 
why dockets go missing. We also know why it takes a police officer hours to 
take down a statement, which is then full of unpardonable errors…Indeed, it 
was not for lack of trying from the police – they simply did not have the skills 
or the training to do a proper job!” 
 
The editorial comment further noted that considering that some police officers‟ highest 
qualifications were standard six (now grade eight), the situation could not have been different.  
 
This acknowledgment did not mean an acceptance of the situation on the part of the City 
Press. Rather, the newspaper challenged the government to deal with the problem. Now that 
the problem was on the surface, the editorial comment (City Press Comment, 1999a:6) further 
pointed out that the “government should move quickly to address this matter, because as long 
as this state of affairs continues, serious criminal cases will remain unsolved”. Not only did 
the City Press show an indication of sympathy for the government‟s difficulties in fighting 
crime, but the newspaper also applauded efforts made to fight crime. 
 
When the late Steve Tshwete became the Minister of Safety and Security and issued a tough 
warning that criminals were going to be given a taste of their medicine by being dealt with 
harshly, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1999b:6) noted that it was “a pleasure to listen 
to those sweet-sounding words that inspire confidence and restore our lost dignity”. The 
editorial comment further noted that  
 
“[f]rankly, this is the language we ordinary freedom-loving citizens of this 
country want to hear from a minister entrusted with our safety and security – 
and if the criminals hate it, that‟s tough”.  
 
When the then president Thabo Mbeki told senior correctional services managers in March 
2000 that government officials were aiding criminals to continue the criminal acts from jail, 
the City Press commended him (City Press Comment, 2000b:10). The newspaper noted that 
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South Africans had “been waiting a long time for a senior politician to concede that this is 
taking place”: 
 
“We are glad that the president is taking an interest in what is going on in our 
prisons. There was no point in us complaining about never-ending crime when 
criminals were simply „freed‟ by corrupt officials before serving their full 
sentences.” 
 
In further pointing out that it was common knowledge that the business of selling dagga and 
other drugs in prison was aided by warders, the City Press editorial comment (City Press 
Comment, 2000b:10) further expressed hope that “Mbeki‟s address was not just lip service. 
His ministers must follow-up and root out corruption.” In less than a month after the City 
Press cautioned against prison official‟s corrupt activities in prison, the newspaper expressed 
disapproval at the release of a convicted drug dealer, Sipho Ndzeku, who had served only 83 
days of a four-year jail term (City Press Comment, 2000c:14). The release of Ndzeku, who 
reportedly was well connected in political circles, meant, according to the City Press‟ editorial 
comment (City Press Comment, 2000c:14), that criminals would continue doing crime and 
nothing would happen to them. The City Press argued that such should not be the case: 
 
“Criminals must know that no matter how powerful their business, political 
and other connections, there is still a power above them that will not allow the 
country‟s criminal justice system to be undermined. Ndzeku must be returned 
to prison where he belongs as speedily as possible.” 
 
Two days after the City Press called for the re-arrest of Ndzeku, the convict was back in jail. 
Commenting on the move, the City Press “could not help but pat ourselves on the back this 
week after exposing a stinking miscarriage of justice within the Correctional Services 
Department” (City Press Comment, 2000d:12). In a celebratory mood, the City Press further 
noted that had the newspaper not exposed the incident, it “could have gone unnoticed and 
swept under the carpet”.  
 
In February 2003, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2003d:22) was moved to note that  
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“[c]riminal syndicates appear to be running amok within our government 
departments. With the help of civil servants, these syndicates appear to have 
their hands firmly gripped on the public purse.”  
 
The editorial comment was remarking on the wake of the arrest of more than 50 health 
workers in Mpumalanga on various charges of fraud and corruption relating to the theft of 
medicine and hospital equipment. The editorial comment further noted that the City Press was 
informed that “apart from the hospital medicine, these crooks were also stealing equipment 
like x-ray machines before selling them in neighbouring countries, like Mozambique”. 
Among those arrested, the editorial comment revealed, were senior health officials, hospital 
managers and government pharmacists. What was even more tragic, the City Press remarked, 
was that all the arrested doctors were serving mostly rural communities on the fringes of 
Mpumalanga. 
 
As the criminal system was getting more sophisticated, the police were also doubling their 
effort in fighting the upsurge of crime. When in the last week of February 2004, the police 
arrested 15 men who were allegedly involved in a cash-in-transit robbery on the Golden 
Highway outside Johannesburg, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2004a:18) remarked 
that the move was “surely further proof that the police are now winning the battle against 
these criminal syndicates”. This remark was made in the light of the arrest of 10 heavily 
armed gangsters the previous week who were on their way to attack a van transporting 
millions of rands (City Press Comment, 2004a:18). Against this background the  
 
“City Press [was] convinced that the police intelligence work which has been 
infiltrating these gangs is finally bearing fruit as evidenced by the latest arrests 
as well as several foiled attempted heists in the past few weeks”.  
 
These victories were not permanent though. One can state that violent crime continued its 
determined march. So much so that the City Press was moved to say that South Africans had 
become prisoners in their homes and “hostage to criminals” (City Press Comment, 2004a:18). 
No one was safe, including law-abiding citizens who had acquired guns for personal 
protection. The daring criminals stole these and continued using the guns for their reign of 
terror (City Press Comment, 2004b:18). But while common crime assaulted South African 
citizens, political corruption was an equal threat in the new dispensation, as will be discussed 
in the next session. 
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6.3.2 Political Corruption 
The ANC, observed Sello (1995c:17), came to power on a massive popular bandwagon. 
Besides its ticket to power as a movement that fought against apartheid, the ruling party 
endeared itself to its voters on promises of “clean administration, a government closer to the 
people and one which is transparent and accountable”. Yet, less than a year in power, Sello 
further observed that “[s]ad to say, even at this early stage…recent events do not inspire 
confidence”.  
 
Sello‟s comments were informed by claims of corruption against ANC leaders that were in 
government. These claims, some of them contained in readers‟ letters sent to the City Press, 
included corruption, nepotism and jobs for pals in government structures controlled by the 
ANC (Sello, 1995c:17). The tendency on the part of former liberation movement cadres to get 
into government in order to access power so as to accumulate wealth for selfish interests was 
coined the “gravy train” by the media, as will be shown next.  
 
6.3.2.1 Opposing the “gravy train” 
In opposing this tendency, Sibiya (1995b:14) argued that while  
 
“it is true that the previous government and those who surrounded it were also 
on the gravy train, hence the imbalances of the resources and the economy in 
this country in favour of most whites…this should not give the present 
government the same license to climb on this train”. 
 
Echoing Sibiya‟s sentiments, Sello (1995d:15) remarked that “[f]ailure to demonstrate that 
there‟s no gravy train will harm the ANC‟s case and poison future relations between labour 
and government”. Sello‟s comment was made against the background of a strike by nurses in 
October 1995. The strike was an expression of disenchantment with salaries. In what was an 
expression of frustration with the ANC‟s gospel of patience, while there was a  
 
“growing perception that senior government officials who are former comrades 
in the struggle are now living high on the hog…some nurses carried placards 
demanding that the government stop the gravy train so that they too can get on 
board” (Sello, 1995d:15). 
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Towards the first local government elections in November 1995, the City Press editorial 
comment (City Press Comment, 1995g:16) noted that the culture of the “gravy train” was 
becoming so widespread that there was concern that some local government candidates, 
“probably taking a cue from those in the national and provincial assemblies…seem to think 
that this is the route to the gravy train”.  
 
While not linking the growing apathy on the part of black people towards the local 
government elections to the gravy train tendency, Memela (1996:17) observed that there was 
a sense of disillusionment on the part of black people informed by a perception that the fruits 
of freedom had “come for some people”. These privileged few, Memela further pointed out, 
were referred to by ordinary township folk as “fat-cats on the gravy train”. The ANC did not 
take kindly to the criticism that they were riding on a gravy train (Maharaj, 1996:17).  
 
6.3.2.2 Government Minister asserts that City Press stance on the “gravy train” is 
baseless 
The Minister of Transport and ANC leader, Mac Maharaj, dismissed Memela‟s assertions as 
“fallacy”, baseless, and an indulgement  “in another theme: those elected to represent the 
majority care only for what they can get from the gravy train” (Maharaj, 1996:17). Not only 
did Maharaj criticise Memela but also the City Press as a whole, claiming that the City Press 
was dishing out a usual fare which was a repetition of a theme that did not stand up to 
scrutiny. That “persistent theme” was that the ANC had done little or nothing to change the 
lives of the majority of ordinary people. 
 
The City Press did not take Maharaj‟s criticism lying down. Its whole editorial comment (City 
Press Comment, 1996e:16) published the same day that Maharaj‟s piece appeared, was 
dedicated to a response to Maharaj. The editorial comment pointed out that the ANC could 
easily put up a long list of what had been done in the past two years – but that no amount of 
arguing could hide the fact that the government had “failed rather dismally to build those 
houses which were promised to our people”. Furthermore, the editorial comment pointed out 
that the “perception that the ANC members are on the gravy train is not a media fabrication” 
but an issue people were complaining about daily.  
 
The editorial further told the ANC that it “must face up these challenges instead of blaming 
the press or burying their heads in the sand – hoping complaints against the government will 
go away”. The editorial comment further noted that the City Press was not prepared to 
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practise sunshine journalism by being “the government‟s praise singers” and keeping quiet 
when things were going wrong. The editorial comment further noted that the City Press 
believed that “the press must continue to be the public‟s watchdog,” adding that “[i]f our 
leaders are wallowing in the gravy train, these things must be reported without fear or 
favour”.  
 
True to its promise to be the government‟s watchdog, when the government spoke of 
increasing parliamentarians‟ salaries, the City Press protested. In its editorial comment (City 
Press Comment, 1996f:16) the City Press argued that the move was wrong in light of 
repeated government‟s statements that the economy was going through a difficult time and 
that workers in the public and private sectors must make sacrifices and accept low increments 
– or none in some cases. In a frank tone, the editorial comment pointed out that after all, “the 
ANC has failed to deliver on many of its election promises” and therefore “[t]here is just no 
justification for our fat cats getting these increments amid so much poverty in the land”. 
Unlike Memela who said that it was the ordinary people who called government officials “fat 
cats”, the editorial took responsibility for such a label by referring to the politicians as such. 
When occasion necessitated, it singled them out, named and shamed them as will be shown 
next. A case in point was that of the former defence minister, Joe Modise.  
 
It emerged that Modise had his house built by Denel, a parastatal (City Press Comment, 
2001a:8). The City Press argued that even though it was said that Modise was repaying the 
parastatal, in the first place “he was not supposed to use the parastatal to improperly benefit 
himself”. The City Press further reminded the government that “[p]arastatals are not the 
personal fiefdoms of the ruling elite; they belong to the people”. In a direct reference to the 
ruling party, the editorial comment further asserted that it was not enough for the ANC to 
declare that it was against corruption when headlines exposing crime pointed an accusing 
finger at “ANC bigwigs” (City Press Comment, 2001a:8). The newspaper further pointed out 
that  
 
“[c]ynics could justifiably argue that such rhetoric is part of the ruling party‟s 
political agenda, aimed specifically at neutralising public outrage against 
corruption and securing the ANC government‟s tenure in office”. 
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When it emerged that some parliamentarians had exchanged their travel vouchers meant for 
constituency work for luxuries like bookings in five-star hotels and car hire, the City Press 
(City Press Comment, 2004b:18) noted that this was the kind of  
 
“stuff that feeds into the stereotype of Africans as people who can‟t say no to 
temptation. For how long was SA going to be different to other corrupt African 
governments, the sceptics will ask.”  
 
The editorial comment reminded the parliamentarians that their duty in government was to 
“carry a responsibility, on behalf of the country‟s citizens, to keep government in check: to 
ensure that government acts in the interest of the country and its citizens”. 
 
It further noted that “if those who are to check on government to ensure it does the right thing 
are themselves caught with their hands in the cookie jar, then we must all be worried”. 
Adding his voice, the then City Press‟ deputy editor, Khathu Mamaila (2004a:18), 
emphasised that “Members of Parliament are supposed to be above reproach”. Mamaila 
further argued that parliamentarians should not “break the laws they make” and are “supposed 
to be honourable” because they “even address each other as „honourable so and so‟”. 
 
6.3.3 Summary: the City Press editorials and the City Press’ black journalists’ 
perspectives on crime as expressed in their columns and opinion pieces 
This section has given an account of the City Press‟ and its journalists‟ perspectives on both 
common crime and political corruption in South Africa. The newspaper‟s view was that crime 
was undermining the newly found freedom in South Africa. While in some cases the 
newspaper and its journalists appreciated the government‟s difficulties in dealing with crime, 
the newspaper and its senior journalist, Sekolla Sello, opposed the abolishment of the capital 
punishment or death penalty. However, one of the City Press‟ journalists, Benison Makele, 
broke ranks with his newspaper on this issue. 
 
On the issue of corrupt tendencies by former freedom fighters who later constituted part of the 
government, the newspaper condemned them. On this, there was no difference between the 
official position of the City Press and its individual journalists. 
 
6.3.4 The Zimbabwean Crisis 
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In this section the researcher presents findings on the City Press‟ official position and 
individual black journalists‟ positions on the Zimbabwean crisis, and how former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki handled the crisis. Mbeki‟s diplomatic initiatives between the 
ruling party and the opposition were generally referred to as “quiet diplomacy” by the media. 
 
6.3.4.1 The City Press blaming Mugabe  
After noting that Mugabe had supported the war veterans, and also arguing that their action 
was a justifiable protest against the unfair ownership of land by the country‟s minority whites, 
the City Press editorial comment (City Press Comment, 2000e:14) observed that the 
“auguries for stability and peace in Zimbabwe did not look good when its president 
encouraged lawlessness”. The editorial comment further noted that though Mugabe was 
blaming white land owners for the lack of equity in land ownership, Mugabe himself was 
partly to blame. That was because, the editorial comment argued, it was an indictment against 
Mugabe that it took twenty years after Zimbabwe attained independence that he, as head of 
government, had still not resolved the land question. The City Press felt that Mugabe and his 
Zanu-PF had the legislative wherewithal to address the issue in a manner consistent with 
justice. The editorial comment did not place the blame solely on Mugabe‟s shoulders, though, 
but on white Zimbabweans as well for failing to cooperate with the Zimbabwean president. 
 
6.3.4.2 The City Press blaming white Zimbabweans  
The editorial (City Press Comment, 2000e:14) further noted that white Zimbabweans had 
“made little effort to reciprocate his outstretched arm of friendship” and added that  
 
“[i]n fact, some of them still think of themselves as Europeans first and 
Zimbabweans second. This had generated a lot of disappointment and 
resentment on the part of black Zimbabweans.”  
 
The then City Press editor, Vusi Mona, saw the forceful ejection of white landowners not just 
as a reflection of resentment on the part of black Zimbabweans, but “as chickens coming 
home to roost” (Mona, 2000a:12). 
 
6.3.4.3 The Zimbabwean crisis: a historical context 
Mona argued that the Zimbabwean case had to be viewed within a historical context. His 
sense being that “commentary about the current land invasions in Zimbabwe is informed by 
an arrogant and pathetically ill-informed understanding of the history of that country”, Mona 
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felt that “a reflection of where Zimbabwe has come from becomes necessary”. He argued that 
this became even more necessary “when an impression is created that the black Zimbabweans 
who have invaded white-owned farms have sunk to the lowest level of human existence – and 
this in a manner unique to indigenous Africans”. Going the historical route for Mona 
(2000a:12) meant taking into cognisance that as “[o]utrageous as the invasions are, the truth is 
that similar or worse incursions happened in that country a century ago”.  
 
Mona was referring to the land dispossession of Zimbabweans by British settlers led by Cecil 
Rhodes. When the Zimbabweans resisted, Mona pointed out, the leaders who hid in caves 
were dynamited and others caught and hanged. Mona (2000a:12) also noted that at the 
Lancaster House Conference in 1979, in negotiations between the then Rhodesia‟s rulers and 
the Zimbabwean freedom fighters, Britain  
 
“undertook among other things, to raise money to buy white-owned farms 
which were to be used for land redistribution once the new government came 
into power. Seemingly, Britain now has a dim recollection of this undertaking. 
But Mugabe has not forgotten.”  
 
Following in the footsteps of its editor‟s opinion piece, the City Press invoked history to 
justify its support for Mbeki‟s diplomatic approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. Its editorial 
comment (City Press Comment, 2000f:12) argued that it was hypocritical of organisations 
like the Democratic Party (forerunner of the Democratic Alliance) to advocate putting 
economic pressure on Zimbabwe when the very same “were in the forefront of those opposing 
calls for economic pressure and sanctions against SA in the dark days of apartheid”. This was 
especially so, the editorial comment further observed, considering that in the apartheid days 
“Blacks were going through „hell‟, far worse than in Zimbabwe”. Welcoming the decision by 
the South African Development Community (SADC) not to publicly condemn Mugabe for 
allowing war veterans to occupy white farms, the editorial comment further argued that the 
problems in Zimbabwe “would require great diplomatic skills”.  
 
The editorial comment further pointed out that any pressure from the SADC leadership would 
have been the surest way to end the summit prematurely. The City Press felt that this could 
not be afforded because any political instability in Zimbabwe “has a direct impact on other 
economies”, adding that Botswana was “already reeling from Zimbabwean refugees because 
of its weakening economy”.  
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Against this background, echoing its support for Mbeki‟s diplomatic approach four months 
down the line, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2000g:8) argued that the African 
continent had its “own unique problems, different from those of Europe” and added that 
“Mbeki understands his continent much better than those who have one foot in Africa and 
another in Europe”. What the City Press seemed to be suggesting here was that Zimbabwe 
was an African problem that needed an African solution. In a later editorial, the City Press 
made it explicit that it indeed subscribed to a view that Zimbabwe was an African problem 
needing an African solution (City Press Comment, 2002a:8). 
 
6.3.4.4 Zimbabwe: an African problem requiring African solutions 
This view was expressed on the occasion of a deal brokered by the then Nigerian president, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, between Zimbabwe on the one hand and, Britain and other unspecified 
European countries on the other (Seepe, 2001:2). The agreement reached in September 2001 
entailed a commitment from the Zimbabwean government to halt the land invasions whilst 
Britain and other European countries committed themselves to undertake to pay the cost of 
compensating white farmers for farms taken over by the state (City Press Comment, 2002a:8).  
 
Commenting on this development, the City Press‟ editorial (City Press Comment, 2002a:8) 
remarked that “Obasanjo, mandated by other African governments to enter into discussion 
with Britain in an effort to halt the land invasions, has done Africa proud”. This was because, 
the editorial comment further noted, Obasanjo had “shown the rest of the world the 
commitment of African leaders to bring about lasting peace”. In the City Press‟ view, the 
editorial comment further pointed out, “[t]he Zimbabwean accord clearly shows that African 
leaders can work towards providing African solutions to African problems”. 
 
The African leaders‟ approach to the Zimbabwean crisis was given further endorsement by 
the City Press when Nigeria and South Africa opposed punitive measures against Zimbabwe 
during a meeting of Commonwealth countries late in February in 2002 in Australia (City 
Press Comment, 2002a:8). In the same vein, the City Press‟ editorial comment condemned 
Western countries for practising double standards when dealing with the issue of Zimbabwe. 
Singling out the USA and Britain, the editorial comment further pointed out that Swaziland 
and Uganda did not practise democracy and yet these were “acceptable in London and 
Washington. Where is the fairness in all this?”  
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Almost two years later, the then City Press deputy editor, Khathu Mamaila echoed the 
sentiments expressed in this editorial. Mamaila (2004b:18) recalled that the “west conspired 
to overthrow former Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba and imposed a despot Mobutu Sese 
Seko”, a man who was “corrupt and plundered the wealth of the Congo, but he remained in 
power for almost three decades because his puppet regime did not threaten the interests of the 
west”. Mamaila further pointed out that the Angolan president Jose Eduardo dos Santos was 
running a corrupt and undemocratic regime, milking the country dry while “enjoy[ing] his 
millions in America” with no negative reaction from the USA because Western interests were 
not threatened. 
 
It was for these reasons, Mamaila noted, that the readers of the New African, a London-
published magazine, had voted Mugabe “the third greatest African of all time”. It was for 
these reasons, Mamaila further noted, that Mugabe received a thunderous welcome at Orlando 
Stadium in South Africa when he attended the funeral of the ANC leader Walter Sisulu. 
Mamaila pointed out that Mugabe represented “the anger of many Africans against the west, 
in particular colonialism in all its forms”. He represented “tenacity, the undying and 
unconquered spirit of those willing to die on their feet rather than live on their knees”.  
 
The view expressed by Mamaila had been expressed three years earlier by the City Press‟ 
columnist, Sonti Maseko (Maseko, 2001:9) who had noted that  
 
“Mugabe has certainly struck a chord among people and gained the recognition 
as the icon and champion of the struggle for land rights. And as an African 
leader who can stand up to western influence and interests.” 
 
The support for Mbeki‟s diplomatic approach in Zimbabwe on the part of the City Press was, 
however, not synonymous with the support for Mugabe‟s tactics.  
 
6.3.4.5 Support for Mbeki not synonymous with support for Mugabe 
When Mugabe‟s Zanu-PF party won the national elections in March 2002, and South Africa 
accepted the outcomes, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2002b:8) declared Mugabe‟s 
victory as “problematic”. The City Press made this point against the observation of 
intimidation and violence in the country. But unlike “some western leaders like Britain‟s 
Tony Blair” who laid all the blame on Mugabe, the City Press (City Press Comment, 
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2002a:8) had noted that the violence had emanated both from Mugabe‟s and Tsvangirai‟s 
parties, but stating this was not the same as condoning Mugabe‟s reported acts of violence.  
 
Though supportive of Mbeki‟s approach, the newspaper (City Press Comment, 2001h:8) felt 
that “[o]ur approach to the Zimbabwean crisis – that of quiet diplomacy – sometimes creates a 
perception that we apply double standards”. That was because, the editorial further point out, 
South Africa had a “tendency to denounce Mugabe‟s dictatorial grip on power and later we 
heap praises on the man for „the perfect way he handles the controversial land issue‟”. 
According to the City Press (City Press Comment, 2001h:8) “[t]his perception was reinforced 
by statements from the SADC – of which we are a part – who visited that country to assess 
the state of affairs”. The editorial further stated that South Africa “cannot afford to be seen to 
be propping up dictators when we…are a shining example of true democracy”.  
 
When the SADC objected to the Commonwealth Heads of Government‟s decision to extend 
the suspension of Zimbabwe, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2003i:18) criticised the 
SADC, arguing that the Southern African body gave the “impression that it is a regional 
„boys‟ club‟ in which its members are intent on defending each other and, at all costs, will 
avoid rebuking the conduct of one of their own”. The editorial further argued that “[w]hile 
Mbeki has in the past few months pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy in an effort to steer 
Mugabe towards a path of democracy, there is nothing to suggest that this policy has 
worked”. The editorial further noted that while “Mbeki‟s frustration that the land issue has 
disappeared from the global discourse, except when it is mentioned to highlight the plight of 
landowners, may be valid”, it pointed out that “this unfortunate situation was brought about 
by Mugabe himself because he allowed thugs loyal to him to conduct a reign of terror against 
the farming community”. 
 
In yet another editorial, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2003e:18) asserted that “[q]uiet 
diplomacy seemed to be playing into Mugabe‟s hands”. What the City Press meant by this 
was that “[o]ur strategy of quiet diplomacy appeared to have been misunderstood – rightly or 
wrongly – by Mugabe to mean support for his political excesses”. 
 
The editorial comment further expressed displeasure at what it regarded as the South African 
government‟s denunciation of the Zimbabwean opposition and an embrace of Mugabe “even 
when opposition politicians were put in jail and tortured”. The newspaper was unhappy with 
the government‟s perceived dithering “when media freedom and freedom of speech were 
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undermined and journalists harassed by Mugabe‟s secret agents and militia” (City Press 
Comment, 2003e:18).  
 
The editorial comment further expressed displeasure at seeing the people of Zimbabwe living 
in “abject poverty and hunger while Mugabe and his fatcat [sic] ministers enjoy holidays in 
South Africa”. Two months down the line the City Press revisited the “fat cats” theme in 
relation to Zimbabwe‟s ruling elite. Its editorial comment (City Press Comment, 2003f:18) 
asserted that  
 
“[w]hat hurts most is the ruling political elite becoming richer, while the 
conditions of the poor are worsening. Mugabe and his cohorts are fat cats, 
constantly and unashamedly awarding themselves salary increments way 
above inflation”.  
 
Three months after making the latter comment, the City Press took off its gloves and called 
Mugabe a “dictator” and a “clown” with a “cold conscience” (City Press Comment, 
2003g:18). 
 
6.3.4.6 The City Press: Mugabe a “dictator” and a “clown” 
What irked the newspaper were reports that Mugabe was building a mansion worth R72 
million “when the majority of Zimbabweans are starving – a direct result of the dictator‟s 
misrule”. This time around the City Press did not only condemn Mugabe but African leaders 
on the continent as well for not intervening. The City Press (City Press Comment, 2003g:18)  
remarked that it was  
 
“unfortunate that Mugabe‟s comrades in leadership positions across Africa, 
who are expected to knock sense into him, are shirking their responsibility and 
treating him like a hero”.  
 
That African leaders “warmly welcomed” Mugabe when attending their gatherings gave the 
impression that they “embrace[d] his dictatorial mismanagement of Zimbabwe and its 
economy”. These remarks revealed that African leaders‟ approach to Zimbabwe was not the 
“African solution to African problems” that the newspaper advocated and hoped for as 
expressed in an earlier editorial (City Press Comment, 2002a:8). Unequivocally, the City 
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Press declared that the “African leaders are failing the people of Zimbabwe”. Among the 
African leaders that the City Press accused of failing Zimbabweans, Mbeki was not left out. 
 
Revisiting Mbeki‟s approach to the Zimbabwean crisis, the City Press (City Press Comment, 
2004d:18) noted that while it was “fine” for South Africa to choose “the path of quiet 
diplomacy – or non-megaphone diplomacy – in its dealings with the increasingly dictatorial 
regime of Robert Mugabe”, this approach “however, cannot be an excuse to obfuscate when 
wrongs are being done”. The editorial comment was referring to the deportation of a Cosatu 
delegation that visited Zimbabwe on a fact-finding mission. The delegation had met the 
Zimbabwean government‟s opposition. The City Press asserted that the expulsion of the 
Cosatu delegation was “tantamount to saying those Zimbabweans that they are not free to 
meet with whoever they wish to” and that the move should be seen in the light “of a 
government hell-bent on oppressing its own citizens”.  
 
6.3.4.7 Summary: The City Press’ official position, and individual black journalists’ 
positions on Zimbabwe’s crisis 
This section has given a record of the official position of the City Press, together with 
individual black journalists‟ positions on the Zimbabwean crisis. While the City Press 
criticised Mugabe for taking twenty years to address the land question, it did not spare white 
Zimbabweans for failing to reciprocate Mugabe‟s efforts in reconciling black and white 
Zimbabweans after the attainment of independence. While the newspaper gave support to 
Mbeki‟s diplomatic initiatives, it made clear that such was not the same as supporting 
Mugabe‟s approach in addressing the land question. Individual journalists were in agreement 
that Mugabe was a heroic figure to black Africans inside and outside Zimbabwe because he 
represented black people‟s collective anger, for whom nothing or little has changed on 
attaining political freedom. 
 
6.3.5 The HIV/AIDS Issue 
This section gives an account of the City Press‟ and its black journalists‟ commentaries on 
HIV/AIDS during both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki‟s administration.  
 
6.3.5.1 The City Press on HIV/AIDS in Mandela’s era 
Nineteen months after the democratic government was elected, the City Press (City Press 
Comment, 1995h:16) asserted that the “role of the government” in the “fight against Aids 
must not be exaggerated”. The newspaper‟s position was that the government “could do so 
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much and no more” and that the “onus lies with individuals to ensure that this scourge is 
defeated”. Three months after this declaration by the City Press, the government was caught 
in a storm about its allocation of R14 million to the musical Sarafina II, penned by playwright 
Mbongeni Ngema, to spread the message about the dangers of AIDS.  
 
 
 
6.3.5.1.1 The City Press on Sarafina II 
While the City Press did not question the efficacy of a musical in combating AIDS, it 
questioned the lack of transparency in how the tender was given to Ngema (City Press 
Comment, 1996g:16). The newspaper (City Press Comment, 1996g:16) was perturbed by 
conflicting statements from senior officials claiming that state tender procedures had been 
followed while on the other hand there were claims that since the money came from the 
European Union, the state tender had not been involved. What incensed the City Press more 
was the ANC‟s defence in parliament of the then Health Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma‟s department, considering “the inadequate explanations by the minister and the 
contradictory statements by her senior officials”. 
 
Six months later, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) echoed this criticism 
against the ANC. It warned that the ruling party‟s “tendency to protect its members at all cost 
– sometimes before it even gets all sides of the story, as it was the case with Dlamini-Zuma – 
could backfire”. The revisiting of this issue, six months later, was brought about by the report 
of the public protector, Selby Baqwa, which, while it exonerated Dlamini-Zuma, delivered a 
“scathing attack” on her senior officials “for gross misconduct”. Dlamini-Zuma‟s department, 
the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) argued, “did not follow certain procedures for 
acquiring tenders”. The editorial further observed that Dlamini-Zuma “did not even fully 
inform the European Union – funders of the Aids programme in South Africa – as to how the 
money was spent”. Against this background, the editorial argued that it was “silly” of the 
ANC to defend Dlamini-Zuma when she appeared before Parliament in June 1996.  
 
While six months earlier the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996g:16) was willing to 
concede and “laud” the Minister of Health if the tender was given fairly, in the light of the 
Public Protector‟s report six months later, the newspaper took a tough stance. Its editorial 
(City Press Comment, 1996h:16) unequivocally asserted that  
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
“Zuma made an unforgivable blunder in allocating R14, 2 million of Aids 
funds to Mbongeni Ngema‟s play, which according to many who saw it, fell 
far short and does not justify the expense”.  
 
The media‟s criticism of Dlamini-Zuma and the ANC on the handling of the European 
Union‟s funding was not taken lying down by the ruling party. 
 
6.3.5.1.2 Mandela attacks white-owned media 
The party‟s and the country‟s then president, Nelson Mandela, retaliated, claiming that “the 
predominantly white-owned mass media” covered the Sarafina II saga with a bias against 
Dlamini- Zuma (Rantao & Bulger, 1996:1). Mandela argued that while the Public Protector 
had “exonerated Zuma and blamed irregularities on two white officials coming from the 
previous regime, [the] mass media did not say anything about the two officials”. Contrary to 
Mandela‟s claim, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) had made specific reference 
to the two officials (Hugo Badenhorst and Johnny Angelo) that Mandela made reference to. 
The newspaper (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) had noted that 
  
“the serious implications regarding Badenhorst and Angelo once more 
highlight the urgent need for the ANC to get rid of old wood within the civil 
service and start employing efficient people”.  
 
Mandela‟s criticism of the media on this issue was not taken kindly by the City Press.  
 
6.3.5.1.3 The City Press retaliates  
Reacting to Mandela‟s criticism, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996h:14) pointed out 
that it found it 
 
“disturbing when noble and well respected leaders like President Nelson 
Mandela and some of his senior people, in the wake of the Sarafina II debacle, 
have the temerity to bash the media for highlighting what we believe was 
mismanagement in the health department. President Mandela should have been 
happy that his Ministers are kept under check.”  
 
While the government felt that the coverage of the Sarafina II issue was a smokescreen for 
motives to undermine the ANC-led government, former City Press editor, Len Kalane 
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(1998b:16), argued that the real issue was that there was a perception in South Africa that the 
AIDS issue was shrouded in “silence and secrecy” which made many “feel totally hopeless”. 
Kalane further pointed out that if South Africa wanted to have any success in dealing with the 
complexities of the AIDS epidemic, it should take lessons from Uganda which had a 
reputation of having successes in its fight against AIDS. Whether or not the government‟s 
move was influenced by the City Press‟ then editor‟s advice, plans were put in place for 
Zuma‟s successor as Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, to travel to Uganda in July 
1999 to study the methods the country employed in its battle against HIV/AIDS (City Press 
Comment, 1999a:6).  
 
6.3.5.2 The City Press on HIV/AIDS in Mbeki’s era 
Tshabalala-Msimang‟s travel to Uganda was received with acclamation by the City Press. Its 
editorial (City Press Comment, 1999c:6) noted that it was  
 
“clear that the government has begun a total overhaul of its measures against 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic…The new government has shown a fresh resolve in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS that was largely absent in the past.”  
 
The editorial also noted, approvingly, that prior to Tshabalala-Msimang‟s move, “President 
Thabo Mbeki ordered a review of the state‟s HIV/AIDS policy at all levels of government”. 
 
In May 2000, Mbeki convened a two-day conference of mainstream scientists together with 
those who challenged the view that HIV caused AIDS (City Press Comment, 2000h:6). This, 
together with reports that Mbeki appointed to his 30-member presidential AIDS advisory 
panel scientists such as David Rasnick and Peter Duesberg, provoked widespread public 
criticism. What upset Duesberg‟s critics was his theory that the anti-HIV treatment, AZT, 
caused AIDS (Hofstatter, 2000:7). Mbeki‟s extension of invitation to the “dissident” scientists 
led to his critics suggesting that he himself questioned the causal relationship between HIV 
and AIDS, an allegation “emphatically denied” by the Office of the President (City Press 
Comment, 2000h:6).  
 
The City Press journalist, Dominic Mahlangu (2000:14), believed that by entertaining the 
debate on whether or not HIV caused AIDS, Mbeki was sending confusing signals. He 
asserted that  
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“the manner in which our president is handling this issue may have adverse 
effects, not only on HIV-positive people, but also on ordinary people who may 
begin to doubt the link between HIV and AIDS”.  
 
If the perception that HIV did not cause AIDS took root, Mahlangu (2000:14) asserted, 
unprotected sex could become the norm. Mahlangu further asserted that if any doubt existed 
about the link between HIV and AIDS, the issue should have been raised with scientists 
“behind closed doors to avoid confusion among the public”. The matter should “only have 
been taken into the public domain when certainty was established”. The City Press, however, 
disagreed with Mahlangu‟s criticism against Mbeki. 
 
6.3.5.2.1 The City Press defends Mbeki 
The newspaper (City Press Comment, 2000h:6) defended Mbeki saying he had helped to 
“create a climate in which scientists from different backgrounds can come together in the 
fight against HIV/Aids”. The editorial further pointed out that “any debate that can lead to a 
solution is most welcome”. Regarding criticism that “Mbeki has no medical training and, 
therefore, cannot make any pronouncements on issues such as this one”, the City Press (City 
Press Comment, 2000h:6) argued that such claims “are as unfair as they are unhelpful in 
dealing with this scourge, which is annihilating Africa”.  
 
Having noted that “Mbeki has never pretended to be a medical scientist”, the editorial further 
defended Mbeki‟s intervention by arguing that “as president, he is eminently placed to create 
a climate in which scientists from different backgrounds can come together in the fight 
against HIV/Aids”. Even though the City Press defended Mbeki‟s stance, the question on 
whether Mbeki believed or not that HIV caused AIDS was a recurring one that haunted not 
only the Mbeki administration but the City Press itself. 
 
6.3.5.2.2 The City Press challenges Mbeki  
The City Press columnist and journalist, Sonti Maseko (2000a:8), observed that the question 
about whether HIV caused AIDS kept on resurfacing “in news headlines, and everywhere” 
Mbeki made a public appearance.  
 
The City Press (City Press Comment, 2000i:8) expressed concern that the “minister 
[Tshabalala-Msimang] and President Mbeki have been ambiguous on this matter and in the 
process have sent confusing signals to the public”. The editorial further noted that the “sooner 
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they [Tshabalala-Msimang and Mbeki] clarify their position, the better for our fight against 
HIV/AIDS”.  
 
Four months after calling on Mbeki to clarify his position on the question of whether HIV 
caused AIDS, the City Press was forthright in criticising Mbeki on this issue. The newspaper 
(City Press Comment, 2001b:8) noted that “[h]is handling of the AIDS debate last year, 
during which he questioned the link between HIV and AIDS was a disaster”. After the 
delivery of his State of the Nation address in February 2001, emphasising its disapproval of 
Mbeki‟s stance on the debate about whether HIV caused AIDS, the City Press (City Press 
Comment, 2001c:8) “applaud[ed] him for steering away from the…HIV/AIDS debate.” The 
praises did not last for long. 
 
6.3.5.2.3 The City Press: Mbeki is presiding over genocide 
Eight months later the then City Press editor, Vusi Mona (2001b:8), accused Mbeki‟s 
government of “unwittingly presiding over a genocide” over which “posterity will judge them 
harshly”. What had moved Mona to utter such strong words was a Mail&Guardian report 
(Barrel & Kindra, 2001:1) which had stated that the government had suppressed the Medical 
Research Council‟s (MRC) report revealing that the HIV/AIDS epidemic accounted for one-
in-four of all deaths in South Africa. According to the Mail&Guardian, the MRC‟s report 
predicted that by 2010 AIDS would have killed between five and seven million people.  
 
The Mail&Guardian report further revealed that in his preface to the report, the “MRC 
president Malekgapuru Makgoba, confronts those, like Mbeki, who question the causal link 
between HIV and Aids”. The Mail&Guardian also reported that the government had 
announced that it would not avail the MRC‟s report until after two months of its release. The 
Mail&Guardian (Barrel & Kindra, 2001:1) also revealed that the ANC had rejected the 
MRC‟s report as being “not credible”. The government‟s and the ANC‟s reactions did not go 
down well with Mona. 
 
6.3.5.2.4 The City Press: It is not about statistics 
Mona (2001b:8) protested that Mbeki had already caused confusion in the year 2000 when he 
“cast doubt on whether HIV causes AIDS”. Mbeki‟s position, according to Mona, “caused a 
lot of uncertainty in people‟s minds and set back years of education and awareness regarding 
HIV/AIDS”. In Mona‟s view the rejection of the MRC‟s report by the ANC was an act of 
usurping scientists‟ role by politicians.  
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The ANC‟s action gave Mona the sense that “politicians in South Africa, especially from the 
ruling party, equate ignorance about the HIV/AIDS epidemic with stupidity on their part”. 
While Mbeki, according to Mona (2001b:8), was pontificating about whether HIV caused 
AIDS, “the sad thing is people are dying of AIDS-related diseases”. Mona‟s sentiment was 
echoed in the following week‟s editorial of the City Press. 
 
The City Press (City Press Comment, 2001d:8) argued that the “real task” was not about 
finding out how many people died of AIDS but preventing those who did not have HIV from 
getting it. This assertion was in reaction to the government‟s move of pulling in Statistics 
South Africa  to verify the MRC‟s report‟ accuracy (City Press Comment, 2001d:8). The City 
Press (City Press Comment, 2001d:8)  emphasised that the issue was not about numbers but 
about the reality of people dying from AIDS, further noting that those who had “seen relatives 
wiped out by the pandemic think that the MRC‟s 40 percent is too conservative”.  
 
What was urgently needed, the City Press journalist and columnist, Sandile Memela 
(Memela, 2001:9), argued, was that “Mbeki and his government must do something about 
AIDS. It is already too late!” What Memela was suggesting was that the government was 
failing in providing leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
 
This perception was echoed by the City Press on World Aids Day in 2001. Noting that South 
Africans were “crying for decisive leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS” and that the 
“government must lead the way”, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2001e:8) further 
pointed out that the government was “not doing so at the moment”. This statement was made 
in the light of a court battle between the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the 
government, in which the TAC was struggling to get the government to provide anti-HIV 
drugs to all HIV positive pregnant women (Ngcai & Mkhabela, 2001:01 – 02). The City Press 
(City Press Comment, 2001e:08) asserted that it was a “scandalous” situation where citizens 
were compelled to take court action against their own government in a “desperate” attempt to 
have their plight addressed. When the TAC emerged victorious in its court case against the 
government, the City Press celebrated. 
 
6.3.5.2.5 The City Press celebrates the TAC’s victory 
The City Press (City Press Comment, 2001f:8) noted that the TAC‟s “victory”  was not only 
for HIV-positive pregnant women and their offsprings, but also an example of how ordinary 
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citizens could use the law to enforce rights enshrined in the Constitution.  The victory sent “a 
message to the powers that be” that a government elected by the people should align policies 
to cater for basic needs of voters. The editorial further observed that the government‟s 
“inflexible policy of refusing to intervene meaningfully in HIV-prevention”, was a “cause for 
much concern”. The government appealed against the court ruling. 
 
 
6.3.5.2.6 The City Press condemns Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang  
Not only was the City Press “appalled” by the government‟s appeal, but was also “outraged” 
(City Press Comment, 2001g:8). Lashing out at the government, the newspaper observed that 
“[n]o amount of verbal gymnastics or sophistry to justify government‟s position can take 
away the simple fact that refusal to provide the drugs is ill-informed and ultimately callous”. 
The editorial further demanded to know “[h]ow many thousands of graves” should be dug 
before “our own Pharoah can be made to realise that this is too much?” In the City Press‟ 
view, it was “apparent” that the government‟s refusal to provide these drugs was not based on 
“scientific reasons but purely on the whims of a president whose ego has been bruised and 
who refuses to accept that his views on HIV/AIDS are wrong”.  This editorial (City Press 
Comment, 2001g:8) further labelled Mbeki‟s approach as “madness”. 
 
Labelling Mbeki‟s approach to HIV/AIDS as madness by the City Press was not the first on 
the part of the media. Over just a year prior this comment, the City Press‟ journalist and 
columnist, Sonti Maseko (Maseko, 2000b:8), disapprovingly noted that freelance journalist, 
RW Johnson had written for an international publication questioning “the sanity of our 
president”. In Maseko‟s view, such a stance was aimed at “discrediting” the image of South 
Africa. In Mbeki‟s defence, Maseko (2000b:8) argued that Mbeki could be criticised for many 
things, but “one thing that must be conceded to him is his mental capability: a clear, logical 
thinker and one of the finest minds on this continent”. 
 
6.3.5.2.7 The City Press calls for Tshabalala-Msimang’s resignation 
The following week the newspaper (City Press Comment, 2001h:8) called for Tshabalala-
Msimang‟s resignation. The editorial further pointed out that the government‟s reluctance and 
resistance to provide Nevirapine was an intransigent move that defied logic. The City Press 
was convinced that the provision of anti-retroviral drugs such as Nevirapine to pregnant HIV-
infected mothers could reduce the possibility of their children being born with the virus (City 
Press Comment, 2002c:8).  
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Two months after the City Press called for Tshabalala-Msimang to resign, the newspaper 
echoed its call (City Press Comment, 2002d:8). This time around its call had to do with 
Tshabalala-Msimang‟s criticism of the then Gauteng Premier, Mbhazima Shilowa‟s decision 
to expand the provision of anti-HIV/AIDS drugs. In calling for Tshabalala-Msimang‟s 
resignation, the City Press also condemned the ANC for sharing Tshabalala-Msimang‟s 
criticism of Shilowa. While the City Press‟ official position was that the government‟s refusal 
to provide Nevirapine defied logic, this was not a position held by every journalist working 
for the newspaper. 
 
In her column, Maseko (2002:9) recognised that Mbeki risked “going down in history as the 
man who denied people nevirapine and other AIDS drugs”, but in her opinion “Mbeki is a 
very brave man”. Observing that Mbeki had “risked international ridicule for his stance, been 
bashed by the media and been the object of such public hostility that it could cost him dearly 
in the future”, Maseko further argued that Mbeki “ought to be respected” because “he has 
shown something else – that he would lead from the front rather than give in to pressure”.  
 
Maseko believed that rather than “let loose on his subjects drugs that he considers less than 
satisfied with in terms of their efficacy, side effects or benefits to the country”, Mbeki 
“resigned himself to being remembered some years down the line, as the president who 
refused to yield to the seemingly popular demand for drug treatment”. In clearer terms, 
Maseko held the view that Mbeki stuck to a principled position than yielding to popular 
sentiments. However, seven months after Maseko expressed admiration for what she 
perceived as Mbeki‟s principled stance, Mbeki‟s government gave in to the popular demand 
for anti-retrovirals. 
 
6.3.5.2.8 The City Press welcomes the roll-out of anti-retrovirals 
In October 2002, the Cabinet issued a statement announcing that the government was 
considering cost implications of providing anti-retrovirals to all sectors of society (Kindra, 
2002:2). The Cabinet also announced that all provinces would be expanding the programme 
to provide nevirapine to all HIV-positive pregnant women. The government‟s new move was 
received with enthusiasm by the City Press. The newspaper (City Press Comment, 2002e:18) 
noted that the announcement heralded an “important shift in government‟s policy and 
thinking”. While the newspaper was enthusiastic about the new developments, it was, at the 
same time, also cautious.  
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The City Press (City Press Comment, 2002e:18) further pointed out that considering that “it 
took two court rulings (from the highest courts) before government finally conceded to the 
importance of providing anti-retrovirals” such could still leave people suspicious about 
whether it would deliver on its promise. Commenting on the move three months later, the 
then City Press‟ political editor, Jimmy Seepe (2002:25), observed that there was “no doubt” 
that Mbeki‟s administration had now committed itself towards improving the conditions of 
people living with AIDS through its commitment to providing anti-retroviral drugs.  
 
Eleven months after Seepe‟s observation, the government announced it would, within a year, 
provide free anti-retrovirals to those in need (Misbach, 2003:1). The government had set aside 
R12 billion to fund the roll-out. The City Press (City Press Comment, 2003h:18) noted that 
the decision to authorise the roll-out of anti-retrovirals to people with HIV/AIDS was 
“commendable”. The editorial did not just commend the government‟s move, but criticised 
the state for having “taken so long to do the right thing”. It further noted that the delay in the 
roll-out called “into question the integrity of those who have been voted into power”.  
 
As the newspaper did in earlier editorials, it singled out Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang‟s 
“intransigence” as having “resulted in the death of thousands of people whose lives could 
have been prolonged if the drugs had been available earlier in Mbeki‟s presidency” (City 
Press Comment, 2003h:18). The editorial further argued that “HIV/AIDS had become 
Mbeki‟s political liability and it eroded whatever good he was trying to achieve for the 
country and the continent”. In a later editorial (City Press Comment, 2004e:18), the City 
Press hailed the government‟s roll-out as “a major step forward and evidence that the 
government is coming to grips with this scourge…even if belatedly”. 
 
Adding his praise to the government‟s roll-out, the then City Press editor, Mathatha Tsedu, 
(Tsedu, 2004c:18) observed that the roll-out was “the final nail in the coffin of the half-
hearted and grudging acceptance of a need to give people the best of what science can offer 
today”.  Unlike his newspaper‟s earlier harsh tone towards Mbeki, Tsedu had kind words for 
the then president. Noting that “Mbeki‟s image was shackled to that of an Aids dissident”, 
Tsedu pointed out that “the shackles fell off with the ARV roll-out”. In a softer tone compared 
to the City Press‟ editorials which earlier called for the resignation of Tshabalala-Msimang, 
Tsedu further noted that though he would not argue for Tshabalala-Msimang‟s dismissal from 
her office, Mbeki would be well-advised to shift her to another post.  
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Two months after Tsedu‟s editorial, the City Press revisited the government‟s reluctance to 
provide anti-retrovirals, Nevirapine, in particular (City Press Comment, 2004f:18). There 
were three interrelated events that led the City Press to revisit the issue of Nevirapine. In no 
order of importance, the first had to do with the announcement by the Actuarial Society of 
South Africa (ASSA) that the formula they were using to calculate the rate of HIV infections 
was wrong (Molefe, 2004:19). ASSA had reduced its earlier number of projected infections 
by a third (City Press Comment, 2004f:18). The second had to do with the announcement by 
the Medicines Control Council (MCC) that the MCC had reconsidered the merits of 
Nevirapine when used as a monotherapy to reduce the risk of transmission of HIV from 
mother-to-child during labour (Molefe, 2004:19).  
 
The MCC had discovered that Nevirapine led to significant resistance in mothers and babies 
when used as a monotherapy. Following this announcement, the third was Tshabala-
Msimang‟s address at the 15th International AIDS Conference, where she reminded the world 
that when the South African government showed reluctance and urged caution about the use 
of Nevirapine, it was pressurised by AIDS activists, and ultimately by court rulings to roll out 
Nevirapine (Valentine, 2004:03). 
 
Commenting on these developments, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2004f:18) noted 
that the latest events called for a new relationship between the government, professionals in 
the sciences and HIV/AIDS activists. The editorial recalled that when the government 
cautioned about the toxicity and efficacy of some drugs, AIDS activists had said that science 
had already proven what the government still wanted to research. The government was told 
not to try to invent the wheel when the world was already driving. The editorial further called 
to attention the fact that when Mbeki challenged the statistics relating to HIV infections, “he 
was not seen as genuinely concerned, but bolstering his „dissident‟ view”.  
 
Commenting on this issue, the then City Press‟ deputy editor, Khathu Mamaila (2004c:18), 
argued that even though there was an element of truth that lack of leadership on the part of the 
government contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS, “the responsibility to protect oneself 
from HIV must remain with the individual”. Mamaila‟s assertion was informed by what he 
perceived as “victim mentality” by those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. He observed 
that in the spread of HIV/AIDS there was too much focus on what the government was doing 
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or not doing, and less on what people were doing or not doing against the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.  
 
As an indication that the “victim mentality has led us to exaggerate the role and influence of 
our leaders”, Mamaila further pointed out that the “reported surge in teenage pregnancies, 
especially in schools, is proof that the young are not practising safe sex”. Against this 
background, Mamaila (2004c:18) cautioned that as “a people and a nation, we must stop 
blaming others for everything that happens to us”. In making these assertions, however, 
Mamaila made clear that he did “not mean that the government should be exonerated from its 
responsibility to provide medical assistance to those already infected by HIV/Aids”. 
 
6.3.5.3 Summary: The City Press’ official position, and individual black journalists’ 
positions on HIV/AIDS 
This section has given an account of the City Press‟ version and the newspaper‟s individuals‟ 
perspectives on the Mandela and Mbeki‟s governments‟ handling of HIV/AIDS. The 
newspaper was critical of Mandela‟s Health Minister, Nkosazana Zuma-Dlamini‟s initiatives. 
While initially, the newspaper acclaimed Mbeki‟s and his Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang‟s initiatives, later the newspaper was critical. While one journalist was critical of 
Mbeki, another expressed admiration for Mbeki‟s courageous opposition to popular views 
supported by the media.  
 
The next section gives an account of interviews held with the City Press‟ black journalists. 
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6.3.6 Section Two – Interviews 
 
6.3.6.1 Discussion 
In this section an account of interviews with the City Press‟ black journalists is given. The 
interview questions, written in full in Chapter 5 (5.1), are attached as Addendum A. The 
interviewees‟ names, written in an alphabetic order, according to surnames, and the reasons 
they were selected, are also listed in Chapter 5 (5.4.1). 
 
On the evolution of the concept of “black journalism” from a colonial and apartheid 
order into post-apartheid South Africa: 
The concept of black journalism as a political concept was consciously developed in the 
1970s under the influence of Black Consciousness. Black journalists regarded themselves as 
blacks first and journalists second. This meant that they gave priority to the anti-apartheid 
struggle and their journalism was shaped by this commitment. This is the collective 
understanding that the interviewees expressed regarding black journalism prior to 1994 
(Kalane, 2009; Mamaila, 2008; Mbatha, 2008; Memela, 2008; Mkhabela, 2008; Mogale, 
2009; Mona, 2009; Noganta, 2009; Nqayi, 2009; Sibanda, 2008; Sibiya, 2009; Tsedu, 2008). 
 
The meaning of black journalism in post-apartheid South Africa was an issue that preoccupied 
many black journalists (Noganta, 2009). The challenge for some black journalists was that 
this role was not clearly defined, and this absence of clarity was a cause of confusion for some 
black journalists (Noganta, 2009). The debate about the meaning of black journalism in post-
apartheid society saw some black journalists “hankering after the old form of [black] 
journalism as if we are still fighting against an oppressive government” (Mkhabela, 2008). 
 
In spite of the absence of this clarity, many black journalists held strong views about what 
black journalism meant in post-apartheid South Africa. They believed that there continued to 
be an agenda followed by black journalists and another followed by white journalists. Sibiya 
(2009) believed that black journalists continued, in post-apartheid South Africa, to have a 
“responsibility to articulate” black people‟s fears and plight, adding that white journalists 
could not be expected to go to black people‟s areas and claim to want to articulate black 
people‟s frustrations. Arguing along similar lines, Mona (2009) asserted that black journalism 
continued to have relevance in post-apartheid South Africa because white journalists 
continued being authoritative in terms of reporting and analysis due to their access to people 
with influence and power. Mona added that black journalism in post-apartheid South Africa 
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continued to be relevant because, in his view, the same material conditions that black people 
lived in under apartheid still remained. 
 
For Mamaila (2008) the perception that post-apartheid South Africa was totally transformed 
between 1994 and 2004 was self-deluding. While in the pre-1994 era the struggle was against 
institutionalised racism, the post-1994 struggle was about dealing with the legacy of that 
institutionalised racism: the continuing landlessness of black people and continued dwelling 
of black people in shacks, and added to that, joblessness. Against this background, both 
Mamaila (2008) and Sibiya (2009) asserted that the role of black journalists, therefore, was to 
continue to fight for the realisation of the objectives of the struggle.  
 
Also noting that in the “new era black journalists have to ensure that the objectives of the 
struggle do not disappear”, Tsedu (2008) also asserted that the “role of black journalists 
should be to make sure that the marginalisation of the poor does not happen”. In Tsedu‟s 
book, black journalists should make a conscious decision not to forget the condition of those 
living in the townships. This should apply even to those black journalists who no longer lived 
in the townships. Tsedu pointed out that in their interaction with the rich and powerful, black 
journalists needed to be the representatives of the poor. The question that a journalist should 
pose to a president should reflect and represent the concerns of the poor (Tsedu, 2008). In 
Tsedu‟s view, the challenge that faced black journalists in the post-apartheid era was “how to 
avoid being swallowed by the elite of our societies”. This means, in Tsedu‟s view, that “black 
journalists have a responsibility to hold authority to account, especially in the interest of the 
poor”. 
 
Tsedu‟s view was shared by Mkhabela (2008) who observed that the relationship between 
black journalists and former liberation movements in the post-1994 had to be different from 
what it was in the pre-1994 undemocratic dispensation. For Mkhabela this meant that this 
“relationship must be characterised by a professional distance – that of holding politicians to 
accountability and scrutinising their actions”. 
 
While during the anti-apartheid era it was easier to expose the wrongs of apartheid, exposing 
the wrongs of a black-headed government was not so easy (Noganta, 2008; Nqayi, 2009). The 
difficulty facing black journalists, particularly at the City Press, was how to resist both being 
over-complimentary and being over-critical in assessing the performance of a black-headed 
government. Black journalists found themselves having to fend off accusations that they were 
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anti-black when they exposed failures of the black government (Noganta, 2009). For Mamaila 
(2008) to hear voices emanating from some individuals in the government justifying 
corruption in the democratic government on the basis that the apartheid government was 
corrupt, too, was “morally unambitious” and “irritating”. Since the new government was a 
black government, Mamaila believed that black journalists needed to be “more radical” and 
should “set better standards for our government”. 
 
For Mbatha (2008) black journalists during the post-apartheid order did the opposite of what 
was hoped for by many, that is, defending and advancing the gains of the struggle. In 
Mbatha‟s observation “black journalism has become seriously compromised in the new South 
Africa”. That is because, Mbatha noted, certain stories “became untouchables because 
journalists wanted to make business deals with those that are in power. Vested interests 
became elevated above duty.” Mbatha noted that instead of white journalists breaking stories 
about the arms deal, this should have been done by black journalists. In her view, on 
corruption-related issues, black journalists “should have been more vociferous so as to defend 
the gains of the revolution because they fought for this order”.  
 
In the new dispensation, publications like the City Press that traditionally catered for black 
people took a dip in sales (Mogale, 2009). This reality compelled a few black-oriented 
publications to “smell the coffee” and thus to shift their focus to mainstream journalism, that 
is, preoccupation with the “man in the blue collar, fun and celebrities” (Mogale, 2009). 
 
In Sibanda‟s (2008) view, in the new dispensation the role of journalists had become more of 
individual agency than group agency. For her it was hard to pinpoint a voice of a group. 
Where in the past black journalists were identifiable with Black Consciousness, in the new 
dispensation Black Consciousness was replaced with “humanist consciousness”. Sibanda 
asserted that even though there was an emergence of the Forum of Black Journalists in 1997, 
the organisation existed in name and exhibited no clear ideological articulation. Sibanda 
(2008) noted that what made a good journalist in the post-1994 era was adherence to values 
such as accuracy and objectivity. In her view, “[e]ven those black journalists who were 
members of the FBJ” adhered to these values. Unequivocally, Sibanda asserted that in the 
post-apartheid order, in journalism there was “was no platform for Black Consciousness”. 
 
In a similar echo to that of Sibanda‟s view, Mkhabela (2008) asserted that black journalism‟s 
“activism of the pre-1994 era is no longer relevant”. In Mkhabela‟s view, new activism 
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should be directed at defending the new constitution where “[p]art of the victory won by 
activist journalists is reflected – the freedom of the media and expression, for instance”.  
 
In asserting that “the whole notion of black journalism seems to be fading in the post-
apartheid democratic dispensation” and that “[t]his paradigm shift, slow as it is, is to be 
welcomed”, Memela seemed to be in agreement with the positions articulated by both 
Sibanda and Mkhabela. Memela was of the view that journalists were now “scrutinising what 
people do in a way that shatters the race myth” with the realisation that “race or skin colour 
does not make a difference when it comes to corruption, crime, poverty or any other human 
condition”. In Memela‟s view the direction of journalism is “moving into a post-racial society 
that is enshrined as non-racism in our Constitution”.  
 
On the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists in the period 
1994 to 2004: 
Responses from the editors of the City Press during the research period suggest that they were 
clear about what they sought to achieve through the newspaper they edited. 
 
Khulu Sibiya (2009), the second black editor of the City Press, said that he “repeatedly 
drummed” into his staff members that “they had to be the voice of the voiceless”. That, he 
said, was “critical” to him. He said it was for this reason that the City Press launched 
campaigns to “encourage our people to vote”. His successor, Len Kalane (2009), emphatically 
stated that the City Press did not, during the research period, deviate from the newspaper‟s 
historical role – “that of championing the black cause”. The two editors‟ answers suggested 
that they carried on the historical role championed by their predecessor, Percy Qoboza. 
However, the year 1994 and beyond posed new challenges. Holding the reigns was no longer 
the unrepresentative government, but a democratically elected government that had a “black 
face”. Kalane‟s successor, Vusi Mona (2009), was very aware of this and had clear views 
about what the relationship between the government and the City Press had to be. 
 
Unequivocally, Mona (2009) states that he was “unapologetic about our support for the black-
led government”. He “supported the Mbeki administration to the extent where some people 
said I was used as a pawn”. Mona‟s support for the Mbeki administration was informed by a 
belief that the City Press‟ black journalists “had a responsibility to help this government to 
articulate its visions and programmes”. Mona said that while he did not frown on dissent, he 
encouraged his staff to be sympathetic to the ANC government. While he believed that 
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“different political views could exist…the orientation of the newspaper should be clear. The 
reality was that there was a dominant political view” – and that view was a pro-ANC view. It 
is against this background that Mona “would not be ashamed to say vote ANC”. While 
Mona‟s focus was to give support to the ANC to consolidate its position as South Africa‟s 
ruling party, his successor, Mathatha Tsedu (2008) took the reigns at a period when the South 
African government was playing a pivotal role in African affairs, and this is what he believed 
the media, particularly the City Press, should focus upon. 
  
Tsedu (2008) believed that while the City Press‟ historical role “was to act as a voice of a 
people who had no voice”, what the City Press‟ black journalists needed was the “same 
vigour and energy we had in fighting apartheid to give coverage to the African continent”. 
The task for the City Press in Tsedu‟s book was to go “beyond what is usually done by the 
wires, that is, covering war and famine as if that is all there is in and about Africa”. This task 
entailed “covering the good and the bad; to report on the culture and lifestyle of the 
continent‟s people”.  
 
Before he became the City Press‟ deputy editor, Mamaila (2008) worked for the City Press 
for two years between 1992 and 1994. He recalled that during that period the “City Press‟ 
journalists were encouraged to make sure that the democratic project worked”. He was not at 
ease with the City Press‟ editorial call on South Africans to vote for the ANC, his reason 
being that the “role of the media is to enable people to make independent decisions that reflect 
maturity”. Looking back, he said that the media – including the City Press – were “[s]o eager 
…to make sure that the democratic project succeeded that to an extent we failed to exercise 
our critical faculty sufficiently”. 
 
Memela (2008), who served as a Labour and Politics correspondent for almost a year, and 
later as a senior political correspondent for three years, noted that he was “not aware of any 
well-defined political strategy or programme” on the part of the City Press during the research 
period. He further points out that “[i]f it existed, it was vague, haphazard and very casual”. 
Memela is of the opinion that the political role of the City Press – which was to be the voice 
of the voiceless African majority through articulating their aspirations and highlighting their 
struggle – ended with the death of Percy Qoboza. Qoboza‟s successor, Khulu Sibiya, 
according to Memela, “had no political background or grounding”. Things were compounded, 
in Memela‟s (2008) view, by an appointment of former Drum magazine‟s sports editor, 
Sekolla Sello, to head the political desk. Memela pointed out that though Sello learned fast 
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and revealed an understanding of political dynamics, “political coverage was confined to a 
superficial analysis of what was obvious to everyone with eyes to see. In fact, it would be 
untrue to say that there was a political agenda.” 
 
Memela (2008) also noted that “a brief spell of hope and political relevance” shone when 
Chiara Carta and Wally Mbhele led the political coverage at the City Press. But even then he 
pointed out that “it was more news than analysis and commentary that informed and educated 
on the state of the nation”.  
 
In no uncertain terms, Nqayi (2009) said that “[t]here was no political role” that defined the 
City Press when he was working for the newspaper as a Political Correspondent (1997 – 
2001). Nqayi further pointed out that there was a possibility that since journalists working at 
the City Press were black, it was assumed that “we should know and need not be told”. 
Reflecting on personal experience, Nqayi pointed out that as a young journalist assigned to 
Parliament he needed guidance. According to him this guidance was not provided and that 
disappointed him. As a Political Correspondent, he said that there was no policy given to him 
to guide him about how to cover politics. Policy “was lacking – if it existed, it was not 
articulated”.  
 
Nqayi (2009) held a strong view that a policy about how to cover post-1994 politics would 
have helped. He said that he got a sense of direction by looking at what white parliamentary 
journalists from other publications were doing. Nqayi felt that there was little space dedicated 
to politics in the City Press – “it was only one page while entertainment was given more 
space. Much more could have been done politically.” Though he was not as scathing as 
Memela was of Sibiya, Nqayi said that to be “frank, our editor-in-chief, Khulu Sibiya, was 
hands off”. Unlike Memela, he had kind words for Sello, about whom Nqayi (2009) observed 
that he (Sello) took him under his wing and urged his journalists to distinguish the City Press 
from other publications by reflecting the good done by the government and the changes that 
were taking place. 
 
Like Nqayi, Noganta (2009) felt that “there was so much [the] City Press could do” but did 
not do. Like Memela and Nqayi, Noganta pointed out that “there was no clearly stated 
political role for the City Press‟ black journalists”. Like Memela, Noganta held the view that 
if the City Press in the period 1994 to 2004 “had been led by a person of the calibre of Percy 
Qoboza, you would probably have had some kind of a charter reflecting a position on this 
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issue”. Like Memela, Noganta (2009) said that “Khulu Sibiya was not that kind of an editor”.  
There was a feeling among the City Press‟ black journalists that the newspaper could do more 
than it was doing, but did not, because decision-making senior journalists, according to 
Noganta (2009), shot down ideas coming from junior staff. Noganta further pointed out that 
the City Press‟ leadership did not seem to realise the “unique position” the newspaper 
occupied. The way things were, in Noganta‟s view, the City Press “could not have been a 
newspaper of reference at the time”.  
 
Mkhabela (2008) held the view that an accurate answer to this question should be situated in 
four historical contexts which are interlinked: the history of the newspaper, editorial thinking, 
economics of the newspaper and its leadership. Historically speaking, he said that the City 
Press in a post-1994 period believed that even though the struggle was over, the ideals that 
informed the struggle were not completely lost. Because of this history, Mkhabela (2008) 
noted that the City Press positioned itself “towards a particular niche market: the black 
market”. Consciousness of this market, Mkhabela pointed out, “shaped your reporting: you 
had to be relevant to the market”. Though this exercise was not carried out in a “static” but 
“dynamic” fashion, Mkhabela said that “others were still suffering from the unchanging 
condition”. He believed that personal leadership styles and convictions of individual editors 
impacted on the direction of the newspaper: Khulu Sibiya identified himself with an anti-
apartheid cause; Vusi Mona tried to transcend the African market and to “woo” the white 
market; Mathatha Tsedu was unapologetically African.   
 
Mogale‟s (2009) response suggests that he shared Mkhabela‟s views. Mogale stated that 
though soon after 1994 “our role was a carry-over of the sentiment we had before 1994, that 
is, to support organisations deemed to be people‟s organisations…gradually we moved away 
from struggle journalism” and “began to interview leaders of right wing organisations in an 
effort to understand the thinking that informed the things they were doing”.  
 
Though, like Mogale, Sibanda (2008) believed that the City Press played a “carry-over” role 
of “represent[ing] black people‟s interests, their concerns and their ills”, there was another 
equally important challenge in the post-1994 era. 
 
Since blacks were now in power, this role involved dealing with black people‟s mistakes as 
they were experimenting with their new role and challenges that went with it. In the research 
period, Sibanda believed that the City Press‟ black journalists “tried very hard to be educative 
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to the black population regarding the mandate of their political representatives in 
government”. Sibanda‟s response was shared by Mbatha (2008) who said that during the 
research period the City Press “wanted to make it right for black people: to inform them about 
their rights; to educate them”. Like Sibanda, Mbatha noted that the feeling at the City Press 
was that while “[p]eople knew that they were free…they did not know what this freedom 
meant”. The political role that the City Press played, according to Mbatha, was that the 
newspaper “sought to make sure that it helped black people to be conscious of their rights so 
that they could regain their dignity which had been trampled upon through the course of 
apartheid”. In order to do this, Mbatha said that the “City Press assigned its journalists not 
just to look at the negative or the positive that the government was doing but to give context 
to the stories”.  
 
On the ownership of the City Press by a white company and its impact on the political 
role of the City Press’ black journalists in the period 1994 to 2004: 
Without exception, all the editors (Kalane, 2009; Mona, 2009; Sibiya, 2009; Mamaila, 2008; 
Tsedu, 2008) of the City Press during the research period stated that Naspers, a historically 
white Afrikaans company, did not interfere in the editorial of the newspaper run by black 
editors. Kalane and Sibiya expressed belief that this was possible because of the non-
interference charter signed between Naspers and Percy Qoboza. Sibiya noted that the owners 
did not try to interfere with the editorial material “because they knew that black journalists 
would walk away”. He also noted that the Afrikaner owners were “sensitive to the fact that we 
saw them as oppressors”. As a result, according to Sibiya, “they did not want to rock the 
boat”, considering also that black journalists at the City Press had “made it known to them 
[Naspers company] we would monitor the situation to ensure that there was no interference”.  
 
While Mona (2009) said that the City Press‟ owners did not interfere with editorial positions, 
he also noted that the “Afrikaners used the newspaper to get closer to the ruling party”. He 
said they did this “in a sophisticated way by omission”. By omission Mona meant that the 
owners “never raised an eyebrow when the City Press took a pro-government stance”.  
 
Mamaila (2008) noted that the “irony in the ownership of the City Press is that it gives black 
journalists a good space”. He thought that this was possible because the City Press‟ “owners 
have no political ambitions”. Mamaila also pointed out that when a media organ is controlled 
by people with political ambitions, it becomes problematic. He cited the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) as a typical case where interference by ruling party 
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members has been blamed for the SABC‟s inability to exercise independent journalism. 
Tsedu (2008), who had previously served as the SABC‟s Deputy Head of News, attested to 
this interference, pointing out that he sometimes got calls in the middle of the bulletin from 
his bosses. 
 
Tsedu (2008) recalled that once, when the SABC was covering the Zimbabwean 2002 
elections, he received a telephone call informing him that the SABC‟s Group CEO, Peter 
Matlare, was sitting in the news conference. When Tsedu spoke to Matlare, the latter told him 
that the then Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Maphisa-Nqakula, was complaining about 
the SABC‟s coverage of the Zimbabwean elections. Tsedu noted that he objected to this 
interference. Comparing his experience at the SABC and the City Press, he said that he did 
not get calls from the white owners of the City Press “seeking to influence the content of the 
newspaper”.   
 
While there was unanimity among the editors on this issue, in the newsroom perceptions were 
varied. Mkhabela (2008) noted that while there may have been some differences between the 
managers and the editors, he did not think that the “white ownership tempered in any way 
with the African agenda”.  However, Mkhabela also pointed out that while “ownership did not 
tamper with the editorial stance of the newspaper”, he “would assume that as people who 
invested to maximise profit, they would want the newspaper to focus on the emerging 
market”. In Mkhabela‟s observation, the perception around the interference by the owners 
was informed by role expectations. By this he meant that the government, the owners and 
black journalists themselves had each their own expectations about the role of black 
journalists in South African politics.  
 
Mkhabela (2008) noted that black politicians‟ criticism of black journalists were misplaced 
and ignored the fact that their roles had changed – they were no longer leading liberation 
movements but a government, and as such had to expect and accept criticism from black 
journalists. While Mkhabela recognised Mandela‟s right to criticise Sibiya, he also noted that 
Mandela‟s criticism was misplaced. His view was shared by Sibanda (2008). 
 
Sibanda (2008) observed that Mandela‟s criticism was unfair. That was because, Sibanda 
further pointed out, the City Press was the first newspaper that had called on the people to 
vote for the ANC. She further observed that even though the City Press was Afrikaner-owned, 
black journalists wrote against the grain of Afrikaner nationalism. Sibanda also noted that the 
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Afrikaners could have used their ownership to frustrate black journalists at the City Press if 
they wanted to. In her view they did not. This view was shared by Mbatha (2008). The City 
Press, Mbatha observed, even though it was white-owned, allowed her to write and publish 
stories that other newspapers “did not want me to touch”. Mbatha‟s examples were the stories 
of former MK soldiers Andrew Zondo and Robert McBride, who bombed buildings in South 
Africa that cost some white people‟s lives. 
 
Noganta (2009) noted that some City Press‟ journalists perceived the leadership of the City 
Press “as being weak at the time…kowtowing to the Naspers‟ bosses in Cape Town”. 
Noganta pointed out that the City Press‟ editors “were so comfortable and happy in their 
positions, and did not seem to be prepared to rock the boat”. In his recollection, Noganta 
noted that the black journalists at the City Press were bursting with ideas, wanting to do 
things differently, seeking a newspaper that would go deeply into issues, reflecting the mood 
of the country and the state of the economy without being sensational. To their 
disappointment, Noganta (2009) noted that their “editors could not take independent decisions 
to effect these ideas…This fed our perception that there was an invisible hand controlling the 
newsroom”.  
 
Noganta‟s view that the City Press could have done more was echoed by Nqayi (2009). Nqayi 
suspected that “the City Press‟ emphasis on entertainment and less focus on politics was a 
way of treading softly so as not to offend” the owners. Nqayi felt that the City Press “did not 
really make an effort to know the black government”. He also said that when he “was 
covering labour, the workers laughed at the City Press‟ reporters, saying that they did not 
expect much because we were owned by Afrikaners”. Echoing the view among black 
journalists that there was an invisible hand controlling the newsroom, Memela (2008) noted 
that there were “a few instances where stories would be spiked for no good reason because 
perhaps someone at the top did not agree with the political slant”.  
 
Memela (2008) conceded though that this “could be attributed to how newsrooms functioned 
in terms of hierarchy”. But he emphasised that “the suspicion lingered that it could have been 
done for political reasons”. Memela recalled that an incident occurred that consolidated this 
suspicion in the newsroom. Under the leadership of Mona, according to Memela, senior 
journalists threatened to quit en masse because of perceived editorial interference when an 
advertiser threatened to pull out if a certain story about rotten chickens sold to blacks was 
printed. While the event soon petered out, Memela‟s view was that it was “these sorts of 
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incidents that not only highlight the inherent tensions, but give cynics intellectual fodder that 
there was no absolute editorial independence but interference”. 
 
On role of African cultural values in the City Press’ political black journalists’ approach 
to their work: 
Sibiya (2009) was emphatic that African cultural values were observed in his newsroom. He 
said this began with instructions to younger journalists that they were not to be on first name 
terms with older members of the staff – whether the staff members were journalists or not. 
When carrying out their journalistic duties, Sibiya said that journalists were sensitised about 
the importance of handling people with sensitivity. This sensitivity entailed teaching 
journalists  
 
“not to go to a bereaved family and just start clicking away their cameras 
without giving notice. That is invasion. It is disrespectful to do so in our 
culture. That is what sets us apart from white people.”  
 
But Sibiya‟s successor, Kalane (2009), said that there was no outlet for African cultural 
values. He pointed out that one “cannot uphold cultural and traditional values in the house of 
a stranger”. The “house of the stranger” in this case refered to the City Press‟ white 
ownership. The initial response of Kalane‟s successor, Mona (2009) was that to be “brutally 
honest”, while there was a consciousness about City Press‟ journalists‟ blackness, “cultural 
consciousness was non-existent”. But in an afterthought, he observed that at the “City Press 
our values did to an extent play a role in influencing our direction, but I think we could have 
done more”. 
 
While this may sound as self-contradictory on Mona‟s part, when contextualised, it is not. 
The point made by Mona is that while at “an individual level African cultural consciousness 
existed…at a newspaper level there was no cultural consciousness”. He noted that he was 
“pained” by some of the stories that were written by the City Press in his time. As an 
example, he cited an incident when his staff member suggested that they should bring former 
president Thabo Mbeki down by publishing allegations that he had “girlfriends”. Mona‟s 
response to the journalist was that he should be factual and discreet in approaching the story.  
 
Following the approach by his staff member, Mona (2009) noted that he received calls from 
the ANC‟s headquarters asking about the “embarrassing” questions that the City Press‟ 
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journalist had forwarded to the ANC‟s office. Mona‟s “immediate reaction” was that he 
would not run the story. The “African in me” said that the president was like his father and 
that his personal life was not impacting on service delivery. It is against this background that 
Mona observed that at an individual level African cultural consciousness existed but that at a 
newspaper level it was non-existent. Mona‟s point was shared by Nqayi (2009) who 
emphasised that the “African cultural influence was at an individual level – not at the 
company level”. 
 
This was not the only point that Nqayi shared with Mona. Nqayi (2009), like Mona, expressed 
a sense of apprehension when the City Press had to deal with sex scandals involving “adult 
politicians”. He observed that he felt “awkward about posing certain questions to adult 
politicians” because he is an “African child [who] came from a cultural background that 
emphasised respect for adults”. Nqayi further observed that this “dilemma of being expected 
to ask tough questions made it difficult for me to practise as a journalist with an African 
cultural background”. Mogale (2009) could relate to the awkwardness that was experienced 
by Nqayi. The story that Mogale wrote about “Winnie Mandela slapping Madiba [Nelson 
Mandela]…is one of those stories one would have rather not have written, looking back”.  
 
Mogale (2009) thought that the story was “culturally” repugnant. Such stories, according to 
Mogale, made it to print because black journalists “were basically driven by the desire to sell 
the publication, to make it acceptable to the market”. Against this background, Mogale noted 
that he did not “honestly…think that African cultural values played any role in the way we 
did things…I do not recall culture being a driving or determining factor.” 
 
Mona‟s successor, Tsedu (2008), took a conscious decision to inculcate African cultural 
consciousness in the minds of the City Press‟ black journalists. Tsedu noted that the use of 
derogatory language in reference to anyone was disallowed. While criticism on anyone was 
allowed, this was done “in such a way that the dignity of the one criticised will be retained”. 
This approach, Tsedu observed, was consciously taught to journalists in his time. However, 
Tsedu pointed out at the same time that respect in African culture “does not mean that 
someone younger or junior accepts everything and anything that someone older or senior says 
or does”. He emphasised that “respect does not mean absence of criticism”, adding that in this 
regard the “City Press‟ record speaks for itself”. Commenting on the role of African cultural 
values or lack of, Mamaila (2008) expressed belief that the manner in which black journalists 
approached issues “has more to do with political orientation than with culture”.  
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This is a view that was also shared by Memela (2008). Memela pointed out that even though 
African culture emphasised the importance of respect, “you would find that some black 
journalists exhibit a lack of respect for our leaders”. At the same time, he pointed out that 
there are those who shy away from criticising leaders.  Shying away from criticising leaders is 
not a right practice and not a teaching of African culture in Mkhabela‟s view. Mkhabela 
(2008) observed that “African culture does not conceal things”. He cautioned that care should 
be taken to avoid the tendency of saying that just because a person is an African an individual 
should refrain from saying that if “an elderly person has done a wrong thing, because I am an 
African I must be respectful and not call him a criminal”. He observed that it should be 
appreciated that among Africans there are “good and bad people”. 
 
Mkhabela expressed belief that the City Press reflected the good and the bad in African 
people and avoided selectiveness. He also noted that in the cultural arena, “the City Press was 
always in the forefront of celebrating values”. He also observed that there was no need for 
black journalists to be taught African values at the City Press – for him it was a “natural 
thing”. Mkhabela (2008) pointed out that in the City Press‟ environment he assumed that 
“there would be no need to say here we do it the African way, unlike when you are an African 
in a European environment”.  
 
In this regard, Sibanda (2008) shared Mkhabela‟s observation. Sibanda pointed out that 
although it was not “outrightly articulated, being African made black journalists empathetic 
when dealing with African issues”. She noted that in cases where she had to interview a 
widow, she did so “with sensitivity” and did “not just budge in”. She pointed out that “as an 
African you must respect the solemnity of bereavement”. She also observed that working with 
white sub-editors at the City Press, “you would make a follow-up on your story to make sure 
that the necessary sensitivity is reflected”. Sibanda also pointed out though, that in being 
aware of African cultural values as a black journalist there was a “constant balancing act 
between being empathetic and at the same time not allowing empathy to make you let your 
guard down”.  
 
The approach to stories involving bereavement narrated by Sibanda was echoed by Noganta 
(2009). What Noganta  
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“could certainly observe as far as African cultural beliefs and the City Press 
were concerned was the approach of our chief photographer, Felix Mdluli, 
towards using pictures of deceased persons”.  
 
Noganta noted that Mdluli guarded against the “unnecessary use of such pictures”. Noganta 
further observed that he did not recall the City Press having a headline screaming the name of 
a government minister on a first name basis. He also recalled that senior black journalists like 
Benison Makele, who was coaching them, “instilled a sense of respect for elders”. As a result 
of that, when writing feature articles, for instance, “we would prefix the name of an old lady 
with „Ma‟ so and so, in accordance with the teachings of African culture, instead of outrightly 
referring to her on first-name terms”.  
 
Noganta‟s assertion was endorsed by Mbatha (2008). Mbatha noted that where “normally a 
white journalist would be on first name terms or use an honorific (Mr/Mrs), I would go 
„sanibonani baba/mama (greetings father/mother)”. In writing the story, Mbatha observed that 
she would “make sure that the kind of respect due to the elders is reflected in the story”, so 
that the “story would have nuances that make it culture-appropriate”. 
 
On African and Western cultural differences’ impact upon the mandate of the City 
Press’ political black journalists: 
In response to this question, Kalane‟s (2009) answer was one sentence: “Western cultural 
norms held sway.” His answer was consistent with his response to the previous question to 
which his response was that one “cannot uphold cultural and traditional values in the house of 
a stranger”. As pointed out above, the point he was making was that the City Press was a 
white-owned newspaper and therefore African cultural values could not be predominant.  
 
Memela (2008) held a similar view to Kalane, though advancing different reasons. Having 
noted that “black journalists have always embraced the Western concept of journalism”, and 
that black journalists have always “sought to be on the same wavelength with Western 
journalism”, Memela went on to point out that this was due to urban blacks‟ harbouring “a 
secret wish to be equal to whites or their Western counterparts”. Memela further asserted that 
“the fact that City Press journalists were largely urban blacks”, meant that it became “very 
difficult even to suggest any strong connection with the rural or what can be considered 
authentic African culture, if there is such a thing”.  
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While Sibiya (2009) conceded that the Western concept of journalism was pervasive at the 
City Press, he also pointed out that there was a conscious struggle, albeit a difficult one. 
Sibiya noted that reconciling what black journalists were taught in journalism schools and 
how they should carry themselves in real life was a difficult exercise. While in “journalism 
schools, journalists are taught to have an adversarial relationship with governments, to take no 
prisoners when dealing with government officials” and not to let them off the hook, Sibiya 
observed that at the City Press, journalists were taught that they could get answers without 
necessarily being aggressive. 
 
Sibiya‟s claim was confirmed by Nqayi (2009). Nqayi noted that being a black journalist and 
wanting to uphold African traditions, “is one of those contradictions of being a product of a 
university journalism training that taught you that politicians lie, and lie always, and having a 
problem with that notion”. Not being “comfortable with that idea” that politicians are 
perpetual liars, Nqayi noted that working at the City Press made things “easy” for him and 
“that dilemma was removed”. That is because, Nqayi observed, at the City Press the main 
question was about “whether or not there was enough change” in the country  
 
“and not preoccupying ourselves with silly things like towns‟ name changes. 
Such were white journalists‟ preoccupation who found it hard to appreciate the 
changes the black government was making in black people‟s lives.”   
 
Sibanda (2008) concured with both Sibiya and Nqayi. Sibanda noted that while black 
journalists at the City Press “would not label someone as stupid”, they would not shy away 
from reporting that someone had embezzled funds. But Sibanda‟s argument was that while the 
“cultural element is observed”, this should not be done at the expense of sacrificing probing 
journalism. She pointed out that she found it curious that  
 
“an African elder [politician] would cut down to size a black journalist his 
junior for asking a question that is regarded culturally inappropriate and yet a 
white journalist of the same age asking the same question would get away with 
such”.  
 
She further noted that “African leaders are more emboldened to deal with fellow Africans 
than with others”.  
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This attitude on the part of black politicians, according to Mkhabela (2008), is a ploy to get 
black journalists to relate to the politicians as “comrades”. While Mkhabela acknowledged 
that some black politicians might be genuine in alleging that “black journalists are bowing to 
white masters, of not being developmental or patriotic”, other politicians “use these concepts 
to block black journalists from doing their professional work”. When faced with such 
challenges, Mkhabela noted that black journalists should not be afraid of asking difficult or 
even embarrassing questions to the political leadership. He further pointed out that the 
understanding of black journalists at the City Press was that while black politicians were not 
“inherently corrupt”, they were, like other human beings, “prone to corruption”. Accordingly, 
Mkhabela observed that being an African journalist “does not mean taking the concept of 
respect to the level where it impinges negatively on your work”.  
 
Mamaila (2008) shared Mkhabela‟s view on this point. As a black journalist operating in 
Africa, Mamaila rejected the “general view held by Western journalists that there should 
exist, as a matter of principle, an adversarial relationship between the government and the 
media”. But rejecting such a view for Mamaila was not the same as asserting that there should 
be no tension between the media and the government. Contrary to that, Mamaila pointed out 
that a healthy tension between the government and the media was good. He observed that the 
responsibility of the media “is to expose the truth that some in the government may want to 
have hidden”.  
 
Mamaila asserted that such exposures would, in fact, help the government to do its job 
properly. Such an exercise on the part of journalists, Mamaila further pointed out, “is a 
patriotic duty on the part of journalists”. However, he emphasised that journalists should not 
only focus on the negative about the political scene, but strike “a balance between negative 
and positive stories”. He added that both the “extremes of showing only the positive and 
showing only the negative are wrong”.  
 
Mogale‟s (2009) observation on this issue suggested that what Mamaila refered to as 
“extremism” was prevalent at the City Press at some stage during the period 1994 to 2004. 
Mogale observed that when the democratic government was established, “there was a latent 
sympathy for the ruling ANC”. Not wishing the ANC-led government to fail, Mogale further 
observed that the City Press‟ journalists “role as a watchdog was somehow compromised”. 
He noted that in the first three to four months‟ period of the democratic government, the “City 
Press would not go out of its way to find government scandals and expose them”. The “bigger 
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good seemed to be the preservation of the newfound dispensation”. The prevalent sentiment 
was that exposés “would have flown against the spirit and sentiment of celebration” and the 
City Press‟ black journalists “did not want to flow against the tide”. 
 
Mona‟s (2009) observation about black journalists was that they “uncritically accepted 
Western frameworks”. While acknowledging that he was trained according to the Western 
framework at the Mail&Guardian, Mona also observed that he was the Mail&Guardian‟s 
“failed product” in that he “did not set out to carry out the liberal project”: “What are we 
churning out if we train journalists to look at the government as a bunch of liars?” Mona 
raised this question after disapprovingly pointing out that a certain South African professor of 
journalism had recently written in a South African daily newspaper that at his institution he 
trained journalists not to believe what the government said.  
 
In observing that the “tendency in Western journalism is to single out personalities”, Mbatha 
(2008) echoed Mona in noting that “[s]ome black journalists buy into this as well”. Tsedu 
(2008) was also critical of this tendency on the part of black journalists.  According to Tsedu 
(2008), blackness and Africanness is more than just a question of skin colour – Africanness is 
about values. In Tsedu‟s view, for anyone to be acceptable as African has to “accept certain 
values that are accepted as African”. This Africanness, Tsedu (2008) noted, “must be 
reflected in the approach of black journalists”. To be African for a black journalist means, 
Tsedu further observed, “the rejection of the distortion of things African”. Here Tsedu was 
paraphrasing Biko‟s definition of blackness about which Biko said that blackness is more than 
being about the colour of one‟s skin but more about the attitude of the mind, namely the 
rejection by blacks of all forms of oppression. 
 
Tsedu‟s view of what it means to be a black journalist found an expression in the City Press 
of Noganta‟s day, according to Noganta. In his time at the City Press, Noganta (2009) could 
recall treating a story in a way that undermined African cultural values. In emphasising this 
point he recalled how at the City Press‟ newsroom “black journalists were horrified by a 
picture on the front page of a knock-and-drop (free newspaper) that showed a dismembered 
body of a person that had been knocked down by a train”. Such a picture could not have found 
a space in the City Press Noganta worked for. 
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On the link between African cultural values and the City Press’ concept of “Distinctly 
African” 
Soon after Tsedu became the City Press‟ editor, he changed the newspaper‟s motto from “The 
People‟s Paper” to “Distinctly African” in October 2004 (Tsedu, 2004b:1). A number of the 
interviewees had already left the City Press. But even then, they had a view about this change, 
and, therefore commented. Only one interviewee, Sibiya (2009) offered a “no comment”. 
 
The conceptualisation of “Distinctly African”, according to its architect, Tsedu (2008), was 
informed by indigenous African values in contact with other values. Tsedu further noted that 
for the City Press, the “Distinctly African” concept “meant not allowing practices like 
circumcision to be derided even if it is commercial for others to do so”. Echoing Tsedu, 
Mamaila (2008) noted that through the “Distinctly African” concept, the newspaper “seeks to 
confront in its coverage the realities of Africa in a way that is contextual”. By validating what 
is African, through the City Press coverage of the African continent, Mamaila further noted 
that the “Distinctly African” approach addressed practical issues such as Africans‟ lack of 
self-esteem and awe for things European.  
 
Sibanda (2008) endorsed Tsedu and Mamaila‟s explanation of the concept. Sibanda observed 
that the “Distinctly African” concept was a call to Africans to respect fellow Africans. It 
served to remind Africans about their identity. She noted that it also served as a challenge to 
interrogate the meaning about what constituted being “African”.  This, Sibanda further 
pointed out, “makes you conscious of your African cultural values. It calls upon you, as a 
black journalist, to take into consideration the cultural context when you report African 
issues”.  
 
Nqayi (2009) agreed with Sibanda. He pointed out that Tsedu “had a vision of a black 
publication that was going to focus not only on negative things in Africa but the positives as 
well”. He further argued that the move was “aimed at distinguishing the City Press from other 
publications that were only harping on African failures”. All this, according to Nqayi, was 
meant to highlight the efforts that Africans were making in uplifting themselves. In order to 
fully appreciate the “Distinctly African” concept, Mkhabela (2008) noted that an observer 
should take into cognisance the political climate of the time in which the concept was 
launched. 
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Mkhabela noted that the concept was launched during former President Thabo Mbeki‟s era, 
who was at the forefront of championing the African Renaissance. According to Mkhabela, 
the City Press embraced Mbeki‟s broader political appeal of being proudly African. Hence, 
according to Mkhabela it was no coincidence that the City Press‟ billboards carried the faces 
of Tsedu along with the faces of Mbeki and Gertrude Mongella (former Pan African 
Parliament‟s chairperson).  
 
Like Mkhabela, Memela (2008) located the City Press‟ “Distinctly African” concept within 
Mbeki‟s African Renaissance project. But he ws critical of this relationship. Memela asserted 
that the “Distinctly African” project “revealed an incestuous relationship between the 
newspaper and government, especially the Presidency of Thabo Mbeki”. Memela further 
pointed out that as a result of this “incestuous” relationship, the “newspaper – which should 
be expected to be hands-off and independent – had grown too close to power and had become 
the mouthpiece of [the] African Renaissance”. This for Memela “was a contradiction in 
terms”. To Memela “the „Distinctly African‟ project was more of a marketing strategy than a 
political or cultural approach”. Emphasising the assertion that the concept “is more of a 
marketing gimmick than anything rooted in African history, culture and heritage”, Memela 
further observed that the concept “marked the new era of journalists and editors…too close to 
political power”.  
 
Though not dismissive in tone like Memela, Mbatha (2008) echoed Memela‟s viewpoint. She 
noted that the concept in her view “is a marketing tool…an identification of a niche” that 
“gives the City Press a competitive edge”. 
 
Against this background, Kalane‟s (2009) view of the “Distinctly African” concept was that 
the “move was more politically influenced than cultural. Maybe the cultural aspect will follow 
later.” Mogale (2009), in noting that he “honestly” did not “see the [cultural] link except that 
the editor who initiated it was an Africanist”, shared Kalane‟s observation. Mogale was not 
the only person who linked the “Distinctly African” concept to Mathatha Tsedu‟s personal 
political orientation. Noganta (2009) and Mona (2009) did, too. Noganta (2009) observed that 
Tsedu “is a kind of journalist that is interested in telling a story of how ordinary Africans 
live…the stories of suffering ordinary Africans…the human condition of Africans”. Mona 
thought that Tsedu “brought an African consciousness into the City Press and I applaud him 
for that. We Africans must reflect that.” 
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On the issue of Zimbabwe’s crisis, the media, nationally and internationally, have 
condemned what they have termed Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”. What has been the City 
Press’s position on this issue? 
Kalane (2009) and Noganta (2009) felt they were not qualified to respond to this question. 
Mbatha (2008) did not respond because she could not remember the City Press‟ position on 
this issue. 
 
Though Sibiya (2009) noted that the problems in Zimbabwe arose during Tsedu‟s tenure, he 
observed that there was “little difference between Mbeki‟s handling of the HIV/AIDS issue 
and that of Zimbabwe”. He further pointed out that Mbeki was a president with power and 
influence but one who “pussyfooted”. Sibiya (2009) further asserted that HIV/AIDS and 
Zimbabwe “are two things that brought Mbeki down”. Though Sibiya was dismissive of 
Mbeki on the Zimbabwean issue, Mona (2009) was “sympathetic to Mbeki‟s quiet 
diplomacy”. At the editor‟s desk at the City Press, Mona was “outraged by the duplicity, the 
hypocrisy expressed by people having been quiet when black lives were destroyed in the 
DRC, and crying out in Zimbabwe”.  
 
Mona‟ successor, Tsedu (2008) observed that on the issue of Mbeki‟s handling of the 
Zimbabwean crisis, he “tried to be as understanding” as possible. However, he observed that 
information forthcoming was not sufficient, and the signals given by Mbeki were confusing. 
That is because, Tsedu noted, while there were signs that things were “deteriorating” in 
Zimbabwe, and people were being beaten by the police, “on the other hand Mbeki was saying 
that things were on track”.  
 
The understanding on the part of Tsedu was informed by an appreciation that Mbeki could not 
operate as if he was not a mediator – he could not mediate on the one hand, and castigate 
those involved in the negotiations on the other hand. While it was easy for Mandela to openly 
criticise Mugabe because the former was no longer in office, Tsedu noted that Mbeki did not 
have that luxury. Tsedu also pointed out that in private conversations with Mbeki, the former 
president admitted that it was not easy for him to get Mugabe to agree to anything.  
 
Almost word for word, Mamaila (2008) echoed Tsedu‟s observations but also added his own 
analysis. Mamaila appreciated people‟s frustrations with Mbeki‟s handling of Zimbabwe. 
That is because, Mamaila noted, Mbeki “kept on saying that the situation was getting better 
while there was no sign that things were getting better”. But at the same time, Mamaila 
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contended that “such a position is understandable considering that Mbeki is a mediator”. He 
pointed out that had Mbeki taken a tough stance on Mugabe, the former South African 
president‟s “condemnation of Mugabe would have squandered any chance of negotiation”.  
 
Another issue that needed to be taken into context, according to Mamaila (2008), was the 
cultural factor that was at play in Mugabe‟s relationship with Mbeki. Mamaila pointed out 
that culturally, as Africans, Mbeki had to exercise respect in engaging Mugabe. Added to the 
cultural factor was the historical factor, Mamaila argued. Mamaila noted that it should be 
taken into consideration that when Mugabe wanted to address the land question in Zimbabwe, 
the ANC asked Mugabe to delay his move so as not to derail the negotiation process in South 
Africa. This was informed by fear that any move on land resettlement would have instilled 
panic among white South Africans. All in all, Mamaila observed that he thought that 
“Mbeki‟s approach to Zimbabwe was correct”.  
 
From her recollections, Sibanda (2008) was of the opinion that the City Press‟ editorials noted 
that Mbeki‟s approach to Zimbabwe should be given a chance, and further asserted that 
“[j]ournalistically, I think that is fair”. She further observed that while this was the case, 
questions were raised about the extent to which “quiet diplomacy” could be pursued.  
 
Nqayi‟s (2009) recollections were the same as Sibanda‟s (2008). Noting that the City Press 
“was not critical of Mbeki but supportive”, Nqayi further observed that the “newspaper 
echoed Mbeki‟s sentiment that Zimbabwe was a sovereign state and that Mugabe was 
democratically elected”. Nqayi also noted that the “City Press did not advocate the invasion 
of Zimbabwe and economic sanctions and blockades recommended by other newspapers”.  
 
While Mogale (2009) shared Nqayi‟s view that the City Press “sided with Mbeki”, he also 
noted that this position “upset many people who perceived Mbeki to be an ally of Mugabe”. 
The influx of Zimbabweans was “associated with crime, disease and job theft, and Mbeki‟s 
perceived alliance with Mugabe upset many”.  
 
Though Memela (2008) was “not too sure” about the City Press‟ position on Mbeki‟s “quiet 
diplomacy”, he observed that because the newspaper espoused Mbeki‟s “notion of African 
solutions to African problems…the position boiled down to not rocking the boat or running 
anything that would embarrass the President”.  
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
195 
 
Though like Memela, Mkhabela (2008) could not “remember well”, he thought that the City 
Press was critical of “quiet diplomacy”. That is because, according to Mkhabela, “the City 
Press was very vocal in criticising Mugabe”. 
 
Nationally and internationally, the media have generally criticised President Thabo 
Mbeki’s handling of HIV/AIDS and have labelled him an AIDS Denialist. What has 
been the City Press’ position on this issue? 
Kalane (2009), Mbatha (2008), Mogale (2009) and Noganta (2009) did not comment on this 
question. Mbatha (2008) could not remember and doubted whether the newspaper had a 
position except for individual opinions, while Noganta said that he had not undertaken an 
analysis of the newspaper‟s position on this issue. 
 
Answers given to this question seem to be summed up by two responses given by Mamaila 
(2008) and Nqayi (2009). Mamaila noted that the City Press‟ positions were informed by the 
editors‟ political orientations on the matter. Nqayi‟s (2009) sense was that what reflected were 
individual editors‟ views. Nqayi pointed out that while, initially, the newspaper was 
sympathetic to Mbeki on this question and gave him the “benefit of the doubt” and sought to 
understand his position on this issue, with changes at editor level, the positions shifted 
accordingly. To a degree, Sibiya‟s (2009) response confirmed Nqayi‟s observation. 
 
In Sibiya‟s tenure as the editor of the City Press, the newspaper‟s official position “disagreed 
with Mbeki completely on the issue of HIV/AIDS”. But before taking that position, Sibiya 
pointed out that he had made an effort to bring together scientists who were both for and 
against Mbeki‟s approach. Sibiya observed that he “even sat down with Mbeki to find out 
why he was sending wrong signals”. In a critical tone he noted that Peter Mokaba and Parks 
Mankahlana, who were Mbeki‟s close comrades in the ANC, “died of Aids, yet Mbeki said he 
knew of no one who had died of AIDS”. Tsedu (2008) was also in disagreement with Mbeki 
and pointed out that the City Press in his time was “quite clear that science is science” and 
that people “should get real”. 
 
Tsedu (2008) was emphatic that Mbeki “is a denialist”. He also noted that the City Press had 
called on Mbeki to remove Tshabala-Msimang as Health Minister. Tsedu stateed that the City 
Press accepted that Mbeki‟s questioning the causal link between HIV and AIDS was his 
personal view as long as he did not interfere with the government‟s policy which was that 
HIV led to AIDS.  
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But Mamaila (2008) differed with Tsedu on Mbeki‟s “denialism”. Mamaila observed that 
Mbeki “is no denialist but an engaging intellectual”. Mamaila further noted that Mbeki was a 
“victim” of drug manufacturing companies who did not want intellectual engagement. He 
contended that Mbeki‟s stance of emphasising poverty as a priority over HIV/Aids was 
logical. That is because, Mamaila argued, once the issue of poverty was addressed, HIV/AIDS 
could be minimised. Arguing in favour of Mbeki‟s stance, Mamaila argued that once 
economic imbalances – that result in poverty – could be addressed, the need for prostitution 
would be minimised, and women who are submissive to men‟s demands for sex because of 
their financial dependence on men, would assert their right to refuse sexual intercourse.  
 
In Mona‟s (2009) time the City Press was “sympathetic to Mbeki‟s views”. But this sympathy 
was not synonymous with the approval of Mbeki‟s approach to HIV/AIDS. To the contrary, 
Mona‟s view as the editor of the City Press at the time was that “on economics, listen to 
Mbeki, but on science, listen to Makgoba”. But even then, Mona insisted that Mbeki‟s views 
should be given space in his newspaper because Mona‟s “style of editorship was that we 
should not be afraid of contending views”. Mona pointed out that the media need not just 
grow in terms of embracing diversity but should also teach society to embrace diversity.  
 
Mkhabela (2008) and Sibanda (2008) supported Mona‟s contention about the City Press‟ 
endeavour to strike a balance between “orthodox” and “dissident” positions on HIV/AIDS. 
Mkhabela noted that the City Press did not “go all out campaigning for or against him 
[Mbeki] on the issue”. Sometimes the City Press agreed with Mbeki and at other times “we 
criticised and disagreed with him”. He recalled that when Mbeki called for a joint panel of 
AIDS orthodox and dissident scientists, the City Press supported Mbeki‟s initiative. Sibanda 
recalled that when Mbeki denied in an interview with the City Press ever stating that HIV did 
not cause AIDS, the City Press put that on record. When Tshabalala-Msimang wrote an 
article in defence of Mbeki against claims that he had said that HIV did not cause AIDS, 
Sibanda pointed out that the City Press gave space to Tshabalala-Msimang. 
 
Though Memela (2008) did not recall the City Press‟ official stance on this issue, he asserted 
that the City Press “was one newspaper that attempted to project the „intellectualism‟ of 
former president Mbeki when he raised issues on the HIV and AIDS matter”. 
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6.3.6.2 Summary: The City Press’ black journalists’ views 
Eight questions were posed to all the interviewees listed above. Answers given reflect 
individual editors‟ and journalists‟ beliefs regarding the political role of the City Press and the 
City Press‟ black journalists‟ role in post-apartheid South Africa in the period 1994 to 2004. 
In some cases there are convergences in the responses, while in others there are divergences. 
Such responses were informed by individual journalists‟ expectations and experiences. 
 
6.3.7 Summary: Chapter 6 
This chapter has given an account of the newspaper‟s black journalists‟ role by studying the 
City Press‟ editorials, the newspaper‟s black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces dealing 
with crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS. The next chapter focuses on the analysis 
of the City Press‟ editorials, the City Press‟ individual black journalists‟ columns, opinion 
pieces and responses given during the interviews. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the author analyses data based on the research findings presented in the 
previous chapter. This chapter is divided into two sections – the first is an analysis of the City 
Press‟ editorials and the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces; the second 
is an analysis of the interviews conducted with the City Press‟ black journalists.  
 
Three theoretical frameworks, namely Liberal-Pluralism, Political Economy and 
Afrocentricity, are employed to analyse how the City Press‟ black journalists lived up to or 
failed to play their media role according to these theories. The point of departure will be the 
definitions of these theoretical frameworks and how they will be applied in analysing the City 
Press‟ black journalists‟ handling of the major challenges faced by South Africa in the 
research period, as defined by this researcher for the purposes of this study. The definitions 
will be followed with an analysis of the handling of the City Press of the major challenges in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The issues are crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and the HIV/AIDS 
issue and they will be analysed in that order.  
 
7.2 Theoretical Frameworks Defined 
An in-depth discussion of the theories employed here was presented in Chapter Four 
(Theoretical Frameworks) of this thesis. Here, only brief definitions and contextualisation will 
be given for the purposes of this chapter. The order in which they will be defined is Liberal-
Pluralism, Political Economy and Afrocentricity.  
 
7.2.1 The Liberal-Pluralist theories on the role of the media 
Liberal-pluralism, with specific reference to the media, is based on the original free press 
(libertarian) theory, which identifies press freedom with the freedom to own and operate the 
means of publication without permission or interference from the state (McQuail, 2007:185). 
In order for the media to carry out their watchdog role and report in an objective way, the 
liberal-pluralist theory contends that the state should not be in control of the media but should 
operate in a capitalistic environment, that is, they should be privately owned and compete in 
an open market (Siebert, 1963:51 – 52). It is against this background that the liberal-pluralist 
theory of the media is known as the market model. 
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Liberal-Pluralist theories‟ expectations of the media‟s political functions can be summarised 
as follows (Fourie, 2007a:188; Schultz, 1998:23; Bennett, 1982a:40; Siebert, 1963:52): 
 
 To inform about political developments  
 To guide public opinion about political decisions 
 To express different views about political developments and decisions 
 To criticise political developments and decisions 
 To give a platform to diverse information, viewpoints and opinions. 
 
In assessing the role of the City Press‟ black journalists during the research period 1994 to 
2004, according to the Liberal-Pluralist theories, the five-bulleted points will be used as 
definition and therefore criteria.  
 
7.2.2 Political Economy theories on the role of the media 
The Political Economy theory on the media is a perspective which searches for the answers to 
the question of, but not limited to the power wielded by media owners (Boyd-Barrett, 
2006:186; Curran, 2000:73; McChesney, 1998:3; MacGregor, 1997:48; Curran et al 1982:19).  
According to the Political Economy theory of the media, the contents and meanings carried by 
the media reflect the interests of those who finance the production of the media‟s contents – 
not just media owners, but advertisers, as well (Altschull, 1997:259). This argument holds the 
view that the financiers will not allow their media to publish material that frustrates their vital 
interests.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the Political Economy theory of the media will be defined as a 
perspective which investigates the influence of media ownership in the execution of tasks in 
journalism practice. 
 
7.2.3 Afrocentric theories on the role of the media 
Afrocentricity is defined as a mode of analysis, a perspective where Africans seek to assert 
subject place within the context of African history and culture (Asante, 2007:16; Karenga, 
2003:77; Okafor, 1993:200 – 201; Hoskins, 1992:251).  
 
In the discipline of communication studies, the Afrocentric paradigm encourages awareness 
of the particular ways that African communication differs from the Western modes of 
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communication and how issues of the representation of Africans in the mass media are 
emphasised (Fourie, 2007b:177).  
 
For the purposes of this study, the Afrocentric theory of the media is understood as a 
perspective that advocates taking into cognisance of African cultural values in the execution 
of journalism practice. 
 
This chapter will now discuss the major political challenges in post-apartheid South Africa 
during the period 1994 to 2004, beginning with crime. 
 
Section I 
7.3 Analysis of the City Press’ editorials, the City Press’ black journalists’ columns and 
opinion pieces 
 
 7.3.1 Crime – Liberal-Pluralist Analysis  
One can state that within three months of the inauguration of the Government of National 
Unity, the City Press fulfilled the Liberal-Pluralist expectation of the role of the media of 
informing South African citizens about political developments, with particular reference to 
crime. It did so when the newspaper informed the government that one of the “gravest 
problems facing the new government” was crime (City Press Comment, 1994:16). By 
pointing out that the government‟s failure to deal with crime decisively could have “serious 
social, political and economic implications” in that there could be further soaring of crime 
resulting in the fleeing of foreign investment, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1995b:16) 
fulfilled the role of informing the newspaper‟s readership about the political developments in 
South Africa. Not only did the City Press inform about political developments in this regard, 
but contextualised the relationship between crime and politics.  
 
The exercise of contextualisation was carried out by the City Press‟ journalist and columnist, 
Sekolla Sello (1995a:16), in his opposition to the government‟s decision to do away with the 
death penalty. Conscious that the death penalty during the apartheid era had affected black 
people more because of their resistance to apartheid, he acknowledged why those in power 
after apartheid would be against the death penalty since many freedom fighters had been 
executed because of their stance. While Sello could understand the government‟s position, he 
also articulated the frustration of those who were on the receiving end of crime. For them, as 
Sello (1995a:16) observes, “certain crimes are so repulsive that the only fitting punishment is 
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to pass the death penalty”. Sello‟s position on the death penalty was also the official position 
of the City Press. 
 
The City Press was uncomfortable with the abolishment of the death penalty (City Press 
Comment, 1995f:16). It believed that there were certain crimes which were so “revolting and 
brutal” that society should ask whether the lives of perpetrators of such evil deserved to be 
spared. In publicly expressing its disagreement with the government‟s position on the death 
penalty, the City Press fulfilled two roles of the media, according to the Liberal-Pluralist 
theory. Firstly, the newspaper served to guide public opinion about political decisions, and, 
secondly, it played the role of criticising political developments and decisions. The newspaper 
was not content with only enjoying the right of criticising others, but gave space to those who 
criticised its official position, and remarkably from within its own newsroom. 
 
This was the case when the newspaper gave a platform to its journalist, Benison Makele. 
Makele (1996:17) called on the government “not…to budge…and pander to the whims of the 
pro-death penalty lobby” by allowing a referendum. In Makele‟s view, were such a 
referendum held, chances were that people “inspired by emotion and revulsion and not 
rational considerations” could vote overwhelmingly in favour of the executioner. In referring 
to people driven by a sense of “revulsion”, Makele was aware that his newspaper‟s editorial 
comment had labelled the crime incidents in South Africa as “revolting” and his colleague, 
Sekolla Sello, had labelled crime as “repulsive”. In giving space to Makele to express these 
views, the City Press gave Makele a platform to contradict the official position of the 
newspaper that he worked and wrote for. In doing this, the City Press fulfilled the Liberal- 
Pluralist role of the media of giving a platform to diverse information, viewpoints and 
opinions. 
 
7.3.2 Crime – Political Economy Analysis 
According to Calland (2006:200) a view existed in the ANC that  
 
“certain black journalists and commentators who criticize the ANC get 
promoted quicker, because the media is desperate to have these names on their 
pages, regardless of the quality of the analysis”. 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, Mandela is on record as having singled out certain unnamed 
senior black journalists and accused them of being co-opted by the “white-controlled 
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conservative media” to do “their dirty work” (Jenvey, 1996:1). As pointed out in Chapter 2, it 
was reported (Dlamini, 1996:2) that one of the journalists singled out was the then City Press‟ 
editor, Khulu Sibiya. An examination of Sibiya‟s (1996c:14) writings reveals that on the 
crime issue he was impatient with the ANC government. Sibiya went as far as saying that 
failure on the part of the government to deal with crime decisively could very soon see some 
people calling for the resignation of the government. With particular reference to the ANC 
government‟s decision to abolish the capital punishment, the City Press (City Press 
Comment, 1996d:14) had noted that “as long as President Nelson Mandela is still a head of 
state, there is no likelihood of the government changing its position of the death penalty”. 
This could be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Mandela‟s leadership on the part of the 
City Press. 
 
The ANC‟s view was that criticism from the media was influenced by white ownership 
(Calland, 2006:200). But  an examination of the City Press‟ editorial (City Press Comment, 
1998c:14) reveals a pro-ANC sentiment when it condemned members of the South African 
National Defence Force who were arrested for stealing arms from a military base in 
Bloemfontein. Disapprovingly, the editorial pointed out that the soldiers were “people who 
would do anything to undermine President Nelson Mandela‟s democratic government”. The 
latter editorial (City Press Comment, 1998c:14) contradicts the claim that white-ownership of 
the media influenced the City Press‟ black journalists. By criticising the remnants of the 
apartheid order in the SANDF, and criticising the ANC when occasion demanded, the City 
Press fulfilled what is expected of the media: carrying out their duty without fear or favour.   
 
7.3.3 Crime – An Afrocentric Analysis 
The City Press did not treat crime in the black communities as an isolated issue outside a 
historical context. In pointing out that something drastic needed to be done about young black 
people‟s absence of a sense of purpose and education, resulting in them wasting their lives, 
and treating criminal acts like car hijacking, drug dealing and gangsterism as the norm, a City 
Press (City Press Comment, 1995b:14) editorial demonstrated a recognition of the historical 
deprivation of young people as a factor haunting post-apartheid South Africa. This 
consideration was also demonstrated by the City Press‟ journalist, Benison Makele (1996:17), 
who, in arguing against capital punishment advocated by the City Press, pointed out that left 
unemployed and without education, black young people had turned to using their fighting 
skills learnt during the struggle to give their lives meaning and purpose. Makele recognised 
that the violence used against the apartheid government – then accepted as revolutionary 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
203 
 
violence – was now exercised for criminal purposes. In noting that the young people who 
waged a violent struggle against apartheid, were the same ones who were violent in post-
apartheid South Africa, Makele (1996:17) appreciated the point made by Abrahams 
(2000:182) that “[w]here it requires great violence to attain freedom, violence may become 
part of the nature of that society in freedom”. 
 
In condemning cases of child abuse, involving raping of children three years old and younger, 
the City Press (City Press Comment, 1995g:16) invoked and appealed to the Africans‟ value 
of ubuntu, noting that criminal acts flew “against the grain of ubuntu/botho”. In doing this, the 
City Press fulfilled the Afrocentric call to commentators to take into cognisance issues of 
African culture and history. In this particular case the City Press dealt with a problem in 
African societies against Africans‟ own cultural standards. 
 
7.3.4 Political Corruption – Liberal Pluralist Analysis 
One of the roles of the media, according to Liberal-Pluralism, is to give a platform to diverse 
information, viewpoints and opinions. This includes those views that may be contrary to the 
official position held by a particular medium. When the City Press criticised what it referred 
to as a “gravy train” tendency on the part of the government, it was joined by its journalist and 
columnist, Sandile Memela. Memela (1996:17) noted that there was a sense of 
disillusionment among ordinary people in the township, noting that politicians were being 
referred to as “fat-cats on the gravy train”. The then Minister of Transport, Mac Maharaj 
(1996:17), wrote back and dismissed Memela‟s assertions as “fallacy”. By giving space to 
Maharaj to criticise both the City Press and Memela, the City Press had fulfilled its media 
role of giving a platform to opposing opinions. While these concerns were dismissed as 
“fallacy” by Maharaj, for some black journalists, these were moral and ethical issues for black 
people. 
 
7.3.5 Political Corruption – Political Economy Analysis 
In the case of the City Press‟ black journalists‟ analysis of political corruption on the part of 
democratically elected representatives, there is nothing that is found to suggest that the white 
ownership of the City Press had anything to do with their criticism of the ANC government. 
For instance, while Sibiya (1995b:14) criticised corrupt acts in the democratically elected 
ANC government, he did not spare the ANC‟s predecessor, the National Party government. 
Sibiya (1995b:14) noted that “the previous government and those who surrounded it were also 
on the gravy train”. While he acknowledged that, he stressed, however, that “this should not 
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give the present government the same license to climb on this train”. Sibiya expected better 
from the ANC government. 
 
It was in this spirit, as well, that Sello (1995c:17) criticised the ANC leaders‟ involvement in 
the “gravy train”. His criticism was informed by the ruling party‟s promises of “clean 
administration, a government closer to the people and one which is transparent and 
accountable”. The expectation was that the ANC would be different from the NP‟s regime. 
Such comments were not directed at undermining the ANC government, but rather at 
encouraging it to do better. 
 
7.3.6 Political corruption – Afrocentric Analysis 
The concept of blackness for Mona (2000b:10) is “not just a question of skin colour but…also 
a political and ethical construct”. In the context and application of journalism, this means for 
Mona, that black people – those in power particularly – should be “subjected to the broader 
political objectives and ethical framework of black people”. Mona made this observation 
following an encounter with a black public sector official who “accused the media in general, 
and the City Press in particular, of having a hidden agenda against blacks and of harbouring 
counter-revolutionary tendencies”.  
 
This denunciation of black journalists was informed by a perception that in the main black 
journalists were “not loyal to their race group, lack character and do less than enough to 
advance their own kind through positive stories in the media they work for”. More 
specifically, the black civil servant was protesting against stories about corruption implicating 
top black people. In the public servant‟s view, the City Press and other media‟s exposés were 
evidence that black journalists had an agenda against a black government or were 
“unwittingly confirming the stereotypes which whites have created about blacks”. 
 
Mona did not subscribe to the public servant‟s reasoning. In his view the public servant 
advocated blind black solidarity, an attitude that encouraged turning a blind eye by black 
journalists to wrongs done by fellow blacks. In Mona‟s book a “wrong is a wrong irrespective 
of the colour of the perpetrator”. Thus, in Mona‟s view, “black journalists have no obligation 
or limitation as to how they portray black characters, especially when the latter are involved 
in nefarious activities”. Mona‟s definition of “blackness” as “a political and ethical construct” 
conforms to the Afrocentric definition of blackness. In this regard, Asante (2003:2) asserts 
that Afrocentricity seeks to enshrine the notion that blackness is a trope of ethics. 
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The ethical values advanced by Afrocentricity, and Mona‟s conceptualisation of blackness 
were met by the practice of the City Press‟ black journalists in their encounter with corrupt 
acts emanating from the government led by black people. This was the case when Sibiya 
(1995b:14) argued that the observation that the “previous government and those who 
surrounded it were on the gravy train” was no excuse for the ANC leaders in government “to 
climb on this train”. The City Press (City Press Comment, 2004c:18) was not prepared to 
allow the ANC-led government‟s acts to feed into stereotypes that fed the view that Africans 
were corrupt, and as such that the South African government was going to be no “different to 
other corrupt governments”. This latter observation was made with specific reference to the 
revelation parliamentarians had exchanged their travel vouchers meant for constituency work 
for luxuries like bookings in five-star hotels and car hires. 
 
7.3.7 Summary: Crime Analysis 
This section has analysed the City Press‟ and its black journalists‟ engagement with crime 
which was categorised into common crime and political corruption. The researcher employed 
three theoretical frameworks, namely Liberal-Pluralism, Political Economy and 
Afrocentricity. From a Liberal-Pluralist perspective, the researcher has argued that the City 
Press informed about and contextualised the crime situation in the years 1994 to 2004 for 
South African citizens. It created space for different opinions to be expressed including those 
that contradicted the official position of the newspaper, also from within the newspaper‟s own 
ranks. From a Political Economy perspective, the researcher argued that nothing in the 
analysis of the City Press revealed a biased position against the ANC, or an appeasement of 
whites to please white ownership. From an Afrocentric perspective the newspaper published 
pieces that showed recognition of the historical context of South Africa‟s history.  
 
The next section will discuss the second focus of this study, namely the Zimbabwe crisis. 
 
7.4 Zimbabwe 
7.4.1 A Liberal-Pluralist Analysis 
The role of the media, according to Liberal-Pluralism is to present a balanced view about 
issues. This means giving as many sides as possible about a single or number of issues. 
The City Press fulfilled this in dealing with the Zimbabwean crisis on two occasions. When 
the newspaper noted that though the war veterans were justifiable in their protest against the 
unfair ownership of land by the country‟s minority whites, the City Press‟ editorial comment 
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(City Press Comment, 2000e:14) also observed that the “auguries for stability and peace in 
Zimbabwe did not look good when its president encouraged lawlessness”. In this way the 
newspaper advanced an argument that sought to look at the same issue from different angles.  
 
The City Press (City Press Comment, 2002b:8) did this as well when it pointed out that 
contrary to Britain‟s Tony Blair who laid all the blame on Mugabe for the violence taking 
place in the country, the violence had emanated both from Mugabe‟s and Tsvangirai‟s parties. 
But stating this was not the same as condoning Mugabe‟s reported acts of violence.  
 
In line with the Liberal-Pluralist‟s prescription to the media to criticise political developments 
and decisions when the need arises, the City Press (City Press Comment, 2000e:14) noted that 
though Mugabe was blaming white land owners for the lack of equity in land ownership, 
Mugabe himself was partly to blame. That was because, the editorial comment argued, it was 
an indictment against Mugabe that it took twenty years after Zimbabwe attained independence 
to seek to resolve the land question. This was the case as well when Mugabe‟s Zanu-PF party 
won the national elections in March 2002, and South Africa accepted the outcomes. The City 
Press declared Mugabe‟s victory as “problematic”. The City Press (City Press Comment, 
2002b:8) made this point against the observation of intimidation and violence in the country. 
  
7.4.2 A Political Economy Analysis 
Nothing in the City Press‟ editorials (City Press Comment, 2000e:14; City Press Comment, 
2000f:12) and the newspaper‟s black journalists‟ columns (Mamaila, 2004a:18; Maseko, 
2001:9; Mona, 2000a:12) suggests that the white ownership of the newspaper had an 
influence on their writings. The views of the City Press‟ black journalists cited above 
reflected independence of thought. 
 
While the City Press criticised Mugabe for delaying the land question, it also criticised white 
Zimbabweans for not co-operating with Mugabe, and for carrying themselves “as Europeans 
first and Zimbabweans second” (City Press Comment, 2000e:14). The newspaper (City Press 
Comment, 2000f:12) condemned the predominantly white Democratic Party (forerunner of 
the Democratic Alliance) for its calls for economic pressure on Zimbabwe when it opposed 
the same against South Africa during the “dark days of apartheid”. Mona (2000a:12) recalled 
the cruelties inflicted on Zimbabweans when the land was taken by force from blacks and 
given to whites. Both Maseko (2001:9) and Mamaila (2004a:18) argued that while Mugabe 
was condemned by the Western world, he was a hero among the African masses.  
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7.4.3 An Afrocentric Analysis 
The struggle for independence in Africa was a quest for self-determination (Gakwandi, 
1996:182). This meant a rejection of the imposition of the Western world to impose its will on 
Africa. Africans sought to carve their path politically, economically and socially (Abdul-
Raheem, 1996:4). It was in appreciation of this historical reality that in supporting Mbeki‟s 
diplomatic approach, the City Press argued that the African continent had its “own unique 
problems, different from those of Europe” and that “Mbeki understands his continent much 
better than those who have one foot in Africa and another in Europe” (City Press Comment, 
2000g:8). The Zimbabwean crisis was, to the City Press, an African problem that needed an 
African solution, and as such the City Press believed that “African leaders can work towards 
providing African solutions to African problems” (City Press Comment, 2002a:8).  
 
It was against this background that the City Press supported South Africa and Nigeria when 
the two opposed punitive measures against Zimbabwe during a meeting of Commonwealth 
countries in 2002 in Australia (City Press Comment, 2002a:8). The newspaper condemned 
what it perceived as the West‟s double standards in approaching the Zimbabwean crisis, 
noting that the invocation of the abuse of democracy by Zimbabwe was in fact a veiled excuse 
for Western countries‟ selfish interests. The City Press argued that the USA and Britain, in 
particular, did not apply the same measures on Uganda and Swaziland, yet the two countries 
did not practise democracy.  
 
Two years after this editorial comment by the City Press, Mamaila (2004a:18) took the 
historical context further by pointing out that the late Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko 
remained in power for almost three decades “because his puppet regime did not threaten the 
interests of the west”. The unequivocal statement by the City Press was that the newspaper 
viewed Mbeki‟s involvement in Zimbabwe as a necessary intervention, while it perceived 
approaches from Western countries as an unwelcome interference. 
 
While Afrocentricity advocates and advances African unity and African solutions to African 
problems, such unity must be for African progress. Blind and reactionary African unity is 
unacceptable to Afrocentricity. On this score, Asante (2003:63) points out that a “person who 
refuses to condemn mediocrity and reactionary attitudes among Africans for the sake of false 
unity neither honors nor practices Afrocentricity”. It could be argued that when the City Press 
(City Press Comment, 2003g:18) condemned Mugabe for reportedly building a mansion 
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worth R72 million, it fulfilled expectations of Afrocentricity. This also applies to the 
condemnation of African leaders who kept quiet in the face of such an act while, as the City 
Press pointed out, the “majority of Zimbabweans are starving”.  
 
In charging that it was “unfortunate that Mugabe‟s comrades in leadership positions across 
Africa, who are expected to knock sense into him, are shirking their responsibility and 
treating him like a hero”, the City Press was cautioning African leaders against blind 
solidarity. This observation and its support for Mbeki‟s “quiet diplomacy” was not a 
contradictory position. Rather, as the City Press (City Press Comment, 2004d:18) pointed out, 
while South Africa‟s diplomacy was fine, such “cannot not be an excuse to obfuscate when 
wrongs are being done”. Afrocentricity requires that any issue that involves Africa must be 
examined within African historical and cultural contexts. The City Press, to an extent, met the 
requirement of Afrocentricity with reference to the conflict about land in Zimbabwe. 
 
On the issue of the land, the then editor, Vusi Mona (2000c:10), argued that “commentary 
about the current land invasions in Zimbabwe is informed by an arrogant and pathetically ill-
informed understanding of that country”. Mona argued that “a reflection of where Zimbabwe 
has come from becomes necessary”. What this meant, therefore, was that Mona was calling 
for a commentary on the Zimbabwean crisis that was based on a historical context. Not only 
did Mona call for such an approach, but led by example.  
 
He reminded his readership that the 1979 Lancaster House Conference where negotiations 
between the Zimbabwean liberation forces and the Ian Smith government took place, 
concluded with an undertaking by the British government to raise money to buy white-owned 
farms which were to be used for land redistribution so that Zimbabwean blacks could get 
land. At the Lancaster House Conference, against the liberation movement‟s will, a provision 
stipulating that the land could be acquired by the government only on a “willing seller, willing 
buyer basis” was inserted into the new Zimbabwean constitution (Ankomah, 2000:15). That 
provision was to be in effect for ten years – from 1980 to 1990. This meant that the 
Zimbabwean government could only acquire land from the white farmers if they were willing 
to sell any piece of land.  
 
While Mona, as a staff member, endorsed Mugabe, the City Press was cautious. The 
newspaper appreciated the land question as a legitimate issue around which Zimbabweans 
rallied, but it regarded the delay in addressing the land issue as Mugabe‟s fault, pointing out 
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that Mugabe waited for twenty years after independence (which was achieved in 1980) before 
addressing the issue. On this score, the City Press showed failure in appreciating the historical 
developments in Zimbabwe. A glance at the history (New African, 2000:20 – 21) of 
Zimbabwe indicates that there were a number of efforts that were made, legislatively, to 
address land imbalances. These developments, which were crucial in understanding the 
unfolding of the historical events in Zimbabwe, were missing in the City Press‟ editorials and 
the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces, and were reported by the New 
African (2000:20 – 21) magazine as follows.  
 
 The Land Act of 1985. This Act – which was drawn in the spirit of the 1979 
Lancaster House Conference‟s “willing seller, willing buyer” clause which could not 
be changed for 10 years after independence in 1980 –  gave the government the first 
right to purchase excess land for redistribution to the landless. The Act was, however, 
constrained by the Zimbabwean government‟s lack of sufficient funds to compensate 
white landowners. Because of the “willing seller, willing buyer” clause, and the white 
farmers‟ prices, which the Zimbabwean government could not afford, the 
Zimbabwean government was powerless between 1980 and 1990 to speed up the 
programme. This resulted in the government being able to resettle 71 000 families 
instead of the 162 000 intended. 
 The Land Acquisition Act of 1992. When this Act was introduced, the ten-year 
period stipulated by the Lancaster House negotiations had expired. This Act 
empowered the government to remove the “willing seller, willing buyer” clause and to 
buy land compulsorily for redistribution, with the government paying a fair 
compensation for the land acquired. The Act gave leave to landowners to appeal to the 
courts if they felt that the compensation was unfair. As part of the implementation of 
this Act, in November 1997, the government published a list of 1 471 farms it 
intended to buy compulsorily for redistribution. 
 June 1998. The Zimbabwean government published a policy framework on the Land 
Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II) whose objective was to 
compulsorily purchase 11, 2 million hectares owned by black and white commercial 
farmers, parastatal corporations, churches, NGOs, and multinational companies. This 
programme was to be carried out over a period of five years. 
 September 1998. The government called a donors conference in Harare seeking to 
inform and involve the donor community in the programme. 
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Blaming Mugabe for failing to address the land question and not mentioning the issues stated 
above, exposes the City Press‟ failure to take into cognisance important aspects of 
Zimbabwe‟s history.  
 
In 1999, in response to the government‟s moves, the Commercial Farmers‟ Union offered 1,5 
million hectares for sale to the government (New African, 2000:21). At this stage there were 
tensions between the government and the white farmers, the latter being seen by the former as 
resisting land redistribution. This tension was increased by Britain‟s withdrawal of aid to the 
land programme, with the British government claiming that Mugabe was giving land to his 
“cronies and political allies” (Ankomah, 2000:15). As the tension increased, the government 
drafted a new constitution with a clause to acquire land for redistribution without paying for 
compensation. Since the drafting stage was largely boycotted by the opposition, the 
government called for a referendum on the new constitution. The opposition rallying behind 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) defeated the ruling Zanu-PF by 55% against 
Zanu-PF‟s 45%.  
 
There is, according to the former African Union Secretary General, Amara Essy, another 
historical factor that played a significant role in the delay to resolve the land issue in 
Zimbabwe (Ankomah, 2002:27). According to Essy, when the ten-year period of the 
Lancaster House Conference agreement had expired, “it was African heads of state who told 
him [Mugabe] to be quiet, because we were fighting against apartheid in South Africa”. 
According to Essy, the African heads of state prevailed on Mugabe to delay his land reforms 
so as not to “scare the white people of South Africa” since at the time there were serious 
negotiations taking place between the liberation movements and the South African 
government. 
 
Former Mozambican president, and former African Union chairperson, Joaquim Chissano, 
lent credence to Essy‟s assertion in an interview with the Sunday Times (Munusamy, 
2003:13). Though acknowledging that African heads of state were “critical” of Zimbabwe, 
Chissano noted that those critical “did not live their [Zimbabweans] history, their struggle”. 
While many, including sections of the media, were critical of Mbeki‟s diplomatic approach to 
Zimbabwe, Chissano endorsed Mbeki, noting that “Mbeki belongs to a team, our team”. The 
point made by Chissano was that Mbeki‟s approach was not a personal one, but that of a 
collective of African leaders who were mindful of Zimbabwe‟s history and the role the 
African heads of state played in that history. 
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In his biography Thabo Mbeki – The Dream Deferred, Mark Gevisser (2007:445) alludes to 
this historical reality. But in the book, unlike Essy who singles out African heads of state for 
asking Mugabe to delay dealing with the land question, Mbeki is quoted by Gevisser as 
singling out the ANC as having persuaded Mugabe “to defer land reform so as not to scare 
white South Africans away from agreeing to majority rule”. Gevisser (2007:821) notes that 
Mbeki made this statement publicly in Abuja, Nigeria in 2003. The City Press failed to make 
this connection between Mbeki‟s approach to Zimbabwe and this historical background.  
 
Stressing that Mugabe has “never said that white Africans cannot own land or property in 
their country”, Osabu-Kle (2001:47) notes that what Mugabe has been saying is that “land 
ownership has to be compatible with African culture”. Osabu-Kle further notes that Mugabe‟s 
move on the land question was an act of “only enforcing an African culture without which he 
cannot be accepted as an African”.  
 
The question then is: What does African culture say about land ownership? Mqhayi (1974:12-
13) notes that land among Africans was never sold but belonged to the nation as its treasure. 
Williams (1987:171), having observed that according to African culture “the land…cannot be 
sold or given away”, further notes that African culture held the view that the “land belongs to 
no one. It is God‟s gift to [hu]mankind for use and as a sacred heritage, transmitted by our 
forefathers [forebears] as a bond between the living and the dead to be held in trust by each 
generation for the unborn who will follow, and thus to the last generation.”  Abrahams 
(2000:374 – 375) echoes this: 
 
“For Africans for instance, land will always be more special than for most 
other people: land is their life, given by God in trust to sustain the tribe and the 
community. Man [humankind] cannot own land in the way Europeans see 
ownership. If it mothers all who depend on it for life, how can anyone see it in 
terms of exclusive ownership?” 
 
Remarking on the land question, Rodney (1981:41) points out that where  
 
“a few people owned the land and the majority were tenants, this injustice at a 
particular stage of history allowed a few to concentrate on improving their 
land. In contrast, under communalism every African was assured of sufficient 
land to meet his own needs by virtue of being a member of a family or 
community”.  
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In calling upon his government to “go back to the African custom of land holding”, former 
Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere (in Shivji, 2000:42-43), argued against the sale of land, 
reasoning that  
 
“in a country such as this, where, generally speaking, the Africans are poor and 
the foreigners are rich, it is quite possible that, within eighty or hundred years, 
if the poor African were allowed to sell land, all land in Tanganyika would 
belong to wealthy immigrants and the local people would be tenants. But even 
if there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and 
clever Tanganyikans.”  
 
In other words, Nyerere was saying that the African law on land was to protect the poor 
against abuse by the rich. This African cultural perspective on the land was missing in the 
City Press‟ editorials, black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces.  
 
While the City Press showed an appreciation of the historical context on the Zimbabwean 
issue, it also exposed a lack of appreciation for the African cultural context in Mugabe and 
Mbeki‟s personal relationship which impacted on their political relationship. Afrocentricity 
insists that whenever African political issues are discussed, the cultural context must be taken 
into cognisance. This context was also absent in the City Press‟ editorials and the 
newspaper‟s columnists‟ pieces. 
 
In his biography of Thabo Mbeki – Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred – Mark Gevisser 
(2007:439) observes that Mugabe and Mbeki had a father-son relationship, the same way 
Mbeki had that kind of a relationship with Zambia‟s former head of state, Kenneth Kaunda. 
Mugabe, according to the biography, treated and cared for Mbeki as if he were his own son. 
This story was told by Mbeki himself to Gevisser, according to the author. Analysing Mbeki‟s 
revelation to him, Gevisser observes that the “context in which Mbeki was telling me this 
made its implications clear: his latter-day appeasement of Mugabe was rooted at least in part 
in an acute sense of the role the two men had played” in Mbeki‟s personal and political life.  
 
While this aspect of Mbeki and Mugabe‟s relationship was absent in the editorial pages of the 
City Press, and that of the City Press‟ staff columnists, in the interview with Mamaila it 
emerged. Mamaila noted that since in African culture elders must be treated with respect by 
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young ones, “Mbeki had to exercise respect in engaging Mugabe”. In order to appreciate 
Mamaila‟s appreciation of Mbeki‟s relationship with Mugabe, there needs to be an 
appreciation of how African journalists have grappled with the concept of “respect” in 
African culture within a political context, and with particular reference to journalism. 
 
Interviews with City Press journalists were revealing on this aspect. This will be dealt with in 
full in the section discussing the findings in the interviews. 
 
7.4.4 Summary: Zimbabwe Analysis 
In this section it has been argued that the City Press has fulfilled, through its editorial 
comments, the Liberal-Pluralist expectations on the role of the media by seeking to highlight 
different sides of the Zimbabwean story. The newspaper‟s presentation of a balanced story 
was not the same as taking a neutral position on this issue. The newspaper criticised what it 
perceived as being wrong. From a Political Economy perspective, it was argued that nothing 
in the argument of the City Press‟ editorials and its individual journalists‟ writings suggested 
that their approach sought to appease the white owners of the newspaper. From an Afrocentric 
perspective, it has been argued that while the newspaper took cognisance of the historical 
context of the Zimbabwean crisis, the newspaper failed in engaging with African cultural 
nuances in the context of the Zimbabwean question. This is in reference to the land issue and 
the personal relationship between Mugabe and Mbeki. The next analysis will be on the third 
focus of this study, namely HIV/AIDS. 
 
7.5 HIV/AIDS 
In the previous chapter, the discussion on HIV/AIDS was divided into the Mandela and 
Mbeki eras as presidents of the country. In this chapter that order will be followed as well. 
 
7.5.1 A Liberal-Pluralist Analysis: Mandela’s era 
The media‟s role according to the Liberal-Pluralist theory is to keep the government 
accountable to its citizens. On the HIV/AIDS issue, with particular reference to the Health 
Ministry‟s allocation of R14 million to Mbongeni Ngema‟s musical, Sarafina II, the City 
Press played this role (City Press Comment, 1996g:16). This was the case when it questioned 
the government‟s lack of transparency in giving the tender to Ngema. In the same editorial it 
also questioned the conflicting statements from senior officials claiming that the state‟s tender 
procedures had been followed while on the other hand there were claims that since the money 
came from the European Union, the state had not been involved. The newspaper did not 
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conceal its displeasure at what it perceived as the ANC‟s defence in parliament of the then 
Health Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma‟s department, considering “the inadequate 
explanations by the minister and the contradictory statements by her senior officials”. 
 
The City Press demonstrated tenacity and consistency in criticism on this matter. Six months 
later, the City Press (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) warned that the ruling party‟s 
“tendency to protect its members at all cost – sometimes before it even gets all sides of the 
story, as it was the case with Zuma – could backfire”. The revisiting of this issue came about 
as a result of the report of the public protector, Selby Baqwa, which, while it exonerated 
Zuma, delivered a “scathing attack” on her senior officials “for gross misconduct”. The 
newspaper (City Press Comment, 1996h:16) argued that Dlamini-Zuma‟s office “did not 
follow certain procedures for acquiring tenders”. The editorial further observed that the 
Minister of Health “did not even fully inform the European Union – funders of the Aids 
programme in South Africa – as to how the money was spent”. Against this background, the 
editorial argued that it was “silly” of the ANC to defend Dlamini-Zuma when she appeared 
before Parliament in June 1996.  
 
7.5.2 A Political Economy Analysis: Mandela’s era 
Among other things, the Political Economy theory argues that those who own the means of 
material production also control the means of mental production. In claiming that “the 
predominantly white-owned mass media” covered the Sarafina II saga with a bias against 
Zuma, Mandela (Rantao & Bulger, 1996:1) was speaking along the lines of political 
economists on the role of the media. In this particular case, Mandela was criticising the white-
owned media of turning a blind eye to the fact that in its findings after the investigation about 
alleged irregularities on Sarafina II, the Public Protector, Selby Baqwa, exonerated Dlamini-
Zuma and blamed two white officials coming from the previous regime. 
 
It is outside the scope of this research to verify Mandela‟s generalisation on the white-owned 
media. But in the case of the City Press, Mandela‟s claim in this regard was not applicable. 
That is because the City Press had taken a clear stand on this issue. The newspaper (City 
Press Comment, 1996h:16) had noted that “the serious implications regarding Badenhorst and 
Angelo once more highlight the urgent need for the ANC to get rid of old wood within the 
civil service and start employing efficient people”. The City Press took what it believed to be 
a principled stance regardless of its white ownership.  
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7.5.3 Liberal Pluralist Analysis: Mbeki’s era 
The City Press journalist Dominic Mahlangu (2000:14) argued that by entertaining the debate 
about the causal relationship between HIV and AIDS, Mbeki was sending confusing signals, 
which could have adverse effects “not only on HIV-positive people, but also on ordinary 
people who may begin to doubt the link between HIV and AIDS”. What Mbeki should have 
done rather, according to Mahlangu, was to raise the issue with the scientists “behind closed 
doors to avoid confusion among the public” and brought the matter “into the public domain 
when certainty was established”.  
 
According to Sparks (2003:291), Mbeki invited AIDS “dissidents” to his presidential advisory 
panel, in the belief that it was important to explore all views on the subject, however deviant 
or unpopular. While acknowledging the plausibility of Mbeki‟s argument, Sparks shares 
Mahlangu‟s argument by pointing out that the problem with this position was that Mbeki, as 
the president of the country, was not just an intellectual, but a political leader in a world 
spotlight, and that as a result, anything he did sent out “political signals”.  
 
Sparks (2003:291-2) further argues that while Mbeki was correct in arguing that the majority 
is not always right, there is a problem if a political leader goes out of his way to seek counsel 
from a deviant figure because such a move could be interpreted as an act of association with 
those who held such deviant positions. By seeking the “dissidents‟” views, Mbeki, in Sparks‟ 
view, “erred” because by becoming involved with the dissident scientists “he gave the group 
credibility…after their views had been roundly dismissed by the overwhelming majority of 
the world‟s top scientists working in this field”. 
 
The newspaper for which Mahlangu worked did not share his view. The City Press (City 
Press Comment, 2000h:6) argued that by bringing in different sides of the argument together, 
Mbeki had helped to “create a climate in which scientists from different backgrounds can 
come together in the fight against HIV/Aids”. By allowing Mahlangu to express a different 
opinion from the official position of the newspaper he worked for, according to Liberal-
Pluralism, the City Press had fulfilled the media‟s role of giving a platform to contending 
views. By arguing that it was unfair for Mbeki‟s critics to call on Mbeki not to make 
pronouncements on HIV/AIDS because he had no medical training, the City Press was 
upholding the Liberal-Pluralist view on the role of the media – that of promoting debate on 
contentious issues in society. 
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Liberal-Pluralism‟s insistence on creating a platform for debates between contesting views 
should not be isolated from its insistence on the role of the media to provide information to 
the public so that the latter could make informed decisions on issues. Against this background 
it should not be perceived as a contradiction that the City Press defended Mbeki‟s right to 
consult conflicting scientists‟ views on HIV/AIDS, while at the same time the City Press was 
impatient with Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang for being “ambiguous” and sending 
“confusing signals to the public” by not clearly stating their position on whether or not HIV 
caused AIDS (City Press Comment, 2000i:8). When the newspaper (City Press Comment, 
2001b:8) applauded him for steering away from the HIV/AIDS debate, it was not jettisoning 
its subscription to the media‟s role of creating a platform for debate. Rather, the newspaper 
was expressing its disapproval for what appeared to be an equivocal stance on the part of 
Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang about an issue of life and death. 
 
It was commitment to the right of the public to know, that Mona (2001b:8) accused Mbeki‟s 
government of “presiding over genocide” when it was revealed by the Mail&Guardian 
(Barrel & Kindra, 2001:1) that the government had suppressed the Medical Research 
Council‟s report revealing that HIV/AIDS accounted for one-in-four of all deaths in South 
Africa. In arguing that the rejection of the MRC‟s report by the ANC was usurpation of 
scientists‟ role by the ANC, Mona (2001b:8) was not saying that the ANC had no right to 
hold views on HIV/AIDS. The issue was about the suppression of information. 
 
While Mona (2001b:8), according to Liberal-Pluralism, was correct in challenging Mbeki‟s 
government for withholding the MRC‟s report from the public, he gave the wrong impression 
that Mbeki‟s stance on HIV/AIDS was merely an ideological or political position. He did this 
by pointing out that the South African politicians “may be obsessed with proving their 
intelligence even on matters in which they are not experts”. Having made this observation, 
Mona (2001b:8) goes on to say that on “scientific matters, I personally do not trust 
politicians”, adding that “when it comes to HIV/AIDS I am better off listening to Makgoba 
and the MRC than to Mbeki and his cabinet”. 
 
Mona‟s statement gives the impression that Mbeki should not have been critical of scientists 
but simply accepted what was presented by them. Mona‟s argument seems to be oblivious to 
the fact that, as Mbeki (2000a) himself noted, his approach was informed by listening to 
“eminent scientists”, some of whom “have specialised on the issue of HIV-AIDS for many 
years and differed bitterly among themselves about various matters”. In his letter to world 
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leaders on AIDS in Africa, dated April 3, 2000, Mbeki (2000a) made clear his refusal to bow 
down to this pressure, likening such calls to apartheid acts that “killed, tortured, imprisoned 
and prohibited [some people] from being quoted in public because the established authority 
believed that their views were dangerous and discredited”. Mbeki was not prepared to 
disassociate himself from AIDS “dissidents” because they were scientists among whom were 
“Nobel Prize Winners, Members of Academies of Science and Emeritus Professors of various 
disciplines of medicine”. When Mona raised his criticism, Mbeki was on record as having 
already made this point. 
 
When Mona says that Mbeki and his government‟s questioning is causing a lot of 
“uncertainty in people‟s minds” while the “sad thing is [that] people are dying of AIDS-
related diseases” an impression is created that Mbeki is in denial and does not care. Yet, 
Mbeki (1998) is on record as having declared that “HIV/AIDS is among us. It is real. It is 
spreading…HIV/AIDS is not someone else‟s problem. It is my problem. It is your problem.”  
 
Six months after assuming the reigns as the president of the country, Mbeki (1999), 
addressing the country on World AIDS Day, observed that “[e]very day we are burying more 
young people than ever before who have died because of AIDS”. Significantly, in this 
address, Mbeki noted that “[e]very day, more people die as a result of AIDS in sub-Saharan 
Africa than anywhere else in the world”. While, according to Liberal-Pluralism the media are 
expected to play a critical and watchdog role towards the government, the expectation is that 
this must be done fairly by accurately representing the opposite view.  
 
While the City Press (City Press Comments, 2001f:8; 2002e:18; 2003h:18; 2004e:18) clearly 
aligned itself with the Treatment Action Campaign‟s struggle for the roll-out of anti-retroviral 
drugs by the government, and its condemnation of the government‟s reluctance to do so, it 
provided space to those, on its staff, who saw otherwise. It allowed Maseko (2002:9) to air 
her view that Mbeki “ought to be respected” for taking the position that he would not “let 
loose on his subjects drugs that he considers less than satisfied with in terms of their efficacy, 
side effects or benefits to the country”. 
 
When the Actuarial Society of South Africa announced that the formula they were using to 
calculate the rate of HIV infections was wrong (Molefe, 2004:19), that the MCC had 
reconsidered the merits of Nevirapine when used as a monotherapy to reduce the risk of 
transmission of HIV from mother-to-child during labour, the City Press (Comment, 2004f:18) 
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boldly called for a new relationship between the government, professionals in the sciences 
and HIV/AIDS activists. The editorial comment further noted that when the government 
cautioned against use of drugs against HIV/AIDS, activists dismissed the government saying 
that “science had already proven what the government was wanting to still research”, and that 
when Mbeki challenged the statistics relating to HIV infections, “he was not seen as 
genuinely concerned, but bolstering his „dissident view‟”.  
 
The significance of this criticism was that it was not only implicating HIV/AIDS activists 
who dismissed Mbeki‟s cautionary stance towards drugs, but included the media which sided 
with the activists against Mbeki. In this case the City Press not only criticised the 
government, as Liberal-Pluralism advocates, but levelled this criticism against the media as 
well. Not only was Mbeki condemned for his association with AIDS “dissidence” but for his 
insistence on calling for a uniquely African approach to the HIV/AIDS challenge. This issue 
is explored in the Afrocentric analysis section. 
 
7.5.4 Political Economy Analysis: Mbeki’s era 
Unlike in the Mandela era, where it was suggested (Rantao & Bulger, 1996:1) that the 
criticism of the Sarafina II saga was influenced by the white ownership of the media, in the 
Mbeki era, the white ownership of the media did not arise. As in the case with Mandela‟s era, 
nothing in the editorials of the City Press or its journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces 
suggested that they wrote in order to please the white owners of their publication. 
 
7.5.5 HIV/AIDS: An Afrocentric Analysis 
As stated in the previous chapter, in October 2001 after praising Mbeki for “steering away” 
from the HIV/AIDS debate, the then City Press editor, Vusi Mona (2001e:8), accused 
Mbeki‟s government of “unwittingly presiding over a genocide” for which “posterity will 
judge them harshly”. What had moved Mona to utter such strong words was a 
Mail&Guardian report (Barrel & Kindra, 2001:1) which had stated that the government had 
suppressed the Medical Research Council‟s report revealing that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
accounted one-in-four of all deaths in South Africa. 
 
According to the Mail&Guardian the Medical Research Council‟s report predicted that by 
2010 AIDS would have killed between five and seven million people. The Mail&Guardian 
report further revealed that in his preface to the report, the “MRC president Malekgapuru 
Makgoba, confronts those, like Mbeki, who question the causal link between HIV and Aids”. 
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The Mail&Guardian also reported that the government had announced that it would not 
release the MRC report until after two months of its release. The report also revealed that the 
ANC had rejected the MRC‟s report as being “not credible” (Barrel & Kindra, 2001:1).  
 
Mona (2001b:8) argued that Mbeki had already caused confusion in the year 2000 when he 
“cast doubt on whether HIV causes AIDS”. This, according to Mona, “caused a lot of 
uncertainty in people‟s minds and set back years of education and awareness regarding 
HIV/AIDS”. Mona asserted that the rejection of the MRC‟s report by the ANC was an act of 
usurping the scientists‟ role by politicians. This, according to Mona, gave the impression that 
the that “politicians in South Africa, especially from the ruling party, equate ignorance about 
HIV/AIDS epidemic with stupidity on their part”. While Mbeki was arguing about whether 
HIV caused AIDS, Mona (2001b:8) observed that “the sad thing is people are dying of AIDS-
related diseases”, adding that he had “seen people both within and outside my family 
succumbing to AIDS after testing HIV-positive”. Mona‟s sentiment was echoed in the 
following week‟s editorial of the City Press (City Press Comment, 2001d:8). 
 
The editorial argued that the “real task today is not finding out how many people die of Aids. 
It is about preventing those who do not have HIV from getting it”. This assertion was in 
reaction to the government‟s move of pulling in Statistics South Africa which, while it 
welcomed the MRC report as a good starting point, also pointed out that it was 
unrepresentative, incomplete and inaccurate (City Press Comment, 2001d:8). While the City 
Press emphasised that the issue was not about numbers but about the reality of people dying 
from AIDS, the newspaper‟s editorial (City Press Comment, 2001d:8) noted that those who 
had “seen relatives wiped out by the pandemic think that the MRC‟s 40 percent is too 
conservative”. 
 
Afrocentricity‟s premise is that when issues involving Africans are interrogated, the 
discussions must take into cognisance issues of African culture and history. While the City 
Press and its then editor, Vusi Mona, were entitled to challenge the ANC and Mbeki about 
their questioning of HIV/AIDS figures, the newspaper failed to interrogate, deeper, why 
Mbeki and the ANC were concerned about HIV/AIDS figures. The concern about HIV/AIDS 
figures was not just the ANC‟s and Mbeki‟s but also that of some African leaders and 
journalists on the African continent.  
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In January 1998, the then New African deputy editor, Baffour Ankomah (1998a:35) observed 
that the United Nations (UN) Programme on HIV/AIDS and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), on December 1, 1997, jointly published a report that was to coincide with World 
AIDS Day. The report, according to Ankomah, stated that of the 30 million people living with 
HIV/AIDS then, 20.8 million were in sub-Saharan Africa. What was intriguing to Ankomah 
was that the report noted that 9 out of 10 of people living with HIV around the world, mostly 
in Africa, were not even aware that they were infected. The question then was that if those 
supposedly living with the disease were not aware of their status, how did the UN and WHO 
know? According to Ankomah (1998a:35), the UN report claimed that in 1997 the figures 
were based on data gathered by scientists who had visited the regions reported on. The report, 
according to Ankomah, revealed that figures previously published by the UN and WHO were 
based on “regional estimates”. 
 
While not denying that Africa had an AIDS problem, Ankomah (1998a:35) asserted that the 
releasing of “estimated” AIDS figures in Africa was a “ploy” by the Western researchers and 
the media “to keep Africa down perpetually by making us lose our self-confidence and self-
worth through such denigration of our continent and race”. Ankomah blamed the “numbers‟ 
game” and its effect on Africa on the WHO.  
 
The questioning of HIV/AIDS figures by the ANC and Mbeki, as the account above shows, 
was not just an issue preoccupying South Africa‟s ruling party and its then leader, Mbeki. 
Rather, as the account above shows, it was a concern shared on the greater African continent. 
This historical narrative was missing in the City Press. So, from an Afrocentric perspective, 
the City Press failed in this regard to give an African historical context to the ANC‟s and 
Mbeki‟s concerns. To the City Press (City Press Comment, 2001d:8) the issue was not about 
numbers, but about the reality of people dying from AIDS. The City Press was contented with 
only arguing that the issue of numbers weighed less when compared to the reality of people 
dying from AIDS, failing to consider the bigger picture. To other Africans the numbers‟ issue 
had serious implications. In Ankomah‟s (1998a:35) view, the issue of numbers was central in 
determining the reality of Africans dying from AIDS.  
 
That is because, in Ankomah‟s (1998b:37) view, to 
 
“Africans, the most troubling aspect is that the people around the world do take 
these figures at face value, and thus believe that almost every African is riddled 
with the HIV virus from head to toe and only waiting to die of Aids in ten 
years time or so if not dying now”.  
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The AIDS figures, according to the New African Kenyan journalist, John Kamau (1999:30), 
had a negative psychological effect on Africans, provoking him to wonder “why” Africa 
should “suffer all the humiliation about Aids as unreliable figures are peddled around as truth 
and dangled before the entire world”. The point that is being made here is that the ANC‟s and 
Mbeki‟s caution or suspicion about HIV/AIDS should not be treated in isolation but within 
this historical context as far as HIV/AIDS is concerned. 
 
The sentiments expressed in the New African by the African journalists cited above are 
similar to Mbeki‟s (2000b) in his letter to Leon, in which Mbeki noted that the “estimates” of 
the incidence of HIV in South Africa and the greater sub-Saharan Africa made by some 
international organisations, coupled with the “earlier wild and insulting claims about the 
African and Haitian origins of HIV” were “hysterical” and “powerfully” reinforced dangerous 
and firmly entrenched prejudices. What this means is that Mbeki saw the publicised figures 
about HIV/AIDS as a political game against Africa and the Africans which was, as he 
described it, prejudicial.  
 
For Mbeki (2000c), the number one problem, not only for Africa but for the world, was 
poverty. Mbeki made this point clear at the 13th International AIDS conference held in 
Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2000. In making this assertion, Mbeki (2000c) also made it 
clear that he was not being inattentive to “stories being told about malaria, tuberculosis, 
hepatitis B, HIV-AIDS and other diseases”. Yet, he insisted that poverty was the number one 
killer in the world. In backing up his argument, Mbeki referred to the WHO‟s 1995 World 
Health Report from which he quoted the following: 
 
“The world‟s biggest killer and the greatest cause of ill-health and suffering 
across the globe is listed almost at the end of the International Classification of 
Diseases. It is given the code Z59.5 – extreme poverty. Poverty is the main 
reason why babies are not vaccinated, why clean water and sanitation are not 
provided, why curative drugs and other treatments are unavailable and why 
mothers die in childbirth…Poverty is a major contributor to mental illness, 
stress, suicide, family disintegration and substance abuse.” 
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7.6 Summary: HIV/AIDS Analysis 
In this section it was pointed out that during Mandela‟s presidency, the City Press fulfilled the 
Liberal-Pluralist role of the media by criticising the intransparency surrounding Mbongeni 
Ngema‟s musical, Sarafina II. Using the Political Economy‟s theory on the role of the media 
to analyse Mandela‟s claim that the Ngema saga was reported in a prejudiced manner by the 
white-owned media, it is asserted that Mandela‟s claim, with specific reference to the white-
owned City Press, did not apply. During Mbeki‟s presidency, the City Press gave space to 
contending views that even contradicted the City Press‟ official position on HIV/AIDS, thus 
fulfilling the Liberal-Pluralist role of the media. The City Press, from an Afrocentric 
perspective failed to engage Mbeki‟s call for a uniquely African approach to the uniquely 
African AIDS challenge. 
 
SECTION II 
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
 
7.7.1 Introduction 
This section analyses the answer given to the interview questions outlined in chapter 5 and 
also attached as Addendum A. The theoretical frameworks employed are Liberal-Pluralism, 
Political Economy and Afrocentric theories on the role of the media. The answers are not 
analysed separately but linked according to the relevance and connectedness of themes 
discussed. 
 
7.7.2 Liberal-Pluralist Analysis 
An inclination and subscription to aspects of the Liberal-Pluralist prescribed role of the media 
emerged during the interviews with the City Press‟ black journalists. This was particularly the 
case with the media‟s expected role of holding the government to account and being the voice 
of the voiceless (Memela, 2008; Sibiya, 2009; Tsedu, 2008). This was important to do for 
black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa so as to protect the interests of the poor 
(Tsedu, 2008). Black journalism needed to be “more radical” in carrying out the task of 
holding the government accountable in a quest to set better standards for post-apartheid 
government, if for no other reason, for the fact that it is black (Mamaila, 2008). Carrying out 
such a task, on the part of black journalism, would be a fulfilment of a historical role of 
“defending and advancing the gains of the liberation struggle” against corrupt elements in 
post-apartheid South Africa (Mbatha, 2008).  
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Adherence to values such as accuracy and objectivity and the educational role as prescribed 
by the Liberal-Pluralist role of the media was expressed by Mbatha (2008) and Sibanda 
(2008). Its application was informed by the consciousness that while “[p]eople knew that they 
were free…they did not know what this freedom meant” (Mbatha, 2008). Against this 
background, the Liberal-Pluralist role of the media was fulfilled when according to Mbatha, 
the City Press endeavoured “to make sure that it helped black people to be conscious of their 
rights so that they could regain their dignity which had been trampled upon through the 
course of apartheid”. 
 
7.7.3 Political Economy Analysis 
It may have been an impression of both politicians outside the City Press and some journalists 
inside the newspaper that at times the Afrikaner owners of the newspaper dictated terms to the 
editors. However, all the editors interviewed, stressed that they acted independently as 
journalists. Available evidence speaks in their favour. The first, as attested to by Mamaila 
(2008) and Sibanda (2008), is that in the 1999 elections, the City Press (City Press Comment, 
1999d:6) called on its readership to vote for the ANC, a party rooted in the history of anti-
apartheid politics that wrestled power from an Afrikaner-led party, the National Party, which 
had deep historical ties with Naspers, the owners of the City Press. Secondly, as attested to by 
Mbatha (2008), the City Press gave her space to write about former MK soldiers, Andrew 
Zondo and Robert McBride, who bombed buildings in South Africa that claimed some white 
people‟s lives. Significantly, Mbatha says that other newspapers did not want her to touch the 
stories. 
 
While the City Press‟ black journalists were not dictated to by the white owners of their 
publication, the need to fulfil the mandate of making profit for the owners had an influence in 
the direction the newspaper took (2008). Having observed that the media need advertising to 
survive, Tsedu admitted the need on his part to provide a product that would convince the 
advertisers that there are “rich people” to buy the product: 
 
“The need for rich people influences your content. Content decisions may 
marginalise the poor. In order to avoid this, as the editor I took a decision to 
apply affirmative action for the poor readership – to make sure that our 
newspaper remains the eyes and ears of the poor and the voiceless.”  
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
This statement can be interpreted as an indication that due to economic realities, in a post-
apartheid era, when protest politics was no longer the major issue, the City Press had to re-
position itself. Class consciousness or considerations became a defining feature. The bottom 
line – meeting profit imperatives – became a dominant factor. Content decision was greatly 
influenced by financial muscle. This means that the interests of those among black people 
with economic upward mobility became preponderant. The poor, to whom the City Press had 
historically committed itself to, were no longer the determinant factor. Yet, in a post-apartheid 
era a conscious decision had to be made to accommodate them, or in the words of Tsedu, “to 
apply affirmative action” for them. 
 
There is another issue that came out during the interview with Nqayi (2009), which has 
relevance for a Political Economy analysis on the role of the media. Nqayi‟s observation that 
during his time there was lesser space dedicated to politics and more given for entertainment, 
is significant for Political Economy theory. Political Economy theorists hold the view that 
preoccupation with profit on the part of media owners tends to result in preference for 
entertainment at the expense of “serious political debate, and discussions of documentaries 
that dig deeply, inform, and challenge conventional opinion” (Herman & McChesney, 
1997:6). Consequently, the preoccupation with trivialisation and sensationalism take the sting 
out of journalism and undermines the very commitment to the watchdog role highly prized by 
Liberal-Pluralists. Nqayi‟s observation confirms this position from his personal experience 
during his time at the City Press. 
 
7.7.4 An Afrocentric Analysis 
While the City Press was committed to the Liberal-Pluralist role of the media of keeping the 
government in check, it was mindful of the particular context in which it operated, namely the 
post-apartheid context of 1994 to 2004, where former liberation movement fighters were 
occupying the seat of government. Former City Press editor, Vusi Mona, cognisant of the fact 
that the new government was constituted of people who had no experience in running a 
government, held a strong view that black journalists “had a responsibility” to help the 
government “to articulate its visions and programmes”. This support was so explicit for the 
Mbeki government to an extent where, according to Mona “some people said I was used as a 
pawn”. But one can say that this is not true, as the support was not a blank cheque. Where 
Mona disagreed with Mbeki‟s government in particular, he made his disagreement as explicit 
as his support.  
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Kalane (2009), Mona (2009) and Sibiya (2009) expressed the view that the present (the 
democratic dispensation) had hallmarks of the past, and as such black journalists in post-
apartheid South Africa had a responsibility to articulate black people‟s fears and plight. In 
Kalane‟s words, this meant that there was a continued need for black journalists to be in the 
forefront of “championing the black cause”. Not only were the effects of apartheid still felt 
among the general black populace but also among the black elites, particularly black 
journalists. Mona (2009) elucidates this point by noting that the historical marginalisation of 
black journalists resulted in white journalists continuing being in the lead in agenda-setting, 
and against this background, a sentiment existed that black journalism still needed to assert 
itself and balance the scales. 
 
In noting that in the new era black journalists had to ensure that the objectives of the struggle 
did not disappear, Tsedu (2008) was centering the Africans‟ struggle for self-determination – 
an affirmation of Afrocentricity. By declaring the City Press “Distinctly African”, Tsedu‟s 
move needs to be seen as giving substance to a journalistic project that is Afrocentric. It was 
informed by a clear commitment to defend African values and, in the words of Tsedu (2008), 
not to allow “practices like circumcision to be derided even if it is commercial for others to do 
so”. The “Distinctly African” concept was not just about the defence, but also the 
advancement of African interests. This, for Mamaila (2008), meant promoting Africans‟ self-
esteem by inculcating pride in things African in an African environment where Africans held 
European things in awe. 
 
While it may be an exaggeration to claim that the “Distinctly African” concept of the City 
Press was a government project that was driven by Mbeki‟s African Renaissance project, 
Mkhabela (2008) has a point in noting that the City Press in Tsedu‟s time embraced Mbeki‟s 
broader political appeal of being proudly African. Mkhabela is also correct to note that it was 
no coincidence that the City Press‟ billboards carried the faces of Tsedu along with those of 
Gertrude Mongella, the former Pan African Parliament‟s chairperson.  
 
According to Mona (2009), prior to Tsedu declaring the City Press “Distinctly African”, 
African cultural consciousness existed at an individual level. With Tsedu adopting a 
“Distinctly African” approach, African cultural consciousness was made official. Black 
journalists were officially being made to think about the implications of their journalism to 
the African continent and its people. Tsedu made possible what one of his predecessors, Len 
Kalane, said was impossible, when he noted that one “cannot uphold cultural and traditional 
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values in the house of a stranger”. The “stranger” referred to was the City Press‟ white owners 
(Kalane, 2009). 
 
African cultural consciousness was not taken for granted by the City Press‟ black journalists. 
There was a consciousness that culture could be misused by the powerful or the elderly, 
particularly among Africans. It is for this reason that Mkhabela (2008) cautions that care must 
be taken to avoid the tendency of saying that just because a person is an African, an individual 
should refrain from saying that if an “elderly person has done a wrong thing, because I am an 
African I must be respectful and not call him a criminal”. Mkhabela was adamant that 
“African culture does not conceal things”. The City Press‟ journalists did face this dilemma 
and experienced a conflict between what they understood African culture taught in relation to 
their journalism practice. That is why, when Mona (2009) was presented with a story alleging 
philandering on the part of Mbeki, his “immediate reaction” was that he would not run the 
story because the “African in me” said that Mbeki was like his father. 
 
The experience was the same for Nqayi (2009) when he had to deal with sex scandals 
involving “adult politicians”. He felt “awkward” about having to question them about such 
allegations because he is an “African child (who) came from a cultural background that 
emphasised respect for adults”. After writing a story that revealed that Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela slapped Nelson Mandela, Mogale (2009) was assailed by regrets. This difficulty 
experienced by City Press journalists was not unique to them. It was a dilemma faced by 
many African journalists in the African continent, as shown in the Literature Review Chapter. 
 
7.7.5 Summary: Interview Analysis 
In this section responses to the research questions were analysed against three theoretical 
frameworks: Liberal-Pluralism, Political Economy and Afrocentricity. The researcher argued 
that the City Press‟ black journalists indicated commitment to Liberal-Pluralism‟s role of the 
media such as keeping the government in check, educating readership and giving a platform 
to citizens to air their views. From a Political Economy perspective, it was pointed out that the 
white ownership of the City Press did not constrain the newspaper‟s journalists from carrying 
out their political reporting. From an Afrocentric perspective, it was pointed out that the City 
Press‟ journalists were aware of their African cultural values and their relationship with 
journalistic practice. They sought to project and to defend African values, but were vigilant 
against misuse and misinterpretation of African culture by the political elite to suit the latter‟s 
interests. 
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7.8 Summary: Chapter 7 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on the analysis of the City 
Press‟ editorials, the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns and opinion pieces; the second 
section focuses on the analysis of the City Press‟ black journalists responses to the research 
questions posed during interviews with them. In both cases the researcher employed three 
theoretical frameworks: Liberal-Pluralism, Political Economy and Afrocentricity. The 
political themes analysed were crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS.  
 
The next chapter, the last, will provide a conclusion. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The major focus of this study was to establish the political role that the City Press defined for 
its black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa, and the role played by African cultural 
values in the execution of their task with a particular focus on the period 1994 to 2004. 
Taking into consideration the historical role played by white ownership of black-oriented 
newspapers, this research also sought to investigate how white ownership of the City Press 
impacted on the newspapers‟ black journalists‟ execution of their tasks. The tasks refer to the 
newspaper‟s editorials, the City Press‟ individual black journalists‟ columns and the City 
Press‟ black journalists‟ opinion pieces. 
 
This study took a cue from Bennett (1982b:294) who observes that to speak of the political 
role of the media is not an abstract undertaking. Bennett argues that the task of studying the 
political role of the media can be executed only through a study of the role played by the 
media in concrete, historically determined political conjunctures. To study these, Bennett 
notes, it is necessary to deal not only with the media but the political issues at stake in those 
conjunctures.  Against this background three major political issues in South Africa during the 
research period were identified, namely crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and how the former South African president Thabo Mbeki handled the latter two 
issues. These issues were selected on the basis of being identified by political commentators 
(Calland, 2006:190 – 191; Sparks, 2003:85; Jacobs & Calland, 2002:2 – 4) as major political 
issues during the research period. 
 
Against this background, the City Press‟ editorials, the City Press‟ black journalists‟ columns 
and opinion pieces specifically dealing with crime, the Zimbabwean crisis and HIV/AIDS 
were studied. The data selected from the City Press was published after May 10, 1994 until 
December 31, 2004.  
 
8.2 Literature Review 
Since this study‟s focus was on the political role of the media in post-apartheid South Africa, 
the literature reviewed discussed the political role of the media in democracy. The literature 
reviewed was both generic and particular. It was generic in the sense that it covered the 
political role of the media in a general sense. It was also particular in that it specifically dealt 
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with these issues with particular reference to Africa, of which South Africa is an integral part. 
In the main, with specific reference to Africa, the argument in the literature review was that 
black journalists should play a role in establishing a clear link between African culture and 
politics.  
 
8.3 Theoretical Frameworks  
Three theoretical frameworks, namely Liberal-Pluralism, Political Economy and 
Afrocentricity, were employed to analyse how the City Press‟ black journalists lived up to or 
failed to play their media role according to these theories. The definitions of the theoretical 
frameworks were given.  
 
From the Liberal-Pluralist perspective, this study sought to establish the extent to which the 
City Press‟ black journalists played the role of informing its readership about political 
developments; guided public opinion about political decisions; the extent to which the City 
Press provided a platform for the expression of different views about political developments 
and decisions, and whether or not the City Press critically examined political developments 
and decisions. 
 
From the Political Economy perspectives this study sought to investigate this theory‟s 
assertions that the media‟s contents and meanings reflect the interests of those who finance 
the production of the media‟s contents. While Political Economy theorists deal with not just 
media ownership, but advertising as well, this study was limited to media ownership.   
 
From the Afrocentric perspectives this study sought to investigate the role, if any, African 
cultural values played in the City Press‟ black journalists‟ execution of their political tasks. 
 
8.4 Research Methodology 
This study largely used the qualitative research methodology, specifically using content 
analysis and basic individual interview techniques.  
Using the combination of content analysis together with interviews enabled this researcher to 
determine whether or not there was consistency between what the interviewees said during the 
interview and what they wrote. The finding of this research is that there was consistency. 
 
Next are the conclusions reached by the researcher in this study. 
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8.5 Conclusions on the positions of the City Press on the identified key political issues 
This section gives the researcher‟s conclusions on the positions taken by the City Press using 
the three theoretical frameworks mentioned above. The issues are crime, the Zimbabwean 
crisis and HIV/AIDS. This section is divided into two – editorial content and interviews. 
 
8.5.1 Editorial Content 
8.5.1. 1 Crime 
Beginning with crime, this study concludes that the City Press, from a Liberal-Pluralist 
theoretical framework, created space for different opinions to be expressed including those 
that contradicted the official position of the newspaper, also from within the newspaper‟s own 
ranks. From a Political Economy perspective, this study concludes that nothing in the analysis 
of the City Press revealed a biased position against the ANC, or an appeasement of whites to 
please white ownership. From an Afrocentric perspective this study concludes that the City 
Press published pieces that showed recognition of African cultural values such as 
ubuntu/botho, and the historical context of South Africa‟s history.  
 
8.5.1.2 The Zimbabwean Crisis 
On the issue of Zimbabwe, this study concludes that the City Press has fulfilled, through its 
editorial comments, the Liberal-Pluralist expectations on the role of the media by seeking to 
highlight different sides of the Zimbabwean story. The newspaper‟s presentation of a 
balanced story was not the same as taking a neutral position on this issue. The newspaper 
criticised what it perceived as being wrong. From a Political Economy perspective, this study 
concludes that nothing in the argument of the City Press‟ editorials and its individual 
journalists‟ writings suggested that their approach sought to appease the white owners of the 
newspaper. From an Afrocentric perspective, this study concludes that while the newspaper 
took cognisance of the historical context of the Zimbabwean crisis, the newspaper failed in 
engaging with African cultural nuances in the context of the Zimbabwean crisis. This is in 
reference to the land issue and the personal relationship between Mugabe and Mbeki.  
 
8.5.1.3 HIV/AIDS 
On the issue of HIV/AIDS, this study concludes that the City Press fulfilled the Liberal-
Pluralist role of the media by criticising the lack of transparency surrounding Mbongeni 
Ngema‟s musical, Sarafina II. Using the Political Economy‟s theory on the role of the media 
to analyse Mandela‟s claim that the Ngema saga was reported in a prejudiced manner by the 
white-owned media, it is asserted that Mandela‟s claim, with specific reference to the  white-
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owned City Press did not apply. During Mbeki‟s presidency, the City Press gave space to 
contending views that even contradicted the City Press‟ official position on HIV/AIDS, thus 
fulfilling the Liberal-Pluralist role of the media. The City Press, from an Afrocentric 
perspective, failed to engage Mbeki‟s call for a uniquely African approach to the uniquely 
African AIDS challenge. 
 
8.6 Interviews 
On the interviews, this study concludes that the City Press‟ black journalists indicated 
commitment to Liberal-Pluralism‟s role of the media such as keeping the government in 
check, educating readership and giving a platform to citizens to air their views. From a 
Political Economy perspective, this study concludes that the white ownership of the City 
Press did not constrain the newspaper‟s journalists from carrying out their political reporting. 
From an Afrocentric perspective, it was pointed out that the City Press‟ journalists were 
aware of their African cultural values and their relationship with journalistic practice. They 
sought to project and to defend African values, but were vigilant against misuse and 
misinterpretation of African culture by the political elite to suit the latter‟s interests. 
 
8.7 Concluding arguments 
The focus of this research was to establish the political role that the City Press defined for its 
black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa, and the role played by African cultural values 
in the execution of their task with particular focus on the period 1994 to 2004. What this 
means is that this study sought to establish whether or not the City Press “consciously” 
committed itself to a particular political role, and whether or not in executing that consciously 
decided role, its black journalists were taking into consideration their cultural values, with 
particular reference to the concept of respect in the context of African culture. Further, taking 
into consideration the historical role played by white ownership of black-oriented newspapers, 
this research also sought to investigate how white ownership of the City Press impacted on 
the newspapers‟ black journalists‟ execution of their tasks. 
 
Next, the researcher presents concluding arguments on the City Press‟ conscious political 
role, African cultural consciousness, and the newspaper‟s political role in the context of the 
newspaper‟s white ownership. 
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8.7.1 Conscious political role 
On the basis of the interviews with the editors (Sibiya, 2009; Kalane, 2009; Mona, 2009; 
Tsedu, 2008; Mamaila, 2008) of the City Press during the research period, this study 
concludes that the City Press had a defined political role in post-apartheid South Africa. They 
all expressed the view that the political role of the City Press‟ black journalists was to 
continue the historical role of black journalism – championing the cause of the black people. 
In the belief that there was no substantial change in the material conditions of black people 
during the research period, the editors believed that the City Press newspaper should continue 
being the voice of the voiceless and fight for the realisation of the objectives of the anti-
apartheid struggle.  
 
It is against this background – commitment to furthering the objectives of the struggle – that 
in the 1999 elections the City Press (City Press Comment, 1999d:6) endorsed the ANC‟s 
election campaign for the second term. Not only did the City Press support the ANC, but 
declared its opposition to the then Democratic Party and the National Party, asserting that 
these parties 
 
“and all other white parties do not qualify as credible opposition parties. 
Voters must send a strong signal to these parties that unless they urgently 
transform themselves to represent the interests of all South Africans, they are 
destined for the scrap heap.” 
 
The above stance was taken during Sibiya‟s tenure. During Sibiya‟s tenure, in 1994 to be 
specific, the City Press, as recalled by Mamaila (2008), made it its duty to encourage its black 
journalists to make sure that the “democratic project” worked. When Mona took over as 
editor, he steered the City Press in a pro-ANC direction in the belief that the City Press had a 
duty to help the ANC government to articulate its visions and programmes. But this was not 
the same as practicing “embedded journalism”. 
 
Loyalty to the objectives of the anti-apartheid struggle and support for the ANC government 
was not synonymous with ignoring the wrongs of the ANC government. When the 
government showed discomfort with what the City Press saw as corruption, the City Press 
(City Press Comment, 1996e:16) told the ANC that it “must face up these challenges instead 
of blaming the press or burying their heads in the sand – hoping complaints against the 
government will go away”. The editorial comment further noted that the City Press was not 
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prepared to practise sunshine journalism by being “the government‟s praise singers” and 
keeping quiet when things were going wrong. The editorial comment further noted that the 
City Press believed that “the press must continue to be the public‟s watchdog”, adding that 
“[i]f our leaders are wallowing in the gravy train, these things must be reported without fear 
or favour”. 
 
When accusations emerged that the media in general and the City Press in particular had “a 
hidden agenda against blacks and of harbouring counter-revolutionary tendencies” because 
the newspaper published stories of corruption implicating black people, Mona (2000a:10) 
made it clear that a “wrong is a wrong irrespective of the colour of the perpetrator”. Thus, in 
Mona‟s view, “black journalists have no obligation or limitation as to how they portray black 
characters, especially when the latter are involved in nefarious activities”.  
 
While the newspaper was committed to supporting a black government, this support was 
critical in nature. It reserved its right to criticise a black government, not destructively, but 
constructively. It is against this background that the City Press in its criticism against 
parliamentarians‟ abuse of travel vouchers, argued that the parliamentarians‟ act was the kind 
of “stuff that feeds into the stereotype of Africans as people who can‟t say no to temptation”. 
This editorial‟s observation was consistent with the view expressed by Sibiya nine years 
earlier in his column. In his column, Sibiya dismissed the defensive argument on the part of 
those who protested against the exposed corruption in government circles by the media 
claiming that the apartheid government was also corrupt. For Sibiya while this claim was true, 
such “should not give the present government the same license to climb on this train”. 
Sibiya‟s comment was echoed later by Mamaila who noted that it was “irritating that when we 
condemn corruption we hear some voices within the government claiming that corruption was 
there before 1994”. According to Mamaila, “[t]o make such statements is to be morally 
unambitious”.  
 
Criticism on the part of the City Press was not intended to embarrass a black government but 
aimed at sensitising African rulers against participating in exercises that would contribute to 
the denigration of the African image. The City Press wanted the ANC-led government to be 
better than its apartheid predecessor. The newspaper wanted the government to be one that the 
electorate would be proud of, not because it was headed by a black man, but because it was 
doing something that the electorate would be proud of. That is why the City Press wondered 
aloud why “under a democratic dispensation criminals could get away with murder when they 
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could not under a totalitarian regime”. This was a clear and direct warning to the ANC-led 
government against complacency. The City Press was not prepared to allow the ANC-led 
government to take the people who put the ANC in power for granted. Hence the newspaper 
pointed out to the ANC, that, come the 1999 elections, the people would ask the ANC why 
they should return to power an organisation that exposed them to criminal elements. 
 
When the City Press defended Mbeki‟s right to participate in the debate about HIV/AIDS 
against those who argued that he should refrain on the basis that he had no medical training, 
the newspaper argued that such claims were as unfair as they were unhelpful in dealing with a 
scourge “which is annihilating Africa”. This, in this researcher‟s view, was an indication of 
African consciousness on the part of the City Press. It was an indication that it was sensitive 
to issues that had a major impact on Africa. The employment of the word “annihilating” was 
an indication that HIV/AIDS posed a major risk to Africans‟ lives, and as such believed that 
everyone, including Mbeki, should be afforded space to deal with a scourge threatening the 
survival of the African continent. 
 
The hostile reaction of the ANC to media criticism, and their expectation that black journalists 
should continue acting as “comrades” in post-apartheid South Africa, as was the case during 
the anti-apartheid struggle days, is not a uniquely South African phenomenon. Megwa notes 
that this “syndrome of „Journalists-as-comrades‟ has for a long time pervaded African 
governments‟ perception of the role of the media in society”. Yet, while African governments 
expected black journalists to be “comradely”, the former were not. This was pointed out by 
Seepe who noted that concerns had been expressed by black journalists in the 1990s that 
“government bureaucrats and ministers are generally more obsessed with what appears in 
white run [sic] newspapers than they are with what is printed in black publications”. Seepe‟s 
concern was echoed by Sibiya who noted that the ANC-led government in the first five years 
of its rule called upon black journalists when “chips are down, or to clean up the mess”, 
expecting “black publications to write follow-ups of stories that first appeared in the white 
media”. 
 
This experience narrated by black journalists was not uniquely South African. Nyamnjoh 
(2005b:36) seems to suggest that this is the status of African journalism: 
 
“Some African governments would rather trust non-African foreign 
journalists and media with information about decisions concerning the 
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states over which they preside, and often at great cost, than honour their 
own local media with scoops.” 
 
This attitude on the part of African governments, Nyamnjoh further argues, “naturally implies 
that, in their opinion, local journalism is second rate”. On the other hand, Nyamnjoh 
(2005b:36) further points out, “foreign journalists penetrate African corridors of power much 
more easily than African journalists, regardless of qualifications and competencies”: 
 
“Little wonder, therefore, that a strange disease known as xenophilia is 
said to afflict Africans, who are often so negative about themselves that 
they would rather value things foreign and Western, „not for their 
efficacy but simply because of their foreignness‟.” 
 
The act of declaring the City Press “Distinctly African” was a clear act of defining the 
political role of the City Press. In the words of Tsedu (2004b:1) the “Distinctly African” 
declaration was a “commitment to reflect the reality of our lives as Africans” which meant 
“being in the forefront of calling to attention problematic areas, and castigating leaders that 
oppress their people”. The “Distinctly African” approach did not just have a political 
dimension, but a cultural dimension as well. It was informed by indigenous African values in 
contact with other values. The “Distinctly African” concept “meant not allowing practices like 
circumcision to be derided even if it is commercial for others to do so” (Tsedu, 2008). What 
this suggests, in the context of this study, is that the City Press‟ black journalists defined a 
political role for themselves and were also conscious of and committed to African cultural 
values. 
 
The “Distinctly African” approach needs to be seen against a perception by Africans that the 
Western media vilify African culture and valorise Westernisation. On this score, Hawk 
(2002:167) observes that when analysing political conflicts in Africa, the Western media 
identifies them as a “tribal problem” and that “the news blames those who suffer and locates 
the source of Africa‟s difficulties within African culture, often ignoring the roles of others, 
especially foreign actors”. Hawk (2002:168) further argues that a major problem with this 
form of thinking is that “identifying tribalism as a problem emphasizes the negative aspects of 
cultural pride, representing it as the most important social pathology in Africa whilst 
concealing the benefits of tribe”. The consequence of this approach on the part of the Western 
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media, Hawk (2002:172) further argues, is that “these portrayals often define African culture 
as the problem and western institutions as the solution”. 
 
Focusing on tribalism as the problem, according to Hawk (2008:168), tends to mute other 
conflicts of interest between groups, and serves as a distraction from covert causes of many 
African conflicts. Thus, Hawk further notes 
 
“class conflicts become tribalism; regional conflicts become tribalism; 
responses to structural adjustment programs become tribalism”. 
 
This concern is echoed by wa Thiong‟o (2008:1) who notes that the “study of African realities 
has for too long been seen in terms of tribes. Whatever happens in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi is 
because of Tribe A versus Tribe B.” Wa Thiong‟o further notes that this “misleading stock 
interpretation of the African realities has been popularised by the western media which likes 
to deflect people from seeing that imperialism is still the root cause of many problems in 
Africa”. He (wa Thiong‟o, 2008:1) laments that “some African intellectuals have fallen 
victims – a few incurably so – to that scheme”. Tsedu‟s “Distinctly African” approach should 
be seen as a refusal to fall into the trap identified by wa Thiong‟o. It is a stance informed by 
African Cultural Consciousness. 
 
8.7.2 African Cultural Consciousness 
The tensions experienced by the City Press‟ journalists like Mona (2009), Mogale (2009) and 
Nqayi (2009) when they were confronted with stories that projected elderly African 
politicians in a negative light were an indication of African cultural consciousness in the 
context of journalism practice. The same is the case when the City Press‟ black journalists 
like Mkhabela (2008) and Sibanda (2008) insisted that respect in African culture does not 
mean that when the elderly involve themselves in corrupt services these should be ignored by 
young African journalists. Tsedu (2008) emphasised as much when he stated that respect in 
African culture “does not mean that someone younger or junior accepts everything and 
anything that someone older or senior says or does”.  This study concludes that Tsedu‟s 
declaration of the City Press‟ “Distinctly African” motto is an indication that contrary to 
Kalane‟s assertion that African cultural values cannot be upheld in a white-owned media 
company, this is possible. African culture became an official approach in a white-owned 
newspaper. This leads to another key issue in this study – the City Press‟ black journalists‟ 
political role in the context of the City Press‟ white ownership. 
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8.7.3 The City Press’ black journalists’ role in the context of the newspaper’s white 
ownership 
On the basis of the content analysis and interviews with the City Press‟ black journalists, this 
study concludes that the white ownership of the City Press did not impact on the editorial 
trajectory of the newspaper. As already indicated, in the 1999 national elections the City Press 
endorsed the ANC while opposing the then Democratic Party and National Party whose 
membership was predominantly white.  
 
In saying that the white ownership of the City Press did not dictate the political direction of 
the City Press‟ black journalists, is not the same as saying that the assertion of Political 
Economy theorists on the relationship between media ownership and journalism practice is 
invalid. To the contrary, its validity was recognised by the City Press‟ black journalists from 
the moment Naspers acquired the City Press newspaper.  As pointed out in Chapter 2 of this 
study, from the time that Naspers bought the newspaper from Jim Bailey, the City Press‟ 
black journalists feared that the historically pro-National Party government could seek to 
frustrate the anti-apartheid black journalists (Vosloo, 2003:2; Vosloo, 1997:3; Selwyn-Smith, 
1997:6). In a move to pre-empt a potential frustration of their commitment to the anti-
apartheid struggle using the media as a weapon, the City Press‟ black journalists sought and 
secured a charter guaranteeing editorial independence (Qoboza, 1992:2). 
 
Sibiya believes that the charter played a great role in keeping Naspers from interfering 
“because they knew that black journalists would walk away”. He also notes that the Afrikaner 
owners were “sensitive to the fact that we saw them as oppressors”. As a result, according to 
Sibiya, “they did not want to rock the boat”, considering also that black journalists at the City 
Press had “made it known to them [Naspers] we would monitor the situation to ensure that 
there was no interference”.   
 
8.8 Summary: Conclusions 
In this chapter the researcher presented concluding remarks on the political role of the City 
Press‟ black journalists in post-apartheid South Africa. The newspaper‟s black journalists‟ 
execution of their political role was examined in the context of African culture and the 
newspaper‟s white ownership. Three theoretical frameworks, namely Liberal-Pluralism, 
Political Economy and Afrocentricity, on the role of the media, were employed. This study 
concluded that from a Liberal-Pluralist theory, the City Press fulfilled its mandate of giving a 
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platform to contending views and critically examining the political developments in post-
apartheid South Africa. From a Political Economy perspective, this study concluded that the 
City Press‟ black journalists‟ role was not influenced by white ownership but acted 
independently. However, this study also stated that the City Press‟ black journalists 
recognised Political Economy‟s assertion of the influence of media ownership on the role of 
the media. It was for this reason that when Naspers bought the City Press, the newspaper‟s 
black journalists sought the drawing up of a charter that guaranteed their editorial 
independence from Naspers. From an Afrocentric perspective this study concluded that the 
City Press‟ black journalists were conscious of African cultural issues and grappled with how 
to balance these values with the demands of journalism. 
 
This study used content analysis and interviews to establish the understanding of the 
“meaning” of black journalism to the City Press‟ black journalists in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The results yielded by these research methods revealed that while there was 
appreciation of African cultural values such as ubuntu/botho, some black journalists 
experienced tensions while grappling with African cultural values, with particular reference to 
the concept of “respect” in African culture within the context of journalism practice. The 
tensions articulated by the City Press‟ black journalists were issues that emerged in this 
study‟s literature review. 
 
8.9 Recommendations for Future Study 
8.9.1 Increased Study Period 
While this study looked at the period 1994 to 2004, it would be interesting to study the City 
Press‟ black journalists‟ political role in the period 2004 to 2009. That is so because it would 
enable a researcher to get a better picture of what it meant for the City Press to be a 
“Distinctly African” newspaper within the context of its political role. The years between 
2004 and 2009 would mark five years since the City Press became “Distinctly African”. The 
end of this study period – 2004 – was the year in which the City Press became “Distinctly 
African”. 
 
8.9.2 Recommendations for Journalism education 
The post-apartheid dispensation has seen political leaders in South Africa using culture to 
explain among other things, their sexual behaviour questioned by sections of the South 
African society (Sesanti, 2005:365; Sesanti, 2009a:209). These developments caught both 
black and white journalists unawares because of their ignorance of African culture (Sesanti, 
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2005:372). This researcher recommends that more research should be done on African culture 
in the context of journalism so that future generations of journalism students may be informed 
about undistorted versions of African culture. If knowledgeable, they will be able to challenge 
politicians who may attempt to manipulate them. As has been argued by this researcher 
(2009b:125) previously, journalists educated about diverse cultures will not just be able to 
challenge manipulative politicians, but are more likely to link and create a common 
understanding among culturally diverse communities than journalists who are ignorant of 
others‟ cultural norms. 
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Addendum A: Interview Questions 
How did the concept of “black journalism” evolve from a colonial and apartheid South 
Africa into post-apartheid democratic dispensation? 
 
What was the political role that the City Press defined for its black journalists in the 
period 1994 to 2004? 
 
Did the ownership of the City Press by a white company impact on the political role of 
the City Press’ black journalists in the period 1994 to 2004? 
 
What role did African cultural values play in the City Press’ political black journalists’ 
approach to their work in the period 1994 to 2004? 
 
How have African and Western cultural differences impacted upon the mandate of the 
City Press’ political black journalists? 
 
How do African cultural values link to the City Press’ concept of “Distinctly African”? 
 
Nationally and internationally, the media have generally criticised President Thabo 
Mbeki’s handling of HIV/AIDS and have labelled him an AIDS Denialist. What has 
been the City Press’ position on this issue? 
 
On the issue of Zimbabwe’s crisis, the media, nationally and internationally, have 
condemned what they have termed Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”. What has been the City 
Press’s position on this issue? 
  
 
 
University of Stellenbosch  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
